Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Studies in Jewish Civilization
Fall 10-15-2018

Is Judaism Democratic?: Reflections from Theory and Practice
Throughout the Ages
Leonard Greenspoon
Creighton University, ljgrn@creighton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/sjc
Part of the Jewish Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Greenspoon, Leonard, "Is Judaism Democratic?: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the
Ages" (2018). Studies in Jewish Civilization. 9.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/sjc/9

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

Is Judaism Democratic?
Reflections from Theory and
Practice Throughout the Ages

Studies in Jewish Civilization
Volume 29
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual
Symposium of the Klutznick Chair
in Jewish Civilization,
the Harris Center for Judaic Studies,
and the Schwalb Center
for Israel and Jewish Studies

October 30–31, 2016

Other volumes in the
Studies in Jewish Civilization Series
Distributed by the Purdue University Press
2010 – Rites of Passage:
How Today’s Jews Celebrate, Commemorate, and Commiserate
2011 – Jews and Humor
2012 – Jews in the Gym:
Judaism, Sports, and Athletics
2013 – Fashioning Jews:
Clothing, Culture, and Commerce
2014 – Who Is a Jew?
Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
2015 – Wealth and Poverty in Jewish Tradition
2016 – Mishpachah:
The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition
2017 – olam ha-zeh v’olam ha-ba:
This World and the World to Come in Jewish Belief and Practice

Is Judaism Democratic?
Reflections from Theory and
Practice Throughout the Ages

Studies in Jewish Civilization
Volume 29
Editor:
Leonard J. Greenspoon

The Klutznick Chair in Jewish Civilization

Purdue University Press
West Lafayette, Indiana

Copyright © 2018 by Creighton University
Published by Purdue University Press
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Greenspoon, Leonard J. (Leonard Jay), editor.
Title: Is Judaism democratic? : reflections from theory and practice throughout
the ages / edited by Leonard J. Greenspoon.
Description: West Lafayette, Indiana : Purdue University Press, [2018] |
Series: Studies in Jewish civilization | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018031602 | ISBN 9781557538338 (pbk. : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9781612495538 (epub) | ISBN 9781612495545 (epdf )
Subjects: LCSH: Jews—Politics and government. | Democracy.
Classification: LCC BM538.S7 I82 2018 | DDC 296.3/82—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018031602
Cover image: vividvic/iStock/ThinkStock
No part of Studies in Jewish Civilization (ISSN 1070-8510) volume 29 may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  vii
Editor’s Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Goalkeeping: A Biblical Alternative to Greek Political Philosophy
and the Limits of Liberal Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
Joshua I. Weinstein
The “Will of the People” in Antimonarchic Biblical Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
Baruch Alster
The Democratic Principle Underlying Jewish Law: Moving Beyond
Whether It Is So to How and Why It Is So . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
David Brodsky
Mipnei Darkhei Shalom: The Promotion of Harmonious Relationships
in the Mishnah’s Social Order  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
Simcha Fishbane
Theocracy as Monarchy and Anarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Samuel Hayim Brody
Jewish Democracy: From Medieval Community to Modern State . . . . . . . . . . .  105
Joseph Isaac Lifshitz
Linking “Egypt with Texas”: Emma Lazarus’s Jewish Vision
of American Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  117
David J. Peterson and Joan Latchaw
Judaism and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Lenn E. Goodman
Monarchy and Polity: Systems of Government in Jewish Tradition  . . . . . . . . . .  171
Lawrence H. Schiffman
Democracy, Judaism, Israel, Art, and Demagoguery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  185
Ori Z. Soltes

vi

Table of Contents

Dignity and Democracy: Defending the Principle of the Sanctity
of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  197
Alan Mittleman
“The Will of the People” or “The Will of the Rabbis”:
Democracy and the Rabbis’ Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  219
Shlomo Abramovich
The Jewish State and the End of Democratic Judaism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  231
Meirav Jones

Acknowledgments
The 29th Annual Symposium on Jewish Civilization took place on Sunday,
October 30, and Monday, October 31, 2016, in Omaha, Nebraska. The title
of the symposium, from which this volume also takes its name, is “Is Judaism
Democratic? Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages.” All
of the papers collected here, with the exception of the study by Alan Mittleman, were delivered at the symposium itself.
The academic sponsors of this symposium represent three major educational institutions in Nebraska: Creighton University (the Klutznick Chair in
Jewish Civilization, the Kripke Center for the Study of Religion and Society),
the University of Nebraska–Lincoln (the Harris Center for Judaic Studies),
and the University of Nebraska at Omaha (the Schwalb Center for Israel and
Jewish Studies).
In large measure, the symposium owes its success to two groups of dedicated and talented individuals. First are my academic colleagues: Dr. Ronald
Simkins (Creighton), Dr. Jean Cahan (UNL), and Drs. Moshe Gershovitz and
Curtis Hutt (UNO). Their generosity, individually and collectively, has been
exemplary.
The second group consists of administrative assistants, the individuals
who really know how to get things done. In this context, I offer sincere expressions of gratitude to Colleen Hastings, who works with the Klutznick Chair
and Kripke Center at Creighton; Kasey Davis, of the Schwalb Center at UNO;
and Mary Sue Grossman, who is associated with the Center for Jewish Life, part
of the Jewish Federation of Omaha.
As many readers of this volume know well, the road from oral presentation to written publication is filled with obstacles. Our path has been inestimably smoothed over through our relationship with the Purdue University
Press. For almost a decade, we have enjoyed the professional and personable
staff of the press, under the previous directors Charles Watkinson and Peter
Froehlich, and now under co-interim directors Katherine Purple and Bryan
Shaffer. They have made us feel comfortable in every way, and we look forward
to many more years of association with them.
In addition to the academic and communal organizations mentioned
above, this symposium is also generously supported by:
The Ike and Roz Friedman Foundation
The Riekes Family
vii

viii

Acknowledgments

Creighton University Lectures, Films, and Concerts
The Creighton College of Arts and Sciences
The Henry Monsky Lodge of B’nai B’rith
The Drs. Bernard H. and Bruce S. Bloom Memorial Endowment
And others
Leonard J. Greenspoon
Omaha, Nebraska
March 2018
ljgrn@creighton.edu

Editor’s Introduction
Over the course of several millennia, humans have devised a considerable
number and variety of ways to govern themselves. This is apparent from even
a partial listing of forms of government (here in alphabetical order): anarchy,
aristocracy, autocracy, democracy, meritocracy, monarchy, nomocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy, technocracy, and theocracy. Although the forms themselves
derive from different time periods and social conditions, their names are
almost always Greek: the ending “-cracy” from the Greek verb meaning “to
gain or have control over” and “-archy” from the root “to be ruler over.”
For many, especially in the West, democracy (however defined at its
contours) has held a special place for philosophers and practitioners alike. The
essays in this volume explore democracy within Judaism, from its beginnings
(the Hebrew Bible) until today (especially, as the concept is being played out
in the State of Israel). As with democracy in general, so it is in Judaism: questions arise at both theoretical (or theological) and practical levels.
For me, as volume editor and as its first reader, the essays collected here
hold many surprises. For example, I had not previously detected the intimations of democracy in certain biblical texts. Nor had I fully appreciated the
multilayered interrelations between the classical rabbis and the practice of
democracy.
At the same time, I found reinforcement for my understanding that the
current turmoil over the “Jewish” versus the “democratic” nature of the State
of Israel was only a part, albeit a vital part, of a long-standing and vigorously
argued debate among Jewish thinkers and politicians. And I was also encouraged to discover that many of the foundational ideas and ideals of the United
States and other modern governments do indeed draw their distinctive features
from the Jewish tradition.
As always in our volumes, we are nonpartisan. This is not to say, however,
that our authors lack passion or precision. Every scholar in this volume demonstrates how much they care about their respective topics by their concern for
accuracy and their recognition of relevancy in the presentation and evaluation
of material.
The first two chapters place considerable emphasis on the Hebrew Bible:
Joshua I. Weinstein, Herzl Institute, Jerusalem, “A Biblical Alternative to
Greek Political Philosophy and the Limits of Liberal Democracy”; and Baruch
Alster, Givat Washington College, Israel, “The ‘Will of the People’ in Antimonarchic Biblical Texts.”
ix

x
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In Weinstein’s analysis, which is chapter 1, classical Jewish sources from
the Hebrew Bible forward highlight three central aims of the Jewish ideal:
leaving “the house of bondage,” inheriting a land of “milk and honey,” and
maintaining a covenant of divine intimacy. In this context, no system of governance can be viewed as successful if it loses its sense of dependence on the
divine as established in Deuteronomy 8:11–18.
For Alster in chapter 2, the key biblical passage is Deuteronomy 17,
which is critical of the excesses of any human king and demonstrates trust in
the people to uphold the covenant with God. In his view, this is in keeping
with a major theme of the book of Deuteronomy, which sees the public as
responsible for its leadership.
David Brodsky, Brooklyn College, and Simcha Fishbane, Touro College
and University System, take the opportunity to analyze classical rabbinic texts.
Chapter 3 constitutes Brodsky’s presentation, which is titled “The Democratic
Principle Underlying Jewish Law: Moving Beyond Whether It Is So to How
and Why It Is So.” Here he establishes that the Mishnah lays out the principle
that Jewish law is governed by the rules of democracy: when disputes arise, the
majority rules. But, Brodsky continues, democracy is not the ultimate goal,
but serves to promote other ends that he has discerned.
Fishbane’s paper is chapter 4: “Mipnei Darkhei Shalom: The Promotion
of Harmonious Relationships in the Mishnah’s Social Order.” For Fishbane,
Judaism is not a democratic religion per se, but it does include many aspects
that advocate democratic traditions, such as the principle of mipnei darkei
shalom. The application of this principle creates an environment of peaceful
and mutual respect between all people.
Another two essays feature the works of some of the most distinguished
modern Jewish philosophers: Samuel Hayim Brody, University of Kansas,
“Theocracy as Monarchy and Anarchy”; and Joseph Isaac Lifshitz, Shalem
College, Jerusalem, “Jewish Democracy: From Medieval Community to Modern State.”
In chapter 5, Brody points to Martin Buber as a religious Zionist who
sought out the roots for radical political novelties in traditional Jewish texts
like the Hebrew Bible. Buber focused on the premonarchic era of Israel, during which God ruled Israel directly. But, as Brody demonstrates, the resultant
system resembled something close to anarchy—and this represented the original “constitution” of Judaism.
Lifshitz begins chapter 6 by looking back at the medieval political concept of the Jews, which differs considerably from the modern democratic social
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contract. Within this framework, he presents the political theory of modern
Jewish philosophers like Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas as a possibility
for modern Jewish democracy.
The American Jewish experience is at the center of the next two chapters.
The first of these is chapter 7, titled “Linking ‘Egypt with Texas’: Emma Lazarus’s Jewish Vision of American Democracy,” by Joan Latchaw and David J.
Peterson, both professors at UNO. As Latchaw and Peterson point out,
Lazarus’s “The New Colossus” continues to beckon millions to the shores of
America. At the same time, the bulk of her poetry has been largely forgotten.
By closely examining some of this poetry, they show how Lazarus portrays
America and American democracy as enabling Jews to flourish: democratic
America offers both refuge and homeland.
Lenn E. Goodman, Vanderbilt University, was keynoter for the symposium. He provides a significant analysis of “Judaism and Democracy” in
chapter 8. He concludes that many of the key elements of the democratic
ideal are rooted in the biblical text and rabbinic tradition. Among these are
consent of the governed, the presumption of innocence, the exclusion of selfincrimination from court proceedings, and a commitment to the sanctity of
life and the inestimable preciousness of the unique human individual.
The three chapters that follow, Lawrence H. Schiffman, New York University, Ori Z. Soltes, Georgetown University, and Alan Mittleman, Jewish
Theological Seminary, offer broad views encompassing many different time
periods and approaches. Schiffman’s presentation, chapter 9, is “Monarchy
and Polity: Systems of Government in Jewish Tradition.” In this essay, Schiffman brings forth a number of texts that offer parallel lines of debate concerning the political organization of the Jewish people. Both texts and practical
experience come together to guarantee that by modern times democracy
would be assumed by the Jewish community to be the ideal system and model.
Chapter 10 contains analysis by Ori Z. Soltes, titled “Democracy, Judaism, Israel, Art, and Demagoguery.” To the presentations by other presenters,
Soltes adds considerations of art. As he illustrates, art has affirmed and challenged, defined and dissented from Israel’s political-spiritual self-conception:
it has offered a consummate expression of democratic principles.
The study by Alan Mittleman, titled “Dignity and Democracy: Defending the Principle of the Sanctity of Human Life,” constitutes chapter 11.
Throughout his essay he offers a robust defense of dignity. He concludes with
this observation: if dignity is fundamental to a decent democracy, biblical
conviction about indefeasible human value may well be necessary. In fact,
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Mittleman asserts, without the continuing cultural power of “Jerusalem,” the
claims of reason might ring hollow.
No symposium on Judaism and democracy would be complete without
some reference to the modern State of Israel. For the authors of the last two
chapters, the State of Israel is central:
Chapter 12, titled “‘The Will of the People’ or ‘The Will of the
Rabbis’—Democracy and the Rabbis’ Authority,” is by Shlomo Abramovich
(Bar Ilan University and visiting scholar, Beth Israel Synagogue, Omaha). In it,
he looks with special interest at Orthodox communities of the twentieth century, where rabbis have very wide authority and their followers obey their decisions absolutely. He then explores differing explanations and diverse motives
for such absolute obedience to the rabbis. As a result, Abramovich observes
that a community led through obedience to rabbis should not necessarily be
considered nondemocratic.
In her paper (chapter 13), “The Jewish State and the End of Democratic
Judaism,” Meirav Jones (University of Pennsylvania) acknowledges that different democratic forms have characterized Judaism in Eastern and Western
Europe from medieval to modern times. She then contends that the presence
of a Jewish state—even a democratic Jewish state—has changed the nature
of Jewish life since 1948 such that Judaism is no longer in the hands of its
constituents.
Leonard J. Greenspoon

Contributors
Shlomo Abramovich

Beth Israel Synagogue
12604 Pacific Street
Omaha, NE 68154
shlomo23@gmail.com

Baruch Alster

Hatamar 96a
44865 Zufim
ISRAEL
alsterb@gmail.com

David Brodsky

Judaic Studies
Brooklyn College
3111 James Hall
Brooklyn, NY 11210
davidmbrodsky@gmail.com

Samuel Hayim Brody

Department of Religious Studies
University of Kansas
105 Smith Hall
1300 Oread Avenue
Lawrence, KS 66045-7615
samuelbrody@ku.edu

Simcha Fishbane

70-44 137 St.
Flushing, New York 11367
Simcha.Fishbane@touro.edu

Lenn E. Goodman

Philosophy and Jewish Studies
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37240
lenn.e.goodman@Vanderbilt.Edu

Meirav Jones

Department of Political Science
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mount Scopus
Jerusalem 9190501
ISRAEL
meiravjo@gmail.com
xiii

xiv

Contributors

Joan Latchaw

Department of English
ASH 192
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Omaha, NE 68182
jlatchaw@unomaha.edu

Joseph Isaac Lifshitz

Gdud Hermesh 13/7
Jerusalem 9754513
ISRAEL
Isaacl@shalem.ac.il

Alan Mittleman

Jewish Theological Seminary
3080 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
almittleman@jtsa.edu

David J. Peterson

Department of English
ASH 192
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Omaha, NE 68182
davidpeterso1@unomaha.edu

Lawrence H. Schiffman
Skirball Department of Hebrew and
	  Judaic Studies
New York University
51 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012
lawrence.schiffman@nyu.edu
Ori Z. Soltes

5114 Westridge RD
Bethesda, MD 20816
orisoltes@gmail.com

Joshua I. Weinstein

Katriel Tchorsh Street 4/2
Jerusalem, ISRAEL
josh.i.weinstein@gmail.com

Goalkeeping: A Biblical Alternative
to Greek Political Philosophy and
the Limits of Liberal Democracy
Joshua I. Weinstein
Since the State of Israel defines itself, for certain purposes, as both Jewish and
democratic, presumably these elements, while not the same, nevertheless can
combine in a useful or even complementary fashion. Democracy, whatever else
one might say about it, must be termed a form of government and, like all
such forms, promotes some aims and purposes more effectively than others.
From a Jewish perspective, then, the question must arise what contributions
democracy—or, practically speaking, liberal democracy—can make to key
Jewish goals. But what are these goals? Fukuyama’s influential analysis suggests
that the mutuality of egalitarian democracy, combined with the economic
productivity of liberal capitalism, makes liberal democracy the optimal solution to the political problem and hence the “end of History.”1 Since freedom
from slavery or domination and material prosperity express central goals of the
Torah, liberal democracy can fill an important role in Judaism. But Judaism
also seeks other aims, so that liberal democracy should serve it, rather than
as some ultimate endpoint or man-made solution, instead as a platform or
springboard for approaching the divine.
The concept of democracy, as the name suggests, emerges from the
Greek logic of regime analysis. Experience of a variety of polities—multiethnic empires, traditional kingships, new tyrannies, revolutionary egalitarianisms—raised for the Greeks an interlocking set of questions that focus on the
politeia or form of government. First, can one systematically outline all the
basic forms? Rule by one, by the few, by the many? By the rich or by the poor?
Under law or not? Virtuous or corrupt? To this day, most of the names in use
to describe forms of government come from classical Greece: oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, tyranny, anarchy. Second, can one articulate rules of political
causality or change from one form to another, such as the tendency of a corrupt oligarchy to be overthrown by a public-spirited popular movement? Does
rule by any one person tend to deteriorate into corrupt tyranny? Does the
instability of all forms lead, ultimately, to a cycle of regimes? Third, and most
characteristically, which regime form is the best? Rule by the philosopher-
kings of Plato’s Republic? Obeying the laws set down by a wise lawgiver? Or
1
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is Polybius correct to judge the mixed regime—which includes elements of
rule by one, by the few, and by the many and that he attributes to Republican
Rome—the most stable, and hence the best? The living relevance of this last
emerges most clearly from the US Constitution, which not only provides for
a president (one), a small Senate (few), and a large House of Representatives
(many), but also explicitly guarantees to each of the several states a “Republican Form of Government” (IV.4).2 While the term democracy has received
many different meanings, none of them is coherent outside this essentially
Greek logic of regime analysis.
The foundational texts of Judaism display no interest in this Greek politeia discourse. Biblical texts, of course, display awareness of the various ways
rulers exercise their authority; compare, for example, the decision-making process of Pharaoh as depicted in the first part of Exodus with that of Ahashverosh
depicted in the scroll of Esther. But no biblical text itself makes a comparison
of this kind nor seeks any more systematic taxonomy. In the absence of the
Greek logic, language alone does not decide when a biblical melekh qualifies as
a monarch—as opposed to, say, an elected but dominant figure like Pericles.
With no taxonomy, there can be no investigation of causal interconnections
and no concern for identifying the best form of government. This same
systematic lack is just as evident—though raising more complex historical
questions—in the corpus of rabbinic texts of Mishnah, Talmud, and midrash.
Many Greek loanwords stud rabbinic language, but there is no sign of the
vocabulary—and, more important, the logic—of politeia analysis.3 Indeed,
without imagining a “pure” or “uninfluenced” Judaism pristinely divorced
from historical context, the generalization still holds that Jewish authors do
not engage with the themes and logic of Greek political philosophy, in the
first instance, as Hebrew speakers.4 Since this Greek tradition forms the core
of Western political thought in general, there is, in a strict sense, no comparable native Jewish tradition—as indeed the lack of a native Hebrew term for
“politics” suggests.5
The significance of this negative conclusion can hardly be overstated.
If Aristotle is right that man is “a political animal by nature,” then this must
include the Jews as well.6 Jewish thinkers show no shortage of interest in
struggles for power and rulership—one need only think of the authors of
Judges and Kings. But this does not by any means entail that thinking in the
Greek terms of political analysis comes to humans “by nature.” To the contrary. Consequently, when scholars apply to Jewish texts and thinkers terms
that grow (ultimately) out of the Greek political tradition—such as “elected
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representatives,” “checks and balances,” “equal rights,” “separation of powers,”
and of course “democracy”—this must be understood as importing concepts
that do not spring from the intellectual tradition of the works in question.7
There is nothing illegitimate in this practice—despite the risk of mistakenly
imputing one’s own conceptual framework to the object of one’s studies—
but it does have the unfortunate tendency to obscure the Jewish terms and
approach to collective matters of rule and authority. These latter cannot, at
the risk of begging the question, even be termed “political matters.” But once
the Greek tradition becomes clearly identified, it can then be set aside and
methodologically suspended so that the Hebrew texts have the opportunity to
speak in their own terms and voice—without a Greek accent, as it were.
While the logic of politeia analysis neither engages nor appeals to Jewish thought overall, the logic of collective goals—what rule and authority
should aim to accomplish—very much does. Whether the goal in question is
the conquest of the Land of Israel, the purification of Temple worship, or the
establishment of peace among peoples, many biblical characters and prophets
exhort their audiences (and readers) toward large-scale collective actions. The
rabbinic corpus similarly overflows with communal purposes and aims: from
rescuing the aggrieved and supporting the poor, through providing public
infrastructure and regulating the market, all the way to uprooting idolatry
and pursuing the “paths of peace.” A particularly telling talmudic passage takes
up the issue of whether and how one can sort out or in any way simplify this
welter of imperatives.8 If the central questions of the Greek tradition are “Who
should rule and how?” the Jewish thinkers focus primarily on “What is the
aim to be accomplished? For what purpose should rule be exercised?” In this
context, the distinction between the Greek and Jewish traditions can perhaps
best be termed a difference of logic.9
If this is an appropriate characterization of the logic of Jewish thinking
about rule and community, then the emphasis in analysis should be to determine what Judaism has to say about goals. Quite a bit, it turns out. In the first
instance, three goals stand out with particular salience. First, Egypt serves as
a negative pole, the “iron furnace” and “house of bondage” that must be left
behind before any other purpose can hope for realization. Physical removal,
however, does not, unto itself, suffice. The people of Israel are exhorted to
leave also the ways of Egypt, lest they merely reproduce a “house of bondage”
in a new location.10 In a summary slogan, the goal is freedom from oppression. Second, as the Israelites are quick to point out, liberation without food
is simply starvation. They are therefore offered not only water, manna, and
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quail, but eventually also land, bread, well-being of every kind, the opportunity to sit each “under his vine and under his fig tree.” In a slogan, prosperity.
The conjunction of these two goals forms precisely the divine plan or promise
as laid out to Moses at the Burning Bush: “I will descend to save them from
the hands of Egypt and to raise them from that land to a wide, good land,
a land that oozes milk and honey” (Exod 3:8). This pair similarly structures
the threats of suffering and retribution should Israel fail in its devotion to the
covenant: “You will serve your enemies that God your Lord will send against
you thirsty, hungry, naked and utterly lacking, and he will place an iron yoke
on your neck until he destroys you” (Deut 28:48). Exile means losing both
freedom and prosperity.
The aims of prosperity and freedom from oppression take their place
within the overall framework of the covenant, of the relationship of Israel to
her God. In some contexts there is haziness regarding the ends–means relations here; the Israelites at times appear to be motivated only by prosperity
and freedom, for the sake of which the divine seems to serve as an effective
means. But viewing God this way leads to problems—for example, of the
sort raised by the accuser in the opening of the book of Job. But as far as
the collective is concerned, there is ultimately little doubt that closeness to
God—displayed through the pillars of cloud and fire, the Tabernacle and
the Ark, or through expressions like “going before you,” “coming to you,”
and especially “dwelling among you”—enjoys independent, indeed, ultimate
status in its own right.
At the risk of imposing a ham-fisted unity on the rich variety of the
Bible, and, a fortiori, of rabbinic and later strata, one can consider a “toy
model” Judaism boiled down to these three aims: the negative goal of leaving
“the house of bondage” (not just Egypt), the positive goal of inheriting a land
of “milk and honey” (not just Canaan), and the relational goal of living in a
covenant of divine intimacy (not just in Jerusalem).11 But even this artificial
simplicity suffices to generate a raft of questions and difficulties and sets up
what may be termed the central dilemma of Judaism: the biblical texts show
these three aims systematically conflicting with and undermining one another.
Egypt, for example, is itself a land of milk and honey, but it is also a house
of bondage. The wilderness makes available contact with the divine, but the
menu generates recurrent complaints. Perhaps most salient is the worry that
the experience of freedom combined with prosperity will extinguish awareness
of the divine grounds of these very attainments: “Beware, lest . . . when everything that is yours increases, your heart grow high and you forget God your
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Lord who brought you out of the Land of Egypt” (Deut 8:11–14). If even so
simplified a picture leads to the conclusion that the main aims of Judaism are
in practice incompatible, this raises the possibility that Judaism is not merely
difficult but perhaps ultimately futile.
This central dilemma can be confronted, but not solved. Genesis
shows the trade-off between freedom and prosperity already at work among
other nations as well, for example when the Egyptians, but not the Canaanites, choose to sell themselves into slavery under the pressure of famine
(Gen 47:13–26). One possibility is that the divine covenant—including
the restrictions divine law imposes on royal prerogatives and on ownership
of the Land of Israel—allows Israel to escape from an apparently universal
dynamic. But even if this is correct, such an approach (once again) converts
God into a means for achieving human goals—which therefore makes it more
a restatement of the dilemma than its dissolution.
Liberal democracy—though appearing in the first instance as a Greek-
style politeia form—also remains caught in the central dilemma. On the one
hand, individual liberty plays a decisive role in the technological capitalism
that has lifted billions out of starvation. Judaism lauds this, fulfilling as it
does the first human mission of “filling the earth and subduing it” (Gen 1:28)
At the same time, liberal democracies also prevent as many people as possible from suffering oppression and injustice and seem to allow for indefinite
improvement in this regard. There is less slavery—both formal and not—in
democracies than elsewhere. The Jewish logic of aims thus justifies liberal
democracy to a very considerable degree, seeing in this form of government—
in the Greek sense—a valuable means for accomplishing essential goals. But
precisely as a humanly devised means, liberal democracy threatens our awareness that all human deeds are founded on divinely given capacities: “Lest you
say in your heart ‘My power and the force of my arm have brought me this
success.’ But remember God your lord, for he gives you the power to succeed” (Deut 8:17–18). Indeed, taking liberal democracy as some kind of ultimate—as the best man-made solution to the human problems—risks running
afoul of even the injunction against bowing down to the works of one’s own
hands. Furthermore, liberal democracy also seems exposed to various kinds
of perversions, corruption, and decay. It remains an open—and increasingly
pressing—question whether these are best captured and ameliorated by the
biblical goal-oriented warnings against success-worship and outright idolatry
or perhaps better by the Greek politeia-oriented warnings against the tendency
of democracy to decay into mob rule or tyranny.
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THE GREEK TRADITION OF REGIME ANALYSIS
Methodological suspension of the Greek perspective requires first a clearer
view of just what this point of view entails, and here it is useful to begin with
Herodotus, who gives the earliest account of systematic politeia analysis. As
he sets the scene, the rule of Persia has been usurped by an imposter, and in
response a cadre of loyalist nobles undertakes a bold strike against the usurpers. They succeed, but finding that the heirs of Cyrus are no more, they debate
the future of Persia. Otanes advocates handing power over to the many, to the
middling Persians, since they are not given to the profligacy, insolence, and
instability of power-mad kings, ruling instead through equality and accountable, public deliberation. Megabyzus responds that, while he agrees with the
critique of one-man rule, the many are basically ignorant and foolish, tending
to deteriorate into a useless mob. The best decisions will be made by the best
men, who are likely to be few—an aristocracy. Darius replies that the few can
go just as bad as the many, while if we take any form of rule at its best, rule
by one has the advantage. It prevents factional infighting and the risk of plans
leaking to the enemy. In fact, the tendency of both popular and elitist movements ultimately to lead to one-man rule proves the superiority of monarchy.
Thus ends the debate. But the set speeches Herodotus presents here have all
the hallmarks of Greek rhetoric, and even though he insists on their veracity,
no one who knows the Greek intellectual tradition is willing to accept at face
value his attribution of the debate to the Persians.12
Perhaps the most famous politeia analysis is that offered in Plato’s dialogue of that name, Politeia—known in English as Republic. Here, Socrates
details what he takes to be the best way to organize a city, which, as ruled by
philosopher-kings, deserves the name aristocracy, rule of the best. But like all
human things, this regime too will eventually fall into decline. Even a city
focused on the pursuit of truth, Socrates explains, will eventually fail to propagate its education and will decay into a city focused instead on success, power,
and glory. This latter city, in its turn, will be corrupted by pursuit of wealth
into an oligarchy, which will in time be replaced in a revolutionary movement
by a popular democracy. Democracy, as Socrates presents it, is typified not by
focus on any one goal in particular, but rather by a refusal to focus, granting
instead equal legitimacy to all aims. Openness of this kind, Socrates warns,
is genuine openness and hence also openness to transgression. Eventually, he
predicts, the openness in such a democracy to any craving will bring a transgressive tyrant to power.13
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Do democracy—as Plato understands it—and Judaism go together? From
the perspective of Judaism, this kind of democracy offers genuine advantages
in that its openness to all ends also allows Jews to pursue Jewish ends. Jewish
ends in such a democracy are just as legitimate as any others; they are equal.
But this pseudoequality is necessarily temporary. All forms of government,
Socrates explains, create an environment in which the young are educated, and
so too does democracy create a public culture in which the norms, both written and unwritten, train and educate its young. This democratic education,
however, does not aim at Jewish ends but rather at the defining democratic
end: the essential equality of all purposes. So if Judaism teaches any goals in
particular—aside from the equality of all purposes—Jewish education will
suffer limitations, perhaps severe, in such a democracy. Judaism will become
private, clandestine, or even countercultural, and the younger generation will
tend to feel psychic conflicts between devotion to the aims of Judaism and to
the equality of all aims as taught by democracy.14 Such mental tension may be
found among Jewish youths even in non-Athenian democracies.
Aristotle’s analysis of regime types aims to be more complete and is for
that reason less clear and simple. He begins from the approach reported by
Herodotus—rule by one, by few, by many—and then distinguishes whether
the ruling segment rules for its own benefit or for the common good. This
allows him to define one “correct” and one “perverse” regime type for each
size of the ruling group, so that, for example, aristocracy is rule by the few for
the common good, while oligarchy is rule by the few for the good of the few.
So there seem to be six basic regime types. But then he points out that, while
oligarchy seems to be defined by the fewness of its ruling class, this misses its
essence. Oligarchy is primarily rule by the wealthy, while democracy is rule
by the poor; it is merely coincidental that the wealthy are few and the poor
many.15 Then it turns out that there are four or five different kinds of democracies, and so too of oligarchies.16
Among the recommendations that Aristotle puts forward, one with a
very rich afterlife is the idea of a mixed regime.17 Aristotle presents several versions here of both the rationale and the implementation, but the general thrust
seems to be that, since each form of government offers different strengths and
weaknesses, one should (ideally) be able to blend the forms so as to maximize
the strengths while minimizing the weaknesses. Thus, for example, freedom,
wealth, and excellence are each legitimate claims to a share of the rule, and
each, if followed exclusively, would lead to democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy respectively. But in an aristocracy, the great mass of men—who have little
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share in excellence—would also have little share in rule and would be therefore
embittered. Similarly, if the great mass of freemen—the poor—were given
access to the common purse, the temptation to feather their own nests would
be overwhelming. But if the masses can serve in groups—such as on juries—
then their strengths can be brought to bear while minimizing exposure to their
weaknesses. Executive power, by contrast, such as military leadership, should
rest with those who are most able. If the blend is successful—as Aristotle suggests that Sparta’s was—one could name this regime either a democracy or an
oligarchy, but actually neither would be strictly appropriate; the right name is
the generic politeia.
Writing some two centuries after Aristotle, Polybius offers a stripped-
down and systematized version of this kind of politeia analysis. Book six of
his Histories not only follows a schema of six basic regime types similar to
Aristotle’s, but also proposes two laws of evolution: healthy regimes decay into
corrupt ones and these in turn are ousted by the public-spiritedness of a larger
group. Thus a monarch will tend to become a tyrant, and a tyrant will tend
to be overthrown by a virtuous elite and its aristocracy—which will eventually decay into an oligarchy, and so forth. The instability of all forms leads
Polybius to assume a never-ending cycle and to propose that the best regime is
one that can escape this cycle. It must therefore be a mixed regime, balancing
the strengths and weaknesses of the one, the few, and many. Polybius sees in
Republican Rome—with its king-like consuls, its elitist Senate, and its popular
plebs and tribunes—an instantiation of this mixture and a demonstration of
its superiority.
Modern republicanism can mean many things, but in the first instance
it refers to something like this interpretation of the Roman constitution.
Thinkers of the later Roman and medieval periods offer many approaches that
emphasize virtuous, legitimate, or even divine kingship, but from at least the
Latin translation of Aristotle’s Politics in the mid-thirteenth century, the notion
gains traction in the West that proper rule is shared, limited rule.18 By the late
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (at least), Venice, Florence, and other I talian
city-states begin to develop some kind of republican self-understanding and
this—on at least some readings of the evidence—eventually finds its way into
an “Atlantic” republican tradition including (in various ways) English and
American thinkers and politicians such as James Harrington, Henry St. John
Bolingbroke, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson.19 The various discourses of
corruption and virtue, constitutionalism, opposition to tyranny, separation
of powers, and checks and balances form a rich backdrop to seventeenth and
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eighteenth century Anglo-American political thought, study, and dispute, but
regardless of whether any given thinker works with terminology from Polybius, Livy, Tacitus, or even directly from Aristotle, one basic fact remains: the
entire discussion presupposes the search for the correct or best form of government. The logic of Greek politeia analysis thus remains prominent—indeed,
dominant—to this day, and it is this logic that will need to be put in abeyance
so as to allow a clearer view of the Jewish thinkers.
THREE GOALS OF THE JEWISH TRADITION
Whatever account one gives of the rich variety exemplified in the Pentateuch, one cannot mistake the central thrust of the composite whole. From
the blessings of land and progeny offered to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to
the blessings—and apposite curses—dealt out by Moses at both Sinai and
Moab, the core issue remains surprisingly consistent. The Torah concerns
itself above all else with the fertility of man, plant, and animal. Blessing, in
the first instance, means children, plain and simple—immediately followed
by the agricultural productivity for feeding and supporting same. As the key
to all such growth resides in the rain, God can appear as sitting in the sky, all
but literally opening and closing the spigot of precious water—hence, of food
and life itself. While mere life is the minimal, bottom-line goal, the pinnacle
or complete fulfillment of this aim and blessing comes to be expressed in various symbols: in the prophetic writings, each sits “under one’s vine and under
one’s fig” (1 Kgs 5:5, Mic 4:4; cf. Isa 36:16, Amos 9:14, Zech 3:10); but in
the Pentateuch, the preferred expression is simply to inherit “a land that oozes
milk and honey” (cf. Joel 4:18).
This last expression performs such important work in the Pentateuch
that it deserves somewhat closer analysis. Devash, usually rendered as “honey,”
refers more broadly to the sticky, sweet ichor that drips from any appropriate
source, be it fruits like dates or figs, or from actual bees’ hives. But the sugary
sweetness of devash, no matter how delicious, does not exhaust the category
of good things to eat. In particular, fruits that are sweet are not fatty or rich,
and conversely fatty, rich fruits—like the olive or the modern avocado—are
not sweet.20 If the combination of sweet with fatty-rich cannot be found in
creation, it must arise from human artifice. But in other contexts the Torah’s
law imposes various restrictions on the power to effect novel combinations of
either plants or animals, perhaps the most obvious example being the prohibition of cooking a kid in its mother’s milk (Exod 23:19, 34:26; Deut 12:21).21
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The artificial combination of sweet and fatty-rich—still, to this day, all but
definitive of desserts such as ice cream—stands out not only for being subject
to no restrictions but also for serving as unqualified praise for the land that
can produce it. This praise, incidentally, applies not only to Israel, since Egypt
too is a land of milk and honey (Num 16:13, on which more below). But put
more broadly, milk-and-honey is the paradigm of dessert and so serves as an
appropriate figure for the goal of fertility reaching its zenith.
One further remark on the verb zavat, often translated as “flowing.”
This is the usual term for bodily discharges, either specifically menstrual or
more generally discharges from the sexual organs of male or female. This
verb thus emphasizes the spontaneous, perhaps even undesired, character of
the discharge in question. The land of Israel thus receives praise as a land
that, in a sense, could not help exuding sweet, creamy desserts. Certainly the
need to work, farm, and herd is not to be literally obviated, but the figure
implies that the land offers an almost automatic source of luxurious delicacies
(cf. TB Ketubot 111b).
Starting from the core concern of children, land, and fertility, the next
issue is security, as in “May God bless you—and guard you” (Num 6:24).
Already the Patriarchs are struggling with their neighbors—such as Egypt and
Gerar—and so receive blessings expanded to include success in these confrontations (Gen 15:1, 13–14, 28:15).22 By the time that Israel has grown into
a nation of multitudes in Egypt and been subjected to slavery and Pharaoh’s
genocidal policies, suffering under hostile domination begins to eclipse even
the core issue of prosperity and fertility. At the Burning Bush, God commissions Moses for the leadership role in a plan that will dominate the entire
Pentateuch: “I will descend to save [my people] from the hands of Egypt and
to raise them from that land to a wide, good land, a land that oozes milk and
honey” (Exod 3:8). Eventually, the blessings at Sinai and Moab will gloss this
secondary goal as military victory over enemies, supremacy, and peace (Lev
26:3–13; Deut 28:1–14).
This Burning Bush pair—leaving the house of bondage to inherit a land
of milk and honey—has become a cliché, but really requires highlighting and
analysis. The first and more urgent goal presents a negative character: escape
from, release from, salvation from. But from what? Leaving Egypt means more
than just leaving slavery. After all, slavery will be permitted in the Land of
Israel, indeed, even the enslavement of Israelites. Egypt not only allows slavery, but is itself “the house of bondage”—the homepage of slavery, as it were.
Egypt houses systematic slavery, even independently of the fate of the Israelites
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(Gen 47:18–26). Leaving the “iron furnace” of Egypt (Deut 4:20) thus means
escaping this collective, pervasive, and systematic oppression and entering
a shared existence that is no longer structured by relations of domination.
Other Israelites are “your fellow,” “your companion,” and “your brother”—
which last category must also include Israel’s king—while the stranger in
one’s midst must be loved and not oppressed.23 The positive goal, of course, is
good food—in fact, dessert—serving to symbolize a form of life that affords
enjoyment: plenty, prosperity, and leisure. As a pair, these two goals frame
communal motion: from negative to positive, from oppression and misery to
freedom and plenty. These goals form the structural background to the story
of the Exodus and—since the reverse motion always remains possible—to the
stories of exile and of redemption as well. In a sense, this pair sets the evaluative background stage-set against which the “plot” of the various large-scale
Jewish stories unfolds.
Together with the movement toward freedom and prosperity—or however we gloss the Burning Bush plan—the Torah also holds out a special relationship with God as an aim of the community. Whether in the context of
freedom from slavery—“And I will take you to me for a people and I will be
your Lord and you will know that I am God your Lord who has brought out
from under the oppressions of Egypt” (Exod 6:7)—or of providing food—“At
evening you will eat meat and in the morning you will sate yourself with bread
and you will know that I am God your Lord” (Exod 16:12)—experience and
recognition of God’s involvement with the fate of the Jewish people stands
as a goal in its own right. This stands out most clearly after Moses has pacified God’s anger in the wake of the Golden Calf. God makes clear that he
will uphold the terms of his covenant and will bring the people into the land
promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, a land of milk and honey, but “I will
not go up in your midst, for you are a stiff-necked people, lest I consume you
on the way” (Exod 33:4). This bad news precipitates mourning among the
people and generates further rounds of negotiations among Israel, Moses, and
God such that, eventually, God relents. Moses urges God to return his relation with Israel from one at a “hands-off ” distance to one of direct proximity
(cf. Exod 33:13–16 with 34:9–10). The tedious reiteration in Exodus 35–39
of the Mishkan [Tabernacle], in all its design and execution details, thus constitutes reaffirmation that the consequences of the Golden Calf have been finally
averted and God is willing to take up residence, as it were, in the midst of the
camp. God’s absence, apparently, constitutes bad news unto itself, even when
freedom and prosperity are not at issue.
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Even this simplified three-goal Judaism generates many questions and
problems. In the first instance, one might wonder about this relationship with
God that is not merely described or assumed but also expected, demanded,
and indeed commanded: “Love God your Lord with all your mind, all your
life and all your power” (Deut 6:5). In some passages, it appears as if God
serves merely as the gatekeeper of certain blessings—most obviously rain and
progeny. Here, relationship with the divine seems to exercise no independent
attraction, but to serve rather as an extrinsic means for getting what one
really wants. Indeed, the rhetoric of Deuteronomy returns over and over to
something like this extrinsic relation, using locutions such as “in order that”
[le-ma‘an], as if the truly motivating end-goals are leveraged by God to extract
some kind of cooperation and submission: “All this commandment which I
command you this day shall you take care to perform, in order that you may
live and increase and come and inherit the land God promised to your ancestors” (Deut 8:1). “And write them on the doorposts of your house and on your
gates. In order that your days and the days of your children on the ground that
God your Lord swore to your ancestors to give to them shall be as the days of
the sky over the land” (Deut 11:21). “For today I command you to love God
your Lord, to walk in his ways and to keep his commandments, statutes and
judgments, and you will live and increase and God your Lord will bless you
in the land to which you are going to inherit it” (Deut 30:16). In short, “you”
should do what God wants in order to get the good things “you” want. As a
matter of logic, any role God might take as redeemer, protector, or provider of
any good or blessing has lurking within it the potential for such a mercenary,
give-and-take approach—though, of course, Deuteronomy clearly insists on
the unique and intimate relationship that arises from God and Israel choosing
and cleaving to one another (e.g., Deut 26:16–19). Still, the worry that this
genuineness might be undermined precisely by God’s generosity powers the
thought-experiment in the prologue to Job.
THE CENTRAL DILEMMA OF JUDAISM
The ice-cream prosperity implied by the expression milk and honey serves not
only as the positive moment in the divine plan of redemption, but also as a
term of legitimation in disputes over rulership. Though at numerous points in
the trials of the wilderness the issue arises as to whether Israel might not prefer
to be in Egypt (e.g., Exod 13:17, 14:11–12, 17:3; Num 11:5, 14:3–4, 20:5,
21:5), in none of these cases does the text record an actual confrontation or
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struggle over leadership and policy. The only case of outright rebellion involves
one Korach leading a coalition of the disgruntled against the primacy of
Amram’s children, Moses and Aaron. Korach, representing the Levitical house
next in line after Amram’s, conspires together with representatives of the tribe
of Reuven (Israel’s first born), who presumably nurture resentment against the
primacy of the tribe of Judah.24 Moses initiates separate negotiations with each
faction, but the Reuvenites Datan and Aviram reject these overtures:
Is it so little that you have brought us up from a land that oozes milk
and honey to kill us in the wilderness that you should also flaunt
your rule over us? But you have not brought us into a land that
oozes milk and honey and given us an inheritance of field and vineyard. Will you put out these people’s eyes? No, we will not come!
(Num 16:13–14)

The first thing to note about this speech is that, on the level of principle, the Reuvenites advance here what could be called the milk-and-honey
standard for Jewish leadership: he who can provide the ice cream deserves to
rule. “You, Moses,” they seem to say, “would have a good claim to rule if you
were to give us ice cream—or at least, reliable sources of bread and wine. But
you have not done that, now have you?” Not only do they invoke the milk-
and-honey standard, but—more important—they expect it to be clear that
these are the proper terms for conducting the debate. Their claim is not open
to rebuttals like, “But you are no longer slaves, right? That must be worth
something?” Indeed, the Reuvenites take their complaint as so irrefutable—
and Moses makes no effort to refute it—that it eliminates room for any real
negotiations.25
A second thing to note is the status of the land of Egypt. Of course Egypt
offers flesh-pots and abundant fish and vegetables, and is simply called “the
garden of God” (Gen 13:10). But here, the Reuvenites add that Egypt, like the
Land of Israel, is also a land of milk and honey. It is not vaguely attractive in
some fashion or other but in fact fully satisfies the positive plank in the Exodus
plan. Nothing better is to be found in Canaan, at least as far as this matter is
concerned. The claim against Moses amounts to a sharpened version of the
old “Why did you take us out of Egypt?” complaint: “Even at best, the most
you could do is restore to us what we gave up when we left Egypt—and even
that you have not done.”
Now the deep problems begin to show themselves. Egypt is itself a land
of milk and honey, but unfortunately it is also the house of bondage. Even
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worse, it seems that these two facts are not unrelated. Genesis relates how, after
Joseph has stored up the surplus of the seven years of bounty under Pharaoh’s
control, the ensuing famine eventually brings the Egyptians voluntarily to
offer themselves as slaves:
“We will not hide from our master. Our money and cattle are completely given to our master, and there is nothing to offer our master
but our bodies and our land. Why should we die before your eyes,
both we and our land? Buy us and our land with bread and we and
our land will be slaves to Pharaoh. You give seed, and let us live and
not die, that the land may not become desolate.” So Joseph bought
all the lands of Egypt for Pharaoh, for the Egyptians each sold his
field, since the famine was hard on them, and the land become
Pharaoh’s. . . . They said: “You have revived us. May we find favor in
your eyes that we be slaves to Pharaoh.” (Gen. 47:18–20, 25)

Systematic slavery, on this account, is not merely accepted but actually
chosen. The Egyptians’ reasoning here is simple: better to be slaves than to
starve—as the Israelites will later agree when contemplating starvation in the
wilderness. Since famine is not unique to Egypt—the land of Canaan suffers
from it regularly—this specific form of reasoning is made possible, ironically,
precisely by Egypt’s prosperity; if there were no surplus to be prudently stored
up, there would be no choice but to accept the ravages of famine. The survivors might be few, but they would remain free. Indeed, the narrative points
silently to the possibility of preferring this outcome. Once Joseph has gathered
all the money in Egypt and in Canaan, his next offer is to buy cattle. This, the
Canaanites decline to do; they keep their cattle and presumably starve—but
remain free. The Egyptians, by contrast, sell their cattle and then, at the next
stage, sell themselves. But selling oneself is only possible because, in Egypt,
there is something to buy.
This insight raises the harrowing thought that becoming a house of bondage is not a uniquely Egyptian phenomenon. Buying someone’s freedom is
expensive, which means that prosperity (for some) is a precondition of slavery
(for others). But if prosperity contains within it the seeds of oppression, then
perhaps Egypt is merely an exemplar of a general tendency. Perhaps lands of
milk and honey will always tend to become houses of bondage.26 If this is so,
then the entailed conclusion cannot be emphasized too strongly. The Exodus
project of leaving Egypt to enter a prosperous land might turn out, in the end,
to be self-undermining and self-defeating. Israel might leave Egypt only to
inherit the land of Canaan—and then turn this into a new house of bondage.
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This is the central dilemma of Judaism; if prosperity must always lead to
systematic oppression, then Judaism as understood in the Pentateuch is impossible. Clearly, this conclusion is intolerable. But precisely for that reason its
possibility must be thought through with the utmost care.27
The first explicit spokesman for a version of the central dilemma turns
out to be none other than the prophet Samuel. In his notorious—and controversial—speech against the establishment of a kingdom, he outlines the
oppression that a king can be expected to impose on his subjects:
Samuel said “This is what you can expect from the king who will
rule over you: he will take your sons to appoint them for his chariots
and cavalry, that they will run before his chariot, and to appoint captains of thousands and of fifties, and to plow his fields and reap his
harvest and to make his tools of war and charioteering. Your daughters he will take for perfumers and cooks and bakers. Your best fields
and vineyards and olives he will take and give to his servants. Your
seed and vineyards he will tithe and give to his eunuchs and servants.
Your male and female slaves and your best youths and your donkeys
he will take and use for his labors. Your flocks he will tithe and you
will be his slaves. On that day you will cry out because of the king
you have chosen for yourselves, but God will not answer you on
that day.” But the people refused to listen to Samuel’s voice and said:
“No, but rather we will have a king over us.” (1 Sam 8:11–19)

The talmudic sages are already debating whether Samuel outlines here
permitted behavior of the king or whether he takes these acts to be wrongful,
but nevertheless predictable, outcomes of giving any man such royal authority.28 But whether the takings in question are legitimate or not, it is hard not to
hear in Samuel’s warning familiar overtones. Your king will make you slaves—
just like you were in Egypt. But when you cry out [ve-za‘aqtem] in the face of
your oppression—as you did in Egypt—now God will not answer your cries—
as he did in Egypt. This king, unlike Pharaoh, you have chosen for yourselves.
Samuel’s exhortation indicates how systematic subjugation can emerge
from prosperity. Only because one already possesses “fields, vineyards, and
olives” can these be confiscated. The more productive one’s land and flocks,
the more these can be taxed. The more children one has, the more who can be
conscripted. These takings then have a twofold effect. On the one hand—as in
the case of the starving Egyptians—the relationship of exploitation can come
into being only in the context of the gifts of prosperity. If a good does not exist,
it cannot change hands as a sign of submission. On the other hand, prosperity
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fuels the mechanism of domination. Though less explicitly, S amuel’s warning
implies that the more goods become available for confiscation, the more the
king’s activities and personnel can expand. Presumably the king’s horses and
men have useful functions to perform, but one of their uses can be to oppress
the people and extract more and still more resources—limited, as always, by
the available measure of prosperity.
Samuel’s warning qualifies as prophecy in the sense of predicting the
future. Saul is not a particularly oppressive king—if anything, he is chastised
for leading too gently (1 Sam 15:17)—and while David apparently lays the
foundations for a royal bureaucracy, his labors are presented as funded not by
taxation, but by pillage from foreign wars and as aimed, not at royal aggrandizement, but at building the Temple of God (1 Chr 26–28). The first signs
of oppression come in Solomon’s reign. The royal bureaucracy can now put
endless dainties on the king’s table, and while internal taxation clearly receives
a substantial boost from foreign tribute, impressed Israeli labor reaches four
months a year for each of 30,000 men (1 Kgs 4–5). Eerily, the text pictures the
wonderful prosperity of the Israelites hand-in-hand with the growing power of
the king and his coercive machinery:
Judah and Israel were as numerous as the sand by the sea, eating,
drinking and merry. Solomon ruled all the kingdoms from the River
and the land of the Philistines to the border of Egypt, paying tribute
and serving Solomon all the days of his life.
And the bread of Solomon’s table for a single day was thirty kor
fine flour and sixty kor of meal. Ten fine cattle and twenty pastured
cattle and a hundred sheep, besides deer, gazelles, antelopes and fed
fowl. For he held power out to the River Euphrates, over all the
kings on this side of the River from Tifsach to Gaza, and he had
peace in every direction roundabout. Judah and Israel dwelt securely,
each one under his vine and under his fig, from Dan to Beersheva,
all the days of Solomon.
And Solomon had forty thousand horse stables for his chariots
and twelve thousand cavalry. These officials, each for his month,
provisioned King Solomon and whoever was close to King Solomon’s table so that nothing was lacking. Each in his turn brought
to the proper place barley and hay for the horses and steeds. (1 Kgs
4:20–5:8)

At this point, the role of the governing machinery still appears innocuous, but its capacities lay the foundations for what will come. Eventually,
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Solomon will violate enough of the covenant that his kingdom is doomed to
division after his death. But his ability to carry out these violations depends on
the executive power built into his burgeoning bureaucracy.
At its conclusion, Solomon’s reign comes in for public review and scrutiny as his son Rehoboam is about to ascend to the kingship. Rehoboam goes
to Shechem for this sensitive occasion, and there the gathered crowd petitions
him thus: “Your father made our burden hard, but if you now ease the hard
labor [’avodat ‘avikha ha-qashah] and the heavy burden that your father put
upon us, we will serve you” (1 Kgs 12:5). Rehoboam promises a response in
three days, during which time he takes counsel. The elders who served during
Solomon’s lifetime advise Rehoboam to relent and gain the confidence, affection, and obedience of the people, whereas the youths who grew up with him
recommend threats and a show of strength. He chooses the latter, answering
the people thus: “Now my father loaded you with a heavy burden, and I will
add to your burden; my father punished you with whips and I will punish you
with scorpions” (1 Kgs 12:14).
The central dilemma begins here to show itself. Obviously, the narrative points to the insolence and imprudence of youth raised in power and
prosperity, as opposed to the level-headed sobriety of their elders—who presumably worked to achieve these goods.29 But greater analytical importance
must attach to the retrospective view shared by all parties—the elders, the
youth, the populace, and even Rehoboam himself: that Solomon imposed
heavy burdens on Israel. No one advises Rehoboam to reply: “Why are you
complaining? My father never burdened you at all.” All parties agree that
Solomon imposed on the people precisely the “hard labor” [’avodah qashah]
that resounds with the memory of Egyptian slavery (cf. Exod 1:14; Deut
26:6). Perhaps the advice of the elders could have laid the foundations for
a better future, but there is little room for doubt that, by the end of his
reign—not coincidentally, after marrying Pharaoh’s daughter (1 Kgs 11:1)—
Solomon had begun to turn the Land of Israel, oozing with milk and honey,
into a house of bondage; he had begun to produce an Israeli Egypt. This
outcome can hardly be called inevitable, but the course of events that makes
it plausible—indeed, likely—exemplifies the central dilemma of Judaism.
From the perspective of Moses at the Burning Bush, the question “Who am
I, that I should go to Pharaoh and that I should take the Children of Israel
out of Egypt?” now seems laden with bitter irony (Exod 3:11). If exodus from
Egypt ultimately leads Israel back into bondage—only this time under God’s
anointed in Canaan—then, indeed, why bother?
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CONFRONTING THE CENTRAL DILEMMA
The Torah’s laws evince awareness of this central dilemma and include explicit
legislation apparently aimed at avoiding the slide of a prosperous Israel into
systematic servitude. Clearest of these are the restrictions imposed on the king.
On the practical level, he is to limit the number of his wives—presumably, for
diplomatic marriage—and of his horses—the core of his military power—as
well as the overall extent of his amassed wealth (Deut 17:16–17). On the level
of loyalties, he must be an Israelite, committed to the same law and covenant
as all his brothers, and he must diligently study the law, “To prevent his heart
from being lifted up above his brothers, and to prevent him from turning aside
from the commandment right or left” (Deut 17:20).
Solomon violates these restrictions systematically. His annual income
in gold is registered as 666 talents, so that “silver was thought of as nothing
in Solomon’s time” (1 Kgs 10:14, 21). His stables count 1,400 chariots and
12,000 cavalry, the horses of which are sourced—no surprise—from Egypt
(cf. Deut 17:16). His wives end up numbering 700—in addition to 300
concubines—so that they “turn aside his mind” (1 Kgs 11:3–4). Solomon also
violates the covenant and turns to other gods, and though he is not explicitly
described as thinking himself above his brothers, this too seems to belong to
overall picture.
Comparison of the Deuteronomy laws and the Solomon narrative suggests how the laws are aimed at evading the central dilemma. If the king can
be restrained from certain critical forms of self-aggrandizement, then the
Solomonic outcome can, apparently, be prevented. Presumably, for such a law-
abiding king, his capacity—and indeed, willingness—to oppress his brothers
will be decisively curtailed. In contrast with Solomon’s son, who inherits only
a fragment of his father’s throne and power, the laws justify themselves as “in
order that his days of rulership may be lengthened, his and his sons in the
midst of Israel” (Deut 17:20).
The Torah’s efforts to confront the central dilemma emerge in other
contexts as well, since Israel can become a house of bondage even without an
oppressive king. While the enslavement of one Jew by another is permitted, it
is even more carefully delimited than the powers of the king. Such enslavement
must not exceed six years, may not be enforced harshly, must allow midterm
redemption, and must conclude with a substantial severance package. Most
importantly, the alienation from one’s patrimonial land—precisely the concern
that led the Egyptians to opt in favor of slavery—must itself be limited by the
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Jubilee year. Since slavery is closely related to economic difficulties, the law
seeks to inhibit each stage of the slippery slope down to financial ruin—from
debt, to interest, to selling land, and finally to selling oneself—by carefully leaving at each stage an opening for return to independence and stability of some
sort. Debts are cancelled every seven years; the taking of interest is prohibited;
family members can, at will, redeem the enslaved as well as sold land; and every
fifty years the land-ownership basis of the economy is reset. Now, the situations
regulated by these laws come into being only in a land sufficiently productive
that someone has the means to beggar another, buy him out, and then buy him
outright. Prosperity thus sets the stage for systematic slavery “from the bottom
up,” as it were, without the need for an exploitative ruler. The legal framework
of which Leviticus 25 is the epicenter makes best sense as a preemptive cure for
this “decentralized” version of the central dilemma.
This antislavery regime fails in Judea no less spectacularly than the regulations on the king do in Solomon’s case. Jeremiah relates how, in the fading
years of the kingdom of Judea, King Zedekiah calls on his people to let their
Jewish slaves go free—making a covenant to proclaim liberty [dror] in the land.
This the Judeans indeed do—for a moment. But having set their slaves free, the
people, led by the nobility, promptly turn around and recapture these newly
freed individuals and take them back into bondage (Jer 34:8–11). Perhaps
Zedekiah embarks here on a last-ditch attempt to turn Judea into something
better, into something that does not deserve divine wrath or betray the entire
thrust of the Exodus. But it does not work. Even the leadership of the king is
not enough to turn what has apparently become an Israelite house of bondage
into something that deserves to stand. The response is straightforward. Just as
you, says God, have failed the covenant from when I took you out of the house
of bondage, to proclaim liberty and to limit slavery, so will I proclaim to you
“liberty to the sword, to plague, and to famine, and I will make you a horror to
all the kingdoms of the land” (Jer 34:17). Judea delanda est.
As law clearly suffers severe limitations in confronting the central
dilemma, the Torah also works to do so through its rhetoric. Deuteronomy in
particular repeatedly sets out to undermine the confidence, pride, and swagger
that prosperity can generate, emphasizing the dependence of Israel’s freedom
and prosperity on the divine covenant:
When God your lord brings you into the land that he swore to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob to give to you—large and good cities that you
did not build, houses full of all good which you did not fill, carven
cisterns that you did not excavate, vineyards and olives that you
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did not plant—and you eat and are satisfied. Beware lest you forget
God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, from the house of
bondage. (Deut 6:10–12)
God did not crave you and choose you because you are more
numerous than other peoples, for indeed you are the least of all the
peoples. Rather, because of God’s love for you, and because of his
keeping the oath that he swore to your ancestors did God take you
out with a strong arm and redeem you from the house of bondage,
out of the arms of Pharaoh, king of Egypt. (Deut 7:7–8)
Beware lest you forget God your lord, so that you do not keep
his commandments, judgments and ordinances which I command
you today. Lest—when you eat and be satisfied, build good homes
and settle in them, your cattle and flocks increase, you gain much
silver and gold and everything of yours increases—your heart grow
high and you forget God your lord who brought you out of the land
of Egypt from the house of bondage. . . . Lest you say in your heart
“My power and the force of my arm have brought me this success.”
But remember God your lord, for he gives you the power to succeed
in order to fulfill the covenant which he swore to your ancestors as
if it were today. (Deut 8:11–13, 17–18)

This near-obsessive rhetoric, like the legal restraints, seems ultimately
fruitless. Indeed, both God and Moses announce by the end of the book that
they know the Jews well enough to predict that they will fail so that the central
dilemma overcomes them (Deut 31:16, 29).
One can imagine a spiritual-minded complainer who finds a bitter
satisfaction in this whole picture. “Of course the pursuit of prosperity and
freedom from oppression, unto themselves, must ultimately fail,” such a one
might insist. “We must relate to God directly, intimately, lovingly, or the
whole business is pointless. Was not establishing that sort of special relationship precisely one of the three central goals of Judaism? If only Israel had
remained committed to the covenant, she would have enjoyed all the freedom
and prosperity that God continually promised—and that offer still stands.”
This complaint certainly captures a main thrust of the Pentateuch and seems
to summarize the analysis of the central dilemma so far. Combining the
goals of leaving slavery and inheriting milk and honey seems impossible,
since insisting on freedom leads to poverty while gaining prosperity opens
the way to oppression.30 So the spiritualist offers a way out: if only one can
remember the divine origins of both freedom and well-being and perform the
covenantal obligations that follow from this recognition, then all will be well.
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The king will not become oppressive, bound as he must be by the law, and so
too the laws of debt, land, and manumission will prevent society from splitting apart into slave-drivers and slaves. Israel will not forget, glory in its own
power, or allow its heart to become “high.” Pursuing justice, loving kindness,
and walking humbly with her God, Israel will fulfill Micah’s prophetic vision,
and more besides.
This approach, despite its admittedly solid textual and analytic foundations, nevertheless generates problems in the ends-means relations analogous
to those noted above, if higher level and more refined. The covenant-centric
view points to the critical position of devotion to the divine, since without it
the central dilemma will remain unsolvable. But even if this is completely correct—precisely if it is correct—it leaves the worry that God will enter Israel’s
consciousness as merely a means to solving these collective contradictions.
Such a relationship to God need not be as crass as searching for some divine
ATM to dish out rain and fecundity and beat up one’s enemies. The problems
embodied in the central dilemma cut much deeper into the collective life and
soul of the nation, and invoking devotion to God as the only solution to these
is hardly so reductive. But on such a view, relationship with God remains
a means—the highest means—that is only extrinsically related to one’s real
goals. If Israel could just enjoy the fruits of freedom and prosperity without
worry about the consequences of her own future behavior, there would be no
need for all this law, exhortation, and covenant. Confronted with the central
dilemma, Israel might choose God—as the least bad option.31 This, God does
not want—though he may be willing to tolerate it. Such grudging devotion
may prevent national disaster, but, ultimately, God does not want Israel to
conclude that it is simply prudent long-term policy to love and obey him. This
would not constitute a true relationship.
Determining whether a collective’s relation to God is genuine or mercenary may require a reversal of the test that opens Job. There, the accuser
submits for divine consideration the thought that Job’s piety is founded on
quid pro quo, that as long as the divine goodies keep coming, Job will remain
solicitous and obedient. Conversely, should this alleged payment cease, so
too will Job’s piety. This suspicion turns out to be ill founded: Job retains his
devotion even when his blessings—goods, family, health—are systematically
revoked. In a sense, one can say that the experience of the Exile proves that
Israel can pass a collective version of this test. Even deprived of land, wealth,
security, and the Temple as a clear symbol of God’s presence and favor, Israel
retained a fundamental devotion to her covenant and her God.
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But the reverse test applies to the central dilemma. In the hopes of
retrieving—and retaining—her land and the blessings of prosperity, security,
and freedom that come with independence, Israel might very well turn to God
for help, support, and blessing. The question then arises whether this call is
fundamentally utilitarian in intent, and the test for this turns on what happens
after these hopes are fulfilled. Will leaving bondage and inheriting a land of
milk and honey give Israel the opportunity to forget her God, her covenant,
and eventually fall prey to the central dilemma? Will the threat of the central
dilemma keep Israel in line, while caring for her provider and protector in
precisely those terms, and no more? Put differently, if the freedom and prosperity were reliable or even guaranteed, would Israel still feel that something
is lacking, something missing? Who would then say, with the sons of Korach:
“Like a buck panting for streams of water, so does my life pant for you, Lord.
My life thirsts for the Lord, for the living Power. When will I come and see
the face of the Lord?” (Ps 42:2–4)
This issue remains, at the present time, open.
HISTORY’S “END” AND TWO CHEERS
FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
The Bible assigns to each of the kings of Judah and Israel an overall assessment
regarding his impact on the people and the divine covenant. Of Amaziah,
for example: “He did what was right in God’s eyes, but not like his ancestor
David; everything that his father Joash did, so he did” (2 Kgs 14:3), or, more
briefly: “He did what was right in God’s eyes, but not with a whole heart”
(2 Chr 25:2). Some kings are praised—Josiah outstanding among them—
while many others are reviled as doing “what was bad in the eyes of God.”
Kings, the Bible makes clear, rule for a purpose and can therefore be judged
as to how well or poorly they further that purpose. The logic of goals enjoys
priority over the logic of regimes.
Presumably, the same is true of melekh. Was Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
good for the Jews? Independent of the answer—probably a big “yes”—the
analytic emphasis needs to fall on the question. The institutions of Jewish
communities from Cairo and Poland to Cape Town and Kansas City have
always acted through some unstable, often ill-defined combination of oligarchic gevirim, rabbinical leadership, and rank-and-file populism. The mixture
in this mixed regime form remained fluid, changing with time, place, and
circumstance. But this flexibility was possible because there was rarely serious
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doubt as to the aims of these institutions, the standards by which their success
or failure could be judged. For example, R’ Meir of Rothenburg concluded
a complex thirteenth century legal ruling with this warning and exhortation:
“And this would lead to grievous feuds without end. May God bless us that
we become one nation and a unified brotherhood. I pray that we manage to
survive amidst our enemies.”32
In short, Judaism takes the goals of collective life—with all their complexities and contradictions—as logically prior to the various political regime
forms; these latter can and must be judged and adjusted according to their
value for and contribution to the former. The politeia is a means, not an end.
In present circumstances, the most urgent such judgment concerns the
value, from the Jewish point of view, of contemporary liberal democracy. Is
liberal democracy, as Francis Fukuyama famously suggested, the “final form of
human government”? Does the combination of liberal capitalism with egalitarian democracy produce a form of political organization in which humanity
can be “completely satisfied”?33 The prima facie case in favor of this judgment
enjoys considerable strength, indeed, precisely with reference to the Jewish criteria outlined above. Liberal capitalism has produced in the past two or three
centuries fabulously more prosperity—more milk and honey, more ice cream—
than mankind has ever before experienced. Billions have been lifted out of
starvation, while hundreds of millions live in a comfort and luxury previously
unimagined for any but the wealthiest and most powerful of men. What could
qualify as a better fulfillment of the imperative to “fill the earth and subdue
it” (Gen 1:28)? At the same time, egalitarian democracy, founding the legitimacy of government in the consent of its citizens, grants to every one of them
some share, however small, in the decision-making process. There are thus
built-in limitations on the enslavement of the citizens of a democracy (though,
of course, these limitations have been at times effectively circumvented).
More importantly, however, such democracies see themselves as committed
to solidifying and improving these limitations over time. In general, citizens
of democracies are freer from oppression than any others and can expect to
become even more so. What to make of all this, from a Jewish perspective, is
probably both the most urgent and important question. But first it is useful to
examine an account of liberal democracy arising from the Greek perspective.
Fukuyama’s sophisticated case for liberal democracy as the stable point—
indeed, end-state—of human social change consists of two branches, one
seemingly economic but ultimately scientific-technological, the other based on
the what is termed “the desire for recognition.” The first branch begins from
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the accumulative character of modern natural science as it constantly progresses
to new understanding and research based on its earlier stages. The application
of such rational inquiry—to productive or military technology, to rationalized
social practices like accounting and bureaucracy—thus also develops a progressive character. Next, in order to benefit from these ever-renewed practical fruits
of rationality, society must acquire flexibility of various kinds: in its markets
for goods, services, and labor, in the social structures that support these, and so
forth. One of the central lessons of the twentieth century experience with communism is that central planning of the Soviet style simply cannot set and adjust
the myriads of prices that represent these ever-changing needs and their interrelations.34 The core of the flexibility that can handle the dynamism that follows
from rationalization is summed up in the classic slogan “Laissez-faire!” Only
liberal capitalism reliably turns scientific-technological innovation into social
benefits. Furthermore, once some countries have adopted this kind of flexible,
progressive liberalism, others—through the desire to imitate the benefits of a
prosperous lifestyle or merely through the pressure of military competition—
have little choice but, sooner or later, to come into line. The market-oriented
reform movements of the 1980s in China and the then-Soviet Union stand
as the outstanding examples of this tendency toward rational convergence. In
short, science and technology lead to liberal capitalism.
The other branch of Fukuyama’s case for liberal democracy appeals to the
deep human need for recognition. On Alexandre Kojève’s influential interpretation of Hegel, which Fukuyama largely follows, human self-consciousness
arises when the basic animal power to change the world into something it
previously was not comes to focus, not on things in the world, but precisely on
this capacity for innovation. Such a creature is no longer an animal that desires
this or that object, but a human who desires desire, who wishes to be the object
of another’s desire. “Thus, in the relationship between man and woman, for
example, Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire
of the other. . . . Human history is the history of desired desires.”35 Kojève
calls such desired desire the desire for recognition and suggests that, taken
to its ultimate form, it leads to competition, to a struggle for prestige, and
eventually to a duel to the death. Such a duel will determine who deserves the
nonnatural nonthing that is human desire and recognition and who will show
oneself bound by animal fear for preservation of one’s mere creaturely life.36
The relationship of domination and submission established here leads to
the so-called master-slave dialectic, for which Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
is famous. Even the winner of such a competition will remain dissatisfied as
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long as one’s worth is affirmed and acknowledged only by one who is, in a
decisive sense, unworthy. Only the recognition of equals is satisfying, and
this—skipping over intermediate historical stages—eventually underpins the
rationality of democracy. Mutual recognition of the equal humanity of all is
the resolution of the dissatisfactions and contradictions inherent in any other
arrangement of humanity, that is, of the “desiring of desire.” Democratic
societies recognize the equal dignity of each by grounding rule and power
not on domination and violence, but on respect for each one’s self-legislating
autonomy and fully human desire for desire. In short, egalitarian democracy
alone can resolve the paradoxes that Kojève diagnoses as following from the
moment human self-consciousness transcends its merely animal state.
These two branches of analysis add up to a theory of capital-H History, that is, not of events but of humanity’s sequential search for self-
understanding. If rationality applied to desire and the nonnatural struggle
for recognition leads to democracy and rationality applied to nature and the
satisfaction of natural wants leads to liberal capitalism, then the fully rational and self-conscious outcome for humanity seems to be liberal democracy.
Democratic capitalism is thus the endpoint of History—that is, it brings the
human search for fulfillment and self-understanding to its conclusion—and
therefore exerts a powerful pressure on events, history in the ordinary sense.
As it becomes increasingly clear that monarchy, theocracy, communism, fascism, and all other regime types create intolerable dissatisfactions of various
kinds, dissatisfactions that only liberal democracy can alleviate, the long arc
of political actions and historical events will be more and more pressured in
the direction of what Kojève calls the “universal and homogenous state.” This
cosmopolitan but classless and egalitarian world society extends the principles
of liberal democracy to all of humanity. Whether the EU or the UN or some
other institution forms the kernel of this future universal state, the core issue
is not how long it will take to get there—perhaps millennia—since if the
analysis is correct, ultimately nothing else will satisfy. The real question, rather,
is whether this understanding correctly describes how the institutions of the
future really ought to look.
Having argued for liberal democracy, Fukuyama then registers some
doubts—from both Right and Left—regarding the ultimate desirability of
Kojève’s universal and homogeneous state. The Left suspects that any market
free enough to count as capitalist will not only inevitably determine economic
winners and losers but also thereby decide who will be important and who
will be a nobody. If economic liberty thus undermines equal and mutual
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recognition, liberal democracy cannot be the “fully satisfying” arrangement
it purports to be. The Right, on the other hand, suspects that, since some
humans will always exhibit more daring, innovation, and plain old success
than others, their inevitable desire to be recognized for this—in essence, to
be recognized as superior—can neither be fulfilled nor eliminated in the
envisioned liberal democratic order. This already shows that liberal democracy
cannot be called “fully satisfying” without qualification and will moreover give
such individuals the incentive—quite possibly coupled with the ability—to
undermine and perhaps overthrow such a liberal democratic order.
Fukuyama’s assessment of liberal democracy, both in its general outlines
and in many significant details, looks uncannily familiar when viewed through
the Judaic lenses of analysis outlined above. Liberal capitalism attracts due to
its promise of prosperity, of comfort and luxury. Many lands—from Spain
and Canada to Japan and Singapore—have become lands of milk and honey.
Crucially, the land of Israel too has once again become a home where one can
sit “under one’s vine and under one’s fig.” At the same time, the promise of
democracy has lessened the bondage of nation after nation, from Korea and
Thailand to Czechia and (perhaps) Kurdistan. Both prosperity and freedom
can, in principle, spread to other lands as well.
Judaism cannot see all this as anything but a shower of blessings from
God. Indeed, the blessings accruing at the present time to Jewry in particular
are utterly unprecedented. It is difficult to overemphasize the degree to which
the Jewish people, both in the Land of Israel and in the Diaspora, enjoy greater
material prosperity—whether measured in GDP, in charitable giving, or in ice
cream consumption—and suffers less enslavement—be it systematic oppression such as in medieval Europe or the USSR, endemic discrimination such as
persecuted Alfred Dreyfus, or military menace such as Egypt posed to the State
of Israel until 1977—than at any time before in history. One might say that
the plan announced at the Burning Bush is coming to fulfillment.
But one might also say that the Jews are reentering the grip of the central
dilemma. Humans crave both freedom and prosperity, but over the long term,
these two aims can undermine one another; lands oozing milk and honey tend
to become houses of bondage. This may be due to the overweening pride and
ambition of a ruler, as in the case of Solomon and Rehoboam, or it may come
from below, as more and more of the privileged dispose highhandedly of the
livelihoods and persons of their servitors, as with the recapturing of the slaves
briefly freed under Zedekiah. These two scenarios—which certainly do not
exhaust the possibilities—roughly correspond to the complaints against liberal
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democracy that Fukuyama attributes to the Right and the Left respectively.
While some supporters of liberal democracy assume that economic success
and political liberty inevitably go together—even reinforcing one another, as
in some cases they clearly do—Judaism focuses on longer term trends that suggest deep tensions between them. Once alert to the thought that it may not be
possible indefinitely to continue pursuing prosperity while avoiding oppression, one becomes alert to such trends and can find signs of them in many a
contemporary news item.
Mosaic rhetoric has already suggested how to confront the central
dilemma. One must remember that blessings come from God, that success
springs from power that is not fully one’s own, and that one must not bow
down to the works of one’s hands. At a minimum, this requires cultivating
virtues like gratitude, modesty, and piety. Better yet, if Israel will keep to
its covenantal obligations—especially the systematic brakes on the slippery
slope to oppression—then God promises to play rainmaker, both literally and
figuratively. The latter-day prophets exhorting on opinion pages and in social
media in defense of the poor, the widow, and the stranger and exposing the
wrongdoing of the connected and protected—in short, guarding justice and
doing righteousness—shoulder their share of Judaism’s central burden. But
the liberal democrat’s central tools—“more rational productivity” and “more
egalitarian recognition”—cannot be counted on to bear this burden (useful as
they may be in many circumstances). There is no formulaic solution to what
depends on the choice of goodness, justice, and life over evil, sin, and death.
Even if humanity’s capacity for moral choice can become the subject of some
sort of history, imagining an end to that history seems meaningless.37
Without in any way denigrating such moral diligence and rectitude, it
must be admitted that they aim at a resolution that—as crucial and difficult as
it may be—is from God’s perspective tolerable, but still not ideal. The threat
of social dissolution might constrain Israel to the terms of the covenant as she
refrains from trampling divine decrees. Israel would thus become comparable
to a middling king like Amaziah, doing what was right [yashar] in God’s eyes,
but no more. This would surely be better than setting the stage for corruption, oppression, and eventually exile. Such a roughly stable outcome might be
tolerable, but in Israel’s eyes would it be ideal? Would freedom from oppression and inheriting a land of milk and honey, unto themselves, genuinely
satisfy—with obedience to the Torah accepted as a least bad concession to the
inevitable corruptions of the human heart? Or is it possible, precisely because
prosperity and freedom are no longer rarities to be craved but commonplaces
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to be offhandedly appreciated, that other demands will come to the fore?
Might life—however wealthy and secure—come to seem limited and unsatisfying without experiencing the indwelling of the divine presence?
Just because God wants Israel—indeed, all of humanity—to want him,
does not mean that we in fact do. Determining for ourselves whether we really
want a relationship with the Creator that transcends pragmatic obedience
remains the biggest challenge raised by the indisputable successes of liberal
democracy.
EPILOGUE
How much of the goal-discourse discussed above applies to nations other than
Israel? As in so many other fields, also regarding the relation of the Gentiles to
the covenant and the central dilemma, the prophets of Israel agree on important basics while disagreeing on specifics. This is not the place for detailed
examination, but it seems that the following summary points enjoy broad
support. (1) The central dilemma applies to the Gentiles just as much as to the
Jews. Egypt is a land of milk and honey, as well as a house of bondage, without
reference to the fate of the Jewish people. Other nations can be “vomited out”
of their lands in punishment—the Canaanites as the foremost example—and
they can also be restored to these homes. Liberal democracy can thus win
only two cheers across the board, and not only in the special case of the children of Israel. (2) The Gentiles are not given the Torah, but they can—and
should—fulfill a divine covenant. On one version, the covenant in question
is the Noahite covenant that includes all humanity and demands of them the
minimal regimen of basic justice and piety. On another approach, the experience of the nations—very much including their understanding of Israel’s own
experiences—will bring the nations to recognize that they must learn from the
God of Jacob, and they voluntarily come up to do so: “For out of Zion shall
go forth instruction and the word of God from Jerusalem.” (3) Ultimately, all
will “know God”—as waters cover the sea—but what exactly that means is a
matter of disagreement. Surprisingly, the resolution of these disputes may no
longer be relegated merely to some obscure, far-off future.
NOTES
1. F. Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3–18; F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

Goalkeeping

29

2. On the relation of the American Constitution to the classical tradition, especially
Polybius, see: G. Chinard, “Polybius and the American Constitution,” Journal of the History of Ideas 1:1 (1940): 38–58; B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 70–77, especially nn. 15–16; and
G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1998), 197–206.
3. On this lack, see J. Weinstein, “Yishuv Medinah and a Rabbinic Alternative to Greek
Political Philosophy,” Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 23 (2015): 165.
4. Exceptions to the general disinterest in politeia analysis among Jewish thinkers display
the validity of the generalization. Those Jewish thinkers who take up Greek philosophy
as a whole—most importantly Maimonides—include also its political aspects; but this is
no surprise. Abravanel, in a context apparently independent of such philosophical concerns, objects to kingship while praising a structure explicitly inspired by the then-current
constitution of Venice (Commentary to Exod 18 and Deut 1). Though his critique flows
from a well-rooted biblical and rabbinic debate, the appeal to republican forms and traditions arises from avowedly external influences and experience. Abravanel’s engagement
with republicanism and the roots of this engagement are addressed in greater depth in
R. Kimelman, “Abravanel and the Jewish Republican Ethos,” in Commandment and Community: New Essays in Jewish Legal and Political Philosophy, (ed. D. Frank; Albany: SUNY
Press, 1995), 195–216. Much earlier than these examples, Josephus already declares it
among his aims in the Antiquities to outline for the Greek-reading public the special
characteristics of the Judaic politeuma (1.5). For the name of this form of government
he elsewhere offers the—admittedly forced—locution theokratia (Against Apion, 2.165).
Josephus’s audience, Maimonides’ philosophical commitments, and Abravanel’s practical
experience do not derive their inspiration from biblical or rabbinic texts.
5. Some scholars have claimed to identify a Jewish political tradition. For references and
discussion, see Weinstein, “Yishuv Medinah,” 162.
6. Politics 1253a2–3.
7. An important caveat complicates the analytic framework here. Early modern Europe,
while reengaging with the political thought and experience of the ancient world, very
much included Hebraic thinking together with the Greek and the Latin. Consequently,
it can be very difficult to tease out how much contemporary political discourse and terminology owes in its origins and conceptualization—often in a subterranean f ashion—to
the very Hebrew sources to which it might happen to be applied. Nevertheless, the essentially Greek contribution of searching for—or claiming to have identified—the right,
just, or best political order continues to dominate political thought and discourse. It thus
remains methodologically prudent to suspend the presumption in favor of political discourse as such when dealing with Jewish materials. Hebraism in early modern political
thought—very much including such rabbinic sources as the Babylonian Talmud and Maimonides’ Code—is discussed, both in its general outlines and in some particularly salient
exemplars, by E. Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of
European Political Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); G. Schochet,

30

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

et al., eds, Political Hebraism: Judaic Sources in Early Modern Political Thought (Jerusalem:
Shalem Press, 2008); and O. Haivry, John Selden and the Western Political Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
8. TB Makkot 23b–24a, discussed further in Weinstein, “Yishuv Medinah,” 168–74.
9. Ideally, even Greek-origin terms such as “logic,” “method,” and “ideally” would be
suspended as well. The closest Judaic term to “logic” might be “measures by which to
infer”—middot derash (cf. T San. 7.11; Sifra, Baraita de-R’ Ishmael).
10. The general command to avoid the ways of Egypt appears at Leviticus 18:3.
11. The triptych freedom-prosperity-divinity shows its importance most clearly in the
blessings promised for fulfillment of the covenant at Leviticus 26:3–13 and Deuteronomy
28:1–14. For analytic purposes, military success and preeminence are here included under
freedom from oppression, while prosperity includes fertility overall, but most especially
progeny.
12. A useful overview of the main issues raised by this passage is provided by D. Asheri,
et al., A Commentary on Herodotus Books I–IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
471–73.
13. Plato, Republic book 8. On democracy, see especially 561a–e.
14. The Republic details several examples of the psychological stresses that youths experience when their education sends mixed messages: 549c–550b; 553a–554e; 559d–561a;
572c–573b.
15. Aristotle, Politics 1279a22–1280a6.
16. Politics 1291b30–1293a34.
17. Politics 1293b22–1294b35. The earliest reference to such a mixture seems to be in
Thucydides’ History (8.97.2), on which see D. Hahm, “The Mixed Constitution in Greek
Thought,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought (ed. R. Balot; Malden:
Blackwell, 2009), 178–80.
18. J. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992), 5.
19. On this Atlantic tradition of republicanism and its limits, as well as its relation to
republicanism in Dutch, Swiss, and other continental contexts, see the contributions of
J. Pocock and of J. Soll in Limits of the Atlantic Republican Tradition (ed. J. Soll), Republics
of Letters 2:1 (2010).
20. Perhaps there exist tropical exotics—such as the durian or the cupuaçu—that can be
both sweet and fatty-rich. Such fruits were, of course, unknown in the ancient and classical Near East and Mediterranean.
21. The mixing of plant and animal species in planting, plowing, weaving, and breeding
is prohibited at Leviticus 19:19 and Deuteronomy 22:9–11.
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as more than just a symbol of wealth. The behavior of the Canaanites silently implied in
Genesis 47 shows the same dynamic.
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33. Fukuyama, End of History, xi, xxi.

32

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages
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35. A. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (New York: Basic, 1969), 6.
36. Kojève’s view here seems to conjoin both Greek and Jewish conceptions, but a fuller
assessment of this matter is beyond the present scope.
37. Even Nietzsche, who pioneered the possibility of moral history and genealogy, never
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The “Will of the People” in
Antimonarchic Biblical Texts
Baruch Alster
Many biblical texts deal with the Israelite monarchy, but only a few present
any sort of theoretical discussion of it. Of these theoretical passages, Deuteronomy 17:14–20 and I Samuel 8 stand out as legal or quasi-legal texts that
contain lists of the king’s rights and responsibilities. However, both texts are
widely interpreted as antimonarchic, critical of kingly excesses. Therefore,
many use them to show biblical support for basic democratic values. In this
essay, I show that while both texts are indeed critical of the monarchy, they
differ on a crucial issue: whether the will of the people is a positive or negative
factor.1
THE LAW OF THE KING: DEUTERONOMY 17:14–20
The Deuteronomic Code is the only one in the Torah that deals with the
distribution of authority among the various political institutions:2 the judiciary (16:18–20; 17:8–13),3 kingship (17:14–20), priesthood (18:1–8), and
prophethood (18:9–22). The law of the king begins with the establishment
of the office:4
14 When thou art come unto the land which the LORD thy God
giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein; and shalt
say: “I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are round
about me”; 15 thou mayest5 set a king6 over thee, whom the LORD
thy God shall choose; one from among thy brethren shalt thou set
king over thee; thou mayest not put a foreigner over thee, one7 who
is not thy brother.

The monarchy is to be established at the people’s demand. It is not a
requirement, and the Israelites would be within their rights not to demand
a king at all.8 Once they do request one, though, there are limits as to who
may be appointed: only “one from among thy brethren”—presumably a male9
member of the Israelite community—may be chosen. Possibly, God himself
must also be consulted: “a king . . . whom the LORD thy God shall choose.”10
The people’s demand for a king is explained by their wish to be “like all
the nations that are round about me.” In Deuteronomy, this expression carries
33
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an extremely negative connotation, as these same nations worship other gods
(cf. 6:14 and 13:8). This expression seems to cast a negative light on the entire
monarchic endeavor. Not only is a king not required, but it seems that according to Deuteronomy, Israel would be better off without one.
Reading on to the next two verses, we see the legal limitations imposed
on the king, which may also be taken as a warning against kingship itself:
16 Only he shall not keep many horses,11 nor cause the people
to return to Egypt, to the end that he should add to his horses;12
forasmuch as the LORD hath said unto you: “Ye shall henceforth
return no more that way.” 17 Neither shall he take many wives,13
that his heart turn not away; neither shall he amass silver and gold
to excess.14

While these interdictions possibly only somewhat limit the king’s attainment
of wealth,15 I find it more likely, especially after the negative connotation of
v. 14, that they cut directly into his political power. Multiple royal marriages
are meant for political and diplomatic alliances,16 horses for the military,17
and silver and gold for the kingdom’s finances. A king limited in these is one
without much power.
Moreover, the only comments positing any specific duty for the king
see him as mainly a role model for all Israelites, without even mentioning any
political power:
18 And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom,
that he shall write for himself18 a copy of this law in a book, by19 the
priests the Levites. 19 And it shall be with him, and he shall read
therein all the days of his life; that he may learn to fear the LORD
his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do
them; 20 that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that
he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to
the left; to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he
and his children, in the midst of Israel.

The king must copy down the law and obey it, just as every citizen must obey
the law. He may not lord it over the citizens because he himself is just that—
“one from among thy brethren,” duty bound to obey the Torah, the law, just
like everyone else. Thus, the conditionality of the law on the one hand and the
limitations on the king’s power on the other hand show that Deuteronomic
law can come to terms with a limited form of monarchy, but would prefer
there to be no king at all.20
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This impression is only strengthened by looking at what is missing from
the passage. No stipulations regarding the king’s political duties or rights are
mentioned in our chapter. This stands in stark contrast to other Ancient Near
Eastern monarchies, in which the king had a prominent role in judgment,
legislation, warfare, and the cult.21 In the Deuteronomic law of the king, on
the other hand, the king has none of these powers.
THE “MANNER” OF THE KING: I SAMUEL 8
While the law of the king in Deuteronomy is implicitly critical of the monarchy, the parallel passage in Samuel—the so-called manner of the king—is
explicitly so. On the one hand, contrary to Deuteronomic law, the rules
governing the monarchy in Samuel give the king much power vis-à-vis his
subjects. But on the other hand, these rules are imbedded in a narrative that is
strikingly clear about its opposition to kingly rule.
When Samuel, prophet and judge, reaches old age, his sons being unworthy to succeed him,22 the people ask him to appoint a king. The prophet
objects, presumably considering the people’s request as a personal affront to
him, and refers the decision to God.23 This the answer he receives:
7 And the LORD said unto Samuel: “Hearken unto the voice of
the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected
thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not be king over
them. 8 According to all the works which they have done since the
day that I brought them up out of Egypt even unto this day, in that
they have forsaken me, and served other gods, so do they also unto
thee. 9 Now therefore hearken unto their voice; howbeit thou shalt
earnestly forewarn them, and shalt declare unto them the manner of
the king that shall reign over them.”

God sees this as a rebellion against himself, not against the current leader.
Although He goes along with the people’s request, he proceeds to command
Samuel to warn them of “the manner of the king”—how most kings behave—
with the hope that the Israelites rescind their request. Samuel then carries out
God’s command:
10 And Samuel told all the words of the LORD unto the people that
asked of him a king. 11 And he said: “This will be the manner of the
king that shall reign over you: he will take your sons, and appoint
them unto him, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and they
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shall run before his chariots. 12 And he will appoint them unto him
for captains of thousands, and captains of fifties; and to plow his
ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war,
and the instruments of his chariots. 13 And he will take your daughters to be perfumers, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. 14 And he
will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even
the best of them, and give them to his servants. 15 And he will take
the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers,
and to his servants. 16 And he will take your men-servants, and your
maid-servants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and
put them to his work. 17 He will take the tenth of your flocks; and
ye shall be his servants. 18 And ye shall cry out in that day because
of your king whom ye shall have chosen you; and the LORD will
not answer you in that day.”

Taken unto itself, this can be read as the legal rights of the king.24 Such a
ruler may recruit his subjects for military or civilian duty, even for his own personal benefit. He may confiscate their land and bestow it as gifts to whomever he
favors. Slaves and animals may be seized for his own use. But even if we consider
the king’s rights as presented by Samuel as legal, it is obvious in the narrative context that such a king is not God’s idea of His chosen ruler.25 God seems to agree
to appoint a monarch mostly as a means to punish the people for their rebellion
against him, if they actually go through with their plan of choosing a king. All
the more so if the passage is not understood as legal at all, but merely an exaggerated threat—this is what the king will do if you actually make the mistake of
anointing one. No law can actually control a corrupt king. And a corrupt king
is what the people deserve for forsaking the almost direct rule of God, with the
prophet-judge Samuel as more intermediary than ruler, for fallible human rule.26
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
As both Deuteronomy 17 and I Samuel 8 accept kingship only grudgingly, it
stands to reason that these texts would be used as proof of the Bible’s support
for modern democracy. In Protestant Christianity, according to Eric Nelson,
this interpretation of the biblical texts may be seen as accompanying the development of democracy since the late sixteenth century.27 In Judaism, it may
even be older, as the best-known such interpretation may be found in Don
Isaac Abravanel’s commentary on Samuel, written in 1484,28 using contemporary Italian models of democracy.29
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However, I contend that when comparing each biblical passage on its
own to the modern notion of democracy, we may discern a stark difference
between Deuteronomy and Samuel. While much of the modern concept is
based on the people being free to decide on their own how to govern themselves, to set their own policy in matters of state, this is not necessarily the case
in the Bible, where monarchy may be frowned upon because it is considered
dangerous to the covenant between God and Israel.
That said, Deuteronomy 17 may still be seen as a precursor to modern
democracy, but I Samuel 8, a passage that served as a religious basis for early
modern republican thinkers, implies a very different worldview. Deuteronomy
17 shows a basic trust in the people, placing the responsibility to uphold the
covenant directly on the public’s shoulders. It is the people who are responsible for appointing the king, while the monarch is just “one from among thy
brethren,” enjoined to remain that way and not lord it over his subjects, as he
is no more and no less than one of their compatriots.
On the other hand, I Samuel 8 stresses how the people’s will directly conflicts with God’s and should therefore not be trusted. It is they who ask for the
king, and God Himself says that they do so in defiance of Him. They do not
appoint the king themselves, but rather turn to their current prophet-leader
to do so.30 Once a king is appointed, he is not expected to take their will into
account, and the fact that God accedes to the people’s demand is more a punishment than an indication that their request is justified or that their opinion
should be taken into account.31
This distinction between the two texts holds up even when we look at
each of them in its own literary context. Deuteronomy as a whole sees the public as responsible for its leadership, while the book of Samuel sees the leader
ship as responsible for the people’s deeds, as I will now show.32
THE CONTEXT OF DEUTERONOMY
The king in Deuteronomy—not only in the passage we have already seen—
does not engage in the standard spheres of action common among his Ancient
Near Eastern colleagues, namely, judgment, legislation, warfare, and the cult.33
While the cult is left to the Levite priests34 and legislation to God Himself,35
we can see in judgment and warfare that the responsibility falls again on
the people.
The Deuteronomic laws governing the judicial system come at the end
of chapter 16 and the beginning of chapter 17, right before the law of the
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king.36 The people are commanded there to appoint local judges (16:18),37
just as they are responsible for appointing the king: “Judges and officers shalt
thou make thee in all thy gates.”38 The king is not mentioned at all in that
passage, nor in any other passage dealing with judges throughout Deuteronomy. In much of the rest of Deuteronomy, justice is carried out by the
local “elders.”39
Regarding warfare, Joshua Berman has shown convincingly that not only
is the king restricted in the size of his army through the prohibition on amassing horses (17:16; see above, “The Law of the King”), but he is also totally
absent from the Deuteronomic laws governing the military (found mainly in
ch. 20).40 It is the people who go to war, referred to—as in most of Deuteronomy—with a second-person pronoun: “When thou goest forth to battle
against thine enemies, and seest horses, and chariots, and a people more than
thou, thou shalt not be afraid of them (20:1).”
The functionaries in charge of the actual warfare are the “officers” [shoterim].41 They announce exemptions from battle (vv. 5–8) and appoint the
actual commanders [sarei tseva’ot; v. 9]. But in Deuteronomy, shoterim are
mentioned with judges as to be appointed by the people (16:18).42 So it is the
public who is ultimately responsible for going to war, just as it is the public
who is referred to as going to war.
This is the case as well in the passages relating to the conquest of Canaan.
Take for example Deuteronomy 7:1–5:
1 When the LORD thy God shall bring thee into the land whither
thou goest to possess it, and shall cast out many nations before
thee . . . 2 and when the LORD thy God shall deliver them up
before thee, and thou shalt smite them; then thou shalt utterly
destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show
mercy unto them; 3 neither shalt thou make marriages with them:
thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt
thou take unto thy son. 4 For he will turn away thy son from following me, that they may serve other gods; so will the anger of the
LORD be kindled against you, and He will destroy thee quickly.

Note especially vv. 3–4: the referent is the average Israelite man; the responsibility for upholding the covenant is on his proverbial shoulders, so the prohibition on intermarriage with Canaanites is relevant to him. But the same
“average Israelite” is referred to throughout the passage, even in the verses
dealing with warfare. The nation as a whole must conquer Canaan and uphold
the covenant; it is their responsibility, not the king’s.
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According to Berman, Deuteronomy should be understood from a political perspective as a shift from an exclusionary power strategy to a collective
one,43 a shift he rightly regards as no less than revolutionary. The real power in
the regime envisioned by Deuteronomy lies not with any one institution, but
in the balance of power between the different positions of leadership (judges,
king, priests, and prophets) and ultimately with the divine laws and the entire
nation’s responsibility in upholding them. It is the entire citizenry—the collective “thou”—who is mandated to appoint both judges and kings. No leader
is inherently superior to the average citizen. Although Berman sees the priests
as a partial exception to this rule, a case can be made that even they are marginalized in the book.44 Thus Berman correctly presents the requirement of
the king to be “one from among thy brethren” (17:15) as implying “that any
Israelite male may be appointed for the task. Lineage is of no concern here,
because the only lineage that counts is that the candidate be one who stands
in covenant with the Almighty—that is to say, everybody. He need only be a
‘brother,’ that is, a citizen like everyone else, a term mentioned twice in this
verse. Potentially, any citizen may serve as king.”45
Thus Deuteronomy empowers the general male populace, rather than
the king, and places on their shoulders the responsibility for upholding the
covenant, including the mandate to appoint leaders—judges and kings—who
will help them in their task. This may indeed be seen as a precursor to some
ideas pertaining to the modern notion of democracy, even while taking into
account the differences between ancient and modern values.
THE CONTEXT OF SAMUEL
The book of Samuel, on the other hand, has a very different attitude toward
the people, just as we have already seen in the “manner of the king” in
I Samuel 8.46 That chapter begins the Saul cycle, describing the rise and fall
of King Saul, Israel’s first king. Saul begins as an unassuming young man who
had no desire for power. As he hailed from the relatively insignificant tribe of
Benjamin47 and had no political or military record to speak of, it took time for
him to be accepted by the people. He is depicted as being first and foremost
God’s choice, and only secondarily the people’s.48 After his kingship was fully
accepted in chapter 12, he began his fall with two sins, both of which entailed
succumbing to public pressure.
Chapters 13–14 discuss the battle of Mikhmas, in which Saul and his
son Jonathan rebelled against their Philistine overlords and banished them
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from the nascent Israelite kingdom. Saul had previously been commanded by the prophet Samuel that when he reaches Gilgal, he must wait
seven days for the prophet to come and offer sacrifices before proceeding. In
the run-up to the actual fighting in chapter 13, Saul reaches Gilgal, but finds
that with each passing day, more and more conscripts desert him:
7 Now some of the Hebrews had gone over the Jordan to the land
of Gad and Gilead; but as for Saul, he was yet in Gilgal, and all the
people followed him trembling. 8 And he tarried seven days, according to the set time that Samuel had appointed; but Samuel came not
to Gilgal; and the people were scattered from him.

Feeling the popular pressure to either fight or surrender immediately,
Saul buckles and offers the sacrifice himself in preparation for battle, disobeying the prophet’s command to wait for him. Samuel arrives immediately afterward, and Saul explains himself by invoking the people:
9 And Saul said: “Bring hither to me the burnt-offering and the
peace-offerings.” And he offered the burnt-offering. 10 And it came
to pass that, as soon as he had made an end of offering the burnt-
offering, behold, Samuel came; and Saul went out to meet him, that
he might salute him. 11 And Samuel said: “What hast thou done?”
And Saul said: “Because I saw that the people were scattered from
me, and that thou camest not within the days appointed, and that
the Philistines assembled themselves together against Michmas;
12 therefore said I: Now will the Philistines come down upon me to
Gilgal, and I have not entreated the favour of the LORD; I forced
myself therefore, and offered the burnt-offering.” 13 And Samuel
said to Saul: “Thou hast done foolishly; thou hast not kept the commandment of the LORD thy God, which He commanded thee; for
now would the LORD have established thy kingdom upon Israel
for ever. 14 But now thy kingdom shall not continue; the LORD
hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the LORD hath
appointed him to be prince over his people, because thou hast not
kept that which the LORD commanded thee.”

It is due to his soldiers scattering that Saul disobeys the prophet. Their actions
warrant, in the eyes of the narrator, a strong leader who will not be influenced
by public pressure.49
In the following narrative, Saul’s battle against the Amalekites in I
Samuel 15, we find Saul again bowing to public pressure. Despite an explicit
divine command to destroy not only the Amalekites themselves but also their

The “Will of the People” in Antimonarchic Biblical Texts

41

livestock, Saul killed all except King Agag,50 but kept the choice animals for
sacrifices. The narrator presents this as a mutual deed of Saul and the people:51
7 And Saul smote the Amalekites, from Havilah as thou goest to
Shur, that is over against52 Egypt. 8 And he took Agag the king of
the Amalekites alive, and utterly destroyed all the people with the
edge of the sword. 9 But Saul and the people spared Agag, and
the best of the sheep, and of the oxen, even the young of the second
birth, and the lambs, and all that was good, and would not utterly
destroy them; but every thing that was of no account and feeble, that
they destroyed utterly.

Saul, too, explains himself to Samuel in this manner:
13 And Samuel came to Saul; and Saul said unto him: “Blessed be
thou of the LORD; I have performed the commandment of the
LORD.” 14 And Samuel said: “What meaneth then this bleating of
the sheep in mine ears, and the lowing of the oxen which I hear?”
15 And Saul said: “They have brought them from the Amalekites; for
the people spared the best of the sheep and of the oxen, to sacrifice
unto the LORD thy God; and the rest we have utterly destroyed.”

Samuel’s subsequent criticism of Saul underscores this point in particular:
16 Then Samuel said unto Saul: “Stay, and I will tell thee what the
LORD hath said to me this night.” And he said unto him: “Say on.”
17 And Samuel said: “Though thou be little in thine own sight, art
thou not head of the tribes of Israel? And the LORD anointed thee
king over Israel; 18 and the LORD sent thee on a journey, and said:
Go and utterly destroy the sinners the Amalekites, and fight against
them until they be consumed. 19 Wherefore then didst thou not
hearken to the voice of the LORD, but didst fly upon the spoil, and
didst that which was evil in the sight of the LORD?”

Verse 17 is the key here: “Though thou be little in thine own sight,
art thou not head of the tribes of Israel? And the LORD anointed thee king
over Israel.” You were appointed by God to lead the people and are therefore
responsible to him, not to them. They must obey your command to implement God’s law, you must not obey their wish to defy it.
Even beyond the Saul cycle, the book of Samuel seems to disregard the
will of the people as a force of its own. Although the appointment of King
David may be seen as involving the people more than that of Saul,53 there
are other instances where the author or editor shows his disdain for popular
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opinion. The strongest examples of these are in the story of Absalom’s rebellion
(II Samuel 15–20).
The story begins with what may look to us moderns as a parody on candidates’ campaign promises:
1 And it came to pass after this, that Absalom prepared54 a chariot
and horses, and fifty men to run before him. 2 And Absalom used
to rise up early, and stand beside the way of the gate; and it was so,
that when any man had a suit which should come to the king for
judgment, then Absalom called unto him, and said: “Of what city
art thou?” And he said: “Thy servant is of one of the tribes of Israel.”
3 And Absalom said unto him: “See, thy matters are good and right;
but there is no man deputed of the king to hear thee.” 4 Absalom
said moreover: “Oh that I were made judge in the land, that every
man who hath any suit or cause might come unto me, and I would
acquit him!”55 5 And it was so, that when any man came nigh to
prostrate himself before him, he put forth his hand, and took hold of
him, and kissed him. 6 And on this manner did Absalom to all Israel
that came to the king for judgment; so Absalom stole the hearts of
the men of Israel.

Absalom promises to acquit all Israel. The absurdity of such a promise
portrays the people as easy prey, believing in the impossible, as long as the
aspiring leader pledges to do something in their interest.56
Throughout the Absalom story as well—each leader in turn sways public
opinion in his own favor: from David to Absalom (15:12–13), back to David
(19:10–18), on to Sheba son of Bichri (19:41–20:2), and back to David again
(implied at the end of chapter 20). Each leader in turn succeeds in persuading
the public that he should lead.57
Sometimes it is unclear where the public stands—compare these two
verses from the beginning of the rebellion:
II Sam 15:13: And there came a messenger to David, saying: “The
hearts of the men of Israel are after Absalom.”
II Sam 15:23: And all the country wept with a loud voice, as all the
people passed over; and as the king passed over the brook Kidron, all
the people passed over, toward the way of the wilderness.

In the first verse, “the men of Israel” follow Absalom; in the second, “all
the country” follows David.58 And this is at the same time! Public opinion is so
capricious that it cannot be trusted to decide anything on its own, let alone to
appoint its own leaders. To turn Winston Churchill on his head, so to speak:59
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Indeed it may be said that according to Samuel, strong monarchy is the worst
form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time.60
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the claim that Deuteronomy 17 may be understood as protodemocratic may be upheld, in line with the outlook of the book as a whole.
I Samuel 8, as much of the rest of that book, on the other hand, while being
antimonarchic in principle, still deems kingship preferable to allowing the
people to actually participate in decision making.61
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1. Again, this article focuses on the ways the Bible dealt with this issue from a theoretical
perspective. For a historical viewpoint on the people as a political force in Ancient Israel,
see Hayim Tadmor, “‘The People’ and the Kingship in Ancient Israel, With My Many
Chariots I Have Gone up the Heights of the Mountains,” in Historical and Literary Studies on Ancient Mesopotamia and Israel (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2011 [article
originally published 1968]), 759–84.
2. For basic references, see lists brought by Joshua A. Berman, Created Equal: How the
Bible Broke with Ancient Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
189n6; Mark O’Brien, “Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22: Meeting the Challenge of Towns
and Nations,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 33 (2008): 155–58. In addition,
see Amnon Shapira, “‘And He Set Judges in the Land Throughout All the . . . Cities of
Judah’ (II Chr. 19:5): An Expression of the Tendency toward Separation of Powers in
Israel,” in Reflections on Jewish Democracy (ed. B. Porat and A. Ravitzky; Jerusalem: Israel
Democracy Institute, 2010), 475–83 [Hebrew]. Shapira deals with the concept of separation of powers, not only with the specific text.
3. Between the law of local judges (Deut 16:18–20) and the law of the higher court
(17:8–13), we find a pericope dealing with forbidden worship practices (16:21–17:1) and
the judicial procedure for prosecuting idolaters (17:2–7). Although the latter is related to
the constitutional law discussed here, the former looks very much out of place, causing
many scholars to propose that it originated elsewhere; see discussion by O’Brien, “Deuteronomy 16,” 162–64, who himself prefers a synchronic solution.
4. Biblical translations in this article are based on the old JPS edition (1917). My deviations from that translation are noted here in the footnotes.
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5. JPS: “thou shalt in any wise set,” as KJV. “Mayst” may be found in Koren. Translation
here is a matter of interpretation. In my opinion, it is extremely unlikely that appointing
a king is considered here a requirement. See below. For sources supporting the JPS-KJV
option, see below, n8.
6. JPS: “set him king,” as KJV and others. Translation here according to NJPS and Koren.
7. JPS does not have the word “one.” Added according to NJPS to parallel the emphatic
 הואat the end of the verse.
8. Here I present a reading of Deuteronomy in which I show the monarchy as optional.
Cf. sources listed below, n20, and also Christophe Nihan, “Rewriting Kingship in Samuel: 1 Samuel 8 and 12 and the Law of the King (Deuteronomy 17),” Hebrew Bible and
Ancient Israel 2 (2013): 328–29. Other readings, of course, exist as well. For the opposite
approach among academic Bible scholars, see, e.g., Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and
the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 168–71; Marvin A. Sweeney, King
Josiah of Judah: The Lost Messiah of Israel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp.
160–63. Both Weinfeld and Sweeney see Deuteronomy as strengthening royal authority
without burdening it with any serious limitations. Annabel Herzog brings an interesting
twist to this dispute, with her equating the biblical idea of “kingship” with the Greek
concept of politics, rather than with a specific, monarchic form of government. If she
is correct, that would render much of this debate moot. See her “‘A King Like All the
Nations’: The Building of Politics in the Hebrew Bible,” Trumah 19 (2009): 15–25. For
a history of this dispute in Jewish law, see Gershon German, “Kingship in Israel: Sovereignty for All Generations in Light of the Halakha and the Halakhic Status of the Laws of
the Knesset,” in Reflections on Jewish Democracy (ed. B. Porat and A. Ravitzky; Jerusalem:
Israel Democracy Institute, 2010), 65–98. Specifically regarding Talmudic literature, see
Yair Lorberbaum, Subordinated King: Kingship in Classical Jewish Literature (Ramat-Gan:
Bar-Ilan University Press, 2008), 50–56 [Hebrew].
9. As the rabbis (Sifre Deuteronomy, piska 157 [Hammer trans., 192]) say, commenting on
v. 15, “a king—but not a queen.” Indeed, the only queen in the Bible to rule on her own
is Athaliah (2 Kgs 11), described in the text as a usurper in every way possible. See Omer
Sergi, “Queenship in Judah Revisited: Athaliah and the Davidic Dynasty in Historical
Perspective,” in Tabou et transgressions (ed. J-M Durand, et al.; Fribourg: Academic, and
Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2015), 111. On the rarity of queens in the Ancient
Near East in general and in Israel in particular, see Sergi, “Queenship,” 106–7. For a more
accepting view of the possibility of queenship in Ancient Israel, see Carol Smith, “‘Queenship’ in Israel?: The Cases of Bathsheba, Jezebel, and Athaliah,” in King and Messiah in
Israel and the Ancient Near East (ed. J. Day; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), 142–62.
10. God’s “choice” here seems to contradict the idea that the appointment of a king is the
people’s responsibility, to the point where some (e.g., A.D.H. Mayes, Deuteronomy [New
Century Bible Commentary; London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1979], 271) suggest
that the idea is a later interpolation. However, synchronic options to solve this problem
definitely exist. The most popular approach in both traditional and modern commentaries is that God really appoints the king, with the people playing a relatively minor role
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in the process. This seems to also be the opinion of the author of Samuel, who has God
appointing both Saul and David directly, with the people merely ratifying His decision.
As I show below in “The Context of Samuel,” this makes sense in the antidemocratic
context of Samuel. However, other possibilities exist, giving the people more of a say in
the matter. According to Nahmanides and Abravanel in their respective commentaries on
Deuteronomy, God’s “choice” is not a specific king at a specific moment, but rather the
general rule at the end of the verse, namely, that God chooses only an Israelite, but not a
foreign, king. Another option would be that the people may appoint someone and only
then ask God if he is worthy, with God ratifying their decision. See also Herzog (“A King,”
19–20), who understands the people as having a pivotal role in the coronations of Saul
and David, contra to what I write here and below (The Will of the People).
11. JPS: “multiply horses to himself,” as most other translations. Amended here
according to NJPS for grammatical considerations. Note the yiqtol+inflected lamed
construct here in all three interdictions, using what Takamitsu Muraoka calls “centripetal lamedh,” which has “reflexive nuance.” But as this is only nuance, conveyed by an
idiom, I prefer translating it as such, and not literally as “to him[self ].” See Takamitsu
Muraoka, “On the So-Called Dativus Ethicus in Hebrew,” Journal of Theological Studies
29 (1978): 495–98; Paul Joon and Takamitsu Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew
(Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 2006), 133d, 459. See also Bruce K. Waltke and
Michael O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 11.2.10d, 208–9.
12. JPS: “multiply horses.”
13. JPS: “multiply wives to himself.” See above, n11.
14. JPS: “greatly multiply to himself silver and gold.” Amended here according to NJPS.
See above, n11.
15. See Sweeney, King Josiah, 159–63.
16. See Patricia Dutcher-Walls, “The Circumscription of the King: Deuteronomy 17:16–
17 in Its Ancient Social Context,” Journal of Biblical Literature 121 (2002): 601–16.
17. See Berman, Created Equal, 58.
18. Following the distinction made by Muraoka in “On the So-Called” (see above, n. 11),
this specific term does not seem idiomatic, as one may write for someone else as well, not
just for oneself.
19. JPS (following KJV): “out of that which is before.” Most scholars thus understand the
preposition [ מלפניmillifnei] as referring to the book—from the book which is before the
priests. However, I follow many others here who understand the preposition as referring
to the act of writing. See discussion in Duane L. Christensen, Word Biblical Commentary:
Deuteronomy 1:1–21:9, Revised (Nashville: Nelson, 2001), 386.
20. See e.g., Jeffrey Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy (Philadelphia: JPS,
1996), 166, who calls the Deuteronomic king “an optional figurehead”; Christensen,
Word Biblical Commentary, 387–88.
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21. Bernard M. Levinson, “Kingship in Deuteronomy,” Vetus Testamentum 51 (2001):
511–34. Levinson refers to the entire book of Deuteronomy, and not only to the law of
the king. See below, “The Context of Deuteronomy.”
22. Note that the people have a positive role here in rejecting Samuel’s unworthy sons,
just as they had such a role in rejecting Eli’s sons (see 1 Sam 2:12–24). See also discussion
on the people’s role in the battle of Mikhmas (1 Sam 13–14) below, n. 49. Compare,
however, the people’s support for Absalom, discussed below, “The Context of Samuel.”
23. 1 Samuel 8:1–6.
24. See Talmudic dispute on this matter in b. Sanhedrin 20b, which is explicitly connected
there to the question whether establishing a monarchy is obligatory (see above, n8; see
also Lorberbaum, Subordinated King, 67–75). On the debate in biblical scholarship, see
survey in Jonathan Kaplan, “1 Samuel 8:11–18 as ‘A Mirror for Princes,’” Journal of Biblical Literature 131 (2012): 626–29. Kaplan himself (629ff.) compares this passage with
Babylonian literature to show how this is a warning against kingly excesses, not a list of a
monarch’s legal rights. Other scholars use comparative material from other sources to come
to the opposite conclusion. See, based on Hittite texts, David T. Tsumura, The First Book
of Samuel (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 254–55. Elsewhere in this article,
see also Herzog, “A King,” as well as Ben-Barak and Hazony, both discussed below, n25.
25. See Zafrira Ben-Barak, “‘The Manner of the King’ and ‘The Manner of the Kingdom’: Basic Factors in the establishment of the Israelite Monarchy in the Light of Canaanite Kingship” (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1972), 241–43. According to
Ben-Barak, the authority given the king in “the manner of the king” is accepted Canaanite
practice, while the goal of the prophet Samuel is to avoid such negative foreign influence. A similar approach, based more on political theory than on Ancient Near Eastern
comparisons, may be found in John Mauchline, 1 and 2 Samuel (New Century Bible;
London: Oliphants, 1971), 89–92; see also Yoram Hazony, “The Jewish Origins of the
Western Disobedience Tradition,” Azure 4 (1998): 35–36. For them, “the manner of the
king” is the inevitable outcome of the establishment of any centralized state, although, for
Hazony, Samuel’s warning was actually partially successful, and despite the establishment
of the Israelite monarchy, a tradition of limiting his authority was established in Israel. For
Herzog (“A King,” n8, 24–25), this is an unavoidable feature of any noncharismatic form
of government, as in politics the rulers are inherently a power distinct from the people.
26. On the rule of God as ideal here and its Mesopotamian background, see Dale
Launderville, “Anti-Monarchical Ideology in Israel in Light of Mesopotamian Parallels,”
in Imagery and Imagination in Biblical Literature: Essays in Honor of Aloysius Fitzgerald,
F.S.C. (ed. L. Boadt and M.S. Smith; Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association
of America, 2001), 119–28. See also Menachem Ratson, Theocracy and Humanity: The
Political and Social Principles in the Thought of R. Abraham Ibn Ezra (Tel-Aviv: Resling,
2012), 21–44 [Hebrew], who stressed this theme regarding biblical kingship.
27. See Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010),
esp. 26–56.
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28. See Isaac Abravanel, Commentary on the Prophets, vol. 2: Samuel (Hebrew; ed.
Y. Shaviv; Jerusalem: Horev, 579), in the colophon to his commentary on the book. Abravanel’s stance on monarchy may be found in his commentary to 1 Samuel 8 (95–104 in
the Shaviv edition). For an English discussion of his view, see Benzion Netanyahu, Don
Isaac Abravanel: Statesman and Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998 [5th
edition]), 173ff.
29. For the influence of contemporary Italian democracy on Abravanel, see Abraham
Melamed, Wisdom’s Little Sister: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political
Thought (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2012), 137–39, 230–33, 274.
30. The idea of God directly appointing the king may actually be based on Deuteronomy.
See discussion above, n10.
31. Cf. Lorberbaum, Subordinated King, esp. 14 (regarding 1 Sam 8) and 39–44 (regarding Deut 17).
32. This is true especially if one of the texts was written as a response to the other. See
Nihan, “Rewriting Kingship,” 322–39 (esp. sources cited 326, nn32–35).
33. See for example the reference to Levinson, “Kingship.”
34. The king is never mentioned in a cultic function, and the closest thing to such an
idea is at the end of the “law of the king,” where the monarch must copy “this law . . .
before the priests the Levites.” In my opinion, this just emphasizes the lack of monarchic
authority over the cult—in the mandated interaction between the king and the priests, it
is they who are responsible for him to fulfill his duty.
35. As for legislation, Deuteronomy posits that God himself creates the laws, delivering
them to the people through Moses. On the significance of the concept of divine legislation vis-à-vis the positions of political power in Deuteronomy 16:18–18:22, see Peter T.
Vogt, Deuteronomic Theology and the Significance of Torah: A Reappraisal (Winona Lake:
Eisenbrauns, 2006), 225–26. New laws, if any are to be added at all, are to be similarly
handed down from God through later prophets (Deut 18:15–18). In the context of
this passage, the comparison with Moses seems to imply that later prophets may convey
new laws as directed by God, Deuteronomy 4:2 and 13:1 notwithstanding. See Peter C.
Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 129–30. However,
many scholars, as well as most traditional Jewish exegetes, maintain that the verse here
does not refer to actual legislation, but at most to ad hoc instructions. See, for example,
Richard D. Nelson, Deuteronomy: A Commentary (Old Testament Library; Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 2002), 169–70, 235; compare Tigay, Deuteronomy, 43–44. In
either case, God is the sole legislator. The king, as I have already shown, is admonished
to obey the divine laws, but in no way may he be seen as legislating them. But neither do
the people legislate; their sole responsibility, just as the king’s, is to obey the laws.
36. See above, n3.
37. On the other hand, judges on the higher, national-level court (17:8–13) are not
appointed by the people, nor are they responsible to the people. Rather, their appointment
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is not mentioned at all in Deuteronomy, and it seems they are part of the Temple hierarchy
(as they include Levite priests), while the people are just commanded to obey them. See
below, n44.
38. Emphasis here and in all other biblical quotes is mine.
39. See Timothy M. Willis, The Elders of the City: A Study of the Elders-Laws in Deuteronomy (Atlanta: SBL, 2001), 308–11. Willis sees the elders-laws as pre-Deuteronomic
laws incorporated into Deuteronomy and expanded to convey a national perspective,
broader than their supposed original context in a clan-based society.
40. See Berman, Created Equal, 57–58, including n22.
41. A priest is also mentioned, in vv. 2–4, but it seems that his role is mainly to give the
troops moral and spiritual encouragement. The actual operational issues begin in v. 5,
with the introduction of the “officers.”
42. Just as when Moses seeks to appoint judges and officers in Deuteronomy 1:9–15,
he asks the people to nominate them. Note that elsewhere in the Bible, officers may be
subservient to specific rulers, as are the Israelites appointed as enforcers by their Egyptian
taskmasters (Exod 5:14) or various officers mentioned in Chronicles (I 27:1; II 19:11; II
26:11; II 34:13).
43. Berman, Created Equal, 53–56. He defines an exclusionary power strategy as one that
entails monopolization of the sources of power, and a collective power strategy as one
where the source of power is a bureaucratic management structure governed by a code
of law (54).
44. See my “Deuteronomy: Religious Centralization or Decentralization?” on the TABS
website: http://thetorah.com/deuteronomy-religious-centralization-or-decentralization/
(accessed January 9, 2017), in the sections entitled “Limiting the Power of the Levite
Priests” and “Secularization or Sacralization?” and sources cited therein. This would
entail, of course, marginalizing those aspects of power the priests retain in Deuteronomy,
such as sitting on the higher court (see above, n37). Cf. Berman, Created Equal, 65–66.
45. Berman, Created Equal, 60–61.
46. I should note here that much of critical scholarship sees two literary strands in
Samuel, separated by their incompatible attitudes towards kingship. My discussion here
shows what I see as a preferable alternative, namely, that Samuel shows a complex view
of the monarchy, rather than two simplistic ones. See discussion in V. Philips Long, The
Reign and Rejection of King Saul: The Case for Literary and Theological Coherence (Atlanta:
Scholars, 1989), 176–83.
47. As Saul himself says (1 Sam 9:21), “Am not I a Benjamite, of the smallest of the tribes
of Israel? and my family the least of all the families of the tribe of Benjamin?”
48. After Saul’s public coronation by Samuel, he still had his opponents (1 Sam 10:27),
who were powerful enough to warrant a second such ceremony (1 Sam 11:14–15)
after Saul’s victory over the Ammonites, in which Samuel reprimands the people for
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demanding a king, while reiterating the divine choice of Saul to fill that role (chap. 12).
Thus Saul’s acceptance by the people is framed by his divine appointment, which is obviously the more significant of the two.
49. In this story, the people have a positive role as well, as they save the hero, Jonathan,
from death at the hands of his father King Saul, after the latter had sworn to execute
him (1 Sam 14:24ff ). See Hezi Cohen, “Jonathan’s Lot,” in Studies in Biblical Literature
and Jewish Exegesis Presented to Professor Rimon Kasher (ed. M. Avioz, et al.; Atlanta: SBL,
2013), 110–11 [Hebrew].
50. It is unclear why Saul spared Agag. Obviously, he did not do this for moral or humane
reasons, as he did not spare women or children. See Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical
Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 490.
51. It is probably more accurate to say that sparing Agag was Saul’s initiative and sparing
the animals’ was the people’s. See Yoel Bin-Nun, “‘Masa Agag’: The Sin of Shaul with
Amalek,” Megadim 7 (1989): 61 [Hebrew].
52. JPS: “in front of.” Translation here according to KJV, RSV, and Koren.
53. The people’s love for David is stressed in and immediately following the Goliath story
(1 Sam 18:6–7, 14–16), and his coronations over Judah (2 Sam 2:1–4) and all Israel (2
Sam 5:1–3) were initiated by the people. However, in these cases God’s support is taken
in the book as a given, and the people’s action is seen as an affirmation of the success
promised by God (see esp. 1 Sam 18:14–16). Cf. the people’s role in the episode of Saul’s
oath (above, n49).
54. JPS (as most other translations): “prepared him.” See grammatical discussion above, n11.
55. JPS, following KJV: “Do him justice.” Koren, Douay-Rheims, and RSV all have
similar translations. This follows the interpretation common among traditional Jewish
exegetes, following the Targum, that Absalom promises to give everyone a fair trial, implying that David does not do so. However, this does not fit with the Hebrew והצדקתיו. Of
the eleven appearances of the hif ’il form of the root  צדקin the Bible outside this verse,
at least nine definitely mean “to acquit” (Exod 23:7; Deut 25:1; I Kgs 8:32; Isa 5:23,
50:8–9; Ps 82:3; Prov 17:15; Job 27:5; 2 Chr 6:23), the other two (Isa 53:11; Dan 12:3)
being ambiguous but not resembling our verse at all. Abravanel explains the verse this
way, based on Avot DeRabbi Natan (Version B, 45:5), and thus NJPS has “I would see
that he got his rights.” Most modern scholars interpret the text this way as well. See, e.g.,
Jan P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art and Poetry in the Books of Samuel, volume 1: King David
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1981), 167–68.
56. The absurdity here is likely what gave rise to the traditional understanding of the
verse, discussed above, n55. However, we of more electionary experience may actually
find the parody startlingly true to life.
57. On this story, see Tadmor, “The People,” 763–71, who brings a historical perspective
on the meaning of “the people” in each situation, but I do not think that this discounts
the literary aspect of the term I discuss here.
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58. See also the ambivalent and/or contradictory uses of “all the people,” “the people of
Israel,” etc., in 17:3, 18:1–7, 18:16, 19:3–9, 20:15–22.
59. See Richard Langworth, ed., Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations (Philadelphia: Public Affairs, 2008), 574: “Indeed it has been said that democracy
is the worst form. . . .”
60. On this point I agree with David Janzen, The Necessary King: A Postcolonial Reading
of the Deuteronomistic Portrait of the Monarchy (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2013). However, Janzen reads Deuteronomy in light of Samuel, as part of the Deuteronomistic History (Deuteronomy-Kings) rather than as two separate entities, and as positive in general
towards the monarchy as a means of upholding the covenant in the face of a disobedient
nation. In addition, he does not stress enough the idea that in an ideal world, even for the
pro-Davidic book of Samuel, monarchy would theoretically detract from the covenant.
61. I deliberately refrain here from discussing above the historical implications of my
thesis, as I think that there are many possibilities to understand the relationship between
the two biblical books, and determining the correct one is beyond the scope of this article.
Nihan, “Rewriting, Kingship,” 338–39) sees Samuel as rejecting Deuteronomy as being
too utopian. However, one may just as easily claim that it is Deuteronomy that rejects
Samuel as dangerously allowing evil tyrants to ascend the throne; or, alternatively, that
the two books do not actually refer to each other. Thus, the reconstruction of this part of
Israelite intellectual history cannot rely on their political differences alone.

The Democratic Principle Underlying Jewish Law:
Moving Beyond Whether It Is So
to How and Why It Is So
David Brodsky

INTRODUCTION
This essay will look at several aspects of democracy and Judaism. First, I shall
trace some of the political theory that I deem to be native to the Bible, showing that it has much in common with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of the
social contract. Second, I shall demonstrate that it is not a modern imposition
to read Rousseau into the text. Indeed, Rousseau himself acknowledges that he
owes much of this theory to the Bible. Be that as it may, one could argue that
the rabbis of the Talmudic period would not have thought to read the Bible
in this Rousseauian way. Nevertheless, I shall show that the rabbis very much
read the Torah as a social contract a la Rousseau.1
Furthermore, we shall see that the rabbis advocated rule by the majority
—as is well known by scholars of rabbinic literature. In the second part of the
essay, I shall demonstrate that this seemingly rabbinic democratic principle
was not a belief that the majority should get to decide what the laws ought
to be, but rather a product of their recognition that the oral system of transmission is inherently flawed and therefore we follow the majority since they
are most likely to preserve correctly what the law always already was. Having
robbed us of the notion of the rabbis as our democratic heroes in terms of their
principle of majority rule, I shall replace it with what I believe to be a more
profound principle within liberal democracy expressed by Jürgen Habermas,
Robert Goodin, and Michael Morrell, that a healthy democracy needs a citizen
body who can see matters from outside of their own perspective and take into
consideration the needs of other members of society thereby.2
Here I shall show that, whether intentional or not, the give-and-take of the
Talmudic sugya [i.e., the Talmudic passage, which often is a dialectical explanation of opposing legal positions] inculcates in those who study it precisely this
ability to see matters from multiple perspectives, to empathize with the needs of
others, and to take those needs into account thereby. In this sense, then, whether
or not rabbinic Judaism is truly democratic, the study of rabbinic Judaism, and
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the Talmud in particular, can be seen as developing precisely the kind of citizen
body that Habermas, Goodin, and Morrell find so essential for democracy.
Here, I am not claiming that everyone who studies Talmud will come out an
empathetic, democratic citizen, just as not every parent who practices yoga
develops a sense of inner peace and henceforth stops screaming at their children.
But I am saying that when studied with the proper guidance, Talmudic study
can be used to inculcate these crucial skills, and this inculcation may well have
been intended by the authors and redactors of the Talmudic sugya.3
Jacob Neusner has written a seminal book on the Mishnah as political theory, and I would be remiss to ignore it.4 Neusner is focused on those
aspects of the Mishnah that sanction the use of force: “judicial acts of killing, judicial infliction of injury, confiscation of valued property and services,
ostracism and exclusion.”5 Neusner sees these as a rabbinic exercise of political power, and therefore he reads the Mishnah as a book of rabbinic political
theory. In this essay, I am interested in a related but separate question: Can
rabbinic Judaism be described as democratic or promoting democratic values,
and, if so, in what ways (with a special focus on Talmud and discourse ethics)?
Neusner takes to task scholars who treat the politics of rabbinic literature
as a whole or, even worse, of Judaism as a whole, arguing that each period and
each document needs to be read in its own light. Neusner, of course, is correct that scholars should not conflate the various texts, authors, and periods
with one another and that scholars need to hear their separate and distinct
voices from one another. That said, his warning should not mean that each
scholarly article and book can address only a single document. Scholars can
write articles about the changing vicissitudes of rabbinic and Jewish perspectives on political topics without falling into the pitfall of assuming that all of
the texts share the same opinion or that any Jewish text from any one period
can be used as evidence for the attitudes of other Jewish texts and authors from
other periods and cultures. Here I hope not to be conflating the sources and
their disparate attitudes as I show how select Israelite/Jewish attitudes related
to democracy develop and change over time.
THE TORAH AS SOCIAL CONTRACT
The Bible offers mixed messages as to which form of government to prefer.
On the one hand, the book of Judges ends with a cautionary tale of chaos and
mayhem, which the author explains by stating, “In those days there was no king
in Israel. Everyone did what was right in their own eyes” (Judg 21:25), seeming
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to privilege a monarchical form of government.6 On the other hand, when the
people request a king not long thereafter in the book of Samuel (1 Sam 8; cf.
Deut 17:14–20), God is said to see it as a betrayal of him as king, and he has
Samuel warn the people with a scathing rebuke of monarchy that the king will
take their sons to be warriors and laborers and their daughters to be servants,
tax their produce, and ultimately make the people into his slaves, concluding,
“And you will cry out on that day from before your king whom you chose for
yourselves, but the Lord will not answer you on that day” (1 Sam 8:18).
Whether or not the Bible as a whole can be classified as pro-or antimonarchy, what is clear is that the Torah is set up as a kind of social contract that
the people accept upon themselves.7 Thus, the central scene of the revelation at
Sinai constitutes an important transition from the narrative part of the Torah
to the legal section, using the story of both the creation and the exodus from
Egypt to justify the validity of the legal section that follows. After freeing the
children of Israel from slavery in Egypt, God appears before them on Mount
Sinai and gives them a set of laws. The first thing God declares is, “I am the
Lord your God who took you out of the land of Egypt from the house of slavery” (Exod 20:2). God then goes on to declare that they may have no other
gods before him and then to give them a lengthy set of laws, beginning with
the Ten Commandments, but then moving on from there to a larger set of civil
law. In other words, Exodus 20 establishes God’s bona fides as lawgiver on the
basis that God was the one who gave the Israelites their freedom in the first
place. If laws are inherently impositions on the pure freedom of citizens, then
here Exodus 20 is saying that God has the right to infringe on their freedom
because God was the one who gave them that freedom in the first place. In
fact, the biblical story began a book earlier with God creating the world and
the human population along with it, which Exodus 20 conveniently reminds
us when we get to the commandment to keep the Sabbath (Exod 20:9–11).
God not only gave the people their freedom but their very lives and the world
they live in as well. In that sense, the whole story has been building towards
this moment to set God up as ultimate lawgiver (and here I am only slightly
modifying Rashi’s famous opening question and answer in his commentary
on the Torah).8
Indeed, in the section on “The Legislator” in his book on The Social
Contract (2:7), Rousseau acknowledged that the ideal lawgiver would be God
and that the “Judaic law” establishes God as such.9 Not only does the Bible set
up God as the ultimate lawgiver in a Rousseauian sense, but it also sets up the
event at Mount Sinai as a social contract also in the Rousseauian sense (The
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Social Contract 1:6 “The Social Compact”). Thus, immediately following the
giving of the law in Exodus 20–23 on Mount Sinai, where the entire nation
was assembled, we are told that “Moses came and told the people all the words
of the Lord and all the laws, and all the nation answered with one voice and
they said, ‘Everything which the Lord has said, we shall do’” (Exod 24:3; cf.
Exod 24:7 and Deut 5:27). That is, Exodus makes sure to note that all the
people were present and each and every person ratified the law. As Rousseau
explains the social compact:
This sum of forces can be produced only by the combination of
many; but the strength and freedom of each man being the chief
instruments of his survival, how can he pledge them without doing
harm to himself, and without neglecting the concern he owes to
himself? This difficulty, applied to my subject, may be expressed in
these terms:—
“To find a form of association that may defend and protect with
the whole force of the community the person and property of every
associate, and by means of which each, joining together with all,
may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before.”
Such is the fundamental problem of which the social contract provides the solution. . . . These clauses, rightly understood, can be
reduced to a single one, namely, the total alienation to the whole
community of each associate with all his rights.10

Here, of course, Rousseau is interested in the contract between the members of the community, while the Torah is interested in the compact/covenant
between the people of Israel and God, as David Novak has rightfully noted.11
With that important caveat in mind, Rousseau’s theory is quite informative.
Indeed, modern scholars are not the first to see a social compact in the giving
of the law on Mt. Sinai. Rabbinic literature also recognizes people’s acceptance
of God’s laws on Mt. Sinai as a formal social contract (or covenant) that the
people were entering. The Babylonian Talmud (Šabb. 88a) preserves a particularly fascinating and revealing analysis of this issue:
“And they stood at the foot of the mountain” (Exod 19:17). Rav
Avdimi bar H
․ ama bar H
․ asa said, “This teaches that the Holy One
Blessed Be He overturned the mountain upon them like a barrel and
said to them ‘If you receive the Torah, well and good, and, if not,
this will be your grave.’”
Rav Ah․a bar Yaakov said, “But then we have here a strong protest against the Torah!”
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Rava said, “Nevertheless, they accepted it again in the time of
Ahasuerus, as it is written, ‘the Jews fulfilled [qiyyemu] and received
[qibbelu]’ (Est 9:27), they fulfilled what they had already received.”

When Rav Avdimi interprets the verse “and they stood at the foot [tah
․tit]
of the mountain” (Exod 19:17) quite literally as they stood under [tah
tit]
․ the
12
mountain (thus Rashi on Exod 19:17), weaving a creative midrash from it
that God took the mountain and held it over their heads (making them literally under it) and threatened them that either they accept the Torah or he
would drop the mountain on top of them, Rav Ah
․a bar Yaakov immediately
realizes the deeper legal problem underlying this ostensibly cute midrash: if
so, that would negate the covenant since it would then have been made under
duress! In other words, for Rav Ah
․a, if we allow Rav Avdimi’s midrash to
stand, the Torah would not be binding since the compact between God and
Israel was originally made under duress, and contracts made under duress are
by definition invalid. Rava fails to find a way to redeem the Sinaitic moment
for this midrash and ultimately has to find another moment in time when the
Torah was ratified by the entire people, albeit a millennium later in the time
of Esther and Mordechai.
I would argue that Rava finds this other moment in which the covenant
was ratified through a creative reading of the grammar of Esther 9:27. The
verse reads “The Jews fulfilled [qiyyemu] and received [ve-qibbelu] upon themselves and their seed . . . that they should keep these two days according to
their writing.” Read in the context of the rest of the verse, these opening words
are discussing Mordechai and Esther’s new laws regarding the observance of
the festival of Purim. In that case, however, it should have stated that the
Jews “established [heqimu]” this new law (in the hiph‘il) rather than “fulfilled
[qiyyemu]” it (using the pi‘el, as the author did). Following the famous midrash
on the order of the words na‘aseh ve-nishma‘ [we will do and we will hear] in
Exod 24:7, many scholars understand Rava’s midrash here as similarly deriving
from the order of the words qiyyemu ve-qibbelu.13 I would argue, however, that
the ungrammaticality of the use of the pi‘el in this verse is more conducive of
Rava’s interpretation than merely the perhaps problematic order of the verbs
(although these exegetical devices are not mutually exclusive).
For Rava, I would argue, this verse implies a midrashic fulfillment or
ratification (pi‘el: qiyyemu) of a preexisting law (the Torah) in addition to these
words as read in context, which formulates the establishment (hiph‘il: heqimu)
of a new law (the festival of Purim). In this way, he is able to find a verse that
will allow Rav Avdimi to keep his midrash while still maintaining the notion

56

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

that the Torah is binding for Jews in his own day (and had been for many
centuries, even if not going all the way back to Mt. Sinai). Here we see what
is really at stake for Rava: not that the Torah always was a binding social contract, but that the Torah is a binding social contract for the Jews of his day (and
for some time prior). That is, Rava cares that even for Rav Avdimi, the Torah
must be a binding social contract in present actuality. Perhaps, following Rav
Avdimi, King David was not bound by the Torah, but Rava’s own constituents
are bound by the Torah (and by him thereby)! This is in keeping with Rava’s
attitude elsewhere (b. Mak. 22b) in which he complains that people stand for
the Torah scroll but not for the sage who interprets it, mediating the Torah’s
meaning thereby! At stake for Rava in defining the authority of the Torah,
then, is the authority of the sages of his own day. Of less concern, then, would
be determining whether ancient Israelites who long preceded him were technically bound by the Torah.
Notice that I am not arguing that Rava necessarily himself accepted
Rav Avdimi’s midrash nor that Rava considered this midrash to be the only
way that Sinaitic moment could or should be read. Rather, I am arguing that
Rava accepted Rav Ah
․a’s claim that the Torah is a form of a social contract
and therefore that it is binding only if it was freely ratified by all the people,
following the laws of contracts. Novak, in contrast, seems to read this Talmudic passage as concluding not just for Rav Avdimi, but as a whole, that the
covenant at Sinai was forced upon the Israelites.14 Indeed, Novak seems to
consider this rabbinic position—that the Torah was forced upon them at Sinai
and that they did not ratify it willingly until the Second Temple period—to be
historically accurate, understanding ancient Israelite society to have changed
from the time when the Israelites received the Torah at Sinai to when they were
under the rule of Ahasuerus.15 I, on the other hand, read this passage as merely
salvaging Rav Avdimi and his midrash, though in the course of it teaching the
larger rabbinic principle that a contract is not binding if it was entered into
under duress. This principle, I believe, holds true for both the rabbis and, as
we have seen, the authors of the Sinaitic story, though the principle comes into
conflict with the Sinaitic covenant only if we follow Rav Avdimi’s midrash.
Rav Aha’s challenge, therefore, stands as theory: the rabbis recognize that
the Torah can be binding only if it was accepted as a social contract by the
entire people without coercion. It is not enough for the Bible or the rabbis
that God, the omnipotent and omniscient, gave the people the law. Rather,
both recognize that the law had to be ratified by the people following the
norms of contract law. In this way, while neither the Bible nor the rabbis of the
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Talmudic period are exactly democratic, they do fit in certain basic ways with
democratic theory. In what follows, I shall explore some of those ways, assessing not just if the rabbis are democratic, but also some of the ways in which
they fit with various forms of modern democratic theory.
THE PRINCIPLE OF RULE BY THE MAJORITY
IN RABBINIC LITERATURE
The Mishnah states quite clearly that the law follows the majority:
1:4 And why do they mention the words of Shammai and Hillel
for naught [i.e., even when the tradition does not follow them]?
To teach future generations that a person should not stand on
his words [i.e., be uncompromising], for the fathers of the world
[i.e., Shammai and Hillel] did not stand on their words [i.e., they
compromised].
1:5 And why do they mention the words of the individual along
with the majority when the halakhah follows only the majority? So that
if a court will see the words of the minority, they will [be able to] rely on
it. For a court cannot nullify the words of its fellow court unless it
is greater than it in wisdom and number. If it was greater than it in
wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, it cannot
nullify its words until it is greater than it in wisdom and number.
1:6 R. Judah said, “If so, why do they mention the words of the
individual along with the majority for naught? So that if a person
should say, ‘thus I received it [kakh ani mequbbal],’ he will say to him
‘like the words of So-and-So you heard.’”16

Strangely, the Mishnah never tells us why it advocates following the majority,
mentioning it only in passing to go on to discuss why the minority position is
recorded if the law is to follow the majority. It offers two answers to that question: the majority opinion, that the minority opinion is preserved so that a
later court of equal or greater number and wisdom can revive the minority
position,17 and a minority opinion, that the minority position is recorded
should someone claim that they received this position as the tradition [kakh
ani mequbbal], we can tell them that it is the minority position and therefore
not to be followed (m. ‘Ed. 1:6). Of course, this latter position is somewhat
ironic, since it itself is recorded as the minority position, and therefore by its
own rules may not be followed! Nevertheless, in answering “Thus I received
it [kakh ani mequbbal],” it points to an important aspect of the democratic
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principle in rabbinic literature (that of oral transmission) to which we shall
return shortly when we discuss the story of Akavia b. Mehalalel in Mishnah
‘Eduyyot 5:6–7.
Following on the notion of majority rule, people often quote the famous
story of R. Eliezer and the oven of Akhnai in the Talmud (B. Mes․i‘a 59a–b),
in which R. Eliezer declares an oven made of pieces that had become impure
to be pure if it is taken apart, sand is put in between the parts, and it is put
back together again. The majority, in contrast, declare it still impure even after
this process. Logic would dictate that R. Eliezer should be correct: destroying
and rebuilding a vessel is one way to purify it, as new vessels are automatically
clean.18 Nevertheless, the majority ruled (or recalled the ruling—more on this
below) against him. R. Eliezer then offers a series of miraculous proofs to support his position, declaring that if he is correct, may the nearby tree uproot
itself, may the water in the canal reverse its path, may the walls of the study
hall cave in. Each time, the earthly elements do his bidding to show their support. Each time, however, the rabbis retort that such supernatural phenomena
do not constitute legitimate legal evidence, and, indeed, the walls ultimately
stop falling, out of respect for R. Joshua, though neither do they right themselves again, out of respect for R. Eliezer.
Finally, R. Eliezer calls on heaven itself to support him, whereupon a voice
is heard from heaven declaring that the law is indeed as R. Eliezer had declared.
Not to be deterred, however, R. Joshua counters with a verse from the Torah
itself, declaring, “It is not in heaven!” In its original biblical context in Deuteronomy 30:11–18, this verse is declaring that the law is not far away, not in
heaven or across the sea, that the Israelites should have an excuse should they
not follow it. At the hands of R. Joshua, however, the verse is instead brought to
declare to heaven itself that the Torah is no longer in heaven for God to determine the law! It is now on earth, and it follows a process: the majority rules.
In a later Aramaic addition to the story, God is said to have laughed when he
heard R. Joshua’s creative use of this verse, declaring: my children have defeated
me, my children have defeated me! In fact, in explaining R. Joshua’s exegesis
of Deuteronomy 30:12 that the Torah is not in heaven anymore, R. Jeremiah
offers his own creative exegesis of Exodus 23:2 as the basis for majority rule.
Exodus 23:2 states, “You shall not follow the majority in wrongdoing; and you
shall not testify concerning a quarrel to take sides, inclining towards the majority
[alternatively: and you shall not testify concerning a quarrel to incline towards
the majority, leading astray].” R. Jeremiah lifts out the last clause of the verse
“inclining towards the majority” from its context and completely rereads it
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thereby as a declaration of the principle of rule by majority, in spite of the fact
that, in context, the verse is the continuation of the previous clauses not to take
sides in a quarrel by inclining towards the majority!
In any case, in popular retellings of the story of the oven of Akhnai, people often end the story there, and, indeed, ended there, the point of the story
does seem to be that the rabbinic system is democratic. The story, however,
does not end with this declaration. Rather, the Talmud goes on to recount
that Rabban Gamaliel, the patriarch, had R. Eliezer excommunicated, which
left R. Eliezer’s feelings so hurt that one third of the produce of the world was
stricken and destroyed by his grief. When Rabban Gamaliel later attempted a
voyage across the sea, he was nearly drowned by the raging sea. Later, Rabban
Gamaliel’s sister, who happened also to be R. Eliezer’s wife, would always guard
her husband carefully to make sure that he was not afforded the opportunity
to fall in supplication to God over his grief from his excommunication. When
once, out of piety to give charity, she turned her back on her husband and he
fell in supplication to God, she knew instantly that her brother was dead, since
she had been taught in her father’s home that all the gates of heaven are locked
except for the gates of wounded feelings. And with that profound moral lesson, the story comes to an abrupt and final conclusion.19
This latter part of the story is intended to show the devastating effects of
hurting people’s feelings, even when one is in the right, meaning that God will
punish even the majority who rule against the minority if they hurt the feelings of that minority. Nevertheless, to make that point, this story does indeed
assume that rabbinic law follows the majority, revealing the democratic nature
of Rabbinic Judaism. The question for us is, why did the rabbis believe that
they should follow the majority? What was their rationale for establishing such
a democratic system, and what might that rationale teach us about the nature
of their system?
Here the story of Akavia b. Mehalalel in Mishnah ‘Eduyyot 5:6–7 is particularly insightful:
5:6 Akavia b. Mehalalel testified about four things.
They said to him, “Akaviah, retract regarding those four things
that you used to say and we shall make you the head of the court
over all Israel.”
He said to them, “Better that I should be called an imbecile all
my days than that I should become wicked before the Omnipresent
for even one hour, that they should not say, ‘he retracted for the sake
of the office.’” . . .
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They excommunicated him and he died thus excommunicated,
and the court stoned his coffin.
R. Judah said, “God forbid that Akavia was excommunicated!
For the [divine] courtyard is not locked before any person among
Israel with wisdom and fear of sin such as Akavia b. Mehalalel!” . . .
5:7 When he was dying, he said to his son, “My son, retract
regarding the four things that I used to say.”
[His son] said to him, “Then why did you not retract?”
[Akavia] said to him, “I heard it from the majority and they
heard it from the majority. I stood [firm] on what I had heard and
they stood [firm] on what they had heard. But you heard it from the
mouth of an individual and [a different opinion] from the mouths
of the majority. It is better to let go of the words of the individual
and to embrace the words of the majority.”
[His son] said to him, “Father, appoint me as one of your peers.”
[Akavia] said to him, “I shall not appoint you.”
[His son] said to him, “Have you found a falsehood in me?”
[Akavia] said to him, “No, but your deeds will draw you near
and your deeds will draw you away.”

Akavia is excommunicated by his colleagues for holding fast to his legal position and refusing to accept the opinion of the majority. Even being offered to
be head of the court should he change his position is not enough to sway him,
declaring that he would rather be called a fool his entire life than spend even
one moment in wickedness. In a surprising and moving deathbed scene, Akavia asks his son not to follow his (Akavia’s) ruling, to which his son responds
by asking his father why he did not himself follow the law of the majority if
that is what he wants his son to do. In one of the more revealing passages of
the Mishnah, Akaviah explains, “I heard it from the majority, and they heard
it from the majority. I stood by what I heard, and they stood by what they
heard. But you have heard it from an individual and [the opposite position]
from the majority. It is better to let go of the words of the individual and hold
onto the words of the majority.” That is, Akavia is not committed to his law
so much as to the process.
Indeed, we learn from his statement that the ruling never was his in the
first place. It was merely his recollection of what he had received from the
previous generation. Here we learn from him the purpose of majority rule: in
a culture of oral transmission, where memories can err, the majority is to be
trusted to be most likely to remember the tradition correctly. Majority rule
in the Mishnah, then, is not democracy in the sense that the majority get to
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decide the laws that they wish to have. Rather, it is following the majority in
having the most likely memory of the law as they inherited it. In this sense,
then, the rabbis are far from democratic, or their democratic nature is particular to their self-acknowledged faulty memories.
We should add here, however, that when the rabbis fail to have a received
tradition regarding a case, they are then free to use logic to extrapolate from a
received tradition to the case at hand, and such an extrapolation would seem
to need to be accepted by the majority (see m. Ker. 3:7–10 and m. Yebam. 8:3).
Thus, in the absence of received tradition on a topic, there is a democratic
process of sorts that takes place in the rabbinic system. Similarly, we should
acknowledge that Mishnah Sanhedrin outlines a system of courts of varying
sizes in which the ruling follows the majority of judges.20
While these are all definitely very real forms of democratic process within
rabbinic Judaism, they are not as prominent in the Mishnah (and even the
Talmud) as the oral tradition itself and the democratic system underlying that
tradition. The Mishnah in its entirety is an oral tradition transmitted from
person to person through the generations. We learn from the story of Akavia
b. Mahalalel that that system is democratic primarily if not exclusively because
of the problematics of memory. Indeed, the very word halakhah, often loosely
translated by modern scholars as “Jewish law,” literally means a “walking,” or,
I would argue, a “transmission,” and is used in the Mishnah to reference material that has been transmitted orally from teacher to student (e.g., Ker. 3:7–10
and Yebam. 8:3; although this is the subject of a larger paper I am in the process of writing).
Thus, returning to the story of the oven of Akhnai, we should probably read the conviction in that story to follow the majority as a product of
this larger debate around oral transmission and the problematics of memory.
Indeed, R. Eliezer is elsewhere said never to have recited any ruling that he
had not heard from his predecessors (t. Yebam. 3:1), which the authors of
the story in the Bavli likely knew and perhaps even had in mind as they
crafted the story around this earlier Tannaitic dispute. Thus, if the issue is
one of establishing and following systematic rules that address the fallibility of
memory in oral transmission, then we can better understand why even though
logic dictates that R. Eliezer ought to be right in this particular case (given the
laws of purity), and even though God Himself confirmed R. Eliezer to be correct, nevertheless, the rules of oral transmission dictate that the halakhah, the
official transmission, must follow the majority. Any other rule would be sheer
folly in a system so reliant on human memory.
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DISCOURSE ETHICS AND THE TALMUDIC SUGYA
While I am here disabusing us of our notion of the rabbis as promulgators of
democratic values when it comes to their use of the principle of rule by the
majority, in other ways rabbinic literature actually comports with democratic
theory far more than this might at first imply. In my opinion, the most interesting and fruitful connection between rabbinic literature and democratic
theory can be found in deliberative theory, and particularly in Jürgen Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy, Robert Goodin’s
theory of the importance of internal-reflective deliberation for democracy,
and Michael Morrell’s work on the importance of empathy for democracy.21
In a nutshell, these political theorists argue that democracy works best when
people vote and act not just in their own interests but when they do so with
the interests of the collective—that is, of other people and other groups, as
well. They argue that for democracy to be efficacious, it is helpful if members
of the society learn to communicate with one another and to be able to hear
and understand the position of the other.
As Goodin explains,
The democratic aim is to get people to respond empathetically to
others in a wide range of differing social situations. Confronting
all those diverse others and coming fully to terms with their beliefs
and values cannot realistically be done in person in society. But
something like that might be done internally, by populating one’s
imaginary with exemplars rendered vivid by representations into the
place of others, and imagining how the choice would look from their
perspective, might then reshape our own “overall assessment of the
options in turn.”22

Even as disagreement may continue, democracies are better off when their
members can understand one another and even empathize with one another.
For Goodin, therefore, this political process begins from within, the ability of
the individual members to learn to step out of their own position and internalize the perspective of the other. Thus, for Goodin, “a procedure in which people
fail to internalize the perspective of one another qualifies as democratic only in
the most mechanical of ways: without properly registering what one another
is saying, it will be not an exchange of reasons but merely a count of votes.”23
Here, I think we can see the Talmudic sugya as inculcating precisely these
skills. Thus, in a classic type of Talmudic passage, we begin with a dispute
in the Mishnah, with the majority holding by one position and a minority
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holding by the opposite position. The Talmudic sugya then begins to flesh out
the biblical basis for each position and what each side does with the other’s
prooftexts. The sugya develops essentially as follows:
Mishnah:
Rabbi X: Law is A
Rabbi Y: Law is B (= not A)
Gemara:
(1) From where does Rabbi X derive Law A? From Verse 1
(2) Then what does Rabbi Y do with Verse 1? He uses it to derive
Law C.
(3) From where does Rabbi Y derive Law B? From Verse 2.
(4) What does Rabbi X do with Verse 2? He uses it for Law D.
(5) Then from where does Rabbi Y derive Law D? From Verse 3.
(6) What does Rabbi X do with Verse 3? He needs it for Law E.
(7) Then from where does Rabbi Y derive Law E? From Verse 4.
(8) What does Rabbi X do with Verse 4? (He holds that) Verse 4
is not enough to derive Law E on its own, requiring Verse 3 for
clarification.24

While the uninitiated often expect the sugya to proceed until one side
has won and the other has lost, that is rarely if ever what this kind of sugya
sets out to do, nor where it ends. Rather, the goal of this kind of sugya is to
flesh out the positions of each side, walking the reader/listener through all the
same verses and laws back and forth from each of the two perspectives. The
end comes not when one side has won and the other lost, but when (in 8 in
the sample outline above), one side does not hold by one of the other side’s
laws or read the other’s verse in such a way that each side then makes sense
within its own internal system. In other words, the goal of the sugya is to
inculcate in the adherent the ability to see a complex system of analysis from
multiple perspectives and appreciate that each one makes sense within their
own system. It trains the person to be able to move in and out of their own
perspective and to develop the cognitive skill to be able to do so without fear
of losing their own perspective or train of thought. This frees the deliberator
to be able to listen fully even as they hold in abeyance their own perspective
until their time comes to exposit.
One of the biggest impediments for people in listening to others in
debate is that they are so busy holding on to their own perspective to debate
effectively that they are unable to listen to the arguments of their opponents.
Talmudic study, then, solves this problem by building the cognitive skills to
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hold multiple positions in mind at the same time, which allows people to
listen fully even as they retain their own position in mind.25 As for the law,
especially in a sugya that began with a majority and a minority position, the
Talmud always already knew that the law followed the majority. Its goal, then,
never needed to be to figure out which position won, which in some way frees
it to go the next step to helping its reader simply understand all sides in all of
their complexity. The conflict of the Talmudic sugya, then, is used as a way to
sharpen the adherent’s cognitive skills. As John Stuart Mill wrote, “Every one
who knows history or the human mind is aware, that powerful intellects and
strong characters are formed by conflict.”26
At the same time, the sugya is developing the adherent’s ability to understand and empathize with the other, for, as Habermas explains, “empathy—
the ability to project oneself across cultural distances into alien and at first
sight incomprehensible conditions of life, behavioral predispositions, and the
interpretive perspectives—is an emotional prerequisite for ideal role-taking,
which requires everyone to take the perspective of all others.”27 Or, as Goodin
explains, “the process of ‘democratic deliberation within’ . . . has each of us
empathetically projecting ourselves into the place of (ideally) every other. We
would then conduct the ‘democratic conversation’ imaginarily, inside our own
heads rather than in any actually discursive forum.”28
Indeed, the Babylonian Talmud itself posits empathy for the other as
Judaism’s most essential attribute. Thus, in a famous story, the Talmud teaches
that a gentile went before Hillel the Elder with the request that Hillel teach
him the entirety of the Torah while standing on one foot (i.e., requesting a
brief summary of its most essential points). Hillel responded with the Golden
Rule, saying, “That which is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is
the entire Torah, and the rest is its explanation. Go and learn” (b. Šabb. 31a).
For Hillel, empathy for the other, an ability to put oneself in the place of the
other, is the essence of the Torah, and one must also learn to choose one’s
actions accordingly (i.e., in a democracy, to vote and to act politically accordingly). Moreover, Hillel declares the rest as its explanation. While this is often
incorrectly understood as claiming that the rest is insignificant in comparison
(i.e., “the rest is commentary”), I would argue that he is claiming that the rest
of the Torah is in service of this main function. In a sense, it is there to train
the adherent to practice the empathy that underlies this Golden Rule.
Finally, the last instruction is to “go and learn,” to inculcate in oneself
this Golden Rule through the practice of that study. In this sense, then, the
Talmud may indeed be self-aware of the fact that it is designed to inculcate
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empathy in those who study it effectively. Indeed, like Hillel in this Talmudic
story, even certain late antique nonrabbinic forms of Judaism had already
seen the purpose of the commandments to be to develop the moral character of the adherent. Thus, the author of 4 Maccabees has the martyr Eleazar
explain the larger philosophical purpose of the commandments to the tyrant
Antiochus as the latter was trying to force the former to transgress the law by
eating pork:
Therefore do not suppose that it would be a petty sin if we were to
eat defiling food; to transgress the law in matters either small or great
is of equal seriousness, for in either case the law is equally despised.
You scoff at our philosophy as though living by it were irrational,
but it teaches us self-control, so that we master all pleasures and
desires, and it also trains us in courage, so that we endure any suffering willingly; it instructs us in justice, so that in all our dealings we
act impartially, and it teaches us piety, so that with proper reverence
we worship the only living God.29

With this late antique Jewish backdrop in which the commandments are seen
as serving to develop the moral character of those who keep them, it does not
seem a far stretch to imagine that the authors of the Talmud might have similar
intentions for their style of inquiry and analysis, though unfortunately they
never make this point explicit (at least not to my knowledge).
While the Talmud is not here consciously advocating democracy (though
a certain level of democratic practice does underlie it), it is developing precisely
the qualities that democracy needs to prosper. As US Supreme Court justice
Louis Brandeis argued:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that, in its
government, the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end, and as a means. They believed
liberty to be the secret of happiness, and courage to be the secret of
liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth; that, without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile; that, with them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty, and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.30
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To be sure, significant differences exist between these different sources, yet
they are all addressing the same basic or related issues from different angles.
Fourth Maccabees claims that the commandments train people to control
their passion so that they can act more justly toward others in spite of their
own personal wants and desires. Hillel in the Talmud claims that the purpose
of the commandments is to make one better at treating one’s fellow with
empathy and thereby appropriately. Goodin is arguing that large democracies
require citizen bodies trained to think empathetically, while Brandeis comes at
these same issues from the opposite angle, arguing that the goal of democracy
is to afford citizens the freedom and the opportunity to develop their character, which in turn reinforces the democracy. While we should not conflate
these ancient Jewish sources with these modern thinkers, neither should we
ignore how well they situate with one another.
Essential to democracy is healthy deliberation, which in turn requires a
population that has been trained in learning how to see matters from more
than just their own perspective, how to listen to the other and empathize
fully with the perspective(s) of the other even as they may maintain their
own perspective. This is essentially the skill set that a complex Talmudic
sugya like the one above is ingraining in those who study it. As Michael Morrell explains, empathy is essential for healthy deliberation.31 Goodin and
Morrell see poetry, art, and fiction as important modes of teaching people
how to imagine themselves in the place of the other. This brings to mind the
story of the oven of Akhnai (b. B. Mes․i‘a 59a–b) described above with its dual
themes of democratic process (majority rule) and the paramount importance
of not hurting other’s feelings. Indeed, in the story of the oven of Akhnai,
even democracy, even being in the majority, proves to be no defense for a lack
of empathy.
Yet Talmud, I would argue, takes this a step further, beyond Goodin and
Morrell, building the cognitive skills that are necessary to be able not just to
imagine oneself in someone else’s place but also actually to see whole sets of
data in someone else’s system without losing sight of one’s own take on each
datum from within one’s own system. This allows for a deeper and richer
exchange than just the sheer emotional empathy for the other can provide. Of
course, as in the story of the oven of Akhnai, empathy is considered a desideratum, but I would argue that at its core, the Babylonian Talmud is attempting
to train those who study it to do much more.32 Thus, while rabbinic Judaism
may have embraced the democratic principle for practical rather than idealistic
reasons (i.e., as a result of practical concerns regarding the problem of memory
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in oral transmission), it proves to be committed to developing essential qualities for a healthy democratic citizenship in rather profound ways.
NOTES
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eternal, nonetheless, the concept of Rousseau’s “social contract” still applies in too many
other ways, as we shall presently see, to warrant abandoning the phrase.
8. Rashi’s commentary on Genesis 1:1 begins, “R. Isaac said, ‘The Torah ought to have
begun with “This month shall be to you . . .” (Exod 12:2), which is the first commandment that Israel were commanded. So why did it begin with “In the beginning”?’” That is,
Rashi asks why the Torah begins with nearly a book and a half of stories before it starts to
get to the legal section, which he sees as the central purpose of the Torah. In our answers
to this question, both Rashi and I see the narrative section as serving the legal section to
which it leads. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of rabbinic sources are my own.
9. Rousseau writes:
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That is, for Lev, it is our distance from the Talmud that makes it useful as a tool for teaching us empathy. While I find this also to be a valid way to use the Talmud to develop
empathy, I am here trying to show that the Talmud itself is inherently developing the
skills for empathy when it forces the reader to see issues from multiple perspectives in
all of their complexity. That is, even for students of the Talmud’s own time period, who
presumably may not have seen the Talmudic text with its cultural context as foreign,
they would still have been forced to develop the skills that underlie empathy through the
process of studying Talmud with its complex logical system in which issues are examined
from multiple perspectives. While I cannot yet confirm that the redactors of the Talmudic
sugya intended this effect, it seems inherent to the nature of the study of the text.
26. John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XXV—Newspaper Writings
December 1847–July 1873 Part IV (ed. Ann P. Robson and John M. Robson; Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 1106.
27. Habermas, Justification and Application, 174, as quoted in Morrell, Empathy and
Democracy, 76–77. See also Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason,” 11, where he states:
Discourse ethics . . . views the moral point of view as embodied in an
intersubjective practice of argumentation which enjoins those involved
to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive perspectives. Discourse ethics rests on the intuition that the application of the principle
of universalization, properly understood, calls for a joint process of
“ideal role taking.” It interprets this idea of G. H. Mead in terms of
a pragmatic theory of argumentation. Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among free
and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of
everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self
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and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there
emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in
common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of
their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the
appropriateness of the languages in terms of which situations and needs
are interpreted.
28. Goodin, Reflective Democracy, 72.
29. 4 Macc 5:19–25 (NRSV).
30. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
31. Morrell, Empathy and Democracy.
32. On the relationship between the dialectical nature of the composition of the Babylonian Talmud and the importance of not shaming others or hurting their feelings, see
Jeffrey Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2003).

Mipnei Darkhei Shalom: The Promotion
of Harmonious Relationships
in the Mishnah’s Social Order
Simcha Fishbane
The Constitution of the United States has a preamble that states that the
goal of democracy is to create an environment of tranquility. Judaism is not a
democratic religion per se, but includes many aspects that advocate democratic
traditions. This paper will examine the principal of mipnei darkhei shalom [in
the interest of peace] as it manifests itself in the social order of Mishnah. The
application of this concept creates an environment of peaceful and mutual
respect between all persons irrelevant of their race or religion. This principle
was used by the rabbis to modify putative laws sometimes explicitly stated
in Mishnaic texts and at other times only implied. The Mishnah presents
its reader with ten cases of mipnei darkhei shalom. I will first present eight
assumptions on which Mishnah is based. These assumptions will be employed
to analyze these cases and search out the components that motivate and justify
the rabbis’ changing of an accepted law. Based upon my conclusions of the
analysis of mipnei darkhei shalom, I apply the Durkheim school of social theory
to our evidence to better understand the social and cultural ideal world of
Mishnah and its structure as presented by an early Palestinian rabbinic group.
This essay examines the concept mipnei darkhei shalom in Mishnah,
which I translate as “in the interest of peace.” Although a literal translation
would read “because of the paths of peace,” the term is popularly understood
and used as meaning in the interest of peace. The Mishnah, redacted in
the early third century,1 marks the first appearance in rabbinic literature of the
term mipnei darkhei shalom.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Scholars such as Jacob Neusner2 and Jack N. Lightstone3 as well as myself4
have written on the nature and the problems of defining the approach to
Mishnah in detail. Therefore, I will simply note them here in brief.
1. Mishnah is a highly redacted document. Lightstone5 describes Mishnah as a “distinct literary oeuvre, authored, not simply compiled, by
73
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

some person or persons with their own agenda, outlook, style, purpose, and social provenance.” This work, the entire corpus, can be
viewed as a self-consistent whole. Thus, Mishnah contains not only
authoritative modes of behavior but also its author’s message.
Mishnah represents the rabbis’ view of an ideal Temple-centered
society. In this ideal society, the Jerusalem Temple (destroyed in 70
c.e.)6 and its related institutions stand and occupy the center 130 or
so years after the Temple and everything related to it was destroyed.7
Although there are sections or statements in Mishnah that would be
relevant and can be applied to the functioning of a rabbinic post-
Temple culture, these appear within the Mishnaic document that
represents the Temple society. Therefore it can only be suggested
that these statements, even though they are culturally relevant, are
focused on the synchronic message of the Mishnah.
In a Temple-structured culture, the religious authority is the priest.
In the post-Temple era, the rabbis saw themselves as the inheritors of
this role, including the authority that it could embrace. The Mishnah often implicitly (and at times explicitly) manifests the importance of the rabbis within an idealized Temple society.8
The Mishnah, amongst the earliest authoritative rabbinic documents
in our possession, offers a synchronic message. It also offers a diachronic view of society, and both these views serve to view its present
order as an ideal Temple-focused society. The purpose of this essay
is to seek out the message of the redactor concerning mipnei darkhei
shalom within its constructed Temple society and not to understand
or shine light on the actual Palestinian culture and society of the rabbis during the third century.
As a rabbinic document with its resolve to create a social structure for
the rabbinic Jew, boundaries were created that excluded any outsider,
such as gentiles.9 Thus the focus of Mishnah is on the Jew. The only
concern for the outsider is that which affects the life of the Jew but
not of the outsider himself. The Mishnah’s concern is to protect the
rabbinic Jew from various types of threats or dangers, be they economic, religious, or security.
Post-Mishnaic, Tannaitic documents, Tosefta and midreshei ha-
halakhah are often considered as statements not utilized by the
Mishnah redactor but having parallel authority. This essay takes an
alternate view.10 If we follow the suggestion that Mishnah is a tightly
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redacted document, any additional monograph would suggest the
redactors had an alternate agenda. An examination of Tosefta compiled
in the aftermath of Mishnah would suggest a document dependent
upon Mishnah but that is not Mishnah. Neusner11 describes Tosefta
as a “vine on a trellis. It has no structure of its own but most commonly cites and glosses a passage in Mishnah, not differentiating its
forms and wording of sentences from those of the cited passage. . . .
The Tosefta covers nearly the whole of Mishnah’s program but has
none of its own.” Tosefta is not Mishnah and does not necessarily
seek to convey the same message as that of the Mishnah’s redactor(s).
Neusner,12 in two approaches, offers a greater in-depth understanding
of the relationship between Mishnah and Tosefta. First, he states:13
“Pericopae which clearly present a more refined, more subtle, or
more complicated picture of the same law as found in Mishnah must
be regarded as developments of Mishnah’s pericopae and therefore
as a commentary generated by Mishnah itself, not by considerations
absent in Mishnah.” Second, he refers to “autonomous” or “independent” items. He states14 that “Tosefta gives essentially the same
principles as Mishnah, but in its own formulation or with its own
examples. They are a supplement to Mishnah: The secondary meaning of supplement, i.e., a collection of additional materials relevant
to, but not found in, Mishnah will then apply to the autonomous
and independent materials.” This essay is concerned with Mishnah.
Therefore, following Neusner’s lead, I will refer to Tosefta only when
it serves as a commentary or as an exegesis to Mishnah, on individual
pericope and not Mishnah as a complete document.15
7. The redactor of Mishnah was not always forthcoming regarding
clarification of the laws. Laws dependent on Torah passages are conspicuously absent. Statements based on basic principles are ignored,
and then subsequently laws that require elucidation are presented.
The rabbi-teacher had these answers and had to be petitioned for the
explanations. (This will be demonstrated in our discussion below).
MIPNEI DARKHEI SHALOM
The term shalom is most commonly translated as “peace.” This, however, is
only one way it is used, for the term often appears as a way to greet and part
from people. It is also explained as meaning completeness, wholeness, health,
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welfare safety, soundness, tranquility, prosperity, perfection, fullness, rest,
harmony or congeniality,16 the absence of agitation or discord. An additional
name for God is Shalom. In Mishnah it is used as peace or something that can
be referred to as a harmonious or congenial relationship.
Mipnei darkhei shalom appears in Mishnah fourteen times within five
separate Mishnayot. In Tractate M. Shabiit 4:3 once, M. Shebit 5:9 twice,
Tractate Mishnaishnah Gitin 5:8 eight times, Mishnah Gitin 5:9 twice, and in
Tractate Mishnah Sheqalim 1:3 once. The Mishanayot in Tractate Gitin presents
an overall summary and presentation of the Mishnah’s entire occurrences of
Mipnei darkhei shalom, except for the individual case in Mishnah Sheqalim.
Therefore we will focus upon tractates Gitin and Sheqalim but not Shabiit.
These Mishnayot state:
Mishnah Gittin 5:817
A. And these rules did they state in the interest of peace:
I B. A priest reads first, and afterward a Levite, and afterward an
Israelite, in the interest of peace.
II C. They prepare an erub [boundary marker] in the house where it
was first placed, in the interest of peace.
III D. A well nearest to the stream is filled first, in the interest of
peace.
IV E. Traps for wild beasts, fowl, and fish are subject to the rules
against stealing in the interest of peace.
F. Yose says, “It is stealing beyond any doubt.”
V G. Something found by a deaf-mute, an idiot, and a minor is
subject to the rule against stealing, in the interest of peace.
H. Yose says, “It is stealing beyond any doubt.”
VI I. A poor man beating the top of an olive tree-
J. what is under it [the tree] is subject to the rule against stealing, in
the interest of peace.
K. Yose says, “It is stealing beyond any doubt.”
VII L. They do not prevent poor gentiles from collecting produce
under the laws of Gleaning [leket], the Forgotten Sheaf [shichikhah],
and the Corner of the Field [peah], in the interest of peace.
5.9
VIII A. A women lends a sifter, sieve, handmill, or oven to her neighbor who is suspected of transgressing the law of the Seventh Year,
B. but she should not winnow or grind wheat with her,
IX C. The wife of a haber lends the wife of an am haaretz a sifter
and a sieve.
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D. She sifts, winnows, grinds, and sifts wheat with her.
E. But once she has poured water into the flour, she may not come
near her,
F. for they do not give assistance to transgressors.
G. And all these rules they stated only in the interest of peace.
X H. They give assistance to gentiles in the Seventh year but not
Israelite.
XI I. And they inquire after their welfare,
J. in the interest of peace.
Mishnah Sheqalim 1:3
A.	On the fifteenth of that same month [Adar] they set up money
changers’ tables in the provinces.
B. On the twenty-fifth [of Adar] they set them up in the Temple.
C.	Once they were set up in the Temple, they begin to exact
pledges [from those who had not paid the tax in specie].
D. From whom do they exact a pledge?
E. Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freed slaves,
F. But not from women, slaves, and minors.
G.	Any minor in whose behalf the father began to pay the shekel
does not again cease [to pay].
H. And they do not exact a pledge from priests,
I. For the sake of peace.

As Hebert Basser correctly points out,18 mipnei darkhei shalom refers to
the need to establish standards of behavior to avoid conflict in potentia. “This
rubric offers protocols to avoid undue strife. These protocols override or
amend either the intention or the explicit rulings of the Mishnaic rabbis.” The
issue to be considered is whether the concept of mipnei darkhei shalom amends
or enhances an existing law. Why, in some cases, does it transform a thing that
is permitted into a prohibition, while in others it overrides a rabbinic ruling
prohibiting something to then allow it? In my analysis of such cases involving
mipnei darkhei shalom, I will explore this query.
CASE 1. “A PRIEST READS FIRST, AND AFTERWARD A LEVITE,
AND AFTERWARD AN ISRAELITE, IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.”

This ruling is based upon a discussion of reading the Sefer Torah discussed in
Mishnah Tractate Megillah 4:2, 4. These mishnayot discuss the number of individuals who are to be invited to read from the Torah (during the prayer service
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on days that the Torah is read in the synagogue) but no specific category of
persons is identified. The Mishnah Horayot 3:8, while not specifically referring
to Sefer Torah, presents the established hierarchy for the Mishnah’s world:
A. A priest takes precedence over a Levite, a Levite over an Israelite, an
Israelite over a mamzer [bastard], a mamzer over a Netin, a Netin over
a proselyte, a proselyte over a freed slave.
B. Under what circumstances?
C. When all of them are equivalent.
D. But if the mamzer was a disciple of a sage and a high priest was an
am haaretz, the mamzer who is a disciple of a sage takes precedence
over a high priest who is an am haareetz.
Although not explicitly stated, this division of status discussed in the
above Mishnah should also include Torah reading—the educated rabbi would
supersede the priest. The rabbis, in this instance, where it is an issue of honor
rather than of authority or financial implications, for the sake of harmonious
relationships relinquish their prior place of honor.19 In the Mishnah’s perceived ideal Temple society, in which the priest is the religious leader, the priest
still enjoyed a place of symbolic honor. The rabbis chose to apply the principle
“in the interest of peace” to alter and override an existing ruling. The rabbis,
the inheritors of the priests even with this awarded honor, still ruled.
CASE 2. “THEY PREPARE AN ERUB IN THE HOUSE WHERE
IT WAS FIRST PLACED, IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.”

Tractate Sabbath and Erubin both discuss the Torah prohibition against carry
ing any object from one domain to another on the Sabbath. One scenario
regards cases when houses in an urban area were constructed within courtyards
(common during late antiquity). In order to permit individuals to carry objects
from their houses into the courtyard [hatzer] and vice versa, an erub hatzarot is
created. The rabbinic process requires that all the neighbors place food items in
one of the courtyard houses before Shabbat. The erub hatzarot thus organizes
all these domiciles into a single domain in which carrying is permitted.
There are various options for obtaining these food items. One person
from the courtyard can contribute the food, or the other residents can jointly
contribute toward the amount of food required to make the erub hatzarot.
There are instances as discussed in Mishnah Erubin 7:11 in which money is
donated towards the purchase of food items.
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Our paradigm, which discusses erub hatzarot, seems to imply that in order
to reduce clashes between neighbors, maintain harmonious relationships, and
not insult the householder, the erub hatzarot should remain in the home of the
residence where it was initially placed. I believe there is an additional consideration implied in this instance—the possibility for financial gain on the part of
the homeowner where the erub hatzarot is assigned. Although the food products
belong to everyone in the courtyard, after the Sabbath this individual would
have the opportunity to acquire it before the others. As mentioned above, there
are also possibilities for the transfer of monies. Although it is no more than a
possibility, this consideration would offer greater clarity in understanding why
mipnei darkhei shalom is a factor in placing the erub and amending the law.20
CASE 3: “A WELL NEAREST TO THE STREAM IS FILLED FIRST,
IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.”

This Mishnah would seem21 to portray a scenario in which a channel flows
from a river alongside a series of fields. The owners of these fields use the
channel’s water to irrigate their fields. To avoid the possibility of water drying
out before the fields are irrigated, the owners dug cisterns at the edge of their
fields to collect water from the channel. To avoid conflict between the field
owners as to who had first rights to the water from the channel the Mishnah,
applying the principle of mipnei darkhei shalom, decides who has first entitlement to the water.
The Mishnah chooses to amend a situation that could lead to conflict
and strife. There is no halachic ruling that the principle of “in the interest of
peace” would be required to override. Rather, this is a financial issue in which
the strongest person would win and thereby cause a clash.
CASE 4: “TRAPS FOR WILD BEASTS, FOWL, AND FISH ARE SUBJECT
TO THE RULES AGAINST STEALING IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.”

The following three cases (4, 5, and 6) are concerned with the acquisition
[kinyan] of various objects through different methods. Our case deals with
acquisition through one’s property or utensils rather than by placing it in one’s
hand or dragging22 it with his hand. Mishnah is not explicit in defining the
principle of acquisition through the use of an individual’s utensil with a receptacle as its base [beit kibul].23 It is implicitly alluded to in Mishnah Gitin 8:1,
in the sentence “He who threw a writ of divorce to his wife . . . [If he threw
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it] into her bosom or into her basket she is divorced.” The basket makes the
acquisition, since it has a beit kibul while the trap does not, thus preventing its
owner from legally acquiring the catch. The Mishnah employs the principle of
mipnei darkhei shalom to amend the law of kinyan and allow the owner of the
trap to keep the prey. The rabbis permit the trap owner to retain his catch and
one who takes it is a thief.
CASE 5. “SOMETHING FOUND BY A DEAF-MUTE, AN IDIOT,24
AND A MINOR IS SUBJECT TO THE RULE AGAINST STEALING,
IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.”

Although not stated explicitly in Mishnah, it is based on a principle that anyone
identified with these three categories of Jewish persons (deaf-mute, idiot, minor)
cannot acquire property. For example, in Mishnah Baba Metzia 1:5, discussing an object found by a minor, the Mishnah informs us that such objects are
not acquired [kinyan] but become the property of the father (after he makes a
kinyan). These three were unable to own property and to conduct independent
business transactions. The reason for this limitation on the deaf-mute [heresh],
idiot [shoteh], and minor [katan] is the lack of mental capacity. This understanding was common during the Greco-Roman period by the Jews and gentiles.25 It
is clarified in Mishnah Arakhin 1:1 in the discussion of the valuation of different
type of individuals, including the use of one’s monetary value of his body for
determining a pledge amount to the Temple. The Mishnah rules that a heresh,
shoteh, and katan may not dedicate such a valuation since they are not mentally
competent. The lack of the mental capability for dealing with reality would also
exclude the heresh, shoteh, and katan from making a kinyan on any object.
The Mishnah amends this law in prohibiting the taking of a found object
from these three types of individuals. In this case there is a clear possibility of
monetary gain.
CASE 6: “A POOR MAN BEATING THE TOP OF AN OLIVE TREE.
WHAT IS UNDER IT [THE TREE] IS SUBJECT TO THE RABBINIC
OVERRIDE FORBIDDING OTHERS TO TAKE WHAT HAS FALLEN
TO THE GROUND. IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE. YOSE SAYS,
IT IS STEALING BEYOND ANY DOUBT.”

The Mishnah commentaries explicate this scenario referring to the laws of
Gleaning [leket], the Forgotten Sheaf [shikhahah], and the Corner of the Field
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[peah]—agricultural gifts awarded to a poor26 person. The second individual
claiming the right to the produce is forced to comply with this suggestion,
since an individual who is not poor has no right to these products, and if
appropriated they would be his if not for the principle of mipnei darkhei shalom. Again, this case is an issue of acquisition. The poor person shakes the tree,
but since he does not hold the olives in his hand, he does not acquire them.
Therefore, if another poor person grasped them first, if not for the case of
mipnei darkhei shalom, they would belong to him. The Mishnah thus amends
a permitted circumstance and prohibits any other individual from acquiring
the produce.
I would like to suggest an additional consideration. The gifts offered to
the deprived person can be his basic means of sustenance. If guidelines for
receiving these assistances are not clearly and well defined, this could lead to
brawls and possible damage to property, in our case that of the field’s owner.
The need for mipnei darkhei shalom would therefore go beyond a mere clash
between two individuals and could result in financial loss to the owner of the
property. The fear of violence from a poor person is implied in Mishnah Peah
4:4, which reads, “Peah, they [the poor] do not reap with sickles, and they do
not uproot it with spades, lest they strike one another.” This violent behavioral
pattern found in a destitute individual could also result in physical and material damages.
CASE 7. “THEY DO NOT PREVENT POOR GENTILES FROM COLLECTING
PRODUCE UNDER THE LAWS OF GLEANING [LEKET], THE FORGOTTEN
SHEAF [SHICHIKHAH], AND THE CORNER OF THE FIELD [PEAH],
IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.”

Implied in Mishnah’s statement is that a poor gentile is forbidden to receive
gifts of produce. As stated above (methodological consideration 5), Mishnah
is not interested in the welfare of the gentile but rather in that of the rabbinic
Jew and the world of Mishnah.27 The concern here is not only for the security
of the destitute Jew seeking these gifts but also has financial implications. As
shown in the above case, the poor can tend toward violence. If the needy gentile
could not share in these gifts, that could lead to destruction of property and
thus to financial loss both for the poor Jew and for the proprietor of the field.
This amended ruling is designed to prevent gentiles from claiming that Jewish
law discriminates between Jew and gentile and is thereby intended to reduce
conflict. Ultimately, the Jews gain, as it is in their interests to prevent enmity.
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CASE 8. “A WOMAN LENDS A SIFTER, SIEVE, HAND MILL, OR OVEN
TO HER NEIGHBOR WHO IS SUSPECTED OF TRANSGRESSING THE LAW
OF THE SEVENTH [SABBATICAL] YEAR, BUT SHE SHOULD NOT WINNOW
OR GRIND WHEAT WITH HER [IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE].”

This statement first appears in Mishnah Shebiit 5:9. The Mishnah is discussing
a case of a woman who is suspected of not observing the laws of the Sabbatical
year and wants to lend an item that can be employed in the transgression of
shebiit from one who does observes the laws of the Sabbatical year. To clarify:
during the seventh year in the Land of Israel, one is prohibited from working
the land or enjoying its produce in any fashion, and at a designated time must
destroy food in the house from these fields. Our case concerns the cooking
utensils, which normally could not be lent, as the receiver, who is suspected of
ignoring the laws of the seventh year, might use them with forbidden produce
from the Sabbatical year.28 Mishnah 6 and 7 of chapter five state that any utensil employed [during the Sabbatical year] for the purpose of transgression may
not be sold. That is permitted only if the item can also be used for a permitted
activity. Lending would fall under the same law.
Therefore, our Mishnah would need to override the law as it was considered prohibited to use the utensils. The assistance offered to the suspected
woman would benefit her financially. For example, she would not need to buy
or rent these items to use them domestically or for her business. In preindustrial rural societies, women played an important economic role in the world
of agriculture; they were core economic partners with men. Scott and Tilly29
correctly argue that women did work and were necessary for the survival of
the family unit. Their contribution was primarily in the home but also could
include the family fields. This was essential for the family unit whose solidarity provides the basic framework for mutual aid, control, and socialization.30
In the ideal world of Mishnah, women were also segregated and assigned
specific roles.
One can find in Mishnah at least a partial or limited division of labor
between men and women. People resided in close proximity to one another,
as demonstrated by the hatzer. Closeness gives rise to both great dependencies on each other as well as friction and conflict. Thus, the Mishnah rabbis
choose to apply the principle of mipnei darkhei shalom to a case that applied
to women. They chose to subjugate these tensions by applying the principle
of mipnei darkhei shalom as a way to override the law that forbade assisting a
sinner. Lending a vessel to the suspected woman would be of benefit to her
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financially since then she did not need to purchase a new one. The point of
mipnei darkhei shalom here is to avoid conflict caused by the usual strict application of laws.
CASE 9. “THE WIFE OF A HABER LENDS THE WIFE OF AN AM HARES
[SUSPECTED OF NOT KEEPING THE LAWS OF PURITY] A SIFTER AND A
SIEVE. SHE MAY SIFT WINNOW, GRIND, AND SIFT WHEAT WITH HER.
NEVERTHELESS, ONCE SHE HAS POURED WATER INTO THE FLOUR
[ENABLING THE DOUGH TO CONTACT IMPURITY], SHE MAY NOT COME
NEAR HER, FOR THEY DO NOT GIVE ASSISTANCE TO TRANSGRESSORS.
AND ALL THESE RULES THEY STATED ONLY IN THE “INTEREST OF PEACE.”

Since both Mishnah cases discuss women, the consequences of their society’s
structure and assisting a potential sinner, the rabbi has grouped cases 8 and 9
together. Case 9 works on the same principle as 8 but is concerned with the
violation of the laws of tithes and ritual purity [tuma] rather than the haber.31
As in 8, there are financial results from the cooperation of both women. In
order to permit realization of Mishnah’s view, it was necessary to override
the law. Mishnah identifies two status levels of individuals, the haber who is
meticulous in the observance of Sabbatical purity laws, and the am haaretz
[uneducated in Torah and rabbinical law] who is distrusted. There should be
limited interaction between these different classes of women (as specified in
Mishnah Demai 6:7 and 2:3), since the Mishnah is concerned that the wife of
a haber would become ritually impure or eat from foods not tithed. Even so,
in the interest of peace, the Mishnah overrides the law and offers restricted
assistance from the wife of the haber to the wife of the am haaretz up to the
point where the tuma becomes an actual danger and not only a concern.32
CASE 10: “THEY GIVE ALLOW (REAL) ASSISTANCE TO GENTILES IN THE
SEVENTH YEAR BUT NOT ISRAELITES [IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE].”

This Mishnah first appears in Shebiit 4:3 then in 5:9. Later it is presented in
Gitin 5:9. The opening of the Mishnah (in Shebiit 4:3) reads:
During the Sabbatical year they [Jews] lease from gentiles fields
newly ploughed [during that year for the purpose of cultivating
them during the following year,] but [they do not (lease) from an
Israelite a field which he has plowed during the Sabbatical year, in
violation of the law].
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This opening is not repeated in the other two Mishnaic citations. It is
clear throughout the entire Mishnah that the focus is upon the Jew and not
the gentile. The gentile’s role is to assist the Jew to better function in his world
of Mishnah.
This case implies that even though the Land of Israel is holy and should not
be worked by either Jew or gentile on the Sabbatical year,33 one cannot prohibit
the gentile from working the land. Thus, the Jew, if this were the only consideration, should not encourage the gentile to work the land aside from the principle
the rabbis applied of mipnei darkhei shalom. By maintaining a harmonious relationship with the gentile, the Jew will receive financial gain, by having a plowed
field in the eighth year ready to plant, in addition to the security of friendship.
CASE 11: “AND THEY PERMIT INQUIRING AFTER THEIR [THE GENTILE’S]
WELFARE, IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.”

This statement as the case above is first found in Mishnah Shabiit 4:3, then
copied to 5:9. An examination of Mishnah will demonstrate that there is no
discussion concerning a prohibition to greet pagan gentiles even on their festivals, when Mishnah prohibits various kinds of interaction with them. The
Mishnah’s concern is that any interface with the pagan gentiles during their
religious festivals would encourage and enhance their practice of idol worship. There is no reference in Mishnah to any type of prohibition regarding
asking after their welfare. To clarify the issue I turn to Tosefta34 in Abodah
Zarah 1:2 discussing pagan festivals, which reads, “nor should one ask after
their welfare. . . . But if one happened to come across him in a routine way,
he asks after his welfare with all due respect. They permit inquiring after the
welfare of the gentiles on their festivals for the sake of peace.”
I choose to view this Tosefta under the category of Mishnah clarification
or commentary rather than an autonomous Tosefta. Two issues are elucidated:
first, that Mishnah is concerned with the different occasions when the pagan
holiday was celebrated. Other than on these times (when it would be prohibited), it was permitted to greet the gentile in a specific fashion. Second, the
Tosefta clarifies that if not for the principle “for the sake of peace,” it would be
prohibited to ask after the well-being of the gentile on their holiday. This is
demonstrated in the language of Tosefta, identical to that of Mishnah, except
that Tosefta adds the words “on their festival.”
In the above case, the motivation for assisting the gentile is economic. In
our case, I suggest that it is primarily a security issue as in case 7 concerning
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Peah, although financial loss is also conceivable. Religious holiday gatherings
can be a time of incitement to violence and the destruction of property. The
Mishnah is interested in the Jew and his welfare, not in the gentiles. Thus, we
need to look at these texts with only the rabbinic Jews’ concerns in mind. If
offering greetings on the pagan festival will offer greater security to the Jewish
community, their physical well-being, and the protection of their property,
one would seek to override the prohibitions.
Cases 10 and 11 are parallel in structure as are cases 8 and 9. Cases 8 and
10 override a law related to shabiit. Cases 9 and 11 are not related to shabiit
but override a prohibition connected to the status of the person in the p
 revious
case, 9, which relates to women, who appear in 8, and 11 relates to the gentile,
who appears in 10.
CASE 12: “AND THEY DO NOT EXACT A PLEDGE FROM PRIESTS,
FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE.”

The Mishnah in Gitin omits the case in Mishna Sheqalim 1:4. Ancient custom
saw in Exodus 30:12–16 a basis for all Israelites during the Temple period
to give a tax of a half shekel annually for community sacrifices. If a person
could not pay the tax, the rabbis required the giving of a security pledge for
the payment of the half-shekel tax. Priest also were required to contribute and
if they did not, they too, strictly speaking, were subject to giving a security
pledge. The authorities felt it necessary, as Samuel Safrai35 explains, to maintain the internal solidarity of the community by exempting them from giving security although they were expected to pay. Safrai,36 based upon Tosefta
Menahot 13:18–19 and Zebahim 11:17, shows that the priests were aggressive
when their financial gain was involved. This behavior would explain why the
rabbis of the Mishnah needed to employ the mipnei darkhei shalom principle,
a principle used to avoid bickering and strife, to override the law obligating
priests to give security.37
This ruling differs from the cases in Mishnah Gitin. In the Gitin scenarios
all were undisputed. Mishnah Sheqalim 1:4 demonstrates that not all Tannaim
were in agreement as to whether the priests should be exempted from the paying the half shekel. The first opinion in Mishnah 1:4 exempted the priest
from paying the half shekel, and thus they would also be exempted from giving collateral; therefore, the mipnei darkhei shalom principle would not apply.
It is clear that there is financial gain as well as prestige for the priests in
having an exemption from this tax security-pledge. I would like to suggest that

86

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

there is an additional advantage for the rabbis, the inheritors of the priests,
through their inclusion in this law. Religious taxes took different forms after
the destruction of the Jerusalem temple, when the half-shekel tax was no longer
required. If the priests were exempt from a religious tax, that could serve as a
basis for the rabbis to expect exemptions from the religious taxes of their time.
Summary of Mipnei Darkhei Shalom in Mishnah
Jew

Gentile Harmony Security

Financial
gain

Amend
law

Override
law

Social status

Case 1

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

yes

high

Case 2

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

middle

Case 3

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

middle-low

Case 4

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

middle-low

Case 5

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

low

Case 6

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

low

Case 7

no

yes

no

yes

yes

no

implied

outsider

Case 8

yes

no

yes

no

yes

no

yes

low

Case 9

yes

no

yes

no

yes

no

yes

low

Case 10

no

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

no

outsider

Case 11

no

yes

no

yes

yes

no

yes

outsider

Case 12

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

high

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
It can be concluded from the above cases that Mishnah is concerned with civil
and religious laws,38 primarily those regarding financial concerns, affecting
varied strata of society beginning with its leadership and concluding with the
gentile outsider. The Mishnah sought social stability and social order. Therefore, to avoid conflict and ensure a secure and stable society, the principle
of mipnei darkhei shalom was instituted to amend or override rabbinic strin
gencies that encompassed elements endangering this stability. The rabbis chose
cases in which they applied the principle of “in the interest of peace” primarily
in scenarios with financial implications. It was the area of economic relationships, interdependence, and cooperation that would most strongly impact the
social solidarity of the collective. What was required was the “moralization” of
economic relationships.
In order to understand how the above cases play a role in understanding
the sociology and culture of the “ideal world” defined by Mishnah, I turn to
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the Durkheim school of social theory. I do not believe that there is one neatly
packaged world of Mishnah, but rather there is what appears as different variables, which are presented in this document. For example, we find that on the
one hand Mishnah presents a Temple-based culture and on the other hand
a third-century Palestinian social reality. Many pieces make up the puzzle of
Mishnah. The topic of mipnei darkhei shalom is only one piece in this puzzle,
but it may reflect on the others when all the pieces are examined and placed
together.
Emile Durkheim in his work, The Division of Labor in Society,39 pres40
ents his theory of society, moral consciousness, social order, and stability.
I do not believe that this theory in its entirety can be applied to the unpacking
of the world of Mishnah. However, there are elements in this theory that, even
taken out of context, can be used to understand the Mishnah’s topic mipnei
darkhei shalom, and therefore one segment of the Mishnah’s ideal world.
Positive solidarity in society can be considered as playing an essential role
in creating the social order; it is an entirely moral phenomenon. To achieve
this, a legal system with a complete moral consciousness is necessary. Moral
ideals and codes of conduct order the functioning of society, and when this
functioning is strong, it unites individuals in their social framework. This
could then facilitate the basis of the authority necessary to retain the social
order. The solidarity would result in what Mary Douglas41 terms a strong grid
group. A strong legal system in a diverse society as manifested in Mishnah
brings people together. Solidarity overcomes the diversity and strengthens the
collective. Furthermore, based upon our examples of mipnei darkhei shalom,
I suggest that if we apply the group grid cosmology to the ideal world of
Mishnah, we find that “there are visible rules about space and times related to
social roles. Individuals do not, as such, transact with each other.”42 In other
words, in this world the individual is not the focus of this cosmology, as the
individual’s recognition would weaken the culture.
It also must be considered that, as in our case of Mishnah, religion and
religious law often initiate moral consciousness. Moral bounds were provided
by religion. In a religious social structure, morality is permeated with religion.
Juridical life protects these moral bounds and is essential for ensuring social
harmony. The rabbis’ social order was religious in character and articulates
moral behavior. Religion provided for all social aspects of their ideal society.
The world of Mishnah had the maximum characteristics43 for the development
of a collective consciousness. Durkheim identifies these, which compose the
collective consciousness of this religious social order, as the volume, intensity,
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rigidity, and content of the beliefs and values. For Durkheim,44 the state was
a moral agency. The role of this body was to focus the collective representation on moral consciousness. For Mishnah, it was the rabbis’ role to take on
the responsibility to implement the moral phenomenon into their ideal world
and to either develop or retain the stability required for that world and their
authority. One tool they used to achieve these goals was the application of the
principle mipnei darkhei shalom.
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Theocracy as Monarchy and Anarchy
Samuel Hayim Brody

INTRODUCTION: THEOCRACY 101
Since the time of Josephus, it has been argued that the only appropriate regime
for the people Israel is the one described by the term theocracy, the rule of
God.1 The force of this argument is nearly tautological. It starts from the basic
definition of “Israel” as that people formed through its election by God to be
partner to a covenantal relationship. Until the most recent centuries, it made
no sense to speak of a people Israel without reference to this relationship, and
so by the same token it seemed to many to make little sense to ask what would
constitute the best regime for the people Israel. There could only be one.
All that seems simple enough, and yet it is only true if we consider
theocracy, as Josephus did when he coined the term, as an alternative to the
traditional list of types of politeia [polity] that was passed down from Greek
political thought. Aristotle’s list is defined by first counting the number of
people who hold the sovereign power and then determining whether they are
ruling in the public interest. So you have monarchy, the rule of one, and its
negative counterpart, tyranny; you have aristocracy, the rule of the excellent
(usually rendered as “the few”), and its negative counterpart, oligarchy; and
you have polity, the rule of the many, of which the negative counterpart is
democracy. (The distinction between polity and democracy seems to depend,
in the Aristotelian tradition, primarily on which economic class is in charge.
If it’s those in the middle, between rich and poor, that has the potential to be
a good constitution; if it’s the poor, however, the city is in trouble.) Josephus
took one look at this list and immediately intuited what they all had in common: the sovereign power is held by human beings, regardless of how many of
them there are. So he added “theocracy” to the list, in order to show how his
own people, the Jews or Judeans, couldn’t be accounted for in the seemingly
exhaustive list of Greek types.
It is not easy for most of us, however, who live in a world in which
humans rule other humans, to imagine what it might be like not to be ruled by
humans, let alone to be ruled by God. As a result, thinkers of theocracy have
most frequently imagined it not as an alternative to the typical forms of human
rule, but rather as compatible with one or another of those forms. In this view,
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it is sufficient for the human rulers to declare that it is not indeed they who
rule, but rather God; and that they are merely the stewards, interpreters, or
representatives of God’s will. Once the possibility of this is granted, any regime
on the list, in pure form or mixed, can be interpreted as theocratic. And these
varying types and forms can be maintained with more or less seriousness. Over
the course of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim history alike, for example, monarchic regimes have based themselves on theocratic rationales almost without
exception.2 However, when it was felt that these rationales were adhered to
with insufficient honesty, or that theocracy was being abused as a post facto
rationalization for naked human power, monarchies have faced challenges
from both aristocratic and democratic quarters. In particular, when grievances
are rooted in a sense of insufficient adherence to divine will, the aristocracy
of religious specialists—whether priests, prophets, or sages—has claimed the
right, minimally, to challenge monarchy in the name of God’s rule and, maximally, to establish their own rule in the place of the monarch.
Despite this common-sense understanding of theocracy, however, I want
to focus here on the original sense of the term, in which it is considered a free-
standing, independent alternative to all the types of human politeia. In this
strong sense, God is not seen as merely the source of authority—an interpretation that, again, could render theocracy compatible with almost any human
arrangement, whether monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic—but literally as
ruler. God rules now, and not in some distant future; in this reality, and not
in some ideal world. God rules us, human beings, and not just the angels or
the other heavenly beings; he rules the earth, and not the “cosmos” in some
grand, metaphorical sense. This is God as our actual, present political leader,
not as “king of the gods,” or object of cultic worship, or origin of everything
that happens, or metaphysical substrate of Being.
This sense of theocracy might be hard to understand at first. How can
God rule, after all, except through the intermediary of some human or group
of humans? Doesn’t someone have to tell us what God’s will is, and doesn’t
whoever does so automatically become the de facto holder of sovereign power?
Aren’t we then inevitably led back to either the divine right of kings or the rule
of some clerical class? The answer, for defenders of the strong sense of theocracy,
has to be no. Monarchy is always and simply mere human rule, and the rule
of the clergy would be better called “ecclesiocracy” or “hierocracy.” The idea of
true theocracy is direct, and not mediated by any human authority permanently
enshrined for the purpose. But how can this be any more than an insistence,
an assertion of an ideal against all common sense and the evidence of reality?
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In order to illuminate some possibilities for understanding theocracy in
this way, I turn to a twentieth century Jewish thinker who dealt with it extensively: Martin Buber. Buber is more commonly studied for his philosophical
anthropology, conception of dialogue and the interhuman, and his Chasidic
writings, but in his many writings on the Bible he showed a consistent and
intense concern to develop the potential meanings of theocracy for both the
ancient Israelites and the contemporary world. For various reasons, he did not
always make these connections explicitly himself. I therefore take on the task
of showing how what he says about the biblical authors and editors, and about
the ancient Israelite world of faith in which they lived, is intended also for the
twentieth century and for the modern Jewish world, including the Zionist
movement of which he was a vocal part.
INTERLUDE ON NATIONALISM, STATISM,
AND THE NATION-STATE
As noted above, it made no sense to speak of a people Israel separately from the
covenant with God until recent centuries. Modern Jewish nationalism takes
its starting point from just such a conception. The social, political, and intellectual factors that made this new conception of Jewishness possible are well
known, and there is no need to repeat them here.3 Suffice it to say that by the
late nineteenth century, when the various branches of the Zionist movement
emerged in Russia and in Central Europe, the premise that Jews constituted a
nation, independent of the religious beliefs of the individual members of that
nation, was integral to its project. And according to the theory of nationalism,
as it was elaborated from the Balkans to Italy and beyond, each nation was
entitled to autonomy and self-determination. The vehicle for achieving such
self-determination was most frequently imagined to be the state.
This was not universally true, however. Although nationalist groups
living within broad, multinational empires such as the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, the Russian Empire, the British Empire, and the Ottoman Empire
often envisioned the radical destruction of imperial rule and its replacement
with an array of individual national states, each sovereign over its own territory within which its own nation would form a numerical majority, this was
not the only way of expressing nationalist aims. The experience of cosmopolitan coexistence in cities like Prague, as well as the experience of communal
autonomy within the imperial framework, gave rise to many other proposals
for securing local and national self-determination without necessarily seeking
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statehood. As such, it was possible to combine nationalism with ideologies
that might seem at first to make odd bedfellows, including communism—
supposedly internationalist and class-based rather than ethnic in orientation,
although in practice this was heavily contested—and even anarchism, which
sought the destruction of all states in addition to the end of capitalism. An
anarchist nationalism could be premised on the idealization of the dispersion
of power across a plurality of networks, of small-scale, communal mechanisms
for conflict resolution, as well as of the warm intimacy of local life (something
left-anarchists shared with romantic conservatives).
I mention this rather exotic alignment of orientations because it was precisely this combination that was at work in the thought of Gustav Landauer
(1870–1919), Martin Buber’s best friend of two decades and a man whom
the Kaiser’s secret police gave the honor of “most significant agitator of the
radical-revolutionary movement in all of Germany.”4 Although he was indeed
an anarchist and a revolutionary, and by no means a German nationalist,
Landauer also believed that the trends of political thought descending from
the Enlightenment and grouped together under the banner of the “left” made
a mistake when they placed the brotherhood of all humanity too far above
the intimate ties of particular individuals and groups. Even the identity of the
working class, to which he swore allegiance and on behalf of which he opposed
private property and wage labor, was too abstract to sustain itself and could not
hope to replace the bonds formed by common language and culture. Therefore,
Landauer thought, it should not aim to do so. Perhaps anticipating late-century
multiculturalism, he once wrote an article called, “Do Not Learn Esperanto!”5
For all these reasons, Landauer was a more congenial intellectual friend
and mentor to Buber than your run-of-the-mill anarchist communist of the
turn of the twentieth century. Like Buber, his primary interest was in community: what was conducive to it, what was detrimental to it, and what distinguished “true” community, Gemeinschaft, from the artificiality and mechanical
impersonality of Gesellschaft [society]. My argument is that Buber eventually
adopted a Landauer-
style anarchism himself—except that what Landauer
interpreted as autonomy, or self-rule, Buber reinterpreted as theocracy, divine
rule. His name for this type of anarcho-theocratic tendency, which he uses
primarily in his biblical writings, is “theopolitics.”6
The term theopolitics is important. In the context of Zionism, Jews tried
to innovate new forms of Jewish polity while also rooting these radical novelties in tradition. Because the Zionist movement conceived itself as rebelling
against diaspora Judaism, it reached back beyond the rabbis and Talmud,
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searching for precedents in biblical times. However, while the Bible offered
the examples of the glorious reigns of David and Solomon, it seemed to lack
anything that could be used as a blueprint for those interested in modern
democratic representation.
Secular Zionists, who dominated the movement prior to the 1970s,
often reacted to this dilemma by prioritizing liberalism, socialism, or democracy, and demoting the Bible to the status of literary creation, one that could
nevertheless serve as useful evidence for Jewish historical connections to Zion.
Religious Zionists, however, even non-Orthodox ones like Buber, did not
have this option. Thus they had to envision the messianic restoration of the
Davidic monarchy—which meant giving up on democracy—or they had to
get creative. This is where theopolitics comes in.
THEOPOLITICS AND THE BIBLE
Although Paul Mendes-Flohr’s argument for Landauer’s influence on Buber
has been widely accepted, the sphere of this influence has generally been
restricted to its impact on Buber’s movement “from mysticism to dialogue”
around the end of World War I.7 In this narrative, Landauer is the spark that
snaps Buber out of his youthful, neo-Romantic reverie, leading him to understand the problematic nature of his support for the war and thereby of the
whole mystical worldview underlying his early projects, from the first collections of Chasidic tales to the famous Prague lectures, and on to Daniel (1913).
Spurred by this revelation, Buber sets out to rectify the problem by allotting an
increasing place in his thought to encounter and to the position of the Other;
this process culminates in the writing of I and Thou (1923) and the development of the dialogic philosophy.
I offer two modifications to this narrative. First, we should consider the
positive influence of Landauer on Buber, and not merely the negative. That
is, Buber doesn’t merely take Landauer’s criticism as a sign that he needs to
probe what he had previously gotten wrong—there is a positive impact as
well, as he turns to a deeper examination of his friend’s thought in order to
understand what resources it contains that enabled Landauer to get World War
I right. Second, I extend the narrative of this impact into the 1920s, beyond
the publication of I and Thou, so that it encompasses Buber’s work with
Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) on a new Bible translation and the adventure
of the Frankfurt Lehrhaus [adult education school], and Buber’s increasing
engagement with Religious Socialism and with the burgeoning kibbutz idea.

96

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

This approach allows me to consider Kingship of God (1932) as a different
kind of culmination: one that expresses neither Buber’s prewar mystical neo-
Romanticism, nor a narrowly construed philosophy of dialogue, but rather a
synthetic and idiosyncratic combination of all these interests as Buber worked
them out from 1916 to 1932.
In Kingship of God, as well as in Buber’s later biblical writings, we read of
a hierarchical, covenantal relation between a transcendent God enthroned as
king and a people who continually struggle to answer his call, to measure up to
their sense of being commanded. There is “content” to this call, and not merely
“presence” as in Buber’s dialogical thought—they are elected to form the first
decent society on earth, to become a “kingdom of priests and a holy nation.”
Although Buber adheres to the most current trends in biblical criticism as he
sees them and although he does not enumerate the rabbinic 613 commandments as the nature of the revelational content, nonetheless we find such institutions as the Sabbath and Jubilee sketched out in terms of how they serve the
purpose of the divine election. The divine purpose alluded to, in almost every
case in which Buber allows for the expression of some content to revelation, can
best be understood as “conducive to true community,” in a Landauerian sense.
In other words, whenever Buber allows “content” to revelation in his biblical
writings, this “content” is theopolitical in nature, which means anarchistic.
In line with Leonhard Ragaz and the Religious Socialists, Buber holds
that a transcendent vision of a kingly God does not underwrite an authoritarian political theology but rather undermines it, together with all unjustified
human hierarchies, instead lending support to a radical vision of human
equality—perhaps even more dependably than the I-Thou relation, which is
powerful but also fleeting. This has implications for his Zionism, since it casts
fundamental doubt on the goal of statehood and sovereignty, or to be more
precise, it casts fundamental doubt on the idea that a Jewish polity is best
constituted according to ordinary ideas about sovereignty and security. In line
with this doubt, Buber refrains from having recourse to the great tales about
Jewish kingdoms of the past, in the manner of David Ben-Gurion and other
Zionist leaders. Instead, he looks to the period before the establishment of
the monarchy, resisting the notion that the monarchy represented the glory of
Jewish sovereignty and asserting God’s kingship against it.
I will give an example of what I mean. In December 1918, Buber seems
to have delivered an address in Munich. One month earlier, Kurt Eisner had
declared Bavaria an independent republic, effectively ending hundreds of years
of monarchy, and he had invited Gustav Landauer to come to Munich to help
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him in his work. Landauer, in turn, invited Buber to Munich, writing that
“collaboration with Eisner functions very well. I am sure you have seen from
his proclamations how ‘anarchist’ his understanding of democracy is: he favors
the active participation of the people in all social bodies, not bleak parliamentarism. . . .”8 The lecture that Buber gave in Munich was originally titled
“Judaism and True Community,” and was eventually published as “Der Heilige
Weg” [The Holy Way].9 By the time it was published, the revolution was over.
Landauer had been martyred, murdered by the counterrevolutionary Freikorps
militias hired by the social-democratic government in Berlin (a crime for which
no one would ever face charges). And Buber dedicated the essay to his friend.
Of interest in this text is the significant shift that has occurred in Buber’s
thinking in contrast to his famous Prague “Lectures on Judaism,” delivered
only seven years earlier but on the other side of the war, the revolution, and
the British conquest of Palestine.10 In those lectures, Buber offered a powerful
but also fairly typical cultural-Zionist reading of Jewish history: once, the Jewish people were vital and creative in their land; then, they were exiled and lost
their vitality, which appeared only occasionally in subterranean movements
outside the mainstream; now, the Jews return to Zion and to the land and so
restore their original creative genius. In “The Holy Way,” however, the loss of
the Jewish commonwealth is no longer the event that “split Judaism’s history
in two.”11 Rather, “the true turning point in Jewish history” is declared to be
the moment of the establishment of the Israelite monarchy.12 It is the idolatrous turn toward institutional human authority, not the loss of sovereignty
over the land, that rends the mundane from the spiritual and creates the very
idea of the political sphere as something separate from religion (by restricting
God’s rule to “spiritual” matters). Over the course of the 1920s, Buber hones
and fine-tunes his understanding of the Bible, so that by 1932 when he publishes Kingship of God, he has developed his understanding of philology and
biblical history much more deeply. But the basic theopolitical claim remains
the same as in the 1918 text dedicated to Landauer.
Buber’s position is more or less consistent, too, between Kingship of
God and his other biblical writings published later: the unfinished sequel Der
Gesalbte [The Anointed] (1936), Moshe [Moses] (1945), and Torat Hanevi’im
[The Prophetic Faith] (1950). Together, these works narrate a theopolitical
history of Israel from the moment of the election of the people in the revelation at Sinai down to the Babylonian Exile. The book on Moses describes a
charismatic leader who denies the role of institutional leadership for himself
lest he end up imitating the Pharaoh against whom he rebelled. He passes
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leadership onto Joshua for a limited task, the conquest of Canaan, and Joshua
passes leadership on to no one, not seeing any need to do so. The period of
the Judges, according to Kingship of God, is one in which the political system
vacillates between rule by a specially chosen charismatic leader, who performs
only a limited task before fading back into the body of the people or serving as
an arbitrator of disputes on the basis of earned authority, and what we might
call anarcho-theocracy, when there is no human ruler at all and the people live
under the direct kingship of God. Ultimately, however, the people fail here:
only some of them, the most faithful, recognize this anarchy as an opportunity
to exercise the highest responsibility; others succumb to fear of external military threats and demand the institution of a human monarchy. The aftermath
of this, as described in The Anointed and The Prophetic Faith, is a decline that
could have been avoided. God continues, through the prophets, to exhort the
people to obedience of the original covenant; the kings suppress and ignore
the prophets and the people pivot wildly between obedience and idolatry.
THEOPOLITICS AND ZIONISM
All this is deeply relevant to Buber’s Zionism. A survey of the range of Buber’s
editorials and occasional writing on Zionism, together with a consideration
of his major statement in Ben Am Le-Artzo [Between a People and Its Land,
published in English as On Zion] (1944), shows that the post–World War I
Buber understands the contemporary Zionist project as nothing less than a
renewal of the original attempt of the people Israel to fulfill the terms of its
election and covenant. As such, it remains subject to the same specific dangers
that inhered in this attempt the first time around. Buber thus assumes the role
of the contemporary inheritor of the prophetic, anarcho-theocratic tradition,
urging his Zionist fellow-travelers not to succumb once again to the monarchic, statist temptation. In this picture, the ancient tribal system with its clans
and sheikhs is updated by modern familial and productive associations, while
the contemporary equivalent for ancient anarchy would be something like a
network of kibbutz councils. The modern equivalent of the ancient monarchy,
of course, is the nation-state, which represents the principles of human sovereignty and domination whether or not it includes a parliament and elections.
The fact that these themes, along with the first appearance in his writings
of warnings against capitalist exploitation and imperialist domination, show
up in 1917 and 1918 is no coincidence. Buber tried many times to enlist
Landauer in the defense of Zionism and was rebuffed just as many times.
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Landauer saw Germany as the place to realize his dreams of a nonhierarchical,
directly democratic society made up of a network of nested workers’, peasants’,
and soldiers’ councils. He worried, further, that the growing British interest
in Palestine meant that it would become yet another site of colonial oppression and that this agenda would override whatever independent projects small
groups of idealistic Zionists might attempt to realize there. Nonetheless, after
his death, Buber mourned the man he called Zionism’s “hidden leader,” the
man who should have eventually realized his place at the side of the new Jewish spirit had history not stolen him away.13 In the early 1920s, Buber was not
the only one to think this way—other, more powerful and influential Zionist
figures, such as Chaim Arlosoroff and Nahum Goldmann, spoke similarly
about Landauer and his ideas.14
This brings us to perhaps the most important thing to realize about the
Landauerian anarchist position as it realizes itself in Buber’s theopolitics: it is
at no time a “utopian” project, in the sense of an abstract ideal to be realized
only in fiction or in the far future. From the moment Landauer went to work
by Eisner’s side in Bavaria, through his declaration of the Bavarian Council
Republic, to the growth of the kibbutz movement during the years of the Third
Aliyah, there were significant groups of people working to actually put these
ideas into practice. To be sure, Buber criticizes Landauer’s role in the Bavarian
Revolution, but not simply because it was political action—rather, Buber fears
that Landauer has badly misjudged the forces arrayed against him and thus
acts on the basis of an incorrect political diagnosis, which fear turned out to
be correct. This fear was perhaps the mirror image of Landauer’s own fear, that
Buber was signing on to a Zionist project of which he was not in control and
in which he was doomed to be little more than a dissenting minority voice.
This fear also turned out to be correct, but given the strength of Labor ideology
and of the kibbutz movement in the 1920s, it was hardly completely romantic
for Buber to see the cells of a new type of society in the kibbutzim. From the
anarchist standpoint, in fact, what happened in Palestine was a mirror of what
happened in Germany—a labor-oriented but statist party (Ebert and the SPD
in Germany, Ben-Gurion and the Achdut Ha’avoda [Labor Unity] party in Palestine) crowds out those committed to nonhierarchical organization, dominates
the scene for a while, then in turn succumbs to forces to its own political right.
It is also important to clarify that we are worlds away here from the
“religious anarchism” attributed to Buber by Gershom Scholem in his critique
of Buber’s writings on Chasidism.15 When Scholem speaks of “religious anarchism,” he means anarchism with respect to the category or particular sphere
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called “religion,” which is to say that he means antinomianism. Scholem
identifies this, in turn, with messianism, since the chaotic wind of eschatology blows through the orderly house of religion. But Landauerian anarchism,
which I am arguing is manifest in Buberian theopolitics, is antimessianic and
highly “nomian.” To be sure, it does not accept that the demands upon us are
equivalent to what the institutions of the state or the rabbinate say that they
are, but this hardly leads straight to nihilism. On the contrary, the demands of
divine rule are total; Israel is never free from the need to do teshuva [repent]
and to become what it was always meant to be. Such a realization must also
strive to avoid the temptation of adopting an “anarchist constitution”—a
specific form of society, however nonhierarchical, that endures from one generation to another in such a way that future generations are prohibited from
altering it.16 But it is nonetheless, despite being theopolitics, an achievable goal
in the mundane world.
To return, then, to the context of Palestine, Buber saw clearly that the
so-called Arab question posed a threat to the viability of the only kind of Zionism he believed worth the name, not just because it raised general and fuzzy
ethical quandaries about the use of power or the ability to live with others,
but because the fear of an external threat called Philistines was the very factor
that first gave rise to the temptation of idolatrous human authority in Israel,
undermining the rule of God and severing the political sphere from a now-
impotent realm of the “spiritual,” leading eventually to destruction and exile.
Buber’s binationalism is, as he put it, “only a temporary adaptation of our path
to the concrete, historical situation—it is not necessarily the path itself.”17 He
does not arrive at it by taking the generally current ideas about liberal self-
governance and nation-state structures and then adding one plus one, nor can
it really be understood as some kind of extrapolation or generalization of the
teachings of I and Thou and Dialogue. Rather, the task of finding a modus
vivendi for living with, not above, and not merely alongside, the Palestinians
is a necessary prerequisite for preventing the reemergence of the kind of fear
and hyperconsciousness of security that is conducive to the deformation of a
Jewish anarchistic theopolitics into a Jewish authoritarian political theology.
CONCLUSION: THEOPOLITICS AND DEMOCRACY
I want to conclude by restating the connection between this type of anarchist
theopolitics and theocracy and then asking how democracy fits into the picture. The relationship between God and Israel in Buber’s biblical writings is

Theocracy as Monarchy and Anarchy

101

presented as both hierarchical and covenantal, laying insistent demands on the
collectivity of Israel even if those demands are not crystallized in the form of
the rabbinic commandments. Instead, this demand requires teshuva, a turning to God that manifests in the organization of society according to a theo
political impulse, which tends to map onto a Landauerian vision of anarchism:
a society containing only nonhierarchical forms of organization, in which
authority is granted only to those who earn it and only to do particular things.
It is this theopolitical vision that Buber deploys against traditional notions of
political theology and hierocracy, and it is this vision that manifests in Buber’s
commitment to the kibbutz as the potential core of a new Jewish society in
Palestine. In this context, binationalism should be seen as a pragmatic compromise, not with an ideal of full Jewish sovereignty in a homogeneous society,
but with any idea of statehood at all. Binationalism, through establishing clear
conduits for cooperation between Palestinians and Zionists, counters the fear-
security resonance machine that conduces to the idolatrous recourse to an
authoritarian human power.
Of course, Buber and his friends did not win the argument about what
form the Jewish polity in Palestine should take. And despite his radical idealism, Buber also had a practical side. He thus accepted the existence of the State
of Israel as a liberal, representative democratic state that had resulted from the
Zionist project, even though it did not embody what he saw as the true goal
of Zionism. Nonetheless, because he believed that his version of Zionism was
intimately bound up with the divine calling and commandment to the Jewish people to create a holy nation, he could not give up on his ideal. Thus he
spent the last decades of his life trying to push the new State of Israel in the
direction he thought it needed to go. This meant taking part in the democratic
give-and-take that characterizes the politics of that country, in which relevant
voices include the religious and secular Jewish publics, the Arab and Palestinian publics, and the arenas of global politics.
Because of this, I think Buber offers contemporary Jews and Israelis an
interesting example of a theopolitics that takes it as axiomatic that God’s rule
is the end goal of Jewish public life, but at the same time does not assume that
this means creating a coercive apparatus that will enforce rabbinic halachah,
create facts on the ground in the West Bank, emphasize and stand on Jewish
rights to the Temple Mount, and so on. From this standpoint, in fact, even
the adoption of laws intended to regulate or enforce a Jewish demographic
majority appears extremely problematic. As Buber puts it, the Jewish covenant
operates as a dialogue between “a world which does not want to be God’s,
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and a God that does not want to compel the world to become His.”18 If God
refrains from dominating the world, then imitators of God must themselves
so refrain, even if they think they can glorify God through their domination.
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Jewish Democracy:
From Medieval Community to Modern State
Joseph Isaac Lifshitz

INTRODUCTION
Like any political theory, Jewish political theory underwent a change of two
major perspectives, ethical and theological. It changed from focusing on legal
definitions to values as freedom and equality and from perceiving the political
body as a reflection or an extension of God to secularization of the political.
In the Middle Ages, questions of political theory were concerned with legal
definitions of the political body, the authority of the leaders upon its members, and the rights of the members. Jewish scholars defined the political body,
which was the Jewish community, as a quasi-corporation or as an association
that was largely based on a social contract.
The Jews in the Middle Ages lived in the European and Middle Eastern
cities as separate communities, and as I have shown in a previous study, they
were organized as a quasi-corporation for external purposes and internal alike.1
This legal definition played in the field of private law. The public sphere was
gaining slowly its upper hand, but was not defined as inherently different
from the private domain. Although not completely equal, they were both legal
adversaries within the legal domain. In this sense, politics in the Middle Ages
was not different from politics in antiquity. Kings were owners of their land
and masters of their citizens, even if the latter were not necessarily defined as
slaves or serfs. The legal definition was private law.
Medieval political theory was concerned with theology as well. As medieval historians point out, application of theology to politics in the Middle
Ages was taking place. That has become even clearer since Ernst Kantorowicz
published The King’s Two Bodies. In this book published in 1957, Kantoro
wicz set a guide for generations of historians through the arcane mysteries of
medieval political theology. Kantorowicz traces the historical problem posed
by the “king’s two bodies”—the body politic and the body natural—back to
the Middle Ages and demonstrates, by placing the concept in its proper setting of medieval thought and political theory, how the early modern Western
monarchies gradually began to develop a political theology.2
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The king’s natural body has physical attributes as do all humans, but the
king’s spiritual body transcends the earthly and serves as a symbol of his office
as majesty with the divine right to rule. The notion of the two bodies allowed
for the continuity of monarchy even when the monarch died, as summed up
in the formulation, “The king is dead; Long live the king.”
Politics in the modern era is different. The medieval social contract is
not the modern democratic social contract, and modern rights talk is not a
medieval demand for rights. As Joseph R. Strayer claimed in On the Medieval
Origin of the Modern State,3 besides changes of culture, a major change arose
after the Middle Ages, a political change. The rise of the modern state exhibits a change that started at the Renaissance, before the rise of the democratic
state; that is, bestowing responsibility on the state for social justice, education, health, and culture. Unlike the legalistic medieval concept of the social
contract, modern democracy is not only a legal construct but rather an ethical
principle, embedded either in rights talk or as a virtue. Modern democracy is
perceived as protecting a bundle of rights, including the rights of minorities,
and not only enhancing the rights of the majority. Thus, the modern state is
an entity that became a source of moral identity. It is also usually perceived
as a secular source of identity. The modern state is a human construct that
expresses human values. It is not created by God and it doesn’t present God
as its foundation. If that is the case, it is a question if a modern Jewish state is
possible, a Jewish state with its religious values at its center.
In this essay I contend that religious values do not necessarily infringe
upon the possibility of a modern Jewish state. As I show through an analysis
of the works of Jewish philosophers like Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber,
and Emmanuel Levinas, such a possibility of modern Jewish democracy does
exist. As I show, their perception of self and community, and of certitude and
doubt, enables a sense of liberty that should generate a new idea of dialogue
with secularity and therefore a new Jewish democracy.
A SECULAR AGE
As I mentioned before, the modern state, as Strayer explained, inherited God
as the founder or the source of existence, and thus it became in charge not
only of securing the safety of the citizens, but also of their education, medicine, welfare, and law. Of course, this revolution couldn’t arise without a religious change. Throughout the humanistic revolution of the Renaissance, God
shifted from being the center of existence, for the sake of man as the center,
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and became just a personal experience. Thus, together with the centrality of
earth, God lost his place as the foundation of human existence for the sake of a
man-made creature—the state, which inherited God. Since that era, people
have looked for the state to save them, not only from enemies, but also from
catastrophes of nature, and even for their sorrows, the root of their well-being.
Strayer’s understanding, which continued Friedrich Nietzsche’s well-
known claim about the death of God, became common knowledge for many.
Charles Taylor, in A Secular Age, describes the modern Western perception of
religion according to what he calls a change of identity.4 If until the Renaissance a doubt of faith was hardly an option, in modernity faith became obsolete. God is not perceived anymore as the sole source of nature. There are
alternatives to understanding reality, and faith became just one choice among
many. I should add that if until modernity, God was indeed the scientific
source of existence, the source of energy, and the cause of all creation, modern
science doesn’t believe in causes and is not teleological. Modern science prefers
mechanical or mathematical explanations of nature. It is not that modern science created heresy or atheism. It did not prove that God doesn’t exist. It just
sees God as irrelevant. As for Taylor, he claims that as a result of the change of
identity for humanity, which traditionally identified itself with religion, in the
modern era faith became a personal choice, and social identification was now
with the state. But it wasn’t only a change of identity. Replacing God as the
source of reality enabled the Western world to use instrumental reasoning in
the political sphere. Societies and states are organized now in a way that was
impossible in the past.
It is true that perceiving the polity as secular is not accepted by all. Even
if we ignore Carl Schmitt, with his Politische Theologie,5 for using God as a
mere symbol for power as an antiliberal strategy, Michel Foucault,6 Giorgio
Agamben,7 and Erik Peterson8 took political theology much more seriously.
Possibly the most important understanding of the weight of theology in political theory arose in a meeting between Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Alois Rat
zinger in the Catholic Academy of Munich during 2004. Both of them agreed
that the secular society cannot produce values on its own and that it depends
on religion, or at least on a dialogue with religion, in order to create a set of
values. Yet these opinions present a call for the voice of God, which answers
a need, rather than a secular alternative, while I think that we must accept
Taylor’s claim that we are in a secular age. For religious people, the modern
state does have religious values, but they are peripheral. The modern state is
perceived largely as a secular institution, even for religious people.9
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After stating that, I must ask again, what about a Jewish state as a religious state? One must bear in mind that regarding a Jewish state, the question
is not only how much the state represents God and his attributes, but since
Judaism is a heavily legalized religion, the question is also how much a Jewish
state reflects Jewish laws. If for Taylor as a Christian, religion in modernity
may belong to the private sphere, as a mere expression of a whim or a personal
emotion, for a religious Jew, religion is not only about faith but also about law.
In Judaism, religion can’t be limited to the private sphere.
JUDAISM
As Leo Strauss claimed, Judaism can’t afford separation between state and
religion.10 Secular values are universalistic values, and accepting them causes
a change in principle to a Jewish state, which ceases to be Jewish. Judaism
is not just a personal religion but a communal and social structure that has
political law. It has a narrative and an end. Strauss envisions the solution of
the Jewish state as a return to a creative Judaism, a return to religion. In order
to describe his point, Strauss presents Rosenzweig and Buber’s philosophy as a
possible example of an intelligent, up-to-date Judaism.11 I will follow Strauss
by describing their philosophy and continue with Levinas.
For Rosenzweig, there is no room for a nation-state, with the exception
of the Jewish state. According to Rosenzweig, the purpose of all humanity is
universal, and the values of such a world are to strive for an ethical world, to
enhance the good. He thought that nation-states are an obstacle to such purpose, and if they are created as an end to itself, they are not justified. If that is
the case, why is a Jewish state justified? Rosenzweig answers that creating a Jewish state is justified only if it helps the universal, if it creates unity between all
nations, unity between man and the world, and most important between man
and God. A Jewish state must therefore be a light to the nations as fulfilling the
goal of creating space for God in order to create this unity. Rosenzweig emphasized that this unity is achieved through revelation and redemption of God.
Rosenzweig explained his theory by describing a geometric model, his famous
Star of David, which is made of two triangles consisting of six elements—God,
world, and man on one triangle, and creation, revelation, redemption on the
other triangle. The meeting of all elements is the Jewish goal.12
So the purpose of the Jewish state is to have one God who unites man
with the world. At the same time, we are to believe in the idea that God did
not leave his creation, but is involved with it and reveals himself as loving, and
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will at the end redeem the world to become one with him. The purpose of the
Jewish state is to bring it to its infanthood, where man will love his neighbor,
where man will love God. Rosenzweig’s theory may bring to mind the Maimonidean’s Universalist utopia, as described at the end of the Mishneh Torah:
In that era, there will be neither famine nor war, envy or c ompetition
for good will flow in abundance and all the delights will be freely
available as dust. The occupation of the entire world will be solely
to know God. Therefore, all will be great sages and know the hidden matters, grasping the knowledge of their Creator according to
the full extent of human potential, as Isaiah 11:9 states: “The world
will be filled with the knowledge of God as the waters cover the
ocean bed.”13

But Maimonides was a rational philosopher, and his utopia is a triumph of
philosophy. Rosenzweig’s utopia is a call for overcoming philosophy and rationality, for the sake of revelation, to the realization that human existence is
relying on God. Not on his wisdom or intellect, but on his being.
Unlike Rosenzweig, Martin Buber did not accept that certitude of faith.
Quoting Martin Heidegger, Buber claimed that God’s existence and God’s
truth are not that obvious. As the prophets taught, man is advised to be human
and not to look for a shelter in the temple of God:
Heidegger warns this way against “religion” in general, but in particular against the prophetic principle in the Judeo-Christian tradition. “The ‘prophets’ of these religions,” he says, “do not begin by
foretelling the word of the Holy. They announce immediately the
God upon whom the certainty of salvation in a supernatural blessedness reckons.” Incidentally, I have never in our time encountered
on high philosophical plane such a far-reaching misunderstanding of
the prophets of Israel. The prophets of Israel have never announced
a God upon whom their hearers’ striving for security reckoned.
They have always aimed to shatter all security and to proclaim
in the opened abyss of the final insecurity the unwished-for God
who demands that His human creatures become real, they become
human, and confounds all who imagine that they can take refuge
in the certainty that the temple of God is in their midst. This is
the God of the historical demand as the prophets of Israel beheld
Him. The primal realty of these prophecies does not allow itself to
be tossed into the attic of “religions”: it is as living and actual in this
historical hour as ever.14
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By this acceptance of Heidegger, of placing man in the center, man with
his doubts and faiths, Buber permits a secular age à la Taylor, regardless of
faith. Even the most famous, in a secular age, assumes his self before God. God
is an experience of man. He doesn’t exist outside human experience. But there
is something else in Buber’s thought, regarding Judaism; he denies the priority
of the law. Indeed, Buber is antinomianist, and Jewish law receives its value
only if it reflects human experience. Otherwise the law expresses relationship
of Ich-Es or I-It. So although Buber believes in a Jewish state, it is rather a
secular state with some Godly values. No Jewish laws. Of course, such an
opinion doesn’t fit Strauss’s view. As I mentioned above, Strauss claimed that
there is no Judaism without the law. The Jewish state is not Jewish without its
attachment to the laws of the Torah. From a Jewish point of view, the question is not only if a person identifies himself with God, as Tailor says, or if he
relies on God instead of on the state, as Strayer says, but if he identifies with
the Torah and its laws.
I would like to leave the question of the law for a moment and focus
on the definition of the polity. Buber shared one more understanding of Heidegger; it has to do with a disagreement he had with Edmund Husserl. As I
quoted Karl Jaspers elsewhere, he describes a sociological dichotomy between
Husserl and Heidegger, between egological epistemology and social ontology.
For Husserl, the world, including the social world, is a world that a person
perceives as a spectator. In what Husserl calls “bracketing,” he reduces the
world that is relevant to a human being into what appears to the subject: “I
am no longer a human Ego in the universal, existentially posited world, but
exclusively a subject for which this world has being, and purely, indeed, as that
which appears to me, and of which I am conscious in some way or the other, so
that the real being of the world thereby remains unconsidered, unquestioned,
and its validity is left out of account.”15
As Jaspers describes it, “the world is experienced and known by the transcendental subject in isolation-the Ego. . . . The mental becomes the foundation, rather than the external world of objects, as in the objectivistic tradition.”
As Husserl himself pointed out: “In respect to order, the intrinsically first of
the philosophical disciplines would be the ‘solipsistically’ reduced ‘egology,’ the
egology of the primordially reduced ego. Then only would come intersubjective phenomenology, which is founded on that discipline.”16
Jaspers continues by claiming that according to Husserl, man is not
inherently social, but is capable of being social, an idea that he shares with Max
Weber. As Heidegger already criticized René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz,
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the detached subject is unable to communicate with others. Husserl tried to
solve this problem by imposing empathy between the ego-poles, and it is the
assumption of empathy that is the foundation of Husserlian intersubjectivity.
For Heidegger, instead man is a social entity. He is born into society,
and his source of perspective of the world is never his subjectivity versus the
world but within the world. Any knowledge of the world is grounded in man
as living among other men: “On the basis of this with-bound (mithaften)
being-in-the-world, the world is already the one that I share with others. The
world of Dasein is a with-world (Mitwelt). Being-in is being-with (mitsein)
others. The innerwordly being-in-itself of others is Dasein-with (mitdasein).”17
Human beings are conditioned by their past, by history. Man is from the
very beginning part of a larger whole, of the world of society. He is not only
conditioned by his immediate society but also by his culture of which he is
surrounded. The effect of society is not merely conversations or theories he
encounters, but objects as well, like tools and buildings. What is important to
note in Heidegger’s thought is that man is never alone. Man can only be with
others, which is the special ontological relation that characterizes man.
Buber sides with Heidegger, and for him a political entity is not necessarily created by man, but is done spontaneously. Man is born into society
and is part of it. The same is true of course in a Jewish state. Forcing Jewish
law will be foreign to the Jewish state, and will not reflect its citizens’ natural
social interconnections. Levinas had a different approach to man’s social being,
and therefore his concept of the polity is different as well. I will thus present
Levinas’s political perception from this idea in mind.
LEVINAS
Levinas’s political philosophy is not as explicit as his other writings on phenomenology. Yet it is assumed that his Third Party is synonymous with “humanity.”
The Third Party is another way of speaking of other people identified as other
selves, and is also a perception of me through the eyes of the other. Human life
is a social life, or mitdasein, as Heidegger called it. Human beings are born into
society. In this sense, being in society is being in the world. But for Levinas,
the existence of the other doesn’t only signify life or being, but also a call for
responsibility. What Levinas calls “the epiphany of the face” of the other creates a total responsibility for the life of the other. Thus, with the mere fact of
the existence of two human beings, ethics is created, ethics but not yet law or
justice. Justice is created only when a third party watches over:
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By essence the prophetic word responds to the epiphany of the face,
doubles all the discourse not as a discourse about moral themes, but
as an irreducible movement of a discourse which by essence is aroused
by the epiphany of the face inasmuch as it attests the presence of the
third party, the whole of humanity, in the eyes that look at me. Like a
shunt every social relation leads back to the presentation of the other
to the same without the intermediary of any image or sign, solely by
the expression of the face. When taken to be like a genus that unites
like individuals the essence of society is lost sight of.18

For Levinas, the third party as an observer is what develops ethics to law.
As I described in the beginning of this essay, it is the legal aspect that forms
the Jewish philosophical tradition. Indeed, Levinas did not develop a theory
of justice, but he did create a philosophical foundation for a political theology.
God is found in his thought in the realm of the individual and his meeting
with the other; through the other evolves ethics, but only in society this ethics
develops to justice, which is a full application of ethics in the world. But what
is missing in Levinas’s thought is the place of the law as revelation. Unlike a
long tradition of Jewish philosophers, for whom it is the revealed law that creates ethics, for Levinas ethics are revealed and the law evolves from ethics, and
thus politics is but an effect of ethics as well.
JEWISH STATE AND JEWISH LAW
We come back to Strauss’s claim: because Judaism is about law, the Jewish state
should be bound by Jewish law, and of course, there shouldn’t be separation
between state and religion. But such a demand from a modern democratic
state raises many questions: Can a Jewish state be a democracy or must it be
a theocracy? Who should decide which laws should apply and which not? Is
there any room for a public discussion about which of the Jewish laws should
be applied? Doesn’t the law bestow power on rabbis and remove any authority
from the people? And the most difficult question: How can religion be a subject of discussion? Isn’t religion absolute? A religious person can’t compromise
with his religion. The same is true about Jewish law. Jewish law is considered
absolute in the eyes of an observant Jew, and he can’t compromise it for the
sake of secular law. If that is true, how can a democratic state bear Jewish law?
In order to solve these questions, I want to distinguish between subjectivity and doubt. I claim that the fact that Jewish law should define the Jewish
state does not necessitate a rejection of public discussion, and the reason for
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that is the state of certitude of Jewish faith as well as Jewish law in the modern era. As Buber claimed, certitude of faith is impossible in our time. We
do confront our faith in God with doubts about his existence and his Torah.
Yet that doesn’t mean to say that we are not convinced about the two. As
opposed to some claims, Jewish religion should not be limited to the subjective
sphere, to the private sphere. Conviction may arise in a background of doubt.
A similar claim was made by R. Abraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, the Khazon Ish
(1878–1953), who said that despite the authority and the obligation that is
given by the Jewish law to force law, that shouldn’t apply in the modern era.
The reason is that the existence of God is not as revealed as it used to be in
the past. When the Divine Providence is concealed, man can demand neither
faith nor obedience to the law:
Individual cohesion of the law is only permitted at times when the
Divine Providence was revealed, and only then punishing the sinners
was the way to enhance observation of the law. But at a time when
His face is hidden, and faith ceased from the indigent, cohesion
doesn’t add observance anymore, but creates the opposite instead,
because it will appear as violence, God forbid. Not as cohesion for
the sake of observance. And since the idea of individual cohesion
was created for the sake of Tikkun Olam, the law does not exist
when there is no Tikkun. And we should try to influence them with
means of love and to shade as much light as we can.19

Perceiving our time as a time of doubt, as time that we can’t be certain
about his existence because he hid his face, leaves faith to the individual’s conviction. He can’t demand it from his neighbor. In my opinion, such perception
of certitude of faith enables not only acceptance of secular people within society, but also secularity itself. Understanding it has an enormous importance
because it enables public discussion instead of force.
Public discussion is enabled when disagreements are managed with
respect to both sides. If in the case of disagreement each adversary does not
respect the legitimacy of his adverse, the society is doomed for schism. Each
side must accept the opinion of the other as a possible truth. It doesn’t mean
that he is not convinced that he is correct and that his adversary is wrong, but
rather that there is a possibility that he is correct. Accepting the possibility of
truth from one’s adversary is the most important condition of decent democratic life.
I claim that the same thing is true regarding Jewish law in modernity.
An observant Jew must be convinced about the law, but the lack of certitude,
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as R. Karelitz says, enables the possibility of secularity and therefore its legitimacy. It is this legitimacy that enables a decent discussion about Jewish law in
the Jewish state. Observant and nonobservant can meet and decide about the
laws of the Jewish state and its public sphere, and both can accept the results
of their decisions as legitimate.
The sort of decent discussion that I suggest reminds us of the sort of
discussion of the public sphere of Habermas. I think that the importance of
my idea is not the fact that I suggest a decent discussion but that I enable it
even between such a principled subject as religion and religious law. The distinction between certitude and conviction is thus essential to a decent public
discussion.
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Linking “Egypt with Texas”:
Emma Lazarus’s Jewish Vision
of American Democracy
David J. Peterson and Joan Latchaw

INTRODUCTION
Emma Lazarus was from a mixed Jewish heritage bridging the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries in America. Her mother’s Portuguese Sephardic
ancestors (Seixas and Nathan) emigrated to British colonial America before
the 1750s, and her father’s Ashkenazic family left Germany for the United
States in the 1790s. It was largely the Sephardic ancestry that conferred near
blueblood status on Lazarus’s family. Her great-great-uncle Gershom Mendes
Seixas, for example, led New York City’s Shearith Israel Synagogue, and her
great-great-uncle Moses Mendes Seixas presided over the most fabled of all
Jewish American places of worship, Newport’s Yeshuat Israel (later Touro
Synagogue).
The correspondence between Moses Seixas and George Washington
stands as a beacon to American liberty and civil rights. The newly elected
president, along with a delegation that included Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson, visited Newport in August 1790. Among the citizens who addressed
the president was Seixas, who stated, “Deprived as we heretofore have been
of the invaluable rights of free Citizens, we now . . . behold a Government,
erected by the Majesty of the People—a Government, which to bigotry gives
no sanction, to persecution no assistance—but generously affording to all Liberty of conscience, and immunities of Citizenship.”1 In a letter written soon
after the visit, Washington famously assured the Newport Congregation that
“‘the children of the Stock of Abraham shall sit in safety under his own vine
and figtree, and there shall be none to make him afraid,’” an image Emma
Lazarus would invoke in several of her poems.2
When Emma Lazarus was born in New York City in 1849, her immediate family was prominent in both the Jewish community and, due to her
father’s prosperous sugar business, the upper echelons of New York society. Social connections further linked the family to America’s literary elite,
enabling an eighteen-year-old Emma to send her first volume of poetry, Poems
117
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and Translations (1867), to Ralph Waldo Emerson. He enthusiastically offered
to became her literary mentor, and he remained an important advocate of her
work.3 With her family’s support (and Emerson’s mentoring), she developed
into a prolific writer, publishing six volumes of poetry and translations. In
the early 1880s she became, moreover, a social advocate for the Russian Jews
fleeing the pogroms. She wrote impassioned defenses of European Jews, along
with proto-Zionist essays that appeared in prominent American periodicals
such as Century Magazine and American Hebrew. She also volunteered for the
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and in 1883 organized the short-lived Society
for the Improvement and Colonization of East European Jews, which promoted the settlement of Palestine.
Eulogizing Lazarus for American Hebrew after her untimely death at
thirty-eight in 1887, Rabbi Sabato Morais, Orthodox hazzan [cantor] of
Philadelphia’s Mikvah Israel Synagogue, styled her the “poetical Deborah”
of the United States, noting she “would have reached a superlative degree
as the poetess of the Jews in America” had she lived.4 While Morais’s praise
for Lazarus asserts an uncomplicated understanding of her Jewish identity,
contemporary Lazarus scholars note a sharp contrast between Lazarus’s early
poetry—seen as more secular—and the later works that attack European
Antisemitism or explore Jewish diasporic experiences, a shift they figure as
reflecting an assimilated, secularized American who late in life comes to
embrace a Jewish identity.
They further observe that Lazarus shared an uneasy, at times ambivalent,
relationship with her Jewish heritage that guided her interest in Jewish philosophers and intellectuals (such as Baruch Spinoza, Heinrich Heine, and Benjamin
Disraeli) who experienced similar conflicts between their ethnic and religious
heritages and their attraction to a broader, more cosmopolitan world. Esther
Schor asserts, for example, that Lazarus shared with Heine a strongly divided
sense of self: his between Jewish and German-Romantic identities, and hers
between “the double life she was trying to live as an American and a Jew.”5
Indeed Lazarus’s own comments on Heine are frequently glossed as summing
up her own sense of self: “He was [writes Lazarus] a Jew, with the mind and
eyes of a Greek. A beauty-loving, myth-creating pagan soul was imprisoned in
a Hebrew frame; or rather, it was twinned . . . with another equally powerful
soul—proud rebellious, oriental in its love of the vague, the mysterious, the
grotesque, and tragic with the two-thousand-year-old passion of the Hebrews.”6
Though her family was not religious, Lazarus’s Jewish heritage serves
as an important touchstone in her writing, drawing on major Jewish figures
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(mostly Sephardic) from the medieval, Enlightenment, and Romantic periods. She celebrates luminaries such as Solomon ibn Gabirol, Maimonides,
Abraham ibn Ezra, Rashi, Spinoza, and Heine for their contributions to
both Jewish and European intellectual and artistic culture. Moreover, she
herself often made statements that reveal her strong identification with her
Jewish heritage even as she explicitly disidentified with the religious aspects
of Judaism. Writing to Edmund Stedman, for example, she declares that
she is “proud of my blood and heritage, but Hebrew ideals [i.e., religious
principles] do not appeal to me.”7 Sending Reform Rabbi Gustav Gottheil
(Temple Emanu-El, New York City) some requested translations of Gabirol,
Judah Ha-Levi, and ibn Ezra, she notes, “I cheerfully offered to help you to
the extent of my ability, and was glad to prove to you that my interest and
sympathies were loyal to our race, although my religious convictions (if such
they can be called) and the circumstances of my life have led me somewhat
apart from our people.”8
The hypothesis that she struggled with Jewish identity has even been
used by some to explain the relative obscurity into which her poetry has fallen.
Francine Klagsbrun goes so far as to claim that her writings “[reflect] the discomfort of a woman who was not totally at home in the Christian world she
inhabited but had not quite found her footing in the Jewish one either. It has
the feel of outsiderness, of a writer who held herself too much apart, too much
above the people she sought to defend and counsel. The outsiderness has stood
in the way of [her work’s] survival.”9 Ranen Omer-Sherman even argues that
Lazarus’s Jewish-focused poetry tends to present Jewish faith traditions as
parochial, comprising what Lazarus calls “‘the whole rotten machinery of ritualism, feasts and fasts, sacrifices, oblations, and empty prayers.’”10 Moreover,
Omer-Sherman asserts, Lazarus tends to contrast these insular seeming traditions to American democracy’s embrace of the “Enlightenment’s universalizing
discourse of rationalism.”11 According to Omer-Sherman, Lazarus’s dedication
to such rationalism leads her to “[erase] Jewish difference” in favor of assimilation and to encourage “the consolations of forgetfulness”12 whereby unenlightened Jews (especially Eastern European Ashkenazim) could move out of their
primitive “Oriental” past and into Enlightenment modernity.
Questions about her religious identity, degrees of assimilation, and
commitment to Enlightenment universalism obscure, however, her role as
both Jewish intellectual and poet of American democracy, roles highlighted
in Rabbi Sabato Morais’s eulogy. While Lazarus may have lacked strong
religious convictions, she never lost her commitment to the intellectual,
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spiritual, artistic, and political legacies of her people. Indeed, she belongs
in the company of other Jewish-American intellectuals, such as Isaac Leeser,
Isaac Mayer Wise, Isaac Harby, and Morais, all advocates for a particularly
American-inflected approach to the Jewish Enlightenment, an approach that
positions the United States as a new homeland where Jews can enjoy religious,
economic, and intellectual liberty.13 As Morais argues in his famous 1851
Thanksgiving sermon,
A century has nearly elapsed since the scattered children of Judah
here found a home of security and peace; here they have thriven and
acquired wealth; no internal adversary has ever molested them, nor
has the rod of tyranny from without reached these shores; here they
have but to prove themselves worthy, and they will rise as high as any
free man can aspire; no disabilities, no legal impediments, militate
against them; what a felicity is that of which you are made to partake!
dear brethren, the boundless field of knowledge is unclosed to you,
you may enter it, and freely gather its delightful fruits; you may give
scope to your mental energies, for the advancement of your fellow-
citizens and of mankind at large:—Unimpeded in the exercise of your
religious duties, in accordance with the Jewish doctrine, you are not
merely tolerated, but regarded with respect, for you also form a part
of that glorious whole that constitutes the American Republic.14

Lazarus’s work reflects similar themes. In the subsequent sections of this
essay we demonstrate how Lazarus draws on the dominant culture’s tropes of
universal rights to freedom, liberty, and opportunity to argue for and promote
Jewish belonging. As we show in our discussion of poems such as “In Exile,”
she draws on discourses associated with Jeffersonian agrarian democracy to
figure America as providing a new promised land for diasporic Jews. Moreover,
her model of American democracy does not necessitate assimilation under the
aegis of some universalized rationalism that requires Jewish citizens to forget
either their ethnic and religious identities or their diasporic experiences. Nor
does becoming, in the words of Morais, “a part of the glorious whole that
constitutes the American Republic” necessitate the surrendering of differences
within the broader Jewish community. Indeed, as our discussion of “By the
Waters of Babylon” suggests, Lazarus presents America as the location where
all the “outcasts of Judea” (Morais) may gather to reconstitute the “Soul of
Israel.” Yet this rebirth cannot fully unfold, Lazarus argues, until the already
established Jews of America (the Sephardic Portuguese specifically) are prepared to cast aside their antipathy toward Ashkenazic difference.
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“IN EXILE,” RUSSIAN JEWS, AND FRONTIER
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
“In Exile” (Appendix 1) is a five-stanza poem that depicts idyllic, pastoral
scenes wherein “soft breezes bow the grass” and Jewish comrades, unused to
agrarian life, labor “beneath the shadowing oak tree” after “the Southern day
of heavy toil.” The poem opens with an epigraph that situates the poem on
the American frontier. In the epigraph, an unidentified Russian correspondent
declares that since their arrival in Texas “our life is one unbroken paradise. We
live a true brotherly life. Every evening after supper we take a seat under the
mighty oak and sing our songs.” We never learn with any certainty how these
Jewish immigrants came to be in Texas. Perhaps they are pogrom refugees fresh
off the boat, as it were, who were recruited by organizations such as the Alliance Israelite Universelle/Am Olam and sent West to become farmers. Or perhaps they are Russian exiles who brought with them plans to form agricultural
utopian communities in the American West, yearning, as Herscher puts it, to
“strike roots in the American soil,” despite having little farming experience.
According to Herscher, these Jewish idealists saw America as a democratic
utopia, “a great and glorious land of liberty, whose broad and trackless acres
offer an asylum and a place for . . . courageous souls, willing to toil.”15 Lazarus’s exiles demonstrate similar yearnings. The poem’s images of “brotherly
life” and “unbroken paradise,” a phrase repeated in the second stanza, link to a
broader discourse about agrarian democracy and the American Frontier’s role
in its development, as envisioned by founders such as Thomas Jefferson and
extolled by writers and thinkers ranging from Henry David Thoreau, to Walt
Whitman, to Frederick Jackson Turner.16
Richard Slotkin explores how the discourse of agrarian democracy represented the frontier as a “Garden of Earthly Delights” that held “restorative
and regenerative power”17 for any individual willing to risk the arduous
journey West and undertake the hard work of agricultural labor. We see these
revitalizing and restorative aspects of the agrarian life in the poem’s opening
stanzas. Echoing those peaceful moments when God visits Adam and Eve in
the “cool of the evening” after their pleasant labors in the Garden of Eden, we
find former Russian peddlers and merchants, these “unused tillers of the soil”
and their domesticated animal partners, resting after a hard “day of heavy
toil.”18 While we do not see them working in the poem, the transformative
power of their labor is clear: a sense of “unbroken paradise” for both men
and beasts.
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The poem also subtly reflects another important aspect of the political
ideology of the American frontier, the belief that it would provide an “inexhaustible stimulus for economic growth” (40), securing material rewards for
those willing to do the hard work. This aspect of the frontier is reflected subtly
in the opening stanza’s images that bespeak of the immigrants’ material prosperity, which includes land, livestock, and the rich products of their labor. We
see “yoke-freed oxen,” the donkey at a “deep trough,” along with the “frothy
pails” full of milk drawn from the “udder-lightened kine.” The “rich, black
furrows” evoke both the land’s fertility and promise of rich bounty and the
dedicated labor (both human and animal) that created them. In short, Texas
becomes the site of utopian habitation for these formerly oppressed refugees.
These transplanted Eastern European Jews have forged “a true brotherly life”
through their agrarian efforts, enabling them to escape the degrading urban
sweat shops and marginal economics of the large industrializing cities.19 At the
same time and in contrast to their experiences in Czarist Russia, these immigrants are ensured that they never again will suffer from oppressive, coercive
political regimes who have always sought to bring “fire and blood” to the Jewish people.
The exiles, the poem suggests, are thus free to create an agrarian democratic community composed of Whitmanian “comrades” and “brothers,” who
are equally free to engage in Jewish religious and intellectual traditions (as we
discuss further below) or just to “drink / The universal air.” Importantly, the
frontier enables (again echoing Walt Whitman, Henry David Thoreau, and
other American Romantics) a world where humans, animals, and nature itself
interact in equanimity in both work and rest. The oxen are “yoke freed,” and
the unburdened “patient ass” freely enjoys a drink “in the cool, deep trough.”
Even the cattle, who do not labor like the ox or donkey, have been freed of the
painful burden of milk. Humans and animals each prepare to rest, “to lie, with
limbs relaxed” and enjoy the cool breeze.
While there is nothing in the poem to indicate that these Jews are preparing for Shabbat, the poem evokes the biblical injunction that establishes the
day of rest, down to the presence of oxen and asses: “Six days you shall do your
work, but on the seventh day you shall rest, so that your ox and your donkey may have relief, and your homeborn slave and the resident alien may be
refreshed” (Exod 23:12). Indeed, the subtle Jewish imagery even seems to echo
Havdalah [service marking the end of Shabbat]: the fragrant “Fresh smells of
earth” emerge as the day draws to a close, as if the earth itself and the “glebe”
[cultivated fields] reward the herdsmen and their animals with invigorating
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scents, much like the spice box rejuvenates the spirit after separation from the
joy and holiness of the Sabbath.
While the traditions of Shabbat and Havdalah are only alluded to and
compressed into a single moment, together they suggest a closer connection to
Jewish traditions than critics have assumed, particularly given their presumptions of Lazarus’s complete assimilation. For frontier freedom, the restorative
power of labor and resulting economic security, along with the Whitmanian
democratic union of humanity and the natural world, do not necessitate
that these Jews forget their heritage and assimilate. For example, though in
the midst of evening rest, the poem’s speaker in the third stanza attenuates the
Texas Jews’ joy by recalling both their own suffering during the pogroms as
well as that of Jews at other times and places:
The hounded stag that has escaped the pack,
And pants at ease within a thick-leaved dell;
The unimprisoned bird that finds the track
Through sun-bathed space, to where his fellows dwell;
The martyr, granted respite from the rack,
The death-doomed victim pardoned from his cell,
Such only know the joy these exiles gain,
Life’s sharpest rapture is surcease of pain.

In metaphoric sympathy, the stag and bird extend the relationship between
humans and animals that we see in the poem’s opening stanzas. The hounded
stag’s experience resembles that of the Ashkenazim who have escaped the Russian wolves. So, too, the bird’s escape may recall their flight beyond the Pale
of Settlement. Shifting from animal examples, the speaker remembers the
suffering of Sephardic conversos during the Spanish Inquisition, particularly
focusing on the graphic horror of the tortuous rack, the victim’s arms and legs
tied and pulled, sometimes torn out of joint or from the body.
The stag, bird, martyr, and victim’s joy in release are explicitly linked to
those of all Jewish exiles, whose songs are connected by similar experiences.
Their singing reflects what the speaker, in the poem’s closing couplet, characterizes as “the conquest of the spirit strong, / The soul that wrests the victory
from pain.”
The fourth stanza abruptly shifts from the exile’s escape to their experience of frontier life and freedom in the New World, which draws another
connection to the discourses of agrarian democracy. Slotkin notes that the
democratic farmer was often figured as “a free individual, living on his own
land, independent of others for the necessaries of life yet depending on his
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fellow citizens (and society in general) for protection, law, and civilized amenities.” We see such idealizations in the poem’s fourth stanza, when the Jewish
farmers gather together after their various individual labors (plowing, herding,
etc.) to enjoy the
Freedom to love the law that Moses brought,
To sing the songs of David, and to think
The thoughts Gabirol to Spinoza taught,
Freedom to dig the common earth, to drink
The universal air—for this they sought
Refuge o’er wave and continent, to link
Egypt with Texas in their mystic chain,
And truth’s perpetual lamp forbid to wane.

The stanza presents a declaration of independence for Jews who immigrate to the American frontier, guaranteeing these Eastern European Jews a
proliferation of freedoms. In Texas, the Torah and liturgical traditions (“the
law of Moses” and “the songs of David”)—which elsewhere Lazarus associates with the newly arrived Ashkenazim—are engaged alongside Jewish poetic
and philosophical pursuits (“The thoughts Gabirol to Spinoza taught”) that
Lazarus grounds in Sephardic tradition. Together these form a “mystic chain”
that links Jewish history, traditions, and culture. The Texas frontier becomes
a site wherein Jews of both Ashkenazic and Sephardic traditions are relinked.
Both strands of Jewish difference are supported by, grounded in, the agrarian
democratic universals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, represented
by “the common earth” and “The universal air” to which all have access. Thus,
they are further bound, as Morais asserted in his sermon, to “that glorious
whole that constitutes the American Republic.”
The mystic chain further binds the Russian Jews and their journey to
America to the exilic experiences of all Jews, recalling, then, others’ experiences of exile and exodus, whether Egyptian bondage, Babylonian exile, the
Diasporic exodus, the expulsion from Spain, or the pogroms of Russia, all of
which form the chain that links Egypt with Texas. By linking Egypt to Texas,
moreover, Lazarus seems to suggest that rather than mere exiled refugees, these
Russian Jews have found a new promised land, which is reinforced by their
sense of living in “unbroken paradise.” In this sense, we can also see the Texas
Jews and their coming out of Russia as reenacting the Pesach story.
The freedom stanza further draws our attention to the fact that American democracy, agrarian or otherwise, is rooted in conceptions of democracy
that are specifically Jewish. Although not foregrounded in Lazarus’s poem, the
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Torah and other aspects of Judaism, as others have argued and demonstrated
in this volume, are rich sources for the Western democratic tradition. Moreover, Jefferson and the founders of the United States did not invent the central
metaphysical tenets of modern democracy. That honor goes to Spinoza.20 As
Lee Ward argues, Spinoza sought to overcome religious sectarianism (which
in his time had torn Europe apart) by championing democracy. Influenced by
Gabirol, Spinoza draws on neoplatonist conceptions of the Divine as a universal
“substance” that appears as the many “modes” of the created universe. As we
see in “In Exile,” all beings share in this divinity.21 While space does not allow
for a full disquisition on Spinoza’s theological-political system, two aspects are
important to American democracy: rational-based governance and religious
toleration, both of which Jefferson and other founders championed.22 In Lazarus’s poem, Spinozan democratic principles are pointed to as the Russian immigrants find the opportunity to think the “thoughts Gabirol to Spinoza taught.”
And these political ways of thinking become part of the mystic chain that links
these immigrants together as a Texas community, that bind them to America,
and that further link them to Jewish history and to “truth’s perpetual lamp.”
THE GREAT DIVIDE: JEWISH BELONGING
AND “BY THE WATERS OF BABLYON”
That the new emigrants are now free “to think / The thoughts” of freedom
and democracy suggests that they were previously not free to think, or even to
live out, these thoughts, perhaps a reasonable assumption given their situation
when in Czarist Russia. Yet it also suggests that these Eastern Ashkenazim may
not have even had exposure to the greatness of Sephardic philosophic thinking
until coming to America. In a sense, these Jews are just now getting the opportunity to partake of modernity. While “In Exile” does not push this question
of Ashkenazic difference, Lazarus, like many long-established American Jewish
families, and, before them, Western European Jews more broadly, took at best
a dim view of Eastern European Jews. As Laurel Plapp notes in Zionism and
Revolution in European-Jewish Literature, it was common in German-Jewish
literature to provide positive portrayals of Sephardic characters and negative
depictions of the Ashkenazic.23 As a number of Lazarus scholars have documented,24 Lazarus’s own writings demonstrate that she, like many members of
America’s Jewish establishment, viewed the influx of Eastern European Jews
as problematic, and she struggled to work her way through her own and the
American Sephardic community’s intolerance.
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This struggle over the Jewish Sephardic establishment’s ability to see
the Ostjuden [Eastern European and Russian Jews] as more than fallen and
degraded, as worthy of full democratic citizenship is demonstrated by the last
poem she published a mere eight months before her death at age thirty-eight
in 1887: “By the Waters of Babylon.” Perhaps her most accomplished poem,
“By the Waters” is, as Michael Weingrad notes, the first prose-poem published
in English.25 Lexically, syntactically, and structurally echoing biblical text, the
poem, divided into seven short chapters with numbered verses, compresses
nearly 400 years of Jewish diasporic experience, beginning with the Sephardim’s
expulsion from Spain and culminating in the Ashkenazim’s arrival in America.
In order to examine and resolve the conflict between America’s Sephardic
elite and their negative responses to the influx of Ashkenazic “ghetto” Jews,
Lazarus must first examine the basis for Sephardic attitudes of sociocultural
superiority. She thus begins the poem with several chapters that measure out
“the mystic chain” that links American Sephardim to Europe and to ancient
Israel. The first chapter, “The Exodus,” recounts the Sephardim’s grueling
expulsion from Spain and their sojourn to the “Continent of freedom,”
America. Unlike the biblical Exodus, their story is not about the struggle to
achieve freedom from bondage. Rather, it is about the recovery of a people
after freedom’s loss, represented as a sudden rupture through Lazarus’s starting the poem in medias res; we are in the middle of the expulsion, watching
as “dusty pilgrims crawl” through the sere landscape under the Spanish sun’s
“blaze of azure fire.”
The verses that follow depict a diverse group of people and animals
who are on the march. But instead of the genealogical lists often associated
with biblical narrative of sojourns, exiles, and exoduses (e.g., Gen 12, Exod 1,
Ezra 2), Lazarus opens the second verse with a single “hoary patriarch” who is
followed by a woman with a “sleeping babe,” nestled in “her large enfolding
arms” along with her other “little ones.” The image is generalized: the identity
of the “patriarch” could refer to any Spanish Jewish male and thus encompasses
all lineages of Sephardim, while also conflating the expelled with the storied
biblical patriarchs from whom all Jews descend. The image of the woman
with her babe and other children memorializes the extent to which the expulsion impacted Jewish families. It further and strategically recalls the story of
Mary and Joseph’s flight to Egypt with the infant Jesus to escape slaughter by
Herod (Matt 2), an association further reinforced by the “youth with Christ-
like countenance” in verse 3. The sentimentality of these images, particularly
the plight of the “little ones with bruised and bleeding feet,” empathetically
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appeals to both Jewish and Christian readers. Further identification is enabled
by a Whitmanesque catalogue of the people, their animals, and their possessions that equally enables Jewish and non-Jewish readers to identify with the
experience of the expulsion.
Moreover, verses 12–14 invite readers not only to empathize but to experience the worries and sorrows of the people. As if writing a haggadah suited to
remembering the exodus of August 1493, readers are commanded to “Listen
to their lamentation” and are invited to share in the sojourners’ loss and doubts
(“Whither shall they turn?”). Verse 15 provides the answer to the Sephar
dim’s plight, for Columbus, “the world-unveiling Genoese,” will “unlock the
golden gates of sunset and bequeath” to them “a Continent to Freedom!” That
America is their promised destination (given by the “bird of the air” in the
chapter’s last verse) is important not only from a historical perspective but also
in terms of establishing Sephardic preeminence in the New World. Lazarus
thus invokes American democratic feelings26 that enabled Sephardic Jews like
the Seixases and Nathans (in concert with Christians like Washington and Jefferson) to rebuild the lost promised land.
Interestingly, the poem does not explicitly present the arrival of the
Sephardim in America. Instead, the speaker shifts, in Chapter II (“Treasures”),
to the deep Jewish past, in order to recover the “buried” treasures of Israel:
“the golden knowledge, Truth” and “the delicate pearl and adamantine jewel
of the Law.” Knowledge, Truth and Law, already invoked in Chapter I:6 by the
image of “the tenderly-carried silken scrolls,” are part of the heritage the Sephardim bring to the Continent of Freedom and the refounding of the promised land, what Chapter III (“The Sower”) enigmatically refigures as seeds to
be resown by Israel. Indeed, Chapter III traces the impact of Jewish knowledge
and law on world history. Echoing Jesus’s Parable of the Sower (Matt 13:3–19;
but also see Hos 10:12), the “seeds” of Judaism are sown by “seed-bearing
Israel,” giving rise to both Christianity (verses 3 through 7) and Islam (verses
8–11). While these two postdiasporic sowings yield destructive Antisemitism
(the “treacherous boughs to strangle the Sower”), the chapter ends with the
promise of yet a third planting, whereby Judaism’s “golden knowledge” and
“adamantine Law” will flourish in the United States. The chapter is a further
reminder to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim readers of their shared history, a
history that binds them together (as “People of the Book”) and should unite
them in democratic inclusion, freedom, and brotherhood in America.
Chapter IV (“The Test”) continues to trace the diasporic experience,
beginning with “the Passion of Israel,” a recasting of the Passion of Christ. As
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with previous verses, Lazarus once again seeks to enable non-Jewish readers
to identify with Jewish experience: like Jesus (the “divinely beautiful man” in
III:6) and many early Christian martyrs, Israel was persecuted by the Romans,
“bound to the wheel, nailed to the cross, cut off by the sword, burned at the
stake, tossed into the sea.”27 Despite the persecutions, the speaker draws our
attention to the heroic survivance of Israel and the continuing production of
knowledge, poetry, and philosophy during the diaspora. The Prophet, Poet,
and Sage certainly have biblical resonance (one thinks, for example of Ezekiel’s
encounter with the four angels, of King David’s psalms, or perhaps Solomon’s
wisdom), and the storied, “monumental dead” and “standard-bearers of the
future” foreshadow the catalog of Sephardic greats (Maimonades, Ha-Levi,
Gabirol, et al.) that will open Chapter VI.
Yet this celebration of Sephardic triumph is “suddenly” interrupted in
verse 8 by “a burst of mocking laughter” as “the shuffling gait, the ignominious features, the sordid mask of the son of the Ghetto” appears, the first of
what becomes, in Chapter V (“Currents”), a “vast oceanic movement” of Ash
kenazim fleeing the Russian pogroms. The “son of the Ghetto” marks what has
been unmarked through most of the poem: the exclusion of Ashkenazim from
the Sephardic imagination as well as (by extension) from the American democratic experience. “Israel,” after all, includes both Sephardim and Ashkenazim;
yet the narrator has largely spoken as though only the Sephardic experience—
including the coming to America—is worthy of remembrance and celebration.
As scholars have noted, the speaker’s shock of recognition represents an
important shift in the poem. Lazarus’s own writings demonstrate that she, like
many members of America’s Jewish establishment, viewed the influx of Eastern
European Jews as problematic, and she struggled to work her way through her
own and the American Sephardic community’s intolerance. This struggle over
the Jewish Sephardic establishment’s ability to see the Ostjuden as worthy of
full democratic citizenship has been the subject of much Lazarus scholarship.
In a characteristic reading, Weingrad asserts that Lazarus’s stereotyped “ghetto”
Jew represents the views of “a late-nineteenth-century assimilated American
Jew, uncomfortable with the alien qualities of East European brethren.”28
Weingrad correctly notes that the Ostjuden present Lazarus with “a formidable psychological challenge both to her understanding of Jewish identity
and to her conviction that . . . American opponents of Jewish immigration
were wrong.”29 And he acknowledges some of the ways in which the poem
deals with the struggle over the extent of ethnic and cultural tolerance on the
part of established Jewish-Americans or Americans more broadly: the ability
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to “transcend . . . prejudice and love the Jew—with understanding that, as a
result, the Jew will shed his ignorance, superstition, and abjection.”30 But it
is not the Eastern European Jew alone who suffers from “ignorance,” and the
point of transformation is not merely assimilation as so many Lazarus scholars
have figured it. Missing from such analysis is how the poem also struggles with
the question of full inclusion in democratic citizenship as part of the work of
renewing Israel itself.
At the end of Chapter V, America, “the generous mother of nations,”
has welcomed the refugees, drawing them “unto her ample breast.” Yet at this
point in the poem it remains to be seen whether they will become full members of the American democratic landscape. While welcomed, “The herdsman
of Canaan and the seed of Jerusalem” have moved, in keeping with the “safety
valve” theory of Jeffersonian agrarian democracy,31 to the frontier where they
can “renew their youth amid the pastoral plains of Texas and the golden valleys of the Sierras.” This repeats the image of the Russian Jews in frontier
Texas from “In Exile,” who found their new “life . . . one unbroken paradise”
because of both economic independence and religious freedom. Yet, as we
noted in our discussion of “In Exile,” the Ashkenazim in “By the Waters” enjoy
their freedom at a distance from the urban Sephardic elite; these Jews are, after
all, safely stowed away in Texas, unlikely to make an appearance within the
gloried halls of Shearith Israel or Touro. There seem, as was implicit in “In
Exile,” to be limits to democratic inclusion, set in part by the intolerance of
the Sephardic elite.
Still ambivalent about including the Ostjuden, then, Chapter VI (“The
Prophet”) returns us (as does the start of almost all the other chapters) to celebrating Sephardic experience and tradition. Once again, readers are reminded
of “monumental dead and the standard bearers of the [American] future”
(IV:7) whose status appears now threatened by “the exiles of Babylon” (V:4).
The first eight verses present a diverse catalog of figures whose philosophical, political, and artistic ideas form additional links in the mystic chain that
binds America’s Jews and American democracy to Jewish history, something
all Americans, the poem implicitly argues, should understand. The doctors,
scholars, and artists she celebrates were all part of what Lazarus imagines as
illustrious cosmopolitan, tolerant societies that prefigure American democracy:
Spain, Egypt, and Portugal, along with medieval French and Enlightenment-
era German principalities.
Indeed, their influence was vast. Moses ben Maimon’s medical learning (among other things), for example, spread beyond the Jewish world to
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influence Western medicine. Halevi’s religious and secular poems are still considered primary examples of Jewish poetry. Gabirol had less effect on Jewish
philosophical and intellectual thinking than he did on Christian thinking,32
though he further influenced, as we’ve already discussed, Spinoza’s understanding of the Divine, which in turn undergirded his thinking about democratic
governance. “The Prophet” thus presents these Western European Jewish
thinkers as important to the development of European (and hence American)
artistic and philosophical thinking.
Lazarus implicitly (and explicitly) juxtaposes these glorified Sephardim
and German Ashkenzim,33 whose fame “resounds like the brazen-throated cornet,” with Eastern European Ashkenazim. In contrast to the rationalistic tone
of the first seven verses, verses 8–12 admonish readers to accept and even love
their culturally and physically impoverished seeming Ostjuden brothers. The
speaker draws our attention to the “caftaned wretch,” “the ignorant, the coarse,
and the abject,” “the bigot,” and “the creature of darkness” who have arrived on
America’s shores in Chapter V. As commanded by the speaker through a series
of “Thou shalts,” these new arrivals should be taken by the hand (verse 9) and
welcomed by the American Sephardim as “My Brother” and “My Friend.”
Such democratic embrace results in the unfolding of the redemption of
Israel as forecasted by the final verse of Chapter III. The newly arrived Ashkenazim experience “fountains of love” cast upon them from the hearts of the
American Sephardim, who have now laid aside their limited understanding of
who is worthy of both Jewish and American citizenship. Granted, Ashkenazic
names do not yet appear in Lazarus’s list of famous Jewish thinkers, but that is
only a matter of “not yet” rather than “never will.” The American Sephardim
experience is in turn a purification of their sin of exclusion. Their “quivering lips shall be pressed” with “the live coal,” and, as the Seraph tells Ezekiel,
“’Now that this [coal] has touched your lips, your guilt has departed and your
sin is blotted out” (Ezek 6:7).
The redemption of Israel begins to unfold in the poem’s final chapter,
“The Chrysalis.” America will provide the haven for the formerly oppressed
Ashkenazim, who have survived Antisemitic oppression by cocooning themselves in the “cunningly enmeshed web of Talmud and Kabbala.” Now safe,
they can finally flourish, for “when the Sun of Love shines out with cordial
fires, lo, the Soul of Israel bursts her cobweb sheath, and flies forth attired
in the winged beauty of immortality” (verse 4). American democracy (the
“emancipating springtide”) and the American Sephardic community (the “Sun
of Love”) together enable, then, a rebirth for the Ashkenazim, the “Soul of
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Israel.” Implicit in this rebirth is a reunification of the two strands of Judaism,
which must be sutured before “Israel” can be realized and which is possible
only under the specific conditions offered by America: rational governance
and religious tolerance.
CONCLUSION
“Identity politics” has galvanized the public sphere, cultural criticism, and
academic scholarship, becoming what Kenneth Burke calls a “terministic
screen,”34 the lenses through which we interpret—for good or ill—the world
based on individual interests, occupations, or ideologies. In the case of Lazarus scholarship, using religious identity as a primary screen tends to reduce
Lazarus to a minor figure in American literature and democracy. Widening
the scope, however, we find in poems such as “In Exile” and “The Waters of
Babylon” speakers embracing a democratic spirit through empathy and acceptance. However, the speaker’s struggle to accept the “strange faces” and “dark-
bearded chin[s]” of the strangers in “Exile” reveals Lazarus’s own struggle to
include herself in the “mystic chain” that links all Jews and by extrapolation
all Americans.
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, when hate crimes
against Jews, Muslims, and other minorities are on the rise, we believe “Exiles”
and “Waters of Babylon” can serve as a reminder of the importance to American democracy of welcoming and including the “other” after these “tired and
poor” arrive on our shore. Our contemporary culture too often sees immigrants through the imagery of “The New Colossus”: “huddled masses” and
“wretched refuse.” In contrast, the speaker of “Exile” imagines the Ostjuden
foreigners as studious and purposeful, though anguished because of religious
oppression. But on the Texas frontier they can enjoy freedom of “the common
earth” and the “universal air.” Likewise, our society might consider how to
extend a “beacon-hand” to immigrants and minorities, to become a “Mother
of Exiles,” as Lazarus’s most famous poem proposes. We too, like the speaker
in “Waters of Babylon,” must widen our vision and embrace our multiple
ancestries, just as Lazarus herself came to support her Ostjuden brothers. These
poems teach us that brotherhood is an ethical, cultural, and political imperative and a bedrock of American democracy.
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APPENDIX 1: “IN EXILE” (1882)35
Twilight is here, soft breezes bow the grass,
Day’s sounds of various toil break slowly off.
The yoke-freed oxen low, the patient ass
Dips his dry nostril in the cool, deep trough.
Up from the prairie the tanned herdsmen pass
With frothy pails, guiding with voices rough
Their udder-lightened kine. Fresh smells of
earth,
The rich, black furrows of the glebe send forth.

Strange faces theirs, wherethrough the
Orient sun
Gleams from the eyes and glows athwart
the skin.
Grave lines of studious thought and
purpose run
From curl-crowned forehead to dark-bearded
chin.
And over all the seal is stamped thereon
Of anguish branded by a world of sin,
After the Southern day of heavy toil,
In fire and blood through ages on their name,
How good to lie, with limbs relaxed, brows bare Their seal of glory and the Gentiles’ shame.
To evening’s fan, and watch the smoke-
wreaths coil
Freedom to love the law that Moses brought,
Up from one’s pipe-stem through the rayless air. To sing the songs of David, and to think
So deem these unused tillers of the soil,
The thoughts Gabirol to Spinoza taught,
Who stretched beneath the shadowing oak
Freedom to dig the common earth, to drink
tree, stare
The universal air—for this they sought
Peacefully on the star-unfolding skies,
Refuge o’er wave and continent, to link
And name their life unbroken paradise.
Egypt with Texas in their mystic chain,
And truth’s perpetual lamp forbid to wane.
The hounded stag that has escaped the pack,
And pants at ease within a thick-leaved dell;
Hark! through the quiet evening air, their song
The unimprisoned bird that finds the track
Floats forth with wild sweet rhythm and glad
Through sun-bathed space, to where his
refrain.
fellows dwell;
They sing the conquest of the spirit strong,
The martyr, granted respite from the rack,
The soul that wrests the victory from pain;
The death-doomed victim pardoned from
The noble joys of manhood that belong
his cell,
To comrades and to brothers. In their strain
Such only know the joy these exiles gain,
Rustle of palms and Eastern streams one hears,
Life’s sharpest rapture is surcease of pain.
And the broad prairie melts in mist of tears.
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APPENDIX 2: “BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON” (1887)36
I. THE EXODUS. (AUGUST 3, 1492)

1. The Spanish noon is a blaze of azure fire, and the dusty pilgrims
crawl like an endless serpent along treeless plains and bleached highroads, through rock-split ravines and castellated, cathedral-shadowed
towns.
2. The hoary patriarch, wrinkled as an almond shell, bows painfully
upon his staff. The beautiful young mother, ivory-pale, well-nigh
swoons beneath her burden; in her large enfolding arms nestles her
sleeping babe, round her knees flock her little ones with bruised and
bleeding feet. “Mother, shall we soon be there?”
3. The youth with Christ-
like countenance speaks comfortably to
father and brother, to maiden and wife. In his breast, his own heart
is broken.
4. The halt, the blind, are amid the train. Sturdy pack-horses laboriously drag the tented wagons wherein lie the sick athirst with fever.
5. The panting mules are urged forward with spur and goad; stuffed are
the heavy saddlebags with the wreckage of ruined homes.
6. Hark to the tinkling silver bells that adorn the tenderly-carried silken
scrolls.
7. In the fierce noon-glare a lad bears a kindled lamp; behind its network of bronze the airs of heaven breathe not upon its faint purple
star.
8. Noble and abject, learned and simple, illustrious and obscure, plod
side by side, all brothers now, all merged in one routed army of
misfortune.
9. Woe to the straggler who falls by the wayside! no friend shall close
his eyes.
10. They leave behind, the grape, the olive, and the fig; the vines they
planted, the corn they sowed, the garden-cities of Andalusia and
Aragon, Estremadura and La Mancha, of Granada and Castile; the
altar, the hearth, and the grave of their fathers.
11. The townsman spits at their garments, the shepherd quits his flock,
the peasant his plow, to pelt with curses and stones; the villager sets
on their trail his yelping cur.
12. Oh the weary march, oh the uptorn roots of home, oh the blankness
of the receding goal!
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13. Listen to their lamentation: They that ate dainty food are desolate in
the streets; they that were reared in scarlet embrace dunghills. They
flee away and wander about. Men say among the nations, they shall
no more sojourn there; our end is near, our days are full, our doom
is come.
14. Whither shall they turn? for the West hath cast them out, and the
East refuseth to receive.
15. O bird of the air, whisper to the despairing exiles, that to-day, to-
day, from the many-masted, gayly-bannered port of Palos, sails the
world-unveiling Genoese, to unlock the golden gates of sunset and
bequeath a Continent to Freedom!
II. TREASURES.

1. Through cycles of darkness the diamond sleeps in its coal-black
prison.
2. Purely incrusted in its scaly casket, the breath-tarnished pearl slumbers in mud and ooze.
3. Buried in the bowels of earth, rugged and obscure, lies the ingot of
gold.
4. Long hast thou been buried, O Israel, in the bowels of earth; long
hast thou slumbered beneath the overwhelming waves; long hast
thou slept in the rayless house of darkness.
5. Rejoice and sing, for only thus couldst thou rightly guard the golden
knowledge, Truth, the delicate pearl and the adamantine jewel of the
Law.
III. THE SOWER.

1. Over a boundless plain went a man, carrying seed.
2. His face was blackened by sun and rugged from tempest, scarred and
distorted by pain. Naked to the loins, his back was ridged with furrows, his breast was plowed with stripes.
3. From his hand dropped the fecund seed.
4. And behold, instantly started from the prepared soil blade, a sheaf,
a springing trunk, a myriad-branching, cloud-aspiring tree. Its arms
touched the ends of the horizon, the heavens were darkened with its
shadow.
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5. It bare blossoms of gold and blossoms of blood, fruitage of health
and fruitage of poison; birds sang amid its foliage, and a serpent was
coiled about its stem.
6. Under its branches a divinely beautiful man, crowned with thorns,
was nailed to a cross.
7. And the tree put forth treacherous boughs to strangle the Sower; his
flesh was bruised and torn, but cunningly he disentangled the murderous knot and passed to the eastward.
8. Again there dropped from his hand the fecund seed.
9. And behold, instantly started from the prepared soil a blade, a sheaf,
a springing trunk, a myriad-branching, cloud-aspiring tree. Crescent
shaped like little emerald moons were the leaves; it bare blossoms of
silver and blossoms of blood, fruitage of health and fruitage of poison;
birds sang amid its foliage and a serpent was coiled about its stem.
10. Under its branches a turbaned mighty-limbed Prophet brandished a
drawn sword.
11. And behold, this tree likewise puts forth perfidious arms to strangle
the Sower; but cunningly he disentangles the murderous knot and
passes on.
12. Lo, his hands are not empty of grain, the strength of his arm is not spent.
13. What germ hast thou saved for the future, O miraculous Husbandman? Tell me, thou Planter of Christhood and Islam; tell me, thou
seed-bearing Israel!
IV. THE TEST.

1. Daylong I brooded upon the Passion of Israel.
2. I saw him bound to the wheel, nailed to the cross, cut off by the
sword, burned at the stake, tossed into the seas.
3. And always the patient, resolute, martyr face arose in silent rebuke
and defiance.
4. A Prophet with four eyes; wide gazed the orbs of the spirit above the
sleeping eyelids of the senses.
5. A Poet, who plucked from his bosom the quivering heart and fashioned it into a lyre.
6. A placid-browed Sage, uplifted from earth in celestial meditation.
7. These I saw, with princes and people in their train; the monumental
dead and the standard-bearers of the future.
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8. And suddenly I heard a burst of mocking laughter, and turning,
I beheld the shuffling gait, the ignominious features, the sordid mask
of the son of the Ghetto.
V. CURRENTS.

1. Vast oceanic movements, the flux and reflux of immeasurable tides,
oversweep our continent.
2. From the far Caucasian steppes, from the squalid Ghettos of Europe,
3. From Odessa and Bucharest, from Kief and Ekaterinoslav,
4. Hark to the cry of the exiles of Babylon, the voice of Rachel mourning for her children, of Israel lamenting for Zion.
5. And lo, like a turbid stream, the long-pent flood bursts the dykes of
oppression and rushes hitherward.
6. Unto her ample breast, the generous mother of nations welcomes them.
7. The herdsman of Canaan and the seed of Jerusalem’s royal shepherds
renew their youth amid the pastoral plains of Texas and the golden
valleys of the Sierras.
VI. THE PROPHET.

1. Moses ben Maimon lifting his perpetual lamp over the path of the
perplexed;
2. Hallevi, the honey-tongued poet, wakening amid the silent ruins of
Zion the sleeping lyre of David;
3. Moses, the wise son of Mendel, who made the Ghetto illustrious;
4. Abarbanel, the counselor of kings; Aicharisi, the exquisite singer; Ibn
Ezra, the perfect old man; Gabirol, the tragic seer;
5. Heine, the enchanted magician, the heart-broken jester;
6. Yea, and the century-crowned patriarch whose bounty engirdles the
globe;—
7. These need no wreath and no trumpet; like perennial asphodel
blossoms, their fame, their glory resounds like the brazen-throated
cornet.
8. But thou—hast thou faith in the fortune of Israel? Wouldst thou
lighten the anguish of Jacob?
9. Then shalt thou take the hand of yonder caftaned wretch with flowing curls and gold-pierced ears;
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10. Who crawls blinking forth from the loathsome recesses of the Jewry;
11. Nerveless his fingers, puny his frame; haunted by the bat-like phantoms of superstition is his brain.
12. Thou shalt say to the bigot, “My Brother,” and to the creature of
darkness, “My Friend.”
13. And thy heart shall spend itself in fountains of love upon the ignorant, the coarse, and the abject.
14. Then in the obscurity thou shalt hear a rush of wings, thine eyes shall
be bitten with pungent smoke.
15. And close against thy quivering lips shall be pressed the live coal
wherewith the Seraphim brand the Prophets.
VII. CHRYSALIS.

1. Long, long has the Orient Jew spun around his helplessness the cunningly enmeshed web of Talmud and Kabbala.
2. Imprisoned in dark corners of misery and oppression, closely he
drew about him the dust-gray filaments, soft as silk and stubborn as
steel, until he lay death-stiffened in mummied seclusion.
3. And the world has named him an ugly worm, shunning the blessed
daylight.
4. But when the emancipating springtide breathes wholesome, quickening airs, when the Sun of Love shines out with cordial fires, lo,
the Soul of Israel bursts her cobweb sheath, and flies forth attired
in the winged beauty of immortality.
NOTES
1. Quoted in Esther Schor, Emma Lazarus (New York: Nextbook-Schocken, 2006), 5–6.
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first historians of the American frontier, outlines the effects of the frontier on the nation’s
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of the Frontier in American History” and Other Essays [New Haven: Yale University Press,
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Judaism and Democracy
Lenn E. Goodman
In an incisive piece of analysis, Ann Ward distills the thoughts of Herodotus
about Athenian democracy. The historical vision of Herodotus opens onto a
secularizing vista, comparable, perhaps, to the secularizing outlook in which
the medical work of Hippocrates took root. Herodotus, she finds, sets his
Athenian narrative against the backdrop he paints of the birth of the Spartan,
Median, and archaic Athenian states. In each case, “a notion of divinity behind
the law arises that obscures the rational human agency involved.”1 The dissonance between “what people say”—that “the regime is divinely inspired,” and
the forces at work in its creation, “human reason and will—” leaves these polities vulnerable to tyranny like that of Deioces in Media. Humans are hard to
govern, Herodotus reasons, being “jealous of their freedom and equality”—as
witness the institution of the ostrakon adopted at Athens after the victory at
Marathon and used to exile anyone the demos feared was growing too influential and thus potentially becoming a tyrant. Given the jealousies endemic
in human nature, governance seemed possible only if “some men became like
gods and other men became like beasts.” Politics teetered “on a radical inequality and distortion of what is human.” The underlying dilemma: “combining
freedom and equality with the need for political power and government.”
The rise of Athenian democracy offered a resolution of the dilemma,
related by Herodotus in Book 5 of his histories: “movement from a divine to
a secular foundation of government.” In this account, Athenians take ownership of the state, legitimating the regime no longer by the fiction of its divine
founding but “because they believe the regime is theirs.” The new patriotism
fed on nativism and “equality of speech”—for “all share equally in deliberation.” Reciprocity was coupled with ostracism of the gods: “Athens managed
to combine equality with government by instituting self-
government. . . .
what people say of the regime, that ‘it is ours,’ and what it actually is, a product of human agency, come closer together.” The Athenians “internalize their
regime.” They see it as their own, “not the product of something outside of
themselves.” So they “possess a sense of wholeness rather than alienation.”2
Athenian intellectual and cultural prowess, Ward argues, rests on Athenian
self-determination, “taking account of the whole of human nature, both body
and soul, thus making possible a life according to our highest human potential, the life of the mind . . . integration of the desires of the body with the
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pursuits of the soul.” But there’s a rub, a darkness at the heart of this Periclean
vision. Athens could flourish and draw to itself the greatest minds, the richest produce, the most elegantly wrought works of art and industry, the most
eloquent speakers and writers, partly because she was rich and partly because
her men were expected to take risks for her and were willing to do so. Each
citizen might pursue his private advantage. But, “pursuit of private material
gain coincided with the public good only when conquering other cities.”3
Here lay the dynamic that would breed the Peloponnesian War, the tragedy of
Athens as empire and destruction of the two great hegemonies, that of Athens
and that of Sparta, losing their grip on the nominally independent city-states
they dominated and then losing all, first to Macedon, then to Rome, scarring
history with the first great correction to the myth that democracies do not
wage aggressive wars or establish colonies—let alone, by their own nature,
morph into tyrannies.
I doubt that Athens ever was quite so uniformly secular in outlook or
quite so egalitarian as Ward paints it, through the scrim Herodotus cast over
the cityscape or the scrum of its later history. Nor can we credit the achievements of an Aristotle or the pre-
Socratics to Athenian institutions. The
pre-Socratic thinkers who set the agenda of Greek rationalism hailed from
elsewhere, and Aristotle was never a citizen of Athens. He came from a medical family at the court of Macedon and could not own property at Athens, let
alone succeed Plato as head of the Academy, where he had studied and taught
for nineteen years. As tutor and later beneficiary of Alexander, he fled into
exile on Alexander’s death, lest Athens, he said, sin again against philosophy.
For the democratic assembly had chosen the death penalty, as Plato bitterly
notes, by a greater majority than had voted to find Socrates guilty of impiety
and misleading the youth.
Is democracy incompatible with theism—with monotheism in particular? One challenge faced today by the State of Israel (and echoed in challenges
to traditional Judaism) is couched in the dual claim that Judaism is alien to
democratic values, and that the ideal proclaimed in Israel’s Declaration of
Independence, of a democratic Jewish state, founders on an inner contradiction: The state born under fire in 1948 cannot be both Jewish and democratic.
Against these claims, I’ll argue here that many of the roots of democracy and of
the institutions that ground its legitimacy, its moral strength and beauty—and,
if carefully guarded, its stability—are anchored in the ideals and institutions of
the Torah, where Judaism finds its moral and religious core, a book of law and
culture neither authoritarian nor dogmatic, although critics and polemicists
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have often found it so. Some of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment
thinkers who made the Bible the whipping boy of their personal struggles or
political agendas often aimed more at Christian hierarchies than at authentic
Jewish values. Ironically, they often retooled the anti-Jewish arguments of
Christian predecessors, whose heirs held the reins at which they chafed: Jews
and Judaism were safer targets than Christian hierarchies.
The ancient brickbats long hurled in Christian anti-Jewish polemics
are still dusted off for secular or secularizing purposes: Jews were—or are—
unreceptive, clannish, legalistic. The mythic sin of deicide yields to another
ancient canard: Judaism is wedded to empty ceremonial, the letter rather than
spirit of the law. Pious Jews cower before a wrathful, jealous God, hypocrisy
shrouded in conformity. The Old Testament, as the Torah is often still called,
dismissing the Hebrew Bible as outdated and too primitive for a modern
mind, pictures a God far too lofty to descend from His high places and mingle
with ordinary folk, let alone suffer and die for them; His once chosen people,
too stiff necked to embrace the gentler teachings of Jesus and his God of love.
Later, in post-Holocaust polemic, the people of the reborn state of Israel have
added pride and even prowess to the sins of their ancestors, refusing, when
singled out for bombings, stabbings, car and truck rammings, and relentless,
indiscriminate rocket attacks, to turn the other cheek.4
A Christianity that barred salvation to anyone not saved by Christ was
universal; Judaism, which saw God’s love reaching all his creatures (Ps 145:9)
and held that God reserves a place in eternity for the righteous of all nations
(M. Sanhedrin 10, with Tosefta), was particularistic. The Synagogue was the
spent crone on the left as religious processions entered the cathedral. The
Church was the fresh young woman on the right. Today’s secularizers still
repeat the canards of their Enlightenment forbears: The Torah is no law but
a storybook rife with myth and magic; its norms, if not dismissed as tribal
savageries, are far better recast in the Gospels. They are shards and bones of
a patriarchal culture jutting from the soil in an age that should have learned
to get past them, fiats of a domineering God hungry for the sacrifice of his
favorite son as consummate proof of faith and piety.
Today, in a post-postmodern, wishfully postcolonial era, an era that renders every word fraught, even pairing “democracy” with “Judaism” is meant to
sound oxymoronic, as if to ask, “How can a race of black-frocked Talmudists,
guarded by jackbooted paratroopers, make any claim to democracy in a state
whose land is stolen from innocent, indigenous shepherds and olive g rowers?”
So the only democratic state in the Middle East—one of a handful in the
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world—is regularly tarred with charges of genocide, while the death toll of the
regimes in Syria and Iraq, the dynastic state terror machine of North Korea,
and the millions slain by the communist regimes of Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin are pushed toward history’s memory hole, and the real neocolonialism of
China in Tibet and Russia in Ukraine, the genocidal threats of Iran’s leaders,
and the rocketry of Hamas and Hizbullah are backgrounded among the global
crises of Africa, Asia, and Latin America that bien pensants would rather not
notice.
Our discussion, then, falls naturally into two parts: first we should consider just what democracy might mean, then show not just the compatibility
of Judaic and democratic ideals and institutions but also the historical and
conceptual rootedness of those ideals and institutions in Jewish law. There
isn’t room for more here; but, given the axe that well-financed campaigns of
delegitimation have sharpened and fire-hardened to a fiercely antisemitic edge,
we’ll have a few well-chosen words to say elsewhere about the State of Israel,5
which is not just the hope of Jews and Judaism but the canary in the coalmine
of politics today. For, its future foretells the fate of every modern democracy
and the democratic idea itself.
A WORD ABOUT DEMOCRACY
What exactly are we to mean by democracy? In simple terms democracy means
rule by the people. But simple definitions are made to trip up simple minds.
Rule by plebiscite, as history shows, is not democracy, partly because plebiscites
leave little room for compromise and deliberation; partly because plebiscite rule
can promise no stable regime. Stability, of course, is not everything in statecraft,
as the practitioners of Realpolitik in the last century, and indeed the one before
it, were too ready to forget. But a popular system fated to devolve into tyranny,
as Plato thought they all would, is hardly democracy at its best. Regrettably, it
proves untrue that no nation would give up its right to self-governance, once
won. Such rights are all too easily surrendered, sold, or fled, for security, or
bread, or luxury, or hatred.
Joseph Schumpeter understood democracy in terms of competition for
popular support. Robert Dahl, like Harold Lasky, saw the safeguard, if not
the essence, of democracy in the jockeying of diverse elites and institutions,
pressing the Greek idea of the agon [contest] and taking the idea of checks and
balances a step or two beyond mere mechanisms of division and separation of
powers. For governance to be by the people and not just for the people, there
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must be means of selecting and, critically, of replacing those who exercise
the final say. So there are good reasons for constitutionalism to set limits to the
powers of the state and the duration of a regime. If authoritarian regimes are to
be excluded and the rights of individuals and minorities—or even majorities—
protected, democracies must be constitutional. It’s too easy, without guarantees in practice, not just promises, for a party or person to govern in the
people’s name but not in their common and accountable interest.
Just how common interests are to be defined, served, protected—and
conciliated with the interests of the individual and those dear to him—varies
from one democracy to the next. The people need to have a say in defining
their interests as persons and as communities—one reason why Jefferson and
others of America’s founders saw an educated electorate as critical in a democracy.6 One cannot effectively define one’s interests if one’s notion of an interest
or one’s purview of the options is narrow or distracted. But, like democracy
itself, the ways and means, content and effectiveness, slant and penetration of
education vary widely. So there’s a need for firm principles safeguarding the
core interests of the citizens who constitute a polity. A written constitution
may affirm such principles. But it may also prove farcical, as the Soviet constitution was, promising all sorts of goods but delivering few, and hardly fairly.
For a constitution to be more than a paper rag, principle as practice is needed.
Consistency, from case to case and from day to day and year to year, is
a necessary condition of justice. An unjust constitution—or erratic laws—can
be worse than none at all. So it’s easy to see how consistency became a cynosure
in jurisprudence, anchoring the foundational idea of a written law and the
judicial rule of stare decisis. Consistency promises fairness because (and insofar
as) it rules out invidiousness and favoritism. But undergirding consistency is
the fact that governance serves interests—first, perhaps, those of the governed,
but also those of others not present or not spoken for—the needs and rights
of foreigners and strangers and future generations, the deserts of other species,
the demands of the environment, the claims made by monuments of nature
and of culture, and the principles of fairness itself.7
The constitutions best known to us in our post-Hobbesian age presume
that the governed want their interests served. The founding documents of the
modern liberal state tend to equate those interests with liberty and property,
although modestly clothing the category of property, at least rhetorically, in
gentler words like “pursuit of happiness,” effectively identifying happiness,
self-judged, with fulfillment; and that generic good, in turn, with the means
thought necessary to its attainment. Liquidity is critical here, assuring that
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earned or vested interests can be freely cashed to gratify desires. A tacit premise
equates fulfillment with gratification of desire.
A key assumption of the theories on which modern liberal states were
built is that when their rights to liberty or property are threatened, the people
will stand up on their hind legs and act. That premise gained voice in the
words of leaders ready to shoulder grave risk and contumely and to call on others to rise up with them against grievances readily spiked. Those words caught
fire when the same men stood ready to fight or die for what they had uttered.
Two things we’ve learned from the history of modern states: First, the
occasions on which “the people” do stand up for their rights are highly unpredictable but vanishingly small if risks or costs are to be borne in behalf of those
conceived as “others,” since they live elsewhere, or are not yet born, or speak
a foreign tongue, or because some other overt or ascriptive difference allows
their dismissal as nonpersons or lesser persons.8 The readiness of democracies
to wage wars, including colonial wars like those of modern Britain and France,
and expansive wars like those of nineteenth century America and Australia,
is an unhappy consequence of the penchant for popular democracies to turn
populist, even vokisch. The sense of unity that unites a populace readily sours
and turns exclusionary. It can be deadly.
Our second unhappy lesson: liberty and material interests prove rather
fungible. That wealth can buy privilege has been known since history began.
That people will sell their birthright for a mess of pottage is also an old, familiar
fact, too easily overlooked by those who stress the primacy of rights over other
interests but still hope to ground a theory of justice on the behavior of actual
(or virtual!) human beings. Patrick Henry prized liberty above his life. But
when he said, “Give me liberty or give me death,” he wisely prefaced his words
by saying, “I know not what choice others may make. . . .” His choice, rhetorically declared, was hardly empty. But he counted on others to share his commitment to live or die by and for the principles he was confident that many shared.
Their united efforts made those principles actionable, transforming them from
inchoate presumptions to bastions of a state. Fortunately for the American
enterprise, a critical mass of rebels, rightly called patriots, responded by putting
their lives at risk for liberty. But without a common vision of common rights
and interests, a very different outcome might have followed.
Many today profess that a democratic state must be secular; some presume
it must be socialist. Those claims play upon a pair of confusions. A soundly
democratic society must be a free society—not because a democratic tyranny
is impossible, the oppression of each by all, but because democracy defeats its
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purpose and belies its pledge to freedom when the people, as rulers, betray the
ends for whose sake governance is tolerated. It’s tyrannous to impose beliefs
and spiritually laden practices that individuals do not freely embrace and love.
But it’s wrong to confuse a secular with a secularist state. A secular government
neither promotes nor persecutes noncoercive forms of spiritual thought and
expression and their moral and social appanages. But the same principle calls
on government to foster spiritual exploration and expression. A secular state,
by the logic of its franchise, has no more business promoting secularism than
it has promoting any other sectarian program. Secularity is just one among the
life options its citizens may explore or pursue.9
As for socialism, it’s easily made a rider to democratic ideals: democracy
demands equality before the law and equal opportunity, ideals too readily
twisted to plead for equal outcomes. Talent and application then become
irrelevancies, and publicly promoted norms distinguish only the more and less
fortunate, as though all divergence sprang from chance. A democracy must
serve the interest of all. That’s reason enough to make social and economic
safety nets a public responsibility—not on Immanuel Kant’s grounds, that
anyone might one day need help, but on Baruch Spinoza’s: that need outstrips
private sympathy and private means.10 But state ownership of the means of
production and the party rule that grasps such ownership undermine the civil
rights that are the pride and test of a democracy. Frederick Hayek exposed the
democratic pretensions of socialism in The Road to Serfdom, and Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels openly disavowed such pretensions in The Communist
Manifesto. That was long before party rule had exposed itself as thuggery and
bred a kleptocracy in China, North Korea, and other states whose people are
caught in the socialist fish trap—easier to swim into than to escape.
DEMOCRACY AND JUDAIC NORMS
Biblical law is rooted in the sanctity of the individual. So we should start with
that value in seeking the Judaic roots of the democratic idea. Genesis sharply
distinguishes the slaughter of an animal from the slaying of a human being.
Noah, surviving God’s judgmental flood, is humankind’s second founder. He
and his progeny are permitted to eat meat and will enjoy the wine from the
vineyard that Noah was the first to plant (Gen 9:3). But they must be cautious. Wine will compromise Noah and lead to the offense that foreshadows
the destinies of his descendants (Gen 9:20–27). The knife presents a greater
risk: The blood of an animal, symbol and vehicle of its life, must be neither
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consumed nor fetishized (Gen 9:4) but simply spilled out like water (Deut
12:16, 12:23–24, 15:23). Human bloodshed is quite another matter: the
inestimable value of each human life is safeguarded by God’s proclaiming capital punishment for murder. For human beings, male and female, bear God’s
image (Gen 1:27–28, 9:5–6).
Unlike Hammurabi’s code, the Torah deems the relative status of killer
and victim immaterial; likewise their age and sex. As Rashi explains, the law
forbids striking down any human being [kol-nefesh adam, Lev 24:17, 21].11
Yet intent does matter. The Decalogue commands not “Thou shalt not kill”
but “Thou shalt not murder” (Exod 20:13). Intent sets murder apart from
manslaughter. The Torah implements the distinction by instituting Cities of
Refuge: “Whoever strikes a person fatally must die. But if he did not stalk
him and God simply brought him to hand, I’ll afford you a place where he
may flee” (Exod 21:12–13; see also Deut 4:41; Josh 20:1–6). Making its rule
operational, the Torah sets out markers of intent: malice aforethought and use
of deadly force, typified by a malicious blow with some iron tool, or a rock or
wooden implement capable of mortal injury. A fatal shove can mean an act
was murder (Num 35:6, 15–24). In a characteristic vignette, the Torah pictures an accidental homicide: an ax head flies off its helve and fatally strikes a
fellow woodcutter (Deut 19:5).
The Cities of Refuge were to be served by good roads (Deut 19:3), open
to all and well signposted, the Talmud specifies. Nahmanides, citing the Talmud (B. Makkot 10a), has it that all forty-eight Levitical cities were Cities of
Refuge, four for each of the twelve tribes. As Hermann Cohen notes, “the altar’s
protection for the murderer was abolished.”12 Maimonides contrasts the Torah’s
law for a fleeing murderer with the refuge accorded the inadvertent homicide:
A criminal aggressor, however, is not to be pitied and sheltered when
seeking our protection. His statutory treatment is by no means to be
slighted, even if he appeal to some illustrious grandee: “take him from
My altar for execution” (Exod 21:14), it says. This felon sought God’s
protection, grasping an object linked to his name. Yet God affords
him none—let alone one who seeks human shelter. God orders him
surrendered to the officer he fled. He must not be pitied and protected. Pity for destructive criminals is cruelty to the rest of the world.
The virtuous middle lies here, of course, as prescribed in God’s just
laws and statutes (Deut 4:8)—not where the morals of the pagan age
place it, when heroes were praised for proudly taking just anyone’s
part, victim or perpetrator, as celebrated in their stories and poems.13
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The Torah did not dungeon the inadvertent homicide but protected him
amongst the Levites (Num 35:6)—to cleanse him, Philo reasons, through a
life with those whose sacred duties would sustain an ethos to heal a guilty soul.
“Why,” Philo writes, “did God open the cities of the Levites to fugitives from
vengeance and deem fit that the holiest should live there side by side with
men thought unholy, who had committed involuntary homicide?” Philo’s first
answer: “sinners come to the consecrated for purification.” The hope he vests
in the Levites is that their ethos might alter those who shelter among them, a
hope fed by his reflections on the story of Abraham’s plea for the Cities of the
Plain: “we should try our best to save even those whose inner evil is bringing
them to sure ruin. . . . Should some seed of recovery appear, however slight, it
should be cherished. . . . For we may hope the germ might grow and the man
lead a better life.”14
The precious worth of human life is biblically treated as what we now call
natural law. The Torah does not contrast the dicta of nature’s law with God’s
commands but treats the two as articulating the same idea: God’s prohibition
of homicide specifies one demand of his covenant with nature. For God’s
creativity reached a peak when he created man in his own image. Human life
must be cherished. Nature’s universal law trumps positive law. So long before
Sinai the midwives Shifra and Puah feared God (Exod 1:17) and disobeyed
Pharaoh’s genocidal decree against newborn Hebrew boys. These women knew
right from wrong. Their work and common humanity gave them daily evidence of God’s love of life: they let the boys live (Exod 1:18).15
The midwives’ honest piety allowed them to heed a command as yet
unspoken on the banks of the Nile. By choosing life they bowed to a standard
beyond social approval or the fiat of a monarch—even one who might claim
divinity.16 Their choice helped make clear what sort of norms a genuine God
would issue and helped define the values that would make the Torah welcome
when it came. By flouting Pharaoh’s order, much to the dismay of early modern apologists for the divine right of kings,17 Shifra and Pua marked a course of
civil disobedience and the sovereignty of conscience, critical to the democratic
idea. Their dangerous choice raised a banner for the Torah’s great moral theme,
the love of life. So their story is told and their names are recorded not just to
explain how Moses could escape infanticide but also to celebrate a commitment to conscience and to human life. Their acts resonate when God distinguishes the law Moses will impart from the practices of Egypt and Canaan by
calling its rules laws to live by. So when they read the verse, “You shall keep
my laws and statutes, which a man shall perform and live by” (Lev 18:5), the
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rabbis rule that human life takes precedence over every divine command but
those forbidding murder, idolatry, and sexual crimes. Shifra and Pua were not
jurists. But they staked their lives on the primacy of life.
One feature of the Jewish principles outlined in the Torah and developed in rabbinic rulings is the dynamism of their moral themes, strikingly
emergent over the longue durée. Thus the Torah’s preference for monogamy,
reflecting the preciousness of the individual in God’s eyes, leads ultimately,
despite Patriarchal precedent, to Rabbi Gershom’s famous ban on polygamy
in the year 1000. Gerald Blidstein gives a sense of the life of the law through
centuries of change:
We are committed to the monogamous ideal. . . . We also realize
that the emotional depth of our commitment is not truly generated
by the communal takkanah [regulation promulgated by rabbinic
authority] of Rabbeinu Gershom which banned polygamy . . .
monogamy is strikingly coherent with the basic vision of marriage
and the human person described in the tradition from First Man
and First Woman on. Our commitment to monogamy fulfills that
vision, even if it may have been achieved through the impact of patterns found in other cultures.18

One can see why Asher ben Yehiel could say in the fourteenth century
that Rabbeinu Gershom’s rulings might just as well have been handed down at
Sinai. The same moral dynamic hems in the institution of Sotah [the biblical
prescription for the case of a woman suspected of adultery], making it ultimately a dead letter. For the Talmud exempts from trial by ordeal any woman
suspected of adultery whose accusing husband cannot be presumed innocent
as well; it then suspends the very institution, arguing that one can no longer
(if one ever could) presume such innocence (Mishnah Sotah 1–5).19 Rabbinic
reasoning similarly transforms the Torah’s severity toward the incorrigible son
into a regulative idea20 and reverses levirate marriage from an obligation to an
option better foregone. The process is well underway in the era of the written
Torah, as clearly revealed by the institution and practice of Halitzah [ritual
shaming of one who waived the sometime obligation].
A similar process is at work regarding slavery. For, alongside life, the
Torah treasures liberty. Its ancient law does allow for bonded servitude. But it
stipulates that such a state cannot be permanent without the servant’s explicit
demand. It treats causing death or injury to a servant in identical terms as the
same offenses against a free man. And it commands that runaway slaves may
not be returned but must be sheltered (Deut 23:16)—a stark contrast not only
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with Hammurabi’s Code (15, 16, 19) and that of Theodosianus (5.17.2) but
with the American Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and its more stringent sequel of
1850. Nahmanides, characteristically, expands the biblical provision by elaborating its moral theme: the fugitive slave, he argues, having fled servitude, is
no longer enslaved but free. Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin (1817–1893),
known as Ha-‘Emek ha-Davar, reminds his contemporaries that the fugitive,
having sought asylum, must be cared for and sheltered by those with whom
he has taken refuge.21
In the American case, too, the illogic of slavery was not obscure. Samuel
Johnson voiced it sternly in his trenchant Tory criticism of America’s restive
colonists: “How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers
of negroes.”22 James Madison saw the contradiction clearly between chattel
slavery and natural liberty and listed it among the “vices” of the young republic
as he sought to replace the Articles of Confederation before the fissures it left
in the fabric of American society rent the infant state asunder. “Where slavery
exists,” he wrote, “the republican theory” must be judged “fallacious.”23
Madison knew that a radical cure was needed if America’s bold experiment were not to die in the birth canal; but even John Quincy Adams, no
slave holder and a generation Madison’s junior, saw no way of healing the
abscess in the American body politic. Property rights in the capital and tools
of the plantation economy barred the way. Madison fantasized that moving
to New York state might “provide a decent and independent subsistence” and
allow him personally “to depend as little as possible on the labor of slaves.”
But his political base lay in Virginia, and he keenly understood what a South
Carolinan contemporary predicted, that slaves in America would not be freed
without a civil war. Madison clearly saw that the ideals of liberty he espoused
and labored to enshrine in law and principle were inimical to the slavery on
which his way of life and that of many others depended. But seeing the contradiction, as he named it candidly, did not lead him to press to abolish slavery or
even ban new imports of slaves. Nor did it keep him from holding the slaves he
inherited, on whose labors his livelihood, learning, and leadership depended.24
The Torah is strikingly more active here than were America’s founding
figures. Not only does it forbid the return of fugitive slaves and ban involuntary
lifelong servitude, it also demands that freed bondmen be given a start in lives
of their own (Deut 15:13–14). Perhaps more tellingly, it forbids Israelites’ collecting interest on loans to their fellows, bans permanent alienation of ancestral
land, and sets out detailed rules for gleaning, charity, and a special tithe to benefit
the poor. It opens the fruits of fallow lands to strangers and the poor and renders
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licit simple taking of foodstuffs from the fields and orchards where they grow.
All these laws restrict debt slavery, aiming to prevent the rise of a permanently
dispossessed and desperate class. Nehemiah, in this spirit, secured the release of
debt slaves and return to them of their sequestered property (Neh 5:9–13).
The rabbis go much further: as the practice of slavery declined among
Jews, the slave’s gratuity became an employee’s severance pay (B. Kiddushin
16b–17b, Sifre, Re’eh 119). For Talmudic law deemed slavery canceled among
Israelites once Jubilee years had lapsed (B. Gittin 65a, Kiddushin 69a, Arakhin
29a; Maimonides, MT H. ‘Avadim 2.10). But even when slaves were still held,
their proper treatment, as mandated in the Torah (by a muscular reading of
Deut 15:16) required one to share one’s food and wine with them, the same
as one’s own in quantity and quality. A master must provide his servants with
beds as good as his own. And if one had but one bed, the rabbis required that
the servant be the one to sleep in it: It would be wasteful to leave it unused
and would smack of the ethos of Sodom, a dog-in-the-manger sort of trick.
An Israelite may not sell his slave abroad. Nor may masters require a slave to
perform demeaning chores or make-work tasks, or jobs a tradesman might
have done, unless the slave himself were of that trade. Little wonder the saying
became current that to have a slave was to acquire a master.25 One may work
one’s slave hard, Maimonides maintains, but both fairness and prudence counsel justice and compassion and exclude rigor. One may not shame or berate
slaves but must help them advance materially, morally, and intellectually.
Rabbinic proof texts are often pretexts. But the real arguments in sensitive areas like these pivot on moral themes. Here, what the rules reflect is the
recognition that even abjection does not erase the dignity that slavery holds
in pawn. That theme in Jewish thought and practice long survives the demise
of slavery as a recognized Jewish institution; its prescriptive force will survive
when slavery is finally abolished worldwide. It’s a universal value, part of what
is meant when God promises Abraham (Gen 22:18) that his seed will prove
a blessing to every family on earth through the precepts and practices his
progeny and successors will spread by their thinking and the example God is
confident they will represent.
If life and liberty are sacred biblically, property is not. It is, of course, protected. For the Torah recognizes the relevance of things to the quality of life,
the exercise of liberty, and the expression of personal and communal identity.
But if a culture inscribes its priorities in its penal laws, the Torah’s priorities
are etched indelibly in the fact that it never prescribes a capital penalty for a
violation of property rights.26
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In any crime, the Torah mandates presumption of innocence. That bias
in favor of the accused is almost too familiar to be noticed. Yet by no means is
it universal even today. In Japan criminal convictions are reached in 99.92%
of cases, and no trial, in effect, gets underway until the basic facts are deemed
by the court to be established; 92% of defendants confess themselves guilty as
charged. By shame and psychological pressure confessions are extracted from
detained suspects, with cultural and communal norms affording powerful
leverage.
American norms of criminal law grew up in reaction to the frequent use
of torture, deployed in the Renaissance not only by the Inquisition but also
by no less authorities than the sainted Thomas More. Coercion, at least of a
physical sort, is forbidden in America (although sometimes countenanced offshore, in the face of heated condemnation). Defendants here have a right to
counsel from the moment they’re arrested. They must be read their rights and
may not be long detained unless charged with a specific crime. Even then they
must be released unless found judicially to be at risk of flight or serious crime.
But in Jewish law no confession is admissible in a criminal case (B. Sanhedrin
9b). The Torah demands two witnesses in such cases (Deut 17:6, 19:15), and
interested parties are ineligible.
Maimonides explains the ban on self-incrimination in cases of capital
or corporal punishment by observing that the accused may be troubled of
mind—depressed or moved by a death wish to confess to crimes he did not
commit (MT Sanhedrin 18.6; Laws of Witness 12.2).27 Even earlier, Joseph
b. Migash (eleventh to twelfth century) saw a risk of bias in confessions, since
they are likely to accrue greater credence than potentially exonerating evidence. Rabbi David ben Zimra (called the Radbaz, sixteenth century) explains
that one’s life and body are not one’s property, to be disposed of as one pleases
(commenting on MT Sanhedrin 18.6 and citing Jer 18:4)—although in monetary cases acknowledgment of responsibility is not only admissible but desirable. Steven Resnicoff underscores the contrast of Jewish legal principle with
the norms familiar to anyone who has seen a television police drama: Secular
authorities, he writes:
routinely question suspects and, when doing so, use lies, tricks and
promises of leniency—undermining the reliability of any resultant
confession. . . . Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Jewish law’s
treatment of confessions is that not only is it impermissible to force
someone to testify against himself, but a person is not even allowed
to testify against himself. . . . Secular authorities often assert that the
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constitutional right against self-incrimination reflects the basic sanctity of the individual. Nevertheless, by cynically allowing confessions
to be elicited by trick and deception, secular law makes a mockery
of such pretensions. Under Jewish law, no ruse changes the rule: a
criminal confession is not admissible.28

The Talmud tells proudly of Simeon ben Sheta who swore he saw one
man chase another into a ruined building. Pursuing the pair, he found the
aggressor standing over the still quivering corpse of the victim, his sword dripping blood. “Wretch!” he cried, “Who killed this man? Either you or I! But
what can I do? Your blood is not given into my hands. For the Torah says,
‘On the testimony of two witnesses or three shall a man be put to death’”
(Deut 17:6). “May he who knows men’s thoughts requite the man who slew
his fellow!” (B. Sanhedrin 37b).
Many of us know the words ascribed to Jesus in the Gospel of John
(8:7),“Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.”29 The story of the
woman taken in adultery is related there pointedly to contrast Christian mercy
with Hebraic asperity. Far fewer know that the challenge put into the mouth
of Jesus (and so brilliantly realized graphically by Rembrandt) in fact welds a
principle of law found textually in the Torah to another laid out by the very
Pharisees John condemned: Deuteronomy (17:5–7) requires that those accusing someone of the capital crime of rejecting the Law and pursuing pagan worship must indeed cast the first stone—bringing home to all the enormity of
the crime but also, to the accusers themselves, the enormity of their charges.30
The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 4.5) speaks vividly to the sanctity of each
human life when it relates the cautions given witnesses in a capital case. Such
cases, witnesses are warned, are unlike any other. A conspiring witness is liable
for any miscarriage of justice (Deut 19:18). But, in a capital case, should
one’s testimony lead to conviction of an innocent, the witness is guilty not
just of one death. For in Genesis God is heard by Cain to say, “the bloods of
thy brother cry out to Me from the earth” (4:10)—suggesting, by the use of
the plural, that not just Abel’s life has been lost but so have the lives of all his
potential progeny to the end of time.
The Torah, as the homilist suggests, affirms the inestimable worth of
each human life, an inference confirmed by each person’s link to God, the
ultimate source of life. For the Torah’s prohibition of murder is predicated
on God’s creation of humanity—male and female—in his own image (9:6).
“Why was just one man created at the start?” the Mishnah asks. “To teach us
that anyone responsible for a single death is seen as though he had caused a
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world to perish; and whoever saves a life, in effect has saved a world.” The text
goes on to invoke the uniqueness of each individual. A mortal stamps many
coins from a single die, and all are alike. “But the King of kings, the Holy
One, blessed be He, stamped every man with the seal of the first, yet not one
is the same as another.” In Greek thought, as Shmuel Sambursky explained,
uniqueness can count as a deficit, amounting to idiosyncrasy. Here uniqueness
is precious. For each human being is irreplaceable.
Only after anchoring human worth in personal uniqueness does the
Mishnah move on to speak of equality—not as a formal principle but as a consequence of our common roots: Since we share a common ancestry—and are
fashioned of the same earth—there is no nobler or gentler lineage. Yet there’s
still another implication of individual uniqueness: Each one of us may say to
himself “For my sake was the world created”—for each of us brings to his life
a unique perspective, takes from it a unique experience, and has the potential
to make a unique contribution.
The idea of equality is implicit, as I’ve intimated, in the very idea
of a written law. God’s commands in the Decalogue were carved in stone
(Exod 31:18), emblematic of their permanence. Publicity is a related demand,
a corollary of the principle that just rules do not shift and morph from case to
case. “No law is binding,” Haim Cohn writes, “unless and until publicized”—a
principle acknowledged in the Torah’s frequent reference to God’s instructing
Moses to speak unto the entire congregation of Israel and report his commands (Exod 12:3; see also 20:18, 22; 35:1; Deut 5:4, 19). The Law was to
be read publicly at regular intervals (Deut 31:11–12), informing all whom it
governed of their rights and obligations. Historic instances of such readings are
biblically recorded (2 Kgs 23:2; Neh 8:1–3).31 They were important occasions
and indeed democratic affirmations and celebrations of the Law’s authority.
But they were also instructional, and the ritual aspect of such instruction was
integral to the Law’s acceptance. For one cannot live by rules one does not
know. Explicitness and invariant formulation are critical to the legitimacy but
also to the effectiveness of the Mosaic law.
The Torah records Moses and Israel’s elders instructing those who are to
enter the promised land to inscribe on great, plastered stones set up on Mount
Ebal detailed notice of God’s law.
These were no phallic stelae like the hermai still venerated at Athens in
the days of Socrates. They were inscribed with commands banning idolatry
and mandating honor of parents and respect for others’ property boundaries.
No one was to mislead the blind; all must deal justly with strangers, widows,
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and orphans, honor the parental marriage bed, respect the sexual privacy of a
sister, shun bestialism, assault no one, abhor murder for hire—in short, sustain
the Mosaic law. The people, in a body, are to pledge allegiance not to some
leader but to this law, cursing anyone who breaches it, themselves and their
dear ones included (Deut 27).
In the Book of Ezra we read that scrolls of the law were to be deposited
in a suitable archive as well as publicly proclaimed (1:1, 6:1).32 There’s quite
a contrast here, as David Daube explains, with Roman secrecy about the procedures needed for successful litigation, enshrined in documents “jealously
guarded in the archives” of a body “consisting entirely of high aristocrats.” It
was around 300 b.c.e., Livy reports, that a patrician, Appius Claudius, allowed
his scribe, Cnaeus Flavius, to publish his account of these secret procedures
and the calendar of dates suitable or unsuitable for litigation and other key
transactions. Despite the predictable outcry from Roman nabobs, Flavius
escaped punishment. He became a popular hero and was elevated to high
office, far beyond what his birth had seemed to promise.33
Today when the Torah scroll is to be read in synagogue it is paraded
through the congregation; and, once read, raised high for all to see, while the
congregation chants: “This is the Torah that Moses set before the children of
Israel” (Deut 4:44)—“at God’s bidding through Moses” (Num 9:23). When
Pauline teachings substituted Christ crucified for the life of the Law (Eph
2:15; Heb 8:13; Gal 2:19–21, 3:10–27), “zo’t ha-Torah” [This is the Law]
became “Hoc est corpus Meum” [This is my body] (Luke 22:19; Matt 26:26;
Mark 14:22; 1 Cor 11:24), a phrase later ridiculed by Protestants who scoffed
at the idea of transubstantiation and mocked as “hocus pocus,” the sound
echoing through cathedral apses at the magical moment when the elevated
host became the very flesh of Christ. The law, patent to all, was itself trans
figured into a mystery.
Rabbinic law moved in quite the opposite direction, extending the principle that a law must be promulgated before an act is criminalized, to demand
that a would-be criminal must be cautioned as to the unlawfulness of the act
he is about to commit—otherwise, a human court is deemed unauthorized
to order the statutory penalty, and punishment is left to God (B. Sanhedrin
54ab, 60b, 66a; Makkot 5b, 13b; Avodah Zarah 51b; Yevamot 3b; Yoma 53a).
A core element of freedom in democratic theory and practical norms
is liberty of thought and the liberties of expression deeply intertwined with
it—since expression is at once the fairest fruit and the deepest root of intellectual and spiritual liberty. For thought of any subtlety or complexity needs
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articulate expression to attain clarity—and needs debate too, if it’s to attain
cogency. Freedom of thought and expression—of speech and the press—like
freedom of association were demands that grew from Europe’s bitter schooling
in centuries of religious wars and persecutions that barely ended with the rise
of the secular republics and constitutional monarchies that gained prominence
and credence in good part from popular and learned reaction to those horrors.
The American Constitution and its Bill of Rights in particular were
among the more explicit expressions of that reaction. Examining the Torah,
we find that intellectual liberty is not promised but presumed. As Cohn writes,
“neither the Written nor the Oral Law contains any explicit precept to believe
in God or not to believe in other deities.”34 The very idea of framing religious
obligations in terms of faith is Christian, an offshoot of the Christian idea,
central to the Reformation and its Augustinian roots, that salvation is by faith.
Salvation is not the core issue in Judaism, where the goal is sanctification of
this life, not escape from it. Faith in the Hebrew Bible means trust. Its locus is
communal, not strictly individualistic; its basis is covenantal; its chief expression is practical, not verbal.
Maimonides speaks not of faith but of belief—which, he argues, must
be grounded in understanding: “Belief is not what you say but what you think
when you hold something to be so. . . . There is no believing without first
thinking.”35 The Torah, in fact, does not ask us to rest our hopes on faith.
Belief is not a thing to be commanded by some authority or even by one’s own
sheer will power. Following in the footsteps of Moses Mendelssohn, Cohn puts
it well: Only experience can lead one “to have confidence in God” or even, “to
be aware of God.” That is why the Torah appeals to Israel’s experience when it
calls on the people to accept God’s laws.36
Many of the commandments, Maimonides argues, do have a doxastic
function. They aim to instill certain beliefs and attitudes. But there’s a subtle
dialectic in play: attitudes affect actions; and actions, when made customary
and habitual, affect character. Rituals and symbols like those of Sabbath observance set a trellis for beliefs; and beliefs, in turn, as Maimonides understands the
dialectic, when examined and reflected on, lay foundations for understanding.
His celebrated Thirteen Articles37 are a case in point. Each of them is meant
to function as a gateway to understanding, allowing all Israel and the righteous
of all nations to be promised “a portion in the World to Come,” even though
many lack the conceptual prowess that would link their minds with the Divine.
Building on Plato’s thesis that for most practical purposes belief is as good
as knowledge—it can get one from Piraeus to Larissa even without mastering
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navigation—Maimonides finds that the ethical practices and the shared beliefs
embedded in the Torah’s rituals bear implicit reference to higher ideas. By
sharing in these, ordinary people gain their “portion” in immortality, even if
they cannot articulate their linkage to divinity in conceptual terms. Sabbath
observances, being active, are sanctioned biblically; beliefs are not. Ritual practice, then, so prominent in biblical and rabbinic law as to provoke critique in
Christian and especially in Protestant and post-Protestant settings, subtly solves
a problem that other religions have addressed by futile, often bloody, efforts to
enforce dogmas: these institutions of the culture the Torah founds communicate
ideas, some rather elevated, without demanding or imposing feats of faith.
COVENANT AND DIGNITY
The Torah ordains no specific mechanism of governance. The legislator, biblically and rabbinically, is God. While Moses lived, it was he who brought God’s
commands to Israel. For forty days and nights he kept to his mountain to
learn God’s will. But it was he who conveyed God’s expectations to the people
in human words, spoken and carved in stone (Exod 20:16, 24:18; Deut 9:9,
10:1–5). Israel accepts God’s rule by acclamation. But it is not a leader that
the people acclaim, as they would acclaim Saul as king. What they accept are
the provisions of God’s law (Exod 19:5, 19:8, 24:3, 24:7; Deut 27). They have
joined a covenant. Daniel Elazar, a brilliant thinker who devoted much of his
far too short but highly productive life to the study and advancement of the
covenant idea, defines a covenant in generic terms:
A covenant is a morally informed agreement or pact based upon
voluntary consent and mutual oaths or promises, witnessed by
the relevant higher authority, between peoples or parties having
independent though not necessarily equal status, that provides for
joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect which protect the
individual integrities of all the parties to it. Every covenant involves
consenting, promising and agreeing. Most are meant to be of unlimited duration, if not perpetual. Covenants can bind any number
of partners for a variety of purposes, but in their essence they are
political in that their bonds are used principally to establish bodies
political and social.38

A covenant does not presume its parties equal. But the very act of cutting
a covenant, as the Hebraism has it—forging, as we might say—does presume
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one sort of equality since it requires free consent. That’s true not only of a
pact among the governed formalizing what was, perhaps, a more informal
communal unity, but also of a covenant with a ruler, and even Israel’s with
God. God has chosen and been chosen by Israel as a nation. He has freed the
people and called them his own. He has declared himself their God, and they
have accepted him—as they sing in their moment of liberation at the Sea of
Reeds: “This is my God, and I will exalt him” (Exod 15:2).39 The need for
mutuality seems obvious here in terms of natural law: a law is ineffective unless
accepted and cannot remain effective unless lived by. Indeed, the principle of
desuetude is integral in rabbinic ideas of law. When ancient rabbis sought to
extend to olive oil the stringent rules of purity and sanctity that govern wine,
the rules they commended were not practiced by the people, and the norms
for oil became a dead letter—as did efforts to ban meat and wine after Rome’s
destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem (Tostefta Sotah 15.10).40
Israel’s older and larger covenant with God suffered no such fate. It was
accepted because the people could see the wisdom and justice of its principles—which other nations, too, were expected to recognize, a distinctive
reality check (Deut 4:5–7). Through its appeal to truth and justice and the
clear tilt toward mercy and generosity that its legal rules and moral principles
invoked, God’s covenant linked all Israel with one another in formal bonds
richer and stronger than those of their real or notional shared descent. It
made mutual responsibility actionable morally, socially, even judicially. God
was guarantor of the norms spelled out in his legislation, but Israel’s adherence was the final test. For the Torah was not given to slaves. It presumed the
freedom of those who embraced it. Only free persons could make a moral and
civil charge their own. And the vitality of the Torah’s laws, not least in their
open-ended moral expectations regarding obligations to self and others, called
for continuous striving and commitment.
So the life of the law rested at once on loyalty to the God who gave it
and on every Israelite’s commitment to the rest and to humanity and nature:
all Israel must love God, love each other, love and sustain the stranger and the
helpless. The Torah’s narratives, running back to the creation and the histories
of the first human couple and of Noah, mankind’s second founder, laid out the
rightful boundaries of other nations. For it was not just private boundary markers that must not be moved. The Law’s first narratives mandated and modeled
stewardship for living creatures—the animals God had made (Gen 6:19–20,
7:2, 9:10) and the garden he had planted (Gen 2:15)—animals to be kept from
undue suffering (Exod 20:10, 23:5, 11–12; Lev 22:28; Deut 22:4, 6–7, 10,
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25:4),41 trees to be preserved, natural objects safeguarded from wanton destruction, even ordinary objects kept from waste (See B. ullin 7b).
The Torah’s covenant idea, as Elazar explains, came to America via the
biblicism of the Puritans, reflecting the religious reforms wrought by Huldrych
Zwingli (1484–1531), his successor Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575), and
John Calvin (1509–1564). The work of these reformers laid a spiritual foundation in the New World for the biblical commitment to the sanctity of the
individual, vested in personal freedom and human dignity, the loci and foci
of human rights in a democratic polity. Theorists like Hobbes could ground
natural rights in the virtual power of anyone to slay another. Locke could
rest civic rights on the natural right of self-protection that anyone might be
expected to reserve when seeking shelter in a civil order from an anarchic state
of nature. His thesis, answering Hobbes, enshrines the principles of England’s
Glorious Revolution and anchors the American ideal of inalienable rights. But
the older idea of a covenant grounds individual rights existentially, anchoring
them in the very life of persons as conscious and conscientious souls. America’s
founders could call human rights not only inalienable but God given. For it
was not the state that gave them.
Enlightenment thinkers spoke readily and fluently of equality—in part
because their cause targeted a monarch and the pyramid of class and caste that
both sustained and sapped European societies. But if human equality is to be
fleshed out with material content, it must rest on the inestimable worth of
persons. Robert Cover, a Yale jurist, contrasting the Western, liberal rhetoric of
equal rights with the more materially substantive jurisprudence of the mitzvot,
where obligations are divinely given duties (and, at the same time, by that very
token, blessings for those given those obligations), cites a case in point from
Maimonides’ discussion of impartiality in his Code of Jewish law:
It is an affirmative commandment for a judge to judge justly, as it
says: “In justice shalt thou judge thy fellow” (Lev 19:20). What is
judicial fairness? Impartial treatment of both parties in every way,
not allowing one to state his case fully while instructing the other
to be brief, not showing courtesy to one and addressing him gently
while being severe and harsh with the other. If one party is dressed
well and the other poorly, the judge must tell the one respectably
attired: Either dress him like yourself, or dress like him, so that you
look like equals. Then the trial can begin.42

Rights mean nothing or worse than nothing without dignity. We can see the
tacit reference to the existential worth of persons, little honored in liberal
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democratic theory but indispensable to it, if we consider a problem in Kant’s
moral philosophy.
Kant formulates the categorical imperative in two ways. One looks to the
idea of a universal law of nature, the other to the deserts of subjects: persons
must be treated never solely as means to an end but always, at the same time,
as ends in themselves. The first formulation links fairness with the uniformity
that underwrites the idea of written laws in general and constitutionalism specifically. It tacitly acknowledges the golden rule and nods toward the Torah’s
command to love each other as we love ourselves. But a tip of the hat is not an
argument: applying the same rule to all presumes some recognition of human
worth but does not vindicate or even define it. Kant’s second formulation does
impute a special status to the individual as a locus of worth and suggests its
basis: each person is a locus of value because each person frames goals, projects,
and plans, including projects and plans of self-definition. It’s because human
beings are moral subjects that they deserve treatment as such. The core of ethical practice, as I’ve argued, is to treat all beings as what they are.
The resolve and even the legal commitment to treat all persons equally
would be empty without the imputation of worth to persons and their projects. Without that, equality becomes a grotesque parody of the goods that
moral principles are framed to protect. But despite the moral dependence of
Kant’s formal rule on the material, the material version does not follow from
the formal. It cannot, since there’s more to justice than equality.
“Duty itself,” G. W. F. Hegel wrote, is “without content.” Yet, “ethical
life is not abstract like the good.” What gives ethics its critical concreteness
is the family in the first instance; then, on a larger plane, civil society, forged
to unity by the work of the state.43 Stable families are “the prime unit of civil
society,” as Maimonides explains. Civil society depends on stable families.44
Liberal theory tends, so far as possible, to leave the family alone, and rightly so.
Likewise with other informal or natural social groups. What is communal—be
it tribal or congregational, ethnically organized or built around neighborhoods, schools, or interest groups—neither wants nor needs the heavy hand
or still heavier foot of the state, except when things seem likely to get out of
hand. Yet culturally there’s an all-the-way-downness that liberal states rely on:
families, clubs, sports teams, and, yes tribes and clans, faiths and lodges, if fair
and open, breed an open society and infuse it with varied versions of the values
they canonize and project, most often in the symbols, rituals, and narratives
they espouse. In that sense their life is the life of the state, and their rigidity or
death can mean death or decrepitude for the state.
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John Dewey, who began his philosophical life as a reader of Hegel, saw
the importance of thematic unity or coherence in the life of a society. But
it was easy for him or for his readers to confuse coherence with univocity
and, impatiently, to think thematic harmony must be impressed top down
rather than allowed to grow and flourish organically, from the ground. The
good health of the state depends on the good health of its families, religious
and social communities, schools and universities, even clubs and bowling
leagues. But when the state, in recognition (or denial) of that dependence,
begins impatiently to tell religions, scouting organizations, families, clans, and
schools, bakeries and hobby shops what they shall be, the state has not just put
the cart before the horse, it has sapped the ground it stands on and hacked at
the branch on which it perches. This is not just a matter of the eggs teaching
the chicken. It’s more a case of failure to see what’s molecular and what’s a
construct that will be only as stable as its elements and their ordering.
Liberal theorists have balked at even mentioning the ways in which
Kant’s two principles inform each other. For the end-in-himself formulation is metaphysical, resting on the ontic standing of persons. Viewed from a
top-down perspective, the God’s-eye point of view the Torah so often adopts
and invites, regarding persons as creatures of a loving God, human dignity
becomes a religious topic, reflecting our creation in God’s image. Even a pagan
philosopher like Seneca could say “homo sacra res homini” [man is sacred to
man].45 Liberal thinkers, however, are chary of clouding their rhetoric with too
abstract or too pious an expression of moral concerns, and America’s founding
documents soft-pedal their metaphysical premises and religious motives. The
documents are laced with words like “God-given” and “inalienable,” as hints
or reassurances. But they decline to press a metaphysical or religious thesis. As
a result, the American polity relies tacitly on “the background culture” of its
people and communities to give practical, positive content to the founders’
brief: it could be taken for granted that defendants would defend themselves,
that claimants would assert their rights and demand their due. One result of
the founders’ reticence, practical and welcome but fraught with occasion for
future dispute: the basis of human rights remained largely unstated; their content, often unspecified. It seemed obvious to the founders what was meant. To
many it still does. But neither they nor we have found consensus about those
anchor points or the reach of their demands.
Alexis de Tocqueville keenly saw the problem and its interim solution:
American civil and civic life rests on a bed of religious culture: there was, in
sternly defended principle, no warrant for confessional conformity. But there
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was an often unstated, largely unacknowledged reliance on the confessional
commitments of the people. There was no overt enforcement of doctrinal conformity, but there was a tacit expectation that action and to some extent belief
settle within imperfectly defined but socially visible parameters. Drawing on
his experience in America, de Tocqueville can tell his European readers much
that the concept of equality alone would never have shown them. Acknowledging the open air afforded by religious freedom in America, he adds:
But revolutionaries in America are obliged to profess openly a certain
respect for the morality and equity of Christianity, which does not
permit them to violate its laws easily when they are opposed to the
execution of their designs; and if they could raise themselves above
their own scruples, they would still feel they were stopped by those
of their partisans. Up to now, no one has been encountered in the
United States who dared to advance the maxim that everything is
permitted in the interest of society. An impious maxim—one that
seems to have been invented in a century of freedom to legitimate
all the tyrants to come. So, therefore, at the same time that the law
permits the American people to do everything, religion prevents
them from conceiving everything and forbids them to dare everything. Religion, which, among Americans, never mixes directly in
the government of society, should therefore be considered as the first
of their political institutions; for if it does not give them the taste for
freedom, it singularly facilitates their use of it. It is also from this
point of view that the inhabitants of the United States themselves
consider religious beliefs. I do not know if all Americans have faith
in their religion—for who can read to the bottom of hearts?—but
I am sure that they believe it necessary to the maintenance of
republican institutions. This opinion does not belong only to one
class of citizens or to one party, but to the entire nation; one finds
it in all ranks.46

Instantiating his observation of the consensus he names, de Tocqueville
writes of the warmth and indeed self-sacrifice of those who sustained America’s westward movement. Among their motives he finds not only a belief in
manifest destiny or an appetite for new opportunities, new challenges, and
new freedoms, but also the idea that religion must move westward with the
pioneers for America to remain a republic. And, echoing the Torah’s values, he
finds a union of spiritual with worldly interests that he expects will surprise
readers in Europe, where spiritual and earthly concerns were so often seen as
rivals, a mistress and a bride, love of this world and hope of the next.47
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Tocqueville’s discovery of the American marriage of worldliness with
spirituality was not unrelated to his observations of the dignity expected and
to a striking degree (by contrast with what he knew in Europe) accorded to
American individuals of all classes and even, in some measure, of all backgrounds. For hope is the seed of dignity. And a worldly religion, where hope
need not be dismissed as pie in the sky, helps make hope realistic and allows
worldly effort and its fruits to be seen as rungs of a ladder, where personal,
familial, communal, and national advancement bear spiritual significance
and are not cut off from moral, social, and intellectual advancement. Such a
union is evident in the biblical narratives of the lives of Israel’s patriarchs. And,
despite the risks of confusing worldly success with grace or virtue, de Tocque
ville saw that union in the lives and dreams and multigenerational odysseys
of the Americans he met. That cultural union of law with love, on which
America’s success still rests, is anchored in the alliance of humane and liberal
institutions with the biblical heritage that has become a common heritage of
the West. The same alliance of liberal institutions with biblical humanity is
Israel’s hope and heritage as well.
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Monarchy and Polity:
Systems of Government
in Jewish Tradition
Lawrence H. Schiffman
From earliest Israelite times two parallel lines of debate regarding the political organization of the Jewish people can be traced in our sources. One is the
theoretical debate over whether the Torah requires kingship or not. In this
debate, it was assumed by virtually all that the powers of the monarch would
be constitutionally limited by Jewish law, usually facilitated by means of a
council of some kind. From this discussion, there emerged in modern times
a variety of traditional approaches to supporting democracy, even as the ideal
for a Jewish state. Parallel with this debate was the practical question of how
Jews would be governed in a variety of situations, whether independently
or dominated by foreign powers. Here a variety of monarchic, oligarchic,
and quasi-democratic approaches were followed in different times, places,
and conditions. For the most part, these practical considerations led to a situation in which an ever-broadening electorate selected leaders for the Jewish
community. These historical experiences, together with the rise of modern
nation-states and the concurrent political philosophies, served to guarantee
that by modern times, democracy would be assumed by the Jewish community
to be the ideal system of government for a Jewish state and the ideal model
for diaspora communities.
BIBLICAL PERIOD
There are two ways of approaching the question of Jewish governance in the
biblical period: one is to begin with prescriptive texts and to assume that governance was carried out in accordance with these legal codes. The second would
be to investigate historical sources and determine from them how the political
organization of the Israelites was constructed. We will look at this question
from both points of view. It is worth bearing in mind already at this point that
later links in the Jewish tradition that sought to base their political philosophy
on biblical sources faced the exact same bifurcated approach, and we will see
later on how they sought to harmonize the two approaches.1
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We begin with the prescriptive texts. The main source dealing with political organization in the Torah is Deuteronomy 17:14–23, the Law of the King.
While the Torah appears to command the establishment of a monarch upon
entry into the Land of Israel, the later debate in Jewish sources as to whether
this is an obligation or an option is foreshadowed already in the inner biblical
debate. Whereas a plain-sense reading of the material in Deuteronomy seems
to make clear that the Torah requires government by a limited monarchy, it is
also clear that the author of 1 Samuel 8:10–22 understood monarchy to be an
option, not a requirement, and in fact sees a loose tribal confederacy as preferable to monarchy. Indeed, he expects that establishment of a monarchy would
lead to abject violation of the very limitations imposed by Deuteronomy and
to the abuse of power by the king.2
It is not clear how to understand the refusal of the author of the priestly
material at the end of the book of Ezekiel to term the ruler of his expected
reestablished polity מלך, “king” and his preference for the term נשיא, usually translated as “prince,”3 a word used later to designate the Roman-period
patriarch and in modern times the president of the State of Israel. While this
author says little about the authority of this ruler, discussing only his sacrificial
role and the limitations on his power (Ezek 46:1–18), we might conclude that
avoidance of the term “king” is intended to signal further limitation of the
powers of the ruler than is expected by Deuteronomy. Standard modern biblical criticism would argue that Deuteronomy and the priestly material at the
end of Ezekiel are essentially contemporaneous and would see this refusal to
use “king” as an indication of a fifth century b.c.e. debate over the ideal form
of Jewish government. The problem here, however, is that it is necessary for
the Deuteronomic Law of the King to pre-date the core narrative (not just the
Deuteronomic framework) of the book of Samuel.4 Furthermore, it is clear
from even the most cursory look at the history of the exegesis of Deuteronomy
17 that the Israelites seem to have assumed monarchy as the expected system of
government. This, of course, was the norm throughout the ancient Near East.5
According to the biblical account, after the Israelite conquest the people
were ruled by tribal leaders known as שופטים, usually translated literally as
“judges.”6 These officials seem to have come in various shapes and forms:
some were actually justices, some ad hoc military leaders in times of crisis, and
others tribal chieftains.7 The system of government in which tribes functioned
independently or in loose confederations was insufficient to allow protection
against the depredations of the Philistines and other sea peoples who took
advantage of their earlier entry into the Iron Age and their chariots to raid
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and destroy Israelite settlements.8 With time, according to the Bible, against
the recommendations of Samuel, a king was selected. This king, Saul, was
essentially a national “judge,” ruling with a very minimal bureaucracy but able
to defend the people.9 With his defeat and death, there ensued the classical
United Monarchy of David and Solomon with the large-scale building projects, army, taxes, and bureaucracy typical of an ancient Near Eastern monarchy.10 Attempts to discount the historicity of this monarchy may for now be
laid to rest by the excavations at Khirbet Qeiyafa.11
This monarchy had been cemented together from southern and northern elements that split apart after Solomon’s rule circa 954 b.c.e. with both
kingdoms retaining monarchies.12 However, while the southern kingdom of
Judah practiced succession from father to son, the northern kingdom suffered
repeated revolutions, although within each of the northern dynasties filial
succession was practiced. One has only to look at the positive and negative
portrayals of the monarchs to describe the basic powers and limitations of
their rule. Kings could collect taxes, raise armies, fight wars, either to defend
their kingdom or to expand its borders, engage in large-scale building projects
often with corvée labor, judge legal cases, and control religious practice. At the
same time, it does not seem that the limitations placed on the monarchy by
Deuteronomy were scrupulously observed in either the United or the Divided
Monarchy.13
Considering the nature of ancient communication and the existence of
local elders and priestly religious leaders, we should not see the king as a sort
of totalitarian ruler. On the contrary, he ruled through a bureaucracy that itself
was often tied closely to the people and would have been in some ways receptive to their demands. Some scholars have argued for the existence of a sort
of council termed עם הארץ, literally, “the people of the land,” in First Temple
times that was a sort of constituent assembly that also would have had considerable influence over the affairs of the monarchy. On the other hand, we find
no legal sources describing such an institution.14
In both the North and South this system of government ultimately
failed the Israelites since it allowed the kings sufficient power to engage in
highly unwise foreign policies, flouting the great powers of Mesopotamia. The
monarchs risked their kingdoms in order to assert financial and diplomatic
independence, first from Assyria and then from Babylonia, resulting in the
respective destructions of the Northern Kingdom in 72215 and the Southern in
586 b.c.e.16 One has only to look at the complex narratives of Kings, Jeremiah,
and Chronicles to realize the complexity of the political maneuvering that
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surrounded these fiascoes. Nevertheless, the governmental system permitted
and provided sufficient support to allow the monarchs to travel down this disastrous path. The attempt of the Babylonians to set up a form of weakened Jewish self-rule under Gedaliah ben Ahikam presaged the fact that the debate over
Jewish monarchy would henceforth be conducted in a context in which foreign
monarchs appointed those who would rule over the Land of Israel. Only under
the Hasmoneans would we again encounter independent Jewish rule.
SECOND TEMPLE PERIOD
With the return of a small number of Judeans after the onset of Persian period
in 540 b.c.e., there followed a short period of rule by a Davidic descendant
who served as a Persian-appointed governor. Through some unknown combination of circumstances, the land came to be a hierocracy in which high priests
ruled over the internal affairs of the Jews within a larger foreign-dominated
empire.17 This situation remained throughout the Persian Empire and under
Ptolemies and Seleucids until the Maccabean revolt of 168–164 b.c.e.18 After
the revolt, from 152 b.c.e. the Hasmoneans established a form of rule, eventually termed kingship, that was essentially a blending of the two previous
systems—monarchy and hierocracy—so that one individual now held the
powers that in First Temple times had resided in two individuals, king and
high priest.19 Despite the fact that the monarchs of the First Temple period
dominated religious life, the existence of independent high priests alongside
prophets meant at least some semblance of balance of powers, even if unfairly
balanced.
Despite this unification of powers, throughout the Hasmonean era,
from the consolidation of power by Jonathan in 152 b.c.e. through the end of
Hasmonean rule in 63 b.c.e., the gerousia [council of elders] served as a representative body and included Pharisaic and Sadducean representatives.20 This
representative body was the ancestor of the later Sanhedrin. Otherwise, Hasmonean rulers had all the powers of the ancient Jewish kings and controlled
large bureaucracies, effectively executing all affairs of state: they raised armies,
waged wars to expand their territory, and collected taxes.
During the Hasmonean period, the long-standing debate about the
nature of Jewish monarchy was raised again as can be seen from the Temple
Scroll.21 Here we find an entire section, titled by scholars the “Law of the
King,” that parallels, interprets, and expands the Deuteronomic laws (11QTa
56–57). In many ways, this material can be seen as a polemic against the
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Hasmonean rulers, who were the arch-opponents of the Dead Sea sectarians.
The text spells out a series of obligations and privileges of the king. The command that a Torah scroll must be written for the king is meant to indicate
that he is to be controlled by the laws of the Torah. All the Deuteronomic
restrictions on the king are repeated and emphasized. A council of 12 priests,
12 Levites, and 12 Israelites is to be set up to rule along with the king, who
is prohibited from waging offensive war without the permission of the high
priest. Most importantly, the text makes clear that the king and the high priest
must be two distinct people, clearly opposing the control of both roles by the
Hasmonean priest-kings. The text argues forcefully for reform of the political
system and for a monarchy even more severely limited than that of the book
of Deuteronomy.
However, from 40 to 4 b.c.e. the Romans administered Palestine
through a client king, Herod.22 Rule by client kings emerging from the local
populations was tried by the Romans in many areas, although they soon realized that this system of governance did not meet their needs. The experience of
Herodian kingship posed numerous challenges. His capricious rule and ignoring of Jewish tradition regarding rights of trial and his donations to pagan
rituals must have angered many Jews. However, his paranoia and the resulting
execution by him of numerous family members caused widespread disgust and
dissatisfaction with his rule.
Curiously, however, the rule of his grandson Agrippa I (41–44 c.e.)23 was
later regarded as a golden age by the rabbis.24 Herod seems to have been helped
in his rule by a quasi-council called the filoi, the “friends” of the king. From
Josephus (for the most part following the writings of Nicholaus of Damascus, Herod’s non-Jewish secretary of state), we can determine that there was
great opposition to the rule of Herod and his descendants. Talmudic sources,
however, indicate the great generosity of Herod in building projects and relief
works as well as in the complete reconstruction and expansion of the Jerusalem
Temple.25 After a short experiment with Herod’s son, Archeleus, the Romans
returned the country to procuratorial rule, and kingship26 was never again an
active category in Jewish political life.
A number of important Jewish sources from the Second Temple period
reflected on the question of monarchy versus other governmental systems.
Philo Judaeus discusses this issue in interpreting Deuteronomy 17. He presents a positive view of the king, who was understood to have been chosen by
the people, sensitive to their needs, and ruling according to divine law. Essentially, the king of the Bible is seen as the ideal king.27 Josephus, however, sees
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hierocracy, that is, the aristocracy of the priesthood, as the best form of government when compared to monarchy, so Josephus sees the laws of Deuteronomy
17:14–20 as essentially a compromise. In Josephus’s view, the king there is
expected to submit to divine law and to follow the leadership of the high priest
and the gerousia, the Council of Elders. Josephus understands monarchy as an
aberration and sees the Hasmonean period as proving the advantages of rule
by an aristocracy. Specifically, in a discussion of various types of government,
monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, Josephus states that the Torah required
instead a theocracy, that is, the granting of “sovereignty and authority in the
hands of God.” He specifies that such a government would actually be led by
the priests, with the high priest as the chief authority.28
Philo seems to assume that kingship is a required form of government.
He understands the appointment of leaders in an essentially democratic manner, stating his opposition to the appointment of magistrates by lot. He also
condemns corrupt elections and seems to be criticizing Plato and Aristotle,
who had recommended appointment by lots. He emphasized the right of all
citizens to participate in electing rulers. He makes no reference to election of
kings by prophets. He somehow seems to assume that even though the people
elect the king, he is ratified by God. Therefore, he states about Moses that he
was appointed by God with the complete consent of the people.
Philo states the duties of the king as ruling and judging in accordance
with the Torah, appointing officials, conducting his duties with righteousness,
and deferring to legal experts in difficult cases. All these duties are derived
from biblical verses, although not necessarily verses regarding the king.29 What
seems to be operative here is that Philo follows the Platonic notion of the
philosopher-king, whereas Josephus reads the Bible in accord with the critique
of Samuel and understands the ideal biblical form of rule to be the priestly
aristocracy, which for him in essence represents the rule of God. Remember,
he himself was a priest!
RABBINIC LITERATURE
Rabbinic sources debated the question of the obligation of monarchy, some,
most notably the Mishnah,30 considering it to be an option and others seeing
it as obligatory.31 Those considering it obligatory had to explain how it could
be possible for Samuel to oppose it. Two basic explanations were given. Either
it was said that the people were not yet ready for such a government or that
by asking for a king “like all the other nations” they were seeking what we
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would call an assimilationist path and, hence, Samuel disapproved. For our
purposes, we can point out that rabbinic sources saw Moses in effect as the
first Jewish king.
Various opinions existed as to how he was appointed. One view argued
that he had been appointed by God and another that he was essentially
appointed by the assembly of seventy elders. Saul is said to have been chosen
by God as transmitted to the prophet Samuel, but then he is also said to have
been appointed by lot. David is said to have been chosen in the same way, by
God through Samuel, but then anointed by the men of Judah and later by the
elders of Israel. In other words, rabbinic sources seem to identify two basic
sources for the authority of the king: divine election, on the one hand, and
acclaim by the people or their representatives, on the other hand.
The Tannaim in the Mishnah and Tosefta laid out some basic regulations
for the king,32 effectively naturalizing this position as a part of their overall
halachic system.33 The basic regulations they put forward include: The king is
forbidden from serving as a judge or being judged by a court. Nor can the king
bear witness or be testified against. The king may not compromise his honor.
Various legal procedures may not be effected by the king, and his honor is safeguarded if he should be a mourner. He may lead the people into an optional
war only with permission of the court of seventy-one. He has complete power
over eminent domain in order to build roads, and gets a large share in war
booty. His accumulation of wives, horses, and money is to be limited and the
command that he write a Torah scroll is designed to indicate that he rules only
in accord with the laws of the Torah.
Various symbols of his authority may not be used by others, and special
laws of privacy applied to him to preserve his honor. From the Tosefta we learn
that the king’s regalia are to be burned after death, so as to make sure that they
may not be appropriated by another. Much of the scriptural basis for these
laws can be gathered also from the Sifre Devarim.34 The tannaitic system, as
put forward in the Mishnah, speaks of the ideal Jewish society in the Land of
Israel, effectively a naturalistic messianic vision. In this ideal, the king, holding
executive power, rules alongside a Sanhedrin that serves as the legislative and
judicial branch, and these rule alongside the high priest who controls religious
affairs. The judicial role of the Sanhedrin is part of an assumed group of Torah
sages who are expected to serve as religious authorities and teachers for the
people while coexisting with the priestly establishment.
The Babylonian Talmud differentiates two types of kings in recognition
of the realities of the First and Second Temple periods. In this way, it attempts
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to harmonize the prescriptive text in Deuteronomy with the realities of history.
The kings of Israel and Northern Israel, and the various Second Temple kings,
are seen as those for whom the total set of halachic limitations on the status
of the king is fully enforced, specifically regarding the rule that he may not
judge or be judged. However, these roles are assumed not to apply to kings of
the house of David because the righteousness of this dynasty can be guaranteed. The kings of Northern Israel, the Hasmoneans, and Herodians are seen
as only an incomplete fulfillment of the Torah’s ideal.35 Therefore, this latter
group of kings eventually served as a model for some modern thinkers for the
legitimation of systems of government of a Jewish state other than the Davidic
monarchy. These thinkers saw these forms of government as the fulfillment of
the Torah’s regulations.
MEDIEVAL TRADITION
With the onset of the Middle Ages, the debate over monarchy was framed
in a somewhat different manner but continued nonetheless. Although Maimonides (1135–1204) ruled that the establishment of a monarchy was in
fact a commandment,36 other commentators such as Abraham Ibn Ezra
(1089–1167) saw the Torah’s Law of the King as an option: if you want to
appoint a king, these are the rules.37 This debate was conducted against the
backdrop of medieval Jewish life, in which some Jewish communities were
governed internally by a system of representative decision making. To be sure,
these were oligarchies, not democracies.38 Of great interest is the emergence of
two distinct understandings of local communal authority in medieval Jewish
communities. In one view, reminiscent of the Persian-Hellenistic designation
of high priests as rulers over the Jews, the authority of local communal officials
was traced to authority devolved upon the Jewish leaders by the non-Jewish
king or his agents. In this approach, there is no foreshadowing of democracy.
On the other hand, a second system of thought understood the authority of
local communal authorities to be based upon their election by the electors,
namely, those with rights of residence or certain financial status. In this system, authority stems not from above but from below—the community that
had elected them.39 It was just a short step from this approach to the suggestion that democracy might be a legitimate form of government.
The later Middle Ages, no doubt because of trends observable in Christian society, stimulated considerable original thought regarding the significance
of monarchy for Judaism and Jewish law. One of the most significant thinkers
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in this regard was Rabbenu Nissim ben Reuben of Gerona (1320–1376). He
observed that according to biblical narrative, it can be concluded that the king
had particular rights that went beyond those of the normal halachic system.
Based on these texts, he concluded that there existed a mishpat․ ha-melekh [a
royal law] that was meant to exist as a completely parallel system along with
that prescribed by the Torah. Whereas the first Torah system sought to put
forth the moral and ethical ideals of Judaism, the second royal system intended
to bridge the gap between these ideals and the reality of life. Accordingly, for
example, in his view the king had the right to put to death those who were
not permitted to be executed for lack of valid witnesses according to the ideal
system of the Torah.40
Other commentators explained many of the examples of such nonhalachic behavior in the narratives of Samuel and Kings as violations of God’s
commands, but Rabbenu Nissim saw them as evidence for the obligation and
right of the king to redress evils that could not be handled by the idealistic
and impractical system of Torah law. This approach recognized the necessity
of the king. However, unlike Maimonides who saw the king as an agent for
maintenance of the government according to halachah, Rabbenu Nissim
saw the king as providing an entirely separate and parallel system of law to
overcome the weaknesses of Jewish law that resulted from its idealistic character. We should contrast this view with that of Yosef Chayoun (sixteenth
century), who argued that the purpose of the king was to compel observance
of Jewish law.41
In the fifteenth century, Jews began to be acquainted with developments in Venice and Genoa where democratic institutions were beginning to grow up in the local governmental arena. This led Isaac Abravanel
(1437–1508) to formulate an entire treatise arguing for the superiority of the
democratic system of government wherein those who serve in office know
that they function at the behest of the people and that if they want to be
reelected, they must be responsible to them. Taking his cue from the Talmudic view that the appointment of a king is optional, not a requirement, and
from the arguments of the book of Samuel, Abravanel argued strongly for the
superiority of democracy over monarchy. One might summarize his point
of view by noting that he agreed with the ancient prophet Samuel in seeing
monarchy as undesirable. Undoubtedly he was impacted by the beginnings
of the emergence of modern democracy and convinced that such a system
of government was superior not only for European societies but for a Jewish
polity as well.42
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THE MODERN PERIOD
With the emergence of Europe into modernity, Jews were generally hopeful
that democracy would provide just governments in nations in which they
could live on an equal footing with other citizens. Democracy promised to
bring with it equal civil rights and, indeed, developed in Europe along with
the emancipation of the Jews.43 These two processes went hand-in-hand, and
it was not long before the Jewish people as a whole saw democracy as the best
form of government. It should therefore come as no surprise that the Zionist
movement was, at least outwardly, structured from the beginning as a democracy. That the State of Israel would be a democracy, albeit one with fundamental differences from both the British parliamentary system and the American
constitutional system, was clear even long before anyone knew when it would
be declared or what it would be called.
Nonetheless, and especially in religious Zionist circles, a discussion of
monarchy versus democracy was called forth in the years leading up to and
immediately following the independence of Israel. Here the question was not a
practical one, but rather concerned how to understand the state from a halachic
point of view and how, at least for traditional Jews, to create a bridge between the
new reality and the longed-for dream of a renewed Davidic kingdom. Further,
and actually of greater practical significance, was the question of how to find a
place for Jewish law in the context of a modern democracy.44 Purposely avoiding
the fact that these issues are still plaguing the political and religious leaders of
the State of Israel, we will say something about the nature of the earlier debate.
The simplest of the points of view put forward was that of Agudath
Israel, representing the Ashkenazic ultra-Orthodox (before the split into two
parties). They took the view that the State of Israel is a secular state run by Jews
and, hence, that civil law did not have to reflect Jewish law at all. This point of
view is similar to that of Rabbenu Nissim in that it assumes two parallel legal
systems, since a rabbinic court system functions in Israel as well as the civil
judiciary. At the same time, they demanded, with some success, that the state
as a whole observe Jewish law in various areas of personal status and public life.
The second approach was that of the Religious Zionists (Mizrachi), who
took the view that the state itself, even in the form of a democracy, represented a halachic polity that should observe Jewish law. This vision resulted
in various schemes to integrate Jewish law into the state’s legal system. Some,
in the years leading up to the rise of Israel, thought that it would be possible
to put into effect a modified version of Jewish law that could be applied even
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in a state in which the majority of the citizens were not traditionally observant.45 Others, taking a more pragmatic approach, and here I am referring to
the Mishpat Ivri movement, sought maximum integration of Jewish law into
the state’s civil system, alongside the British and Turkish law that undergirded
it.46 Of course, for those less connected to traditional texts, democracy was
the expected norm that was assumed to be the fulfillment of the ideals of the
prophets of ancient Israel.
The possibility that monarchy might actually be the ideal system of
government for the renewed Jewish state was entertained by virtually nobody.
That democracy was somehow a natural partner of the Jewish tradition, however both Judaism and democracy might be defined, was the natural assumption of all those involved in establishing the state and in advancing their
particular visions for it. To the extent that the Israeli parliamentary system
imitates that of the British, the president serves the legal and ceremonial role
of the British monarch, including selecting the party leader most likely to succeed in forming a parliamentary coalition. However, no one ever dreamt of
appointing an actual king.
We have tried to chronicle the long process by which the biblical ideal
of monarchy, reflecting the norms of ancient society, even if limited and controlled, has essentially been replaced by democracy. This form of government
is now seen virtually unanimously in the Jewish community as the key to the
future of the Jewish people and the State of Israel.
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Democracy, Judaism, Israel,
Art, and Demagoguery
Ori Z. Soltes

DEMOCRACY IN THE JEWISH TRADITION
“Democracy” has evolved as a concept since the inception of the word. When
Kleisthenes created the idea in Athens in 508 b.c.e., he sought to transfer political power from the self-proclaimed “best” [aristoi]— wealthiest—Athenians
to the inhabitants of artificially shaped “demes” [demoi]. There were 30 of
these across the larger Athenian polis: 10 in the city, 10 in the mountainous
outskirts of Attica, and 10 along the lowlands.1 The system to accord power
[kratia] to the demes operated in 10 groups of 3—each group consisting of
representatives elected/appointed by a city, mountain, and lowland deme. The
point was that the representatives and their constituents had little intrinsically
in common, but were forced to find common ground in order to be effective, thus undercutting the traditional governance assumed by socioeconomic
class—and thus typically and traditionally serving the needs of the wealthy.
But the franchise was still limited: to free-born adult males native to Athens. Women were excluded. Slaves were excluded. Those known as metoikoi
[“those who live around”], individuals and their families who had come from
elsewhere, perhaps seeking work, and continued to live in and around Athens,
sometimes for generations, were excluded. Under Perikles (ca 450–430 b.c.e.),
“free-born” was further limited to mean “born of two free-born parents”—thus
the child of a slave and a free person was automatically excluded from citizenship, turning citizenship into a closed franchise and democracy to a limited
governance proposition.2 This would all seem to be a far cry from what most
Americans imagine has always been our own democracy. Of course, our history was not always so different from what Athens offered. American democracy waited until 1870 to afford African American men the opportunity to
vote; Native Americans were not eligible for American citizenship until 1890;
women across America had to wait until 1920 to cast ballots. Jews couldn’t
vote in Maryland until 1828 and in New Hampshire until 1878. Obviously
those who couldn’t vote couldn’t run for office and were clearly not fully
enfranchised as citizens of the polity.
185
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An obvious underpinning of voting is that it affords citizens the opportunity to express opinions and to offer dissent from any given majority view
without fear of negative repercussions. Within Jewish history, dissent and
thus a particular kind of democratic thinking is an essential part of the rabbinic tradition. Many examples may be drawn from midrashic and Talmudic
discussions to demonstrate how multiple points of view are entertained on
diverse issues. Consider as one example one of the early conversations in the
Midrash Rabba on Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning, God created the heavens
and the earth”—referring specifically to the second clause): in which the
question is asked whether heaven or earth was created first. The discussion
ascribes to the “School of Hillel” the view that the earth was created first;
to the “School of Shammai” is ascribed the alternative view, that the heavens were created first—each corroborating its perspective with references to
other passages in the Bible. Hillel’s view is further supported by Rabbi Judah
son of Rabbi Ilai and by Rabbi Hanin. Rabbi Johanan enters the discussion,
reporting on the view of the sages, supported by Rabbi Tanhuma, to the
effect that heaven was first in beginning the process, but earth was first in
completing it.
Into this back and forth discussion steps Rabbi Simeon, expressing surprise at the debate and offering a third view—to wit that both were created
simultaneously—before pointing out analogous biblical questions of precedence (honoring one patriarch or matriarch more than another, or Moses more
than Aaron, or Joshua more than Kaleb) in order to bring the high-flung discussion down to earth with the observation that we must honor both parents
equally (in spite of the commandment that lists “father” first and “mother”
second—since the order of terms is reversed in Lev 19:3: “You shall fear every
man his mother, and his father.”).
The point is that different viewpoints are entertained—although the
evidence suggests that not everyone was comfortably included in the process.
Women, for example, are not only rarely in evidence, but when one stood
out as particularly brilliant—Bruriah, for instance, the wife of Rabbi Meir—
a tradition emerged that questioned her moral steadfastness.3 The rabbinic
underpinnings of the Jewish tradition may be called democratic, then, in the
sense of diverse perspectives being included, but not necessarily in permitting everybody who is not a rabbinic figure to be involved in the multivalent
opinion-expressing process.
The tradition further enjoins us not to oppress those whom our system
does not empower to protect themselves—from the criticism offered to the
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Judaeans by Jeremiah that they “oppress the stranger, the orphan and the
widow, and spill innocent blood” (Jer 7:6, and echoing Exod 22:22)—suggesting in no uncertain terms that to oppress these categories of disenfranchised
individuals is to spill innocent blood and that members of a covenantal people
are proscribed by God from so doing—to the annual reminder in the Passover narratives that we, who were strangers, should not oppress the stranger
(derived from Exod 22:21). This last prescription is underscored by the fact
that the phrase “embrace the stranger” appears 36 times in the Torah, more
times than does any other injunction. The implication of this is that a limited
democracy must not limit an enthusiastically fair treatment of those whose
voices are not heard in the discussions of how to be in the world.
The diasporic nature of Judaism helped to facilitate a democracy of
thinking with regard to living a Jewish life (which is the primary preoccupation of the rabbinic tradition, as opposed to the issue of belief that dominated
Christian patristic and scholastic writing). This is reflected in divergent lifestyle elements—from liturgical details to funerary customs to gastronomic
norms—across the Jewish world, even as various Jewish communities within
that world assumed autocratic personalities. Thus a German Jew would not
even be aware that a Moroccan Jew consumed rice on Passover—kitniyot (that
also includes corn, millet, and legumes)—so he could not be offended by a
norm that would be anathema to him. By contrast, the largely contiguous
Christian and Muslim worlds generated a norm in which religious perspective
and political power so often interwove that it was easier to generate suppression, often violent, of spiritual dissent.4
On the other hand, circumscribed individual Jewish communities could
find themselves in thrall to their own rabbinic leadership. No instance of this
is more notorious than the evolution of the Sephardic community of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century—much of it direct refugees or descendants
of refugees from Spain and Portugal and the brutally suppressive inquisitional
authorities that had prevailed across Iberia since the fifteenth century. Two
individuals stand out as victims of Sephardic rabbinic cruelty and repression
in Amsterdam: Uriel Acosta (1585–1640) and Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677).
The prescriptions of excommunication and/or return to the community [more
“temporary” niddui and more “permanent” herem] in the aftermath of their
respective trials and condemnations for heresy resonate with an inquisitional
tone in terms of both verbiage and methodology. In the end Acosta committed
suicide from the mental strain and Spinoza’s expulsion led him away from the
community toward which he never looked back.5
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The diasporic Jewish world experienced a most distinctive turn with
the advent of modern Zionism and a culmination when Israel was established in 1948. An “ingathering of exiles” offered the chance to shape the
first Jewish-governed polity in history. It drew its name from the ancient
Israelite Kingdom—underscoring an ideological leapfrog over the centuries of
uncomfortable diasporic existence—and it extracted its sense of return from
prophetic promises contoured in the context of the destruction of the First
Israelite-Judaean Temple and the rabbinic thinking shaped after the destruction of the Second Judaean Temple. The new state, when it finally emerged,
derived its sense of self-governance from a combination of rabbinic, Ottoman, and British ideas, ultimately transcending all of them in order to offer a
democracy both Jewishly informed and secular, open above all to Jews—and
to all kinds of Jews, from ultra-Orthodox to atheists—but open to all.
This sort of perspective is reflected in Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which explicitly asserts the intention of the nascent state to “foster the
development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants [and to] be
based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel [and
to] ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants
irrespective of religion, race or gender.” One could argue that, conversely, the
lack of a written constitution reflects the ongoing principles of dissent and
disagreement, given that that lack reflects an inability to achieve consensus
among its constituent groups as to the very purpose of the state, its identity,
and its long-term ambitions. The nature of the Israeli administration is democratic to a fault: the multiparty system often permits small groups with their
particular agendas to have more of a voice than they might, say, in the American two-party system, due to the need for coalitions in order for the major
power party leaders to govern.
The wrestling match to shape and maintain such a democracy began
well before the state was declared and continues to this day. Virtually from
its outset, Zionism was fraught with dissent that continued to expand over
time: Theodor Herzl’s political Zionism was opposed by Ahad Ha’Am’s spiritual Zionism, which was abetted by Boris Schatz’s cultural Zionism; A. D.
Gordon’s labor Zionism overlapped but was distinguished from Rav Kook’s
religious Zionism, all of which were opposed by Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s revisionist
Zionism.6 Throughout the twelve decades between the First Zionist Congress
in Basel in late summer 1897 and today, the debate has continued regarding
what Israel is supposed to be—the center of which debate is a series of questions pertaining to the identity of the state as “Jewish”: where do non-Jews
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fit in who are not entitled to automatic citizenship but can indeed become
citizens? How are converts to Judaism and/or the offspring of mixed marriages
received? What of Muslim and Christian Palestinian Arabs who remained (or
returned) after the War of Independence? Who does or may or doesn’t or may
not serve in the Israeli Defense Forces and in what capacity?
THE EXPRESSION OF DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
IN THE VISUAL ARTS
In the ongoing expression of opinion, art has served the role that art has often
served throughout history: offering political commentary or serving the needs
of politics, sometimes with religion as a third leg—from the images of Egyptian pharaohs asserting the divinity that will discourage revolt against their
power to images of David against Goliath commissioned by the Medici to represent themselves and Florence struggling against larger powers like the Papal
States. In Israel art has continued emphatically to be shaped as a response to
the reality of “Israel.” Art has affirmed and challenged, defined and dissented
from Israel’s political-spiritual self-conception: it has thus offered a consummate expression of democratic principles.
Pre-
Israel’s first public sculpture, Konstantin Melnikov’s Monument
to the Fallen at Tel Hai (1928–1934), offers a roaring lion that combines a
Hittite-style mane and Assyrian-style forepaws, but assumes a contemporary,
more verticalized position than such forebears did. Melnikov’s lion is both
indigenous to the region and unique: old and new. Indeed, the very fact of
this and other works of public sculpture offers a political statement: it asserts
that the Jews are back and in independent control of their land; that they are
here to stay, and can thus, for the first time in two millennia, produce visual
self-expressions that are large and in the open for all to see. Over the decades,
public statuary, particularly memorials—alas, reflecting the war-torn reality of
Israeli history—have proliferated across Israel.
Those memorials refer typically not only to the wars in which Israelis have
died—from the War for Independence (1948) to the Sinai Campaign (1956),
the Six-Day War (1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the Lebanon War
(1982), as well as to various more recent military campaigns involving Gaza
and less clearly articulated wars, such as the War of Attrition shaped by Egypt
in the mid-1970s—but also, beginning some time after the Eichmann trial
of 1961, to the millions of Jews who perished in the Holocaust. After fifteen
years of statehood, during which Israel, no less and no more than much of
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the world, was, for various reasons beyond this discussion disinterested in
commemorating that event, it began to occupy a central place in the national
ideology of memory. In some cases, as in Yigal Tumarkin’s enormous public
sculpture, Holocaust and Resurrection (1975), the intent, in part, is to suggest
a trajectory that leads from enormous suffering and the ashes to the rebirth of
the Jewish people, miraculously, in its own land. His upside-down pyramid,
made of steel and empty space, hovering over and reflected in a small pond
with lily pads, offers notions of impossibility made possible, history turned on
its head, the idea of regularized geometries contrived by human intellect and
effort within the irregularities of nature and of calm within the storm, placed
as it is in a park surrounded by the hurly burly of Tel Aviv.
Appositely, among the important canvasses painted more than a generation after Melnikov’s sculpture is by Mordecai Ardon, soon after he assumed
the directorship of the Bezalel School of Art in Jerusalem. The painting is
called Venus of Beersheva (1962)—alluding to and including within the depths
of his semiabstract, light-within-darkness image the so-named archaeological
artifact, (the small fertility figure dates from the very early Bronze Age), treating it iconically and offering it as a testimony to the historical and literal depth
of Israeli connection to the Land. This is a crepuscular visual articulation of
romantic nationalism.
Within the fifteen years before and the decades after this painting, Israel
was confronted by its neighbors and confronted the world in an ongoing series
of conflicts, from its initial fight for survival in 1948 to its blitzkrieg victories,
over the Egyptians in 1956 and over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967. The
outcome of the first and third conflicts was to increase the outer borders of
the state, and in the Six-Day War to acquire administrative control over hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who had been subject for the previous two
decades to harsh conditions under the Egyptians and Jordanians, since they
had left what became Israel and were trapped, as it were, in Gaza and the West
Bank, where they never assumed the status of real citizens in Egypt and Jordan
respectively.
If at first it appeared that this situation would achieve resolution—that
the Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, Syrians, and others would seek peace
with Israel in exchange for the release of Sinai, the Golan, Gaza, and the West
Bank—the more so when, a few years after a fourth conflict, in October 1973,
yielded further Israeli conquests, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin signed
a peace agreement in 1979 in which the Sinai was returned to Egypt—yet
as tensions remained and as Israeli settlements mushroomed across the West
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Bank landscape, some Israelis, artists among them, began openly to ponder
how long the “occupation” (for that term would become more and more
popular) would persist.
It is a symptom of the vigor of the democratic side of Israel that that
question could and did express itself as oppositional to that status quo; artists were among those who queried and protested in their work. Thus in the
old building of the Bezalel School an exhibition of posters was organized in
1987 marking the twentieth anniversary of the conquest and occupation of
Gaza and the West Bank. By then the first Israeli-Arab war, in Lebanon, to
be questioned by a significant number of Israelis had marked the early 1980s;
the war was designed to drive the PLO out of the neighborhood. Two of the
more obvious noteworthy features of that exhibition were the strident nature
of some of the work produced by Israeli artists and the fact that several Muslim
and Christian artists were invited to participate. Thus work by well-known
figures like Yigal Tumarkin and Raffi Lavie, as well as by lesser known ones,
like Dov Haller, Gabi Klezmer, and Yehoshua Borowsky was exhibited. And
on the other hand the work of non-Jewish Palestinians was shown.
Among these was Taleb Dweik, (b. 1952, Jerusalem), who eventually
became the president of the League of Palestinian Artists (1990–1996) and
has exhibited all over the world. Dweik’s work, then and since, in spite of
living in a Jerusalem that has been such a center of tension and often violence for so long, typically paints with a colorful, often abstract palette so
that his imagery tends to lead the viewer away from the ugly politics outside
the canvas into a realm of beauty and calm: he offers a kind of visual tikkun
olam in his work. In recognizing that Jerusalem and its people are his most
consistent subject, however, one may also recognize the suggestion of yearning for an earlier, more innocent and childlike pre-Occupation, pre-Wall
Jerusalem—particularly in an image in which he has literalized the gerrymandering idea of the Wall by creating a Jerusalem skyline compositionally
broken into thirteen vertical slabs that suggest chunks of city broken by
chunks of obstruction.
There is certainly some irony to the fact that Israel was the only place in
the Middle East at that time where artistic work raising questions about government policy could be exhibited. There is also an obvious contentiousness
between what an artist like Dweik recalls as “innocent” and what Israelis of
the same generation or older, might recall of the 1949–1967 era, when Jewish
access to the Old City was all but forbidden to them—or that, regardless of its
negative aspects, the Wall quickly cut down suicide bombings by 90 percent.
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If democracy is about expressing different viewpoints, then the fact that these
two perspectives can and do coexist in Israel and can be expressed artistically
still speaks to an important aspect of its active democracy.
One can follow the issue of political commentary that may or may not be
taken as critical into the work of any number of Israeli and Palestinian artists
in the decades since 1987. The Palestinian Poster Project is a distinct example;
it offers specifically political—and usually critical of Israel—commentary in
leading up to the 1987 Bezalel exhibit and continuing to this day. Thus, along
conceptual lines paralleling those of Dweik, a 2008 installation by the film-
maker Sobhi al-Zobaldi (b. 1961), called Part-ition, offers seventy-two playing
cards laid out for a game on a table. The cards are made from a cut-up, large-
scale, pre-Israel map of Palestine—a map given to him as a young teenager,
which adorned the walls of his room as a youth in Ramallah as well as in his
home in New York in the 1980s.
He returned to Palestine in 1994 after the Oslo Accords, but felt that he
could not display it, for shame: “I felt embarrassed with the map, as though
I didn’t want it to see me anymore, or see what was going on”—expressing
shame and betrayal from the deals made by Arafat with Israel deemed “humiliating and doomed”: the map as a symbol of loss. Now cut up as cards on a
table with a chair on either side, the map signifies both a Palestinian perspective and a perspective that an Israeli might question—what could Arafat have
negotiated that would have been sufficient for Sobhi to feel good about it? It
also functions, however, as a symbol of the democratic reality that provided a
context for the installation. Can one imagine an analogous sort of installation
openly exhibited anywhere else in the Middle East?
So, too, in the case of Nisreen Najjar’s (b. 1985, Nazareth) Route 443
(2010), an installation at Al-Housh [The House of Arab Art and Design)],
Jerusalem. The mixed-media sculpture takes its name from the infamous
Israeli road that connects Jerusalem to a network of settlements by cutting
though Palestinian land. She has shaped it as a grotesquely enlarged toy racing
track stuffed into the gallery space, entering from a wall, somewhat randomly
rising and falling before exiting into a window grille. So the settlers’ roads can
go in whatever direction they choose, regardless of topography or the needs
of the indigenous population—but it also recalls, with tongue in cheek, the
phrase “roadmap to peace” and the “peace process” as understood by Israelis
and Americans—as opposed to Palestinians.7
In May 2016, an entire conference was devoted to this subject—which
took place in Bethlehem, that is, in a city on the West Bank governed by Israeli
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occupying forces. It was an international conference, in which the contributors came from Palestine and various other countries—but not Israel. So a
conference the substance of which was criticism of Israel took place, if not in
Israel, yet within the area that the Israelis have administered for half a century.
I am not commenting on that criticism as just or unjust—that is beside the
point for my present purposes—but rather that there was nobody to offer a
counterview to the repeated view of Israel itself as unjust—and of the irony
that such a conference could take place in an area occupied and administered
largely by Israel, This irony echoes that of the placement of Najjar’s installation
at an exhibition within Israel proper, in Jerusalem no less.
Questions and comments by Israeli artists have also expanded beyond
various overt criticism back in 1987. Particularly photographers, it would
seem, capture—or stage—moments that raise issues, whether these pertain to
Israeli society in the street and in the home or to the condition of the Palestinians under an Israeli domination that is approaching the end of its fifth decade
and of the Gazans in the grip of an isolation enforced by Israel but necessitated
by Gaza’s duly elected Hamas leaders.
Adi Nes’s 2006 chromogenic print Abraham and Isaac offers the reality
of homeless street people in the country created to provide any and every Jew
with a home. The elderly urban street person who pushes his sleeping son
in a shopping cart packed with flotsam and jetsam is more akin to Abraham
the wanderer than Abraham the founding father of a dramatic new faith, and
more akin to the prophet’s diasporic descendants than to the still largely rural
vision of a century ago in which all Jews coming to the Land would build it
and be rebuilt by it. This is a mythic ideal occasionally still trumpeted by the
politicians—including the current prime minister in, for instance, his declaration to French Jews that they should all emigrate to Eretz Yisrael, where they
will be well cared for and protected.
That same prime minister has presided over an intense response to attacks
on Israel from Gazan Hamas in a campaign, “Cast Lead,” that underscored,
among other things, the doubtfulness of his interest in helping to negotiate a
Palestinian homeland. Rita Castelnuovo’s photo Gaza Border (2009) depicts
an Orthodox Jewish Israeli soldier, at sunrise, wearing his tallit and t’fillin as
he recites his morning prayers atop a military tank parked in a grassy field.
A stream of black smoke rises from a building in the distance, the end of its
plume hovering just over the distant Gazan town illuminated by the newly
emerged sun. The issue of piety and religion as it pertains to the politics of
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defending Israel from Hamas and of devastating Gaza and its inhabitants in
the name of that defense would appear to be very much on the artist’s mind.
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOGOGUERY
IN THE “JEWISH STATE” TODAY
There are two sides to the coin of these forms of expression. One is that the
fact of such public critiques of the Israeli reality suggests a robust democracy
in action that permits internal commentary and criticism. The other is that, on
the one hand, art can be ignored sufficiently by politicians in the mainstream
that they can allow visual expressions of protest as not amounting to much or
undermining their authority; and on the other, that the expressions are emerging because Israeli society is wandering further and further from democratic
values and is in danger of wandering further, so that such artistic expression is
essential if the democracy is to survive as a democracy. Is Israel—the “Jewish
state”—then, still a vigorous democracy in which diverse expressions of agreement and disagreement with the government and its social and political policies flourish, or is it losing its democratic ethos, against which process of loss
artists are desperately trying to push back?
The matter of the ongoing Israeli administration of the West Bank and
Gaza raises an obvious practical question pointing toward the future with
regard to this issue. If, as it appears, given the ever-expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and thus of its Jewish population—together with
the extraordinary gerrymandering of the territories in order to accommodate
those settlements and with walls whose purpose is to prevent Palestinians with
nefarious intent from entering Israel proper—the current Israeli government
is apparently content to allow the occupational status quo to persist into the
uncharted future, then a simple statistical analysis of the evolving demographics of a “Greater Israel” that functionally and de facto if not de jure includes
the West Bank becomes obvious. In not all that many years, the Muslim (and
Christian) Palestinians both within and beyond the Green Line will outnumber the Jews. Either the Jewish state will continue to function as the sort of
democracy in which each citizen has a vote, or it won’t.
Either the non-Jewish West Bank inhabitants will continue not to have
a voice as citizens in an Israel that rules but does not legally govern them, in
which case a majority of those under Israeli rule will be voiceless, and/or the
Israeli Palestinian Christians and Muslim Arabs will in and of themselves begin
to vote in sufficient numbers to upset the delicate balance of the democratic
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multiparty coalition system that has been in place for seventy years. If, however, everyone has a vote, the so-called Jewish state may cease to be “Jewish” or,
if it is to remain dominated by Jews, it may cease to be a democracy.
There is a corollary to all of this, regarding potential power and pain: Plato
argued against democracy on the grounds that, in leveling the field of participation, it necessarily plays to the lowest common denominator: the polis could be
induced to turn away from the “good” by a sufficiently charismatic leader. At its
most extreme downside, democracy can become its cognate: “demagoguery”—
meaning “to lead the people [demos]”—but the term has come to imply a leadership that can and does sooner or later assume tyrannical and opposition-crushing
connotations. An astutely manipulative and crowd-pleasing leader can be elected
by the crowd. This happened in 1933 in Germany. Adolf Hitler feasted on fear
of the Jews and the German concern that their identity was being swallowed, so
that he might achieve power. It has evolved more recently in Russia and Turkey,
where Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have assumed increasingly
long-term roles through the crushing of their opposition by means of arrests
and assassinations—and in the latter case, a false coup attempt in July 2016 that
afforded Erdoğan the opportunity to quickly round up all those perceived to be
in opposition to him—nearly 190,000 people as of this counting.
In 2013, in Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu pulled out a last-minute political victory by a disturbing act of feasting on fear of Arabs and the Jewish Israeli
concern that Israel’s identity and security were in danger of being swallowed.
Admittedly the poster from the Palestinian Poster Project, by an American
(Paul Normandia), not an Israeli or Palestinian, offers a strong viewpoint from
a strongly nonobjective perspective even if it is that of an outsider. It shows
a photograph of Bibi, together with the words in quotes: “Beat them up, not
once but repeatedly. . .”—with further words reflecting or commenting on the
brutality of his regime. If the words are Netanyahu’s own and disturbing, let us
suppose that they are taken out of context, placed here in order to present him
in as cruel a light as possible. Nonetheless, in any context, they hardly suggest
the sentiment expressed in Leviticus 19:34, that “the stranger who resides with
you shall be to you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself,
for you were aliens in the land of Egypt; I am the Lord your God.”
Bibi’s call to arms at the polls in fear of an Arab takeover was in any case
not undemocratic, however ugly. Indeed, one can say that his victory at the
polls was a triumph, not only for Likud and for Bibi, but for democracy. That
is, the Jewish democracy triumphed in that he was fairly reelected, but, in
playing to the uglier side of the human inclination—in bringing to the polls
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Jewish Israelis who voted not for Netanyahu but against what he convinced
them would be an overly Arabized Israel if his more left-leaning opponents
were allowed to win—one might ask whether the price for victory was the
defeat of Judaism at its democratically-
operative-
inclusive-
embracing-
the-
stranger-tikkun-olam best and thus of the Jewishness of the “Jewish state.”
In the time since then, nothing that Netanyahu has said or done, vis-à-vis
Palestinian Arabs, Diaspora Jews, or the world at large, offers much hope that
in his heart or mind he can any longer distinguish between democracy and
demagoguery, Jewish or otherwise.
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Dignity and Democracy:
Defending the Principle of
the Sanctity of Human Life
Alan Mittleman
The idea of human dignity—of the incomparable worth or, in a religious key,
the sanctity of human life—seems fundamental to democracy.1 Major political and constitutional documents articulate a conception of human dignity
in their opening lines. Thus, the Declaration of Independence of the United
States of America, after affirming “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,”
famously asserts that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The
specific language of human dignity or sanctity is not used, but the belief is
nonetheless salient. The reference to the creation of human beings in equality
and to their creator limns its contours.
Similarly, and perhaps with greater historical pathos, the German
Basic Law [Grundgesetz] asserts in Article I: Section 1: “Human Dignity [die
Würde des Menschen] shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be
the duty of all state authority.” We see it as well in Israel’s 1992 Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty. “The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect
human dignity and liberty [kavod ha-adam v’h․aruto], in order to establish in
a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.”
The purpose of the law rests on the fundamental principle of recognition of
the worth of the human being [erekh ha-adam], on the sanctity of human
life [kedushat ․hayyav], and of the status of the human being as a free being
[hiyyuto ben-․horin].
In the United States, Jewish apologists have sometimes associated the
biblical idea of humanity created “in the image of God” with the fundamental
conceptual basis of democracy. Thus, Samuel Belkin, in his mid-twentieth
century study In His Image, writes that Judaism is best characterized as a
“democratic theocracy.” “It is a theocracy because the . . . entire system of Jewish morality derives from and is founded upon the concept of the sovereignty
of God. It is a democracy because, unlike any other legal system, the rabbinic
code places all emphasis upon the infinite worth and sacredness of the human
being.”2 What Jonathan Sarna calls “the cult of synthesis” is at work here—the
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effort to ground the noblest principles of American democracy in the most
sublime theological teachings of Judaism.3
In the case of the constitutional documents, as important as their strong,
clear statements of principle are, I say that they “seem” fundamental rather
than simply “are” fundamental. For there are questions about the role of principles in a legal system or in a constitutional order. What is the relationship
between high-level moral or political norms, such as the sanctity of human life,
and the day-to-day rules of law? To what extent can bodies of rules, inherited
from the past and embedded in their own institutional practices of interpretation and application, continue to operate without reference to the high-level
principles that presumably animate them? How important are such principles
to the life of a legal system? Legal systems or constitutional orders are not
deductive arguments. Conclusions do not flow rigorously from premises. We
need not think of principles as major premises in a logical sense from which
particular rules are ultimately derived. Although there is a logical difference
between principles and rules, modeling that difference upon a deductive argument is too linear.4 The interplay between principles and rules is more reciprocal, fluid, layered, and heterogeneous than that.
Principles, in Joseph Raz’s view, serve as grounds, that is, as metalevel
justifications in such matters as interpreting law, changing laws, making
exceptions to laws, making new rules, and occasionally as the sole ground
for action in particular cases.5 They are logically distinguished from rules by
their generality, that is, they are more comprehensive. They can be used to
justify rules, but rules cannot be used to justify them. Principles themselves
can sometimes be legislated, but most often they arise out of a public form of
life, a culture of political, moral, and religious values to which the principles
give selective expression. When embedded in a constitution, the constitution
allows the citizens of its life-world to objectify their own principled truths.
Once objectified in semantic and pragmatic form, the constitution speaks
with authority. It doesn’t just describe the ambient norms of a culture; it
authorizes them. It acquires authority per se and shapes the normative contours of its world. It guides and constrains the institutions and practices of
the actors within its normative order. Principles function within this order
as claims indicative of core constitutive values. They are employed as compact arguments on behalf of the integrity and moral soundness of a public
form of life.
Thus, it is not clear that principles in isolation mean much. They are
semantic and pragmatic moves within an extended, coherent, normative form
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of life. To take a relevant Jewish example, if the principle of b’tzelem Elohim [in
God’s image]were not instantiated in bodies of halachah, such as those dealing
with capital punishment, it would not amount to more than a metaphysical
claim. As it is, however, if Yair Lorberbaum’s analysis is correct, the theological,
philosophical, and legal implications of the concept come together in a dense,
mutually supporting web.6 A principle comes to mean something by the role it
plays in a legally articulated public form of life.
We appeal to principles from inside of a form of life. We employ them
to adjudicate conflicts among legal rules, among moral obligations or values,
to distinguish between ethical considerations and matters of lesser weight, to
rank matters that we care about, or to remind ourselves and one another of our
axiological orientations and commitments. But we do not build our moralities
or laws upon them brick by brick. As Aristotle, glossing Plato, points out in
the Nicomachean Ethics, if we had not already been raised with moral habits,
we could not even begin to reason about moral first principles (Ethics I:4): “We
must already be within and, I would say, committed to a moral point of view
for principles to play a role in our thought.”
This suggests that principles such as human dignity may not play the
critical foundational role that we believe, pretheoretically at least, they do.7
Imagine someone who does not believe that all human beings have worth and
are, given that worth, equal in the relevant respects. What could one say in
defense or explanation of the principle of human dignity that could convince
such a person? If such a person, say a convinced racist or white supremacist
or Nazi, truly believed that some classes of human beings lacked worth and
hence need not be treated with respect (equality, fairness, and so on), is there
a philosophical argument that could change his mind? Would we believe that
such a person could even be a discussion partner? Rather than argue with him,
wouldn’t we want simply to contain or constrain him, making sure that he
remained politically marginal?
A counterexample to this is Socrates’ treatment of Thrasymachus. Here
is a case of fundamental disagreement about first principles, whether injustice
is superior to justice. Socrates confidently believes that dialectic might bring
mutual enlightenment. He doesn’t withdraw from or merely try to neutralize
Thrasymachus, but to persuade him through philosophical argument. Socrates
takes the only course open to him: to show Thrasymachus that his views are
incoherent. Thrasymachus’s belief in the superiority of injustice is parasitic
upon a suppressed premise in favor of justice. The unjust city, army, bandits
and thieves whose exploitation of the just Thrasymachus is wont to praise
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must themselves behave with some equity and equanimity toward one another
in order to accomplish their nefarious common purpose (Republic 351c).
Once Thrasymachus sees the incoherence at the heart of his own claim,
he abandons the field. But this shows that Thrasymachus was antecedently
open, his vehemence and bluster notwithstanding, to rational argument.
To participate in a rational philosophical argument, in good faith at least, is
already to eschew violence and to affirm a norm of respect. It is implicitly to
concede the premise of human dignity. Dignity here entails respect for the
rationality of the other, attention to the other’s view as that of a rational being,
openness to being persuaded by the rationality of the other, and so forth. The
principle of dignity, or something very much like it, is presupposed by a discursive encounter. In this sense, an encounter with someone who denies the
principle of human dignity must eo ipso fail as a rational conversation.
This suggests that the principle of human dignity has the status of an
implicit norm for conversation rather than a principle that can be discursively
justified by conversation, that is, by philosophical argument. Perhaps it is comparable to Aristotle’s construction of the principle of noncontradiction. It cannot be demonstrated because any argument on its behalf already presupposes
it (Metaphysics, Book Gamma, section 4). And, indeed, purely philosophical
attempts to warrant the principle of human dignity, most eminently Immanuel
Kant’s, have a circular quality to them. For Kant, a rational being must necessarily find worth in itself and respect its own dignity [Würde]. One must already
be committed to the concept of human dignity or, more precisely, the dignity
of a rational being, for a Kantian argument to acquire traction. If one could
coherently maintain the moral irrelevance of rationality and, derivatively for
Kant, of human personhood, one would not be persuaded by Kantian ethics.8
Dignity cannot be demonstrated; it can only be shown to be a transcendental condition for the moral life. But if one is a cynic or a skeptic about
the moral life as such, it is not clear what Kant could answer. If one refuses the
call to noumenal selfhood, autonomy, freedom, and respect for the moral law;
if one aspired to be a great irrationalist like Friedrich Nietzsche, the circularity
of Kant’s account of human dignity would prove vicious rather than virtuous.
Indeed, Nietzsche’s pessimistic precursor, Arthur Schopenhauer, claimed “that
the dignity of man . . . became the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-
headed moralists who concealed behind that imposing expression their lack of
any real basis of morals or, at any rate, of one that had any meaning.”9
I submit that this is becoming our situation today. As the cultural background of Jewish and Christian, ultimately biblical, convictions about the
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sanctity of human life recedes; as scientific images of man-in-the-world, to
use Wilfred Sellars’s phrase, replace Jewish (and Christian) ones, human dignity meets formidable conceptual challenges. The principle may be so deeply
implicated in our laws, institutions, and practices as to be assumed by our very
efforts to defend it. But if we had to defend it, as I think we now do, how shall
we do so? What resources do our religious and intellectual traditions offer us in
our quest to articulate and sustain the principle? Must we rest content with its
status as an ancient if beleaguered tacit norm, or can we give it a full-throated
rational justification? Can this be done in the way that Kant aspired to do,
namely, without reliance upon religious premises?10 The question is whether
a truly fundamental principle can be sustained only by religious faith—which
has an ambiguous status in the discourse of a modern, pluralistic democracy—
or whether parallel secular arguments are available. Unlike the apologetic “cult
of synthesis,” we need not claim that Judaism and democracy are isomorphic.
But does the latter need the former for its moral foundations?11
CHALLENGES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN DIGNITY
The principle of human dignity is challenged, among other reasons, as a consequence of the steady growth of two scientific paradigms: neo-Darwinian
evolutionary biology (and its outgrowth, evolutionary psychology) and neuroscience (and its allied philosophical interpretation, “neurophilosophy”).
On the one hand, scientific inquiry is premised on the intrinsic goodness of
knowledge and is typically conducted with the widening of that good as its
premise. The intrinsic good of knowledge attests to the better angels of our
nature: our dignity as rational beings. On the other hand, the content of scientific knowledge of the human in the mode of modern evolutionary biology
and neuroscience shakes the foundations of the principle of human dignity
and problematizes its conceptual coherence. Democratic societies, I would
argue, need both free scientific inquiry and the principle of human dignity.
The former is iconic of the intellectual and moral freedom that democratic
societies are constitutionally designed and bound to protect. The latter underwrites the norms of responsibility, agency, equality, and liberty, as well as the
laws that exemplify, objectify, and sustain those values. Let us consider some
tensions among these at the point of human dignity.
Challenges to the principle of human dignity arise in at least four ways.
The first is perhaps the least worrisome. Human dignity is thought to be
a preeminently religious notion and as such its status in a secular society is
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questionable. It seems to violate the Rawlsian norm of public reason. That
might not amount to much except that human dignity, in the eyes of its critics, seems to work against other moral and legal principles, which seem more
transparent and urgent from a contemporary secular point of view. Thus,
human dignity is at odds with autonomy (a prospect utterly alien to Kant!).
The principle of human dignity is often employed by moral and cultural conservatives to exclude the right to die or the right to choose an abortion or the
permissibility of stem cell research requiring the discarding of embryos. I will
briefly consider a provocative essay by the Harvard psychologist and public
intellectual Steven Pinker, “The Stupidity of Dignity,” which makes precisely
these sorts of claims.
A second, I think more serious, challenge comes from people like the
Princeton ethicist Peter Singer. For Singer, the restriction of personhood to
human beings—crystallized by the principle of human dignity—excludes
consideration of animals as persons. It entails that a distinctively human characteristic, rationality, is allowed to crowd out other characteristics of sentient
life, such as suffering, as the only characteristic meriting worth-according
treatment. When rationality is not yet gained (as with a fetus or newborn)
or when it is lost (as with a patient in a permanent vegetative state), human
dignity is generously extended in the absence of rationality. For Singer, there is
hypocrisy here. A more valid criterion of worth is the capacity to suffer. Taking that seriously would decouple dignity and humanity. Taking that seriously
would allow for the mercy killing of the irreversibly comatose, for example,
and prevent the slaughter of chickens and cattle for food. I will consider
Singer’s view in more detail below.
Third, there is a complex of views arising from evolutionary biology that,
like Singer, erases any significant line between human beings and animals. We
are confronted with a scientific image of man-in-the-world that accounts for
human features, such as sociality, rationality, and ethics, as emergent properties
of evolutionary adaptation. Once ethics, for example, is traced to the reciprocal altruism of higher primates and, presumably, of our hominid ancestors, a
distinctive and valuable feature of the human is fully naturalized. Chimps are
also moral beings. Nothing is particularly special about us in this respect. So
too for rationality. If rationality is an adaptive mechanism for enhancing the
effectiveness of the fight or flight response, the development of tool usage, and
so on, then human rationality becomes a matter of degree not kind vis-à-vis
that of other primates. The ascription of a peculiar dignity to the human seems
arbitrary, a form of “speciesism,” in Peter Singer’s phrase.
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Neuroscience and neurophilosophy provide an additional challenge to
human dignity. To sustain the latter, one needs more than something emphatically valuable about human beings; one needs human selves. These selves have
to be capable of moral agency, of responsibility, of freedom. But some strains of
neuroscience hold eliminative views of the self. All conscious activity, “mind,”
reduces to brain activity and brain activity—the electrochemical pulses of a
hundred billion neurons linked in a trillion synaptic networks—reveals no single executive center. There is no self in any reified sense. Rather along the lines
of David Hume’s view, there are just different functions, executed by different “software,” realized in different pieces of organic “hardware,” constructed
according to a genetic blueprint. The self is a kind of narrative, organized by
the left hemisphere, ultimately generated because of the survival advantages
that it bestowed on our early hominid ancestors.12 The related problem is the
elimination of free will. If all mental activity is brain activity and if the brain
is a physical object, as it surely is, and if physical objects behave according to
laws of physics, then free will turns out to be another kind of illusory narrative. Our belief in it, based on our first personal self-experience, must also have
been generated through evolutionary happenstance. Hominids who thought
that they had choices and behaved accordingly spread their genes more effectively than their more zombie-like competitors. The neuroscience story may
yet have the greatest impact on moral and legal institutions. Let us consider
each one of these in a little more detail and offer, as well, the beginnings of a
critical response.
In “The Stupidity of Dignity,” Pinker follows an earlier, seminal assault
on the concept by the bioethicist Ruth Macklin.13 Macklin argued that “dignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any
loss of content.” The content that would be preserved when the allegedly
vague, religion-laden notion of dignity is jettisoned is “respect for persons: the
need to obtain voluntary, informed consent; the requirement to protect confidentiality; and the need to avoid discrimination and abusive practices.” Macklin believes that “dignity” adds nothing—but detracts something—from these
core principles of medical ethics. Its use is semantically otiose. It is a “vague”
usage that cashes out at “nothing other than respect for autonomy.” She does
not see it as indicating a deeper justificatory ground for autonomy. Pinker
builds on this view. The occasion for his essay was the publication of a long
report by President Bush’s Council on Bioethics titled Human Dignity and
Bioethics. After a remarkably ad hominem attack on the Council’s chairman,
Leon Kass, and a condemnation of what Pinker takes to be its conservative
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Catholic-dominated political bias, he offers a more substantive argument
against dignity.
The argument is, pace Macklin, that dignity is inherently vague and adds
nothing. It does, however, detract and distract from democratically appropriate moral argument. First, “dignity is relative” to cultural prejudice. What
Victorians found undignified, we find entirely acceptable.
Thus, dignity does not get at anything deep. But wait, one might object:
these surface signs of dignity are culture-relative, but that is not what a proponent of dignity truly means by it. Pinker acknowledges that for some, like
the Vatican, dignity is a “sacred value,” never to be compromised. But he
thinks that this is cant. “Dignity is fungible,” that is, we routinely trade off our
dignity by submitting to things like prostate exams or airport body searches.
Thus, “dignity is a trivial value, well worth trading off for life, health, and
safety.” Finally, “dignity can be harmful.” Pinker sets out a parade of horribles,
instances of dictators cowing their populations with ostentatious displays
of their grandeur to enforce their dignity; fatwas condemning those such as
Salman Rushdie to safeguard the dignity of Islam and so on.14
Pinker concedes that dignity has a role. Donning his official psychologist’s cap, he explains how certain sensory signals convey dignity and dispose
us to treat the dignified generator of those signals with respect. Thus, just as a
baby’s face moves us to protect it, features that convey “composure, cleanliness,
maturity, attractiveness, and control of the body” elicit “a desire to esteem and
respect the dignified person.” But this is a very limited ethical epiphenomenon
hardly able to bear the weight the proponents of human dignity ascribe to it.
Indeed, dignity may become pernicious. The “gap between perception
and reality makes us vulnerable to dignity illusions.” We are back to tin pot
dictators flaunting their dignity in pompous public displays.
What Pinker has done here is conflate different senses of dignity. By reducing the concept of dignity to typical instances of proper deportment in some
given society or to displays of self-importance or public role play, he has slighted
the deeper significance of the concept. For both Macklin and Pinker, dignity
remains superficial; what is deep and important are values such as autonomy,
which are strangely unconnected to dignity on these principled postreligious
accounts. If one were to put this to Pinker, he would not be persuaded. He
would argue that dignity does not stand for something deeper; it remains vague
and therefore useless as a precise concept. The worth of human beings, which we
want to preserve, is amply protected by more precise concepts such as autonomy,
which play out in the relevant bioethics context as informed consent.
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There is more than a semantic wrangle going on here. In cashiering
dignity, these views seek to cut the cord with the history of Jewish and Christian normative theological anthropology and fully empower a secular image
of the autonomous human being as a creature of self-evident worth. This
is the Kantian project, taken several steps beyond Kant. I don’t see this as a
profound challenge to human dignity because it seeks to preserve those values
that religious persons affirm with reference to dignity. It remains parasitic on
them, unable to generate an argument of its own, taking the self-evidence of
human worth as a given. It is more a sign of cultural drift and secularization,
one might say, than of “depravity.” But if depravity in these matters is real,
then views such as Pinker’s and Macklin’s, which rhetorically disparage dignity,
arguably weaken its content and its cause in the long run.
Singer presents a graver challenge. His aim is to efface the distinction
between human life and other forms of (at least higher) sentient life such that
prohibitions on killing biologically defective humans are lifted and allowances
for killing animals are eliminated. Singer’s approach rests on the argument that
any relevant distinction between humans and at least some animals is mere
prejudice and is fundamentally akin to racism. “The doctrine of the sanctity of
human life,” he writes “. . . has at its core a discrimination on the basis of species and nothing else.”15 Sometimes discrimination is appropriate, as when one
teaches a human child to read but not a dog (his example). But if one were to
say, I will teach only white children to read but not black children, one would
be invidiously discriminating because race has nothing to do with the ability
to read. Similarly, species membership in Singer’s view has nothing to do with
claims to special treatment, that is, claims to solicitude, respect, protection, or
deference. Any such claims must be made on the basis of some characteristics
other than sheer belonging to the species Homo sapiens as such. What are those
characteristics? Let me quote Singer at length:
Now what is the position when we compare severely and irreparably
retarded human infants with nonhuman animals like pigs and dogs,
monkeys and apes? I think we are forced to conclude that in at least
some cases the human infant does not possess any characteristics or
capacities that are not also possessed to an equal or higher degree,
by many nonhuman animals. This is true of such capacities as the
capacity to feel pain, to act intentionally, to solve problems, and to
communicate with and relate to other beings; and it is also true of
such characteristics as self-awareness, a sense of one’s own existence
over time, a concern for other beings, and curiosity. In all these

206

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

respects adult members of the species I have mentioned equal or
surpass many retarded infant members of our own species; moreover
some of these nonhumans surpass anything that some human infants
might eventually achieve even with intensive care and assistance.16

Singer takes these enumerated features to be the main indicators of
“personhood” or “humanhood.” If one grants that they are shared by other
species, then the umbrella of personhood ought to extend to those species.
Similarly, “humanity” ought to be understood, as we sometimes do, as an
evaluative term, not solely as a biological classification. We might therefore
understand mature dogs and pigs, monkeys and apes as “human” in an
extended sense, certainly as persons. The burden is on proponents of the
sanctity of human life, in a biological, species-bound sense to show why only
human beings are deserving of protection. Singer believes that burden cannot
be met. We have “huge prejudice in favor of the interests of our own species
and a corresponding tendency to neglect the interests of other species.”17 But
that is all that it is—a huge prejudice.
This was not always the case. Back in the era when Christianity dominated Western intellectual life, people thought that they had sound reasons
for their “prejudice” in favor of human over animal interests. But Singer is
convinced that this is a bit of pre-Enlightenment, pernicious, intellectual
immaturity. He approves, for example, of the near universal ancient practice,
endorsed by no less than Plato, Aristotle, and Seneca, of killing deformed or
defective infants. This was banned under Christendom in the name of the
supposed sanctity of human life. Theological ideas, which today are patently
ridiculous (in Singer’s view), such as possessing an immortal soul or damnation
to hell fire, swayed men’s minds. Abortion and infanticide were condemned
because of their consequences for immortal souls. If a fetus, for example, were
aborted, its soul would go to hell eternally because it had not been baptized.
As a carrier of original sin, through no fault of its own but simply through the
sheer fact of its human status, it was damned, unless it was saved through
the sacrament of baptism. The agent of the abortion would have committed
an unimaginably great sin in damning its soul to eternal torment. Singer does
not trace the sanctity of human life back to the Hebrew Scriptures (e.g., Gen
9:26) but dwells on the medieval Christian appropriation so as rhetorically
to heighten the foreignness of the idea. He is unsparing: “My brief historical
survey suggests that the intuitions which lie behind these laws are not insights
of self-evident moral truths, but the historically conditioned product of doctrines about immortality, original sin, and damnation which hardly anyone now
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accepts; doctrines so obnoxious, in fact, that if anyone did accept them, we should
be inclined to discount any other moral views he held.”18
Singer’s argument rests on a set of claims about personhood. He wants
to free personhood and the moral implications it entrains from humanity in a
narrow sense. In order to do this, he has to decouple personhood from traditional criteria such as rationality and moral responsibility. For Singer, personhood, with apologies to John Locke, is not a forensic term. He accomplishes
this marginalizing of rationality and responsibility by focusing on human
infants, who do not yet possess these traits, as well as on severely deformed
infants who will never possess them. That we consider such infants—as well
as severely senescent adults—to be persons for him speaks to the secondary
or epiphenomenal nature of rationality and responsibility. We are willing to
suspend them, betting that infants count because they will grow into them
(except for severely retarded ones who won’t or terminally comatose or senile
adults who have lost the traits forever). But this only shows how shaky these
criteria for personhood are.
Other characteristics that are shared with nonhuman animals are stronger candidates for the criteria of personhood. Singer’s views might not be as
controversial as they are if he fought shy of rigorous consistency. That is, one
might agree that animal suffering should be minimized, that an ethic of care
toward animals be maximized, and so on. It is the principled elimination of
any line of normative differentiation between humans and animals that is provocative, as is his rigorist conclusion that human life has no claim to protection
if animal life has no claim to protection. He rejects the sanctity of human life
as a prejudiced, invidious claim to human specialness. If humans are special,
they are so in degree rather than kind. This removes an absolute barrier to
infanticide. If a human infant fails the test of personhood on the basis of the
new set of criteria, then its life should be ended as a preemptive act of mercy,
just as one might put a wounded animal down to spare it further suffering.
Singer dispels any prejudiced sentimentality about human life.
What is disquieting about Singer’s views, in addition to their substance,
is the dissonance at the core of his method. He sidelines rationality as a decisive
characteristic of humanity and therefore as a leading criterion of personhood
but pins his whole approach on rational argument, as a philosopher must. He
must persuade us rationally to overlook the centrality of our rationality and
liken ourselves to dogs and pigs. We are to reconstruct our personhood so as to
treat our canine and porcine brethren as persons. But we must do so, of course,
in a uniquely human conceptual way that is utterly alien to our friends Fido
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and Babe. And yet we are not supposed to be, in a relevant respect, radically
different from them.
Nor do we deserve treatment that is different in kind. Is this a coherent
view? Furthermore, he sidelines moral agency and responsibility—which dogs
and pigs do not possess—while calling us to exercise our moral agency with
respect to a concept of responsibility that assumes the personhood of nonhuman animals. I do not see how his expansive view of personhood can be coherently reintegrated with our ordinary experience of what it is to be persons and
consequently what personhood can credibly mean. There is certainly a case to
be made for minimizing the suffering of animals [tza’ar ba’alei ․hayyim] or for
vegetarianism, but doing so on the basis of a radical attack on human dignity
seems self-defeating to me.19
Singer is a moral philosopher and his project of “unsanctifying human
life” is located in the discourse of bioethics. Darwinian philosophers drive views
such as these into other domains. Darwinism can be, in Daniel Dennett’s phrase,
a “universal acid.” It dissolves our ingrained and cherished ideas of human difference. Darwinism’s global explanation for the diversity of organic life presses
down into the origins of life itself and then bridges the gap between the organic
and inorganic realms. Self-replicating carbon-based molecules straddle the line
between the living and the nonliving. No divine spirit breathed life into clay.
Darwinian philosophers see adaptation through natural selection as a universal
explanatory framework, relevant not only to the evolution of species but also to
the coevolution of culture. Under paradigms such as sociobiology, now called
evolutionary psychology, human sociology and psychology are fully analogized,
even reduced, to animal social organization and behavior. Primatology weakens
or erases the lines between humans and other primates. Human moral behavior roots back, in Frans de Waal’s view, to the empathy, altruism, fairness, and
consolation behavior of chimps.20 Of course, there are significant differences
between human moral action and pongid behavior, but, if one is convinced by
the evolutionary paradigm, these are differences of degree not kind. The same
emergent laws of evolutionary biology, genetics, and cognitive science account
for the basic features of human life no less than those of other animals.
Developments such as these have convinced some biologically minded
philosophers that human morality has to be put on a new basis.21 Human
dignity, which entails the view that humans are different in kind from other
animals and the rest of nature, has got to go. “Evolutionary theory does not
directly contradict the doctrine of human dignity,” philosopher Steve Stewart-
Williams writes, but “it undermines the foundations upon which it rests and
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the worldview within which it makes any sense.”22 Stewart-Williams argues
that radical human difference can only be the case if one or both of these
claims were true: (1) there is a God in whose image we were created, and
(2) we and we alone possess rationality. As to the former, many contemporary
philosophers in the analytic and scientific tradition seem incapable of construing the concept of God as anything other than a failed attempt to explain
natural processes. Now that we can better explain such processes through
sound science, the concept of God has no explanatory role and therefore no
cognitive status.
If one were to object that the religious person is doing something other
than attempting a causal explanation of how some feature of the world, like
human beings, came to be, the contemporary philosopher would find that
activity no less occult, wooly-
minded, and misconstrued. Thus, Stewart-
Williams parries a sophisticated theology like Paul Tillich’s: “And if God were
some weird abstract principle, we could not have been made in God’s image.
What could it mean, for example, to say that we were made in the image of
the Ground of All Being?”23 The appeal to God as the ground of values or the
model of moral perfection that humans ought to imitate would be dismissed
as suppositious and unnecessary, given likelier explanations for morality and
mundane reasons to practice it. God can never be, inferentially, the best explanation for anything.
As to rationality, Stewart-Williams and others view it as an adaptation
that conferred a survival advantage early in our evolutionary history. Other
animals, in particular higher primates, share rationality albeit to a lesser
degree. But why should the possession of rationality in any degree be dignity
conferring or confirming? Once you accept the “universal acid” of Darwinian
explanation, the elevation of this trait seems arbitrary. “We like to think that
reason is the supreme adaptation,” Stewart-Williams writes, “that rational animals deserve preferential treatment and that non-humans, because they don’t
have reason, have no intrinsic moral value.”
However, after Darwin, this is no different and no more convincing
than, say, an elephant thinking that trunks are the supreme adaptation; that
animals with trunks deserve preferential treatment and that nonelephants,
because they don’t have trunks, have no intrinsic moral value.”24 Just as we
would dismiss an “elephant-biased view of the world,” we ought also to dismiss
a “human-biased or anthropocentric” view.
Thus, Darwinism leaves human dignity without “intellectual foundations.” “With the corrective lens of evolutionary theory, the view that human life
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is infinitely valuable suddenly seems like a vast and unjustified over-valuation
of human life.”25 After lengthy reflection on the unnecessary suffering caused
to animals (which he likens to the Holocaust), as well as to suffering humans
whom our law deprives of the option of voluntary euthanasia, Stewart-Williams
concludes that “the effect of the doctrine of human dignity is to increase the
sum total of suffering in the world.”26
As in Singer, one must point to an odd, almost willful blindness in
Stewart-Williams’s argument. He suggests a lively thought experiment to get
us to consider the elephant’s point of view vis-à-vis its trunk. But elephants,
after all, don’t think about their trunks; they simply use them. They don’t
think, because they can’t think, of their trunks as adaptations, let alone
supreme adaptations. They don’t, properly speaking, have a point of view.
They have interests, which we should consider; but they don’t have perspectives. If they could be said to have an “elephant-biased view of the world,”
there is nothing that they could do about it. They couldn’t choose to suspend
it to take the interests or perspectives of other creatures into account. The very
fact that we can, in thought experiments and in moral practice, take on a point
of view that relativizes our own interests attests to our profound differences
from other creatures. Chimps may treat other chimps within their kinship
group fairly, but they can’t think about fairness, articulate it as a principle, or
apply it to beings outside of their kinship group. These are differences in kind
not degree. To shovel all of these differences into the bin of “adaptations” is to
obliterate them. It is to these differences, which Darwinian explanations must
elide, soften, or distort, that the principle of human dignity responds and fixes
as axiologically central.
A final challenge to human dignity is found in neuroscience. As mentioned, neuroscience discredits the concept of selfhood where self implies a
reified entity. The modern folk-psychological concept of a self descends from
an earlier conception of the soul. Self and soul were both held to be composed
of occult mental stuff, different in kind from the extended physical stuff that
made up the external world. This kind of thinking, famously propounded by
René Descartes, begins to unravel with Thomas Hobbes and later with David
Hume. Mental stuff, memorably derided by Gilbert Ryle as the ghost in the
machine, has no place in empiricism. Today, mental functions that cannot
be reduced to neuronal activity have no place in the physicalist universe of
brain science. The experience of self, self-consciousness, qualitative states,
and so on must be reduced from a first-person ontology to a third-person
object-language.
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To pass muster, any concept of selfhood must entail conscious awareness
of unity and persistence through time, phenomenological experience of agency
and of embodiment, and relatedness to the outside world.27 These characteristics naturally imply a single being, a subject in possession of these properties.
But there is reason to doubt the cogency of this intuition even pretheoretically.
We do speak in ordinary language of “not being myself ” if one is out of sorts,
or “I hurt myself ” when one means that one hurt one’s body, or “I talk to
myself ” when one carries on an interior dialogue. Thus, we often entertain a
nonunified, pluralistic, flexible concept of selfhood on a pretheoretical level.
Neuroscience theorizes that concept: “What the nonsystematic character of
[ordinary language] suggests is that the self is not a thoroughly coherent, unified representational scheme about which we have thoroughly coherent u
 nified
beliefs.”28 The neuroscientific claim is that the self designates an ensemble of
representational capacities that are always in play.
The self amounts to such capacities of the brain as the ability to map the
internal homeostatic states of the body, the position of the body at rest and in
motion in space, its responses to internal and external stimuli; the ability to initiate muscular exertion, to notice feelings; to become self-aware on a meta-level
of neuronal activity at a more primary level, and so forth. The self captures a
vast plethora of brain activity occurring in parallel processed information states;
there is no unified, executive center, no internal “Cartesian theater,” as Daniel
Dennett calls it.29 Consciousness per se is not a unified process but a “multitude
of widely distributed specialized systems and disunited processes.”30
We feel that we have—that we are—a unified center of thought, decision,
memory, and executive function, however, because one of those specialized systems, the “left hemisphere interpreter” as Michael Gazzaniga calls it, has been
selected by evolution to produce such a representation. This interpreter infers
causal connections among events, thereby generating explanations. When we
perceive a fresh scar on someone’s face, for example, we immediately jump to
speculate about how it got there. Or at least our left hemisphere interpreter
does. We can’t leave striking facts isolated from a potential causal-explanatory
narrative. Selfhood is a kind of narrative explanation arising from the information shaping activity of the left hemispheric interpreter. It brings coherence to
the parallel, diverse, ramified activities of the brain. Without its coordinating,
simplifying activity, we might become overwhelmed by the chatter of a million modules running programs clambering to crack into consciousness. “Our
subjective awareness,” Gazzaniga writes, “arises out of our dominant left hemisphere’s unrelenting quest to explain these bits and pieces that have popped
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into consciousness.”31 Presumably, those prehistoric hominids who, as a result
of random genetic mutations, acquired the illusion of having an executive control center in their heads fared better than their competitors and reproduced
more effectively. The genes that coded for the neural architecture that supported the left hemisphere interpreter function were passed on. Every human
being who thinks she has a self is the descendent of those lucky hominids.
Is selfhood then like Otto von Bismarck’s quip about politics and Wurst,
that is, one shouldn’t look too closely at how they are made? I don’t think that
a neurological account of the constructed, neural nature of selfhood necessarily undermines our phenomenological experience of selfhood. Analogously, a
neurobiological account of vision doesn’t alter how we see things. But there is
a level at which it is problematic, namely, the dismissal of phenomenological
experience per se. This occurs through the global equation of mind with brain,
the reduction of mental states to neuronal synaptic activity, the elimination of
the bedrock ontology of thoughts, beliefs, desires, and intentions in favor of
firings, processing, computation, and function.32 There is a relentless march
against the integrity of the first-person point of view. This was not begun by
neuroscience. We find it in very different ways in Marx (false consciousness)
or in Freud (the Unconscious)—any view that tries to be scientifically credible tends to be reductionist. All the arrows of causality, the physicist Steven
Weinberg says, point downward to physics. It is unclear how the integrity of
the first-person point of view, with which human dignity is intertwined, can
be conceptually maintained.
A special and critical instance of this is found in the renewed debate
over free will. This hardy perennial of philosophical and theological argument
flourishes anew in the age of neuroscience. Hume paved the way with his
compatibilist analysis of free will. No choice is uncaused, on Hume’s account.
Desires, beliefs, and other motivations play a causal role; they determine
choices. Any claim that we make that our choices are free must be compatible
with the claim that they are caused by such things as desires and beliefs. What
we really mean when we say we have free choice is that we acted deliberately,
not by accident—we broke the vase because we threw it down on purpose, not
because we slipped and dropped it. Free-willed decisions are decisions made
within a subtler network of causes, not within a cause-free universe.
Neuroscience pushes the causal network, in which “free” choices are
made, down to a neurobiological level. Thus, we may feel—in the largely
illusory world of first-person phenomenological experience—that we made
our choices in a cause-independent, libertarian way, but that is never actually
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the case. Our decisions are the product of long chains of causation, but not all
causes are created equal. The decision to raise my arm has a different causal
history than someone’s taking my arm and lifting it for me or putting an
electrode on my arm and zapping it, and so forth A relevant piece of support
for this view is the famous experiments of Benjamin Libet. Using fMRI scans,
Libet showed, arguably, that “decisions” are made at a neuronal level before the
conscious mind becomes aware of them. We do not formulate desires and then
enact them; we become conscious of incipient action up to five seconds after it
has been initiated preconsciously. We do not have freedom of will but we do
have “freedom of won’t.” That is, “We don’t quite initiate voluntary processes;
rather, we ‘select and control them,’ either by permitting the movement that
arises out of an unconsciously initiated process or ‘by vetoing the progression
to actual motor activation.’”33 Just as the self has been diffused into an at best
contingently coherent collection of capacities, free will has been translated into
a filtering mechanism that functions ex post facto to modulate preconscious
brain activity.
Neuroscientists and philosophers who theorize along these lines want to
preserve responsibility even if they have weakened or eliminated free will as
the conceptual backdrop to agency. One way to do this is through an evolutionary biological strategy. Just as other social animals, such as chimps, rely
on punishment, exclusion, shunning behavior, and so on, to enforce social
norms—which contribute to and are necessary for group survival—so too
human beings are genetically programmed to maintain such practices. We are
not troubled by the metaphysics of free will with respect to other primates. We
accept that their policing practices, which register approval and disapproval of
one another’s behavior, are entirely natural and confer a survival advantage. We
should thus naturalize the social policing of human action, the ascription of
praise and blame, the fixing of responsibility, and so forth, as what our kind
of highly social, highly developed primate does. There is nothing metaphysically mysterious about this. Responsibility and determinism are compatible.34
Gazzaniga, Churchland and others, like David Hume before them, want
to maintain the salience of human responsibility in the absence of free will, at
least free will of a metaphysical, libertarian sort. Gazzaniga argues that agency
and responsibility are social categories. The level of the individual brain is
the wrong place to look for them. “Responsibility is not located in the brain.
The brain has no area or network for responsibility,” Gazzaniga writes. “The
way to think about responsibility is that it is an interaction between people,
a social contract.”35 There is good sense in this transposition. Holding agents
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responsible is necessarily a social practice, a public feature of a shared, normative form of life. And perhaps the practice is not weakened by a compatibilist
account of free will any more than our conviction of the solidity of tables is
weakened by an atomic account of matter (in terms of which tables are mostly
empty space). Perhaps it is a category mistake to class features of a shared
moral life under the rubric of individual subjectivity. If the story of subjectivity, of consciousness, of mind should turn out to be a physicalist, reductive
one, perhaps we could still maintain responsibility and agency at the emergent
level of sociality.
If we are able to sustain reductions of selfhood and free will to neural,
bioelectrical activity while continuing to take selfhood and free will seriously,
I suspect that we will do so not because we need to affirm the basicality of
social life but because we continue to believe in the reality, durability, and
dignity of human beings. How could society and the humane survival of the
species that it facilitates matter if human beings did not matter? How could
the commitment to human flourishing within society, of which the search for
scientific knowledge is a principal part, matter if human beings did not? If
we were really to bracket all of those profoundly axiological concomitants of
personhood out and reconstruct human beings along purely biological and
neurological lines, would we come up with a picture of persons as distinct
from highly complex things? Would we come up with beings that have worth?
Would we come up with creatures about which we should care on other than
brute conative grounds? I very much doubt it.
CONCLUSION
It is an empirical question, a question about an unknowable future, whether
emphasizing our animality, deemphasizing our capacity for rationality, eroding
the differences constituted by our humanity, and eliminating the foundations
of our experience of selfhood and free will threaten our moral principles and
practices, among those ordered by human dignity. I am inclined to believe
that this course, if followed, would have that effect, but this is only a worry,
an apprehension. Human dignity may prove so fundamental that it cannot be
dislodged or displaced. Or it may be that human dignity, as a robust moral
and legal principle, is so tied to Jewish and Christian religious traditions that
a fully secularized, amnesiac culture would become unmoored from it. I have
tried to argue for human dignity indirectly through probing the weaknesses of
counterarguments and exposing, tu quoque, their covert assumption of what
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they overtly reject. As with a Socratic elenchus or Kantian argument, however,
one must already be committed to the claims of reason to care that one’s violation of them matters. Reason is already biased in favor of human dignity.
This seems to me as robust a defense of dignity as robust secularism can
offer. If dignity is fundamental to a decent democracy, biblical conviction
about indefeasible human value may well be necessary. Absent the continuing
cultural power of “Jerusalem,” the claims of reason might ring hollow.
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“The Will of the People” or
“The Will of the Rabbis”:
Democracy and the Rabbis’ Authority
Shlomo Abramovich

PREFACE
A well-known secret is that if any candidate wants to earn the votes of several
Jewish communities in Brooklyn, he does not need to go visit any bar mitzvah
parties or take pictures with Jewish children. All he needs is to meet with their
rabbi and convince him to order his followers to vote for him, and what the
rabbi decides, they will do without any doubt.
This description might be a simple answer to the common question “Is
Judaism democratic?”1 In these kinds of communities, the answer is a definite
“no.” Without getting into the different ways to define democracy, the free will
of the individual in the society is an essential part of it. Therefore, the Jewish
ultra-Orthodox communities, which emphasize the value of obedience to the
rabbis, cannot be considered democratic communities.
However, as we see in this essay, the truth, as always, is much more complicated. We will examine various sources as well as some research that was
done on Jewish ultra-Orthodox communities, in order to present the different
motives for obedience to the rabbis. We will create a scale of democracy and
see the differences between the approaches in terms of closeness to democratic
values.
We will focus on Jewish ultra-Orthodox communities from the end of
the nineteenth century to the present. Of course, there are big differences
between the communities in this spectrum—a Chasidic community in Brooklyn is not the same as a Sephardic community in Jerusalem. Yet, the differences
are going to be presented in the different ways to explain the obedience to the
rabbis, as we will see.
The decision to focus on this period was made because during this time
there was a huge growth in the importance of this value: obedience to the rabbis. The rabbis had an important role in the Jewish communities for ages, and
they were involved in their followers’ lives in many ways, but in this period
something had changed.
219
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Described in the short and exact words by Haym Soloveitchik: “What
is new in the contemporary scene is the unprecedented frequency, scope and
authority currently ceded to them [the rabbis].”2
The role of the rabbi was no longer limited to typical halachic topics.
Rabbis were asked questions about business and financial issues, as well as
marriages and divorces. In several communities, the members ask the rabbi
whom to marry, where to invest their money, and whether to renovate their
houses. Another important aspect of the obedience to the rabbis is politics.3
Rabbis are involved in each decision of the political representatives of their
communities, and they are the real leaders of ultra-Orthodox political parties.
The political aspect of obedience to rabbis is another aspect of the
change in the role of the rabbis during the period with which we are dealing. The political institutions, with the authority of the rabbis, strengthened
their power and influence. The rabbis became much more famous as they got
exposure from the political party and thus gained many more followers who
looked for their advice and obeyed their decisions. Furthermore, they got the
opportunity to directly influence a wide variety of issues, with national and
even international significance.
This value became very important in ultra-Orthodox communities, and
in some ways, we can say that it defined and separated them from other Jewish religious communities. We can see how some groups in Religious Zionism
define themselves by resistance to the involvement of rabbis in wide aspects of
life, as happened in the ultra-Orthodox communities.4
Other developments in the obedience to the rabbis during this time are
the theoretical explanations for it that were discussed and written by the rabbis, who gave this value deeper and more diverse meanings. The theoretical
explanations for the meaning of obedience to the rabbis will be the basis for
our discussion in this article.
FOUR MOTIVATIONS FOR OBEDIENCE TO THE RABBIS
We can arrange and divide the explanations for obedience to the rabbis into
four different concepts: political-social, mystic, halachic, and rational.5
THE POLITICAL-SOCIAL CONCEPT

Usually, the political-social concept will not appear in internal Orthodox
sources—although we can find some expressions of it, as we will see. However,
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according to some research, this is the main cause for the growth of rabbinic
obedience in this period.
According to this concept, obedience to the rabbis is a way to deal with
the weakening of the traditional Jewish community. Modern influences led
some Jewish leaders to fight back by strengthening the borders of Jewish communities. This is the foundation of Jewish Orthodoxy, in which obedience to
the rabbis is considered one of the main characteristics of this process.6
This obedience to rabbis created a system that requires members of the
community to keep close relations with the rabbi and leaders of the community. If you are taught to ask the rabbi about every step in your life, you cannot leave the community. Strengthening this value became a way to prevent
abandonment of the Orthodox community.
In addition, the empowerment of the rabbis’ position reduces the independence of individuals, and it is therefore easier to keep them away from new
ideologies that may be opposed to Orthodox ideology.
Furthermore, as mentioned before, this value became a way to define and
separate Orthodox communities and Orthodox parties from other groups in
Jewish society. The difference between who accepts the authority of the rabbis and who does not emphasized the uniqueness of Orthodox identity and
helped to strengthen the borders of these communities.
In this concept, obedience to rabbis is not described as a Jewish value—
or as a value at all. It is a political and social tool that is used to promote
several concepts and targets. Therefore, we do not expect to find this concept
in any internal Orthodox sources. We can assume that it will be displayed and
explained in much more ideological ways.
However, we can find traces of it in some rabbis’ writings. For example, an
interesting explanation of the importance of total obedience to rabbis was given
by Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, known by the name of his book—Chazon Ish.7
In his book, he talks about people who do not trust the rabbis and think
that maybe they have private motives in their decisions—just like any other
people. In response, he does not talk about the greatness and holiness of the
rabbis, which makes them think and act differently from other people. Instead
he speaks about the danger of this thinking. He explains that if we do not trust
the rabbis, it will break the entire social and juridical system and will cause
anarchy. He claimed that without total obedience the generation will become
orphans, without any leadership.8 According to his explanation, obedience to
the rabbis, without any doubts in their motives, is a way to keep order in the
community and maintain social stability.
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An interesting comparison was made by Gershon Bacon between obedience to the rabbis in ultra-Orthodox communities and the decision regarding
papal infallibility made by the Vatican Council at the end of the nineteenth
century.9 According to some research, the motive for this decision was to
“enhance his sovereign power as the head of the church,” as Brian Tierney
termed it.10 We can see in both cases how religious decisions and values can
be used for political and social needs.
THE MYSTIC CONCEPT

According to this concept, the rabbi is considered to be closer to God and to
have special spiritual powers. His decisions represent God’s will, and therefore
ordinary people must obey them.
By this concept, obedience to the rabbis has significant importance. It is
not only a matter of keeping community order or the regular halachic obligation. The rabbi’s decisions represent God’s will, and so disobeying is actually
resisting God. This concept gives unlimited power and authority to rabbis and
encourages followers to widen the involvement of rabbis in their lives—who
does not want to have direct guidance from God in every step of his life?
Researchers argue about when this concept started to be popular as an
explanation to rabbinic obedience—after the Holocaust or maybe after the
establishment of the State of Israel.11 However, many agree that its origin is
the Chasidic concept of the Tzadik—the spiritual religious leader—and the
expansion of this concept is an expression of the influence of the Chasidic
movement on the entirety of Jewish Orthodoxy.12
One way to identify the mystic concept of obedience to rabbis is when
the rabbis give their answers and orders without any explanations or sources.
In regular rabbinic writings, rabbis base their decisions on traditional
sources or previous cases. This sort of writing gives other rabbis and followers
the ability to discuss the conclusions and to argue about the way the rabbi
understood the sources. According to the mystic concept, the source for the
rabbis’ decisions is their closeness to God, and therefore there is no need to
bring in other sources or explanations, and it is also impossible to disagree
with their decisions.
There is a similarity between this concept and the Catholic dogma of
papal infallibility that we mentioned before. If the rabbi has close relations
with God and if his decisions represent God’s will, then it makes sense that
he cannot be wrong. Some researchers claim that we can find sources for this
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idea in Jewish ultra-Orthodoxy, in the argument about rabbis’ leadership during the Holocaust.13
However, most rabbis avoid using these kinds of terms and do not
describe rabbis as totally infallible. Followers should obey rabbis without any
doubts, and their decisions have a highly spiritual significance, but not in the
same way that happened within the Catholic Church. The common explanations talk about the huge distance between the rabbis and regular people.
Therefore what seemed to be the rabbi’s mistake is actually the follower’s
mistake—the assumption that the rabbi can never be wrong is usually not
stated.14 This can be explained by a reluctance to relate total divine abilities
to a human being in Orthodox Judaism—even when he considered to have
special spiritual abilities.
THE HALACHIC CONCEPT

This concept seems to be the most conservative concept because it bases obedience to rabbis on the traditional halachic obligation to the rabbis, which is
mentioned in the Torah and the Talmud. However, this concept is radical due
to the unlimited number of topics considered to be part of halacha, which
made every kind of question part of the rabbis’ responsibility—from political
decisions to personal finance questions. According to this concept, members
of the religious community should ask their rabbi who to marry or where to
build their home in the same way they should ask him how to make kosher
food and observe the rules of Shabbat.
This concept is based on the theological idea that everything can be
found in the Torah—every aspect of life, every question we have. Benjamin
Brown wrote a comprehensive study about the roots of this idea and showed
its various origins in Maimonides’ philosophy, as well as in Nachmanides’
kabbalah.15 According to this concept, rabbis should use traditional sources
as a base for explaining their decisions. It requires them to provide a creative
reading of the sources and to use varying sources to find answers to many different questions.
An example for this creativity can be found in an answer written by Rav
Moshe Sofer, known by the name of his book Chatam Sofer, considered to
be one of the founders of Jewish Orthodoxy. He was asked if it is allowed to
build the bimah, or stage, at the front of a synagogue. This question was an
argument between Orthodox rabbis and the new Reform movement, which
chose to place the stage at the front in their new temples. He answered that

224

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

it is forbidden to do it and used extremely unusual sources with remarkable
creativity to support his decision for this simple architectural question.16
Decisions made according to this concept result in open discussion—the
same way it happens in any other halachic decisions. Another interesting result
of this concept is the connection, or perhaps better to say disconnect, between
their decisions and reality.
We previously discussed the claim that rabbis cannot be wrong according to the mystic concept. In the halachic concept we can find similar claims,
that the rabbis’ decisions cannot be tested by their results in reality. The
Chazon Ish, who was mentioned before, was quoted saying that “success is
not Halacha.” This slogan means that the halachic goal is to figure out the
Jews’ duties, what God is expecting them to do in each situation. Therefore,
the practical result of what they do is irrelevant, as long as they believe it is
God’s will.
An example of this way of thinking can be found after the establishment
of the State of Israel, when the ultra-Orthodox rabbis were asked if the success
of the Zionists was God’s will, and if the rabbis who opposed Zionism were
wrong. The answer given by Rabbi Izhak Soloveichik, the Rabbi of Brisk—one
of the most important ultra-Orthodox rabbis in Jerusalem in the first years of
the State of Israel—was the same: that success means nothing if what they are
doing is against halachah, as he believed.17
This concept is a great example for Jewish Orthodoxy. The essence of
Orthodoxy is the claim that nothing has changed—they observe the traditional Jewish way of life, which always included obedience to rabbis.18 Indeed,
great changes had occurred when obedience to the rabbis began to cover all
aspects of life, and halachah itself grew new and wider meanings.
THE RATIONAL CONCEPT

Unlike the halachic concept, according to this concept there is a difference
between ordinary halachic questions and all other questions rabbis were asked,
which are not considered to be part of halachah. The main question is, why
should rabbis be involved in nonhalachic questions? If marriage, finance, and
politics are not considered part of halachah—why should people obey rabbis’
decisions in those areas?
The answer, according to the rational concept, is that the rabbis have
clearer thinking and better logic than the ordinary person has, and therefore
their decisions should be followed. The reason that the rabbis have these
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special abilities is the Torah they studied. Some sources talk about how studying the Torah helps to shape rational skills and logical thinking. Other sources
focus on the moral influence of the Torah, which purifies the minds of learners
and enables them to make decisions without external influences, from desires
to social concerns. This claim about the influence of Torah studying has roots
in the Talmud and even the Bible, but the implication of it in total obedience
to rabbis is a unique development.
We can understand that the commitment to the rabbis’ decisions here is
lower, according to this concept, in comparison to the others. The rabbis are
considered to be good advisors, and it can be useful to consult them in any
aspect of life, but their decisions in nonhalachic topics are only advice.
Therefore, rabbis and other writers were trying to encourage people
to obey rabbis, even in nonhalachic matters. Certain famous quotes sharply
describe the huge difference between the rabbis’ way of thinking and ordinary
people.19 We can see the difference between this concept and the others in the
way it was presented. In practice, the result may be the same—the rabbis lead
their communities with absolute control. This concept can give followers a sense
of willingness and understanding of their rabbis’ leadership in their society, but
does not necessarily mean that their obedience to the rabbis was different.
THE SCALE OF DEMOCRACY
After examining the four main concepts of obedience to the rabbis, we can
examine their level of democracy. As mentioned at the beginning, we are not
talking about full democracy in the way we usually understand this phrase. We
are still talking about ultra-Orthodox communities, where rabbis make most
important decisions for their followers.20 What we are trying to do is to build
a scale of democracy, and examine the differences between these concepts, to
examine their proximity to democracy—or maybe we should say to examine
their distance from democracy.
The main criterion in our scale of democracy will be the individual’s
status in society, relative to the position of the rabbis. The heart of democracy
and the basis for many democratic values is the importance of each member of
a society, which is expressed in his or her independence and freedom. Therefore, the more the individual is worthless and meaningless in society, the more
this concept will be considered as nondemocratic.
By this criterion, we can find a difference between the first two and last
two concepts described above. The basis of the political-social concept was the
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weakening of individuals in society. The strengthening of the rabbis’ position
was part of a process of fortifying the boundaries of the Jewish community,
in order to resist modern theories that were considered a threat to Jewish
tradition.
According to this concept, the less free will the individual has and the less
he or she makes decisions independently, the less ability an individual has to
make changes in his or her life. And the more social institutions, represented
mostly by the rabbis, have the power to control their members’ lives, the more
possible it is to keep them away from any external influence.
Therefore, this concept can be considered extremely nondemocratic.
As mentioned before, this political-social concept was mostly described by
researchers who examined ultra-Orthodox communities, and not by the rabbis
themselves. However, as we stated before, we can find examples of this concept
in their writings.
The second concept, the mystic concept, also presents a total weakening
of individuals, though from a different perspective. According to this concept,
the rabbis have special spiritual abilities, they are closer to God than anyone
else, and their decisions represent his will. Therefore, the individual has to
obey the rabbis and has no right to decide on his own or even to think independently—everything is cancelled in the presence of godliness. Unlike the
political-social concept, the purpose is not specifically to weaken individuals.
However, the emphasis on the rabbis’ greatness and uniqueness leads to the
insignificance of the regular members of society. Therefore, this concept can
also be considered as nondemocratic.
In the next two concepts, however, we find a different status of individuals in society, despite their total obedience to the rabbis. We can see it clearly in
the rational concept. As mentioned before, in the rational concept the rabbis
are considered expert advisors, with special rationality and clear minds, and
therefore their orders should be followed. The individuals in the society have
full freedom to choose their way—and they choose to obey the rabbis because
they appreciate their wisdom and their advice.
Of course, some might claim that it is a fake freedom, because the
encouragement to obey the rabbis is actually brainwashing, and the social
consequences for disobeying rabbis in these communities does not give a
chance for true free will. As mentioned before, we are not dealing with the
psychological aspects of obedience to the rabbis, and we are not examining
the practical motives, but rather the way it is explained in the sources. We can
assume, however, that in a society that educates its members according in this
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manner, it will be easier for an independent individual to choose differently
and to make his own decisions in life.
The halachic concept of obedience to rabbis is different in many ways,
but the position of the individual is similar. According to this approach, all
aspects of life are considered to be part of halachah, and therefore the rabbis,
who are the halachic authority, are in charge of every kind of decision in each
person’s life.
The individual, who chooses to be committed to halachah chooses to
obey the rabbis. We can consider the rabbis as experts in the field of halachah,
and the regular person, who is not qualified enough in this area, needs the
help of the rabbis’ expertise. We can compare it to other aspects in life, such as
medicine, finance, or technology, where most people defer to experts in these
areas—doctors, bankers, or engineers. Obedience to the rabbis is not because
they are greater than other people, but because it is their expertise.
We can see in both the halachic and rational concepts that the individual’s
status is different, in comparison to the mystic and political concepts. Their
obedience to the rabbis is made by their own decision to count on the rabbis’
expertise in halachah or on their wisdom. According to the democratic scale
we describe before, we claim that these concepts are more democratic than the
other two.
We can still claim that the decision to give up on your free will and let
other people make your decisions cannot be considered democratic in any way.
However, we all choose to give up our own free will in many aspects of our
life and live our lives according to the decisions of different experts. The fact
that this is our own choice to count on other people’s decisions is what makes
the difference.
Another way to describe the scale of democracy of these concepts is by
the distance between the rabbi and his followers. According to the political
concept, the purpose of obedience to rabbis is to create a distance between
leadership and individuals, to keep them away from any external influence,
and build boundaries for Jewish society.
In the mystic concept, there is also a huge distance between the rabbis
and their followers. The rabbis have a high level of spirituality, and regular
members of the community are way behind. Therefore, we can, again, describe
these concepts on the democratic scale as closer to dictatorship.
On the other two concepts, we can see that the distance between
the rabbis and their followers is much smaller. The rabbi is an expert in
his field—halachah or rational thinking—but he is not entirely different
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from his followers. Theoretically, anyone in the community can study Torah
and reach his level—the focus is not on the rabbis’ abilities or their social
position, but on the Torah they studied, which is open to everyone to study.
This social structure, where the distance between the leader and followers is
limited and open to change, creates a different society in comparison to the
other two approaches. This is a less hierarchical society, and therefore it can
be considered more democratic.
SUMMARY
In summary, we have seen four different ways to explain the total obedience to
rabbis in ultra-Orthodox communities in the last century. We divided the four
approaches into two main groups, according to their proximity to democratic
values. Our main argument was that the lower the status of the individual in
the society and the greater the distance between the individual and his rabbi,
the more we can consider the approach as nondemocratic.
Understanding the differences between these different motives for obedience to rabbis is extremely important for understanding ultra-Orthodox
communities and their way of life. In modern-day Israel, understanding these
communities is very important, especially because their population growth has
made them an important factor in Israeli politics and economy.
The Israel Democracy Institution has conducted interesting research
about obedience to rabbis in ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel in order to
understand processes happening in this field and to predict where it is going
to take these communities. Their title was a question: “Are we going towards
democracy in the ultra-Orthodox leadership?”21
From these sources, we can answer that if democracy means that the
ultra-Orthodox will no longer obey their rabbis, then the answer is probably
“no.” This value is part of these communities’ identity, part of their DNA.
But, even though obedience to the rabbis will remain, the motives for it can
be changed to more democratic motives, and that may impact Israeli society.
In the end, we can learn from this case about the importance of taking
a closer look, with an open mind, of any social phenomenon. If we just look
deep enough, we will find the differences and the complexities, and maybe
we will see that the reality is different than what we thought before. Even an
ultra-Orthodox community, with total obedience to the rabbis, should not
necessarily be considered as wholly nondemocratic.
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The Jewish State and the End
of Democratic Judaism
Meirav Jones
The question of this volume, “Is Judaism Democratic?” seems to be missing
a word, state.
Since before the formulation of Israel’s declaration of independence, and
increasingly in the last twenty-five years, the question of how to settle the
apparent tension between Jewish state and democratic state, or the demands
of Judaism with those of a democratic state, has been the subject of books,
articles, position papers, educational programs, rabbinic responsa, university
courses, yeshiva arguments, and more.1 It seems that with so much effort having been put into exploring Judaism’s approach to democratic governance—or
how Judaism might be compatible or incompatible with democratic governance—there would be little more to be said.
But the question “Is Judaism democratic?,” absent the term state, provides a new challenge. It asks of Judaism itself whether the highest authority
is in the people. And as we see in the array of essays in this volume, Judaism
itself is and has been many things.
In this essay, I will ask a political theorist’s question: what difference does
a state make to the locus of power in Judaism? If the case can be made—and
has often been made—that Judaism itself, as lived in many places and times
in the Diaspora, was in some sense democratic, with the ultimate authority
in the hands of the people who constitute their own community and leadership, how does the fact of a Jewish state change, preserve, or challenge this?
What does a state—particularly a modern state of the sort conceived in the
sixteenth and seventeenth century by Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, and their
contemporaries, a state constituted by the people for their protection—do to
the locus of power in Judaism?
The essay is in three parts. The first is a brief discussion of Judaism before
the state or without the state. As this is not my area of expertise and some of
the contributors to this volume have spent years studying Judaism throughout the ages, I will keep this section to a talmudic story that sets the terms
for thinking about Judaism as democratic, and I will focus on one particular
Jewish practice—ritual immersion in a mikveh—to explore how the highest
authority being “not in heaven,” translated to the people administering their
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own religious lives. In looking at the mikveh and other aspects of Jewish life,
I introduce a little-known text from around the time the modern state was
being consolidated, which confirms my understanding. I will offer a view
that Judaism before the state or without the state belonged to the people, as
a legacy they preserved, and this had an effect on the diversity that developed
within Judaism.
The second part of the essay is about the modern state: the Westphalian
state established at the heels of Christendom, formally in 1648, but consolidated in the centuries that followed, and still the key ordering principle
of world politics today. What I’m particularly interested in engaging here is
what the modern state does with religion and what it sought to change about
Europe and particularly European religious life when it came into being. My
choice to discuss the European state model founded in the seventeenth century is based on the fact that will be explored in the third part of the essay,
that this was largely the model adopted by Zionism and then by the founders
of the modern State of Israel.
The third part of the essay explores what modern statehood does to Judaism when a “Jewish state” is founded on the seventeenth century model. I claim
that at the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, Israel’s founders applied the
idea of the modern state to a Jewish state without addressing the need to theorize
Jewish statehood or consider how a Jewish state might differ from a “regular”
(or “Christian”) state. Of course, the case can be made that the modern (even
the modern Christian) state is built on Jewish models, and scholarship in the
field of political Hebraism has explored the extent to which this is the case.2 But
whatever Jewish models and ideas were employed by the founders of modern
sovereignty, the state was ultimately established to resolve a Christian problem,
and interpretations of Jewish sources and models were carried out by Christians
for Christians, often with little regard for Jewish exegetical traditions. When
the founders of Israel applied the modern state model to their state, without
conceiving a particular type of state suited to the needs of the Jews, this was set
to affect the locus of power in Judaism. I identify how the Jewish state on this
model undermines the democratic character of Judaism—its belonging to the
people—by offering itself as a higher authority, and then present some alternatives that were available to the founders of the Jewish state and may still be available today. I argue that Judaism is less democratic today than ever due to the role
played by the Jewish—even the Jewish and democratic—state.3
The question of whether democracy is an end worth preserving or
whether the democratic characteristics of Judaism are worth preserving
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remains a question. I end the essay with a reflection on teleology, messianic
times, and the state, refracted through John Milton’s understanding of what
Judaism had to contribute to the argument for free speech and multiplicity of
voices at the dawn of modern politics. My reflection on the telos of democratic
Judaism will be an addendum to my main argument which will run as follows:
(1) Diasporic Jewish life could be described as democratic in certain respects,
as an ideal and in practice, in the sense that practices and institutions belonged
to the people participating in them; (2) the nature of the modern state is such
that it purposely limits the role of the people in constituting religious life when
it sets a single sovereign over civil and religious matters; and (3) that if Israel
does not define its statehood otherwise, Judaism will cease—and in some areas
has already ceased—to be ultimately in the hands of its constituents.
JUDAISM BEFORE THE STATE
Any discussion of locus of authority in Judaism before the state has to contend
with the background story of the “oven of Achnai.” In this remarkable story
recounted in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metziah 59b, Rabbi Eliezer claims the
truth of his halachic position against the position of the sages on the question
of whether a particular sort of oven can be defiled. He calls upon the heavens
to support him when the other sages will not. He calls out: “If the halachah
[religious law] is in accordance with me, let this carob tree prove it!” The carob
tree moves, but the sages reply that nothing can be proven by a carob tree.
R. Eliezer then calls out on the channel of water to prove him correct, and
though the channel of water flowed backwards, the sages responded together,
“No proof can be brought from a channel of water.” He then calls on the
walls of the house to prove him correct, but when the walls tilted as if to fall,
R. Joshua rebuked the walls, saying, “When disciples of the wise are engaged
in a halachic dispute, what right have you to interfere?” According to the
story, the walls did not fall in deference to R. Joshua but they did not resume
their upright position in deference to R. Eliezer; they are still standing aslant.
Finally, R. Eliezer says to the sages, “If the halachah agrees with me, let it be
proved from heaven.” A divine voice is then heard crying out, “Why do you
dispute with R. Eliezer, with whom the halachah always agrees?” R. Joshua
stands up and protests: “‘The Torah is not in heaven!’ [Deut 30:12]. We pay
no attention to a divine voice because long ago at Mount Sinai You wrote in
your Torah, ‘After the majority must one incline’ [Exod 23:2].” God finally
rejoices in his sons defeating him. The Torah is not in heaven.
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What is remarkable about this story when it comes to democracy is
that “the majority” overrule God when it comes to religious law. What is less
remarkable, and what might be used against the argument that the story represents an inclination toward democracy, is that the majority that overruled
God was not a majority of men, but rabbis. Of course, this does not preclude
democracy: only a certain class of Greeks were included in Greek democracy,
and there were modern democracies before women had the right to vote. But
a situation in which the law is in the hands of the majority of rabbis is different from a situation in which the people—even some classes of men—is the
highest authority. The move away from divine authority to human authority,
even the authority of sages, is certainly a move toward democracy, but it is not
definitive. We would want to see that the rabbis are not understood as representing God, or as kings or prophets. We would want to know how rabbinic
authority is constituted. And we would want to know how texts such as this
were understood by Jews administering their public lives.
Many of the essays in this volume discuss Jewish political life in diaspora communities and accounts of such life found in rabbinic responsa that
support the understanding that ultimate authority was in the people or those
viewed as representing the people, rather than in God or in those viewed as
representing God. We find examples of how Jews in diaspora communities
built and maintained their communal institutions, how they represented
themselves to non-Jewish rulers of the states via elected officials, and how
they allowed for popular constituency with the prominence of the idea of covenant. The fact that there were occasionally “states of emergency” where such
protodemocratic practices were curtailed serves as an exception to the rule
that Judaism was generally run bottom-up rather than top-down, belonging
to the people. For present purposes I refer to the contributions of my colleagues and teachers.
But because I intend to explore the difference a state makes to the locus
of power in Judaism, I will look to a concrete Jewish practice that persists
today, which was part of Jewish life from ancient times and which I believe
exemplifies the extent to which Judaism belonged to the people—even radically so—before the state. The example is the mikveh, the Jewish ritual bath in
which women immerse monthly in observation of “the laws of family purity.”4
The mikveh, I suggest, properly belonged to the people, which meant that
the people were the highest authority and ultimately that the women of each
community were its custodians. The mikveh is thus brought to exemplify how
Jewish life was run democratically, as Judaism had the women owning this
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institution, bottom up, before women were granted the rights to be part of
democratic society, top-down. This will be shown to be in stark contrast to
how this institution is run in the Jewish state, to which I will return in the
third part of the essay.
In what sense did the mikveh belong to the people; to the women?
First, in terms of belonging to the people, the mikveh was built by
the community through the collection of taxes, so it was built bottom up,
by the people with their funds. While this has been likened to the way a state
collects taxes and then builds institutions for the people to use,5 there is a key
way in which the building of institutions outside the state differs, and this is
the fact that without a state presiding over religion, the mikveh in the diaspora
belongs to the diverse Jews, with their diverse practices, who contributed to
the building or to its fund. We see this clearly in a twentieth century ruling of
R. Moshe Feinstein, who was asked to rule about whether a mikveh that was
built by an Orthodox community with funds gathered both from within the
community and outside of it should be available for use by Reform and Conservative rabbis for conversion purposes. R. Feinstein ruled that the mikveh
properly belonged to all those who had participated in building it.6 This meant
that not only must non-Orthodox women be welcome to use the mikveh for
postmenstrual immersion, but also Reform and Conservative rabbis should be
able to use the mikveh for conversion purposes if they contributed funds for
the construction of the mikveh.
If we look now at the sense in which the mikveh belonged specifically
to women, we can observe that once built by the community, the structure
itself was handed over to the women of the community as custodians of the
postmenstrual immersion practice. The few artistic renditions we have of
the practice show bathhouses resembling women-only spas, with no men
in sight. As the artwork is not by women, this shows a male acceptance of
such a female realm. In searching for a female account, I found a wonderful
recent book in which a secular Israeli woman with a religious background
describes herself letting go of the preconceptions with which she entered
the mikveh to find herself enjoying a “supreme physical pleasure,” of being
pampered by other women who she likens to “bacchantes in a Dionysian
orgy.” It is described as an essentially feminine encounter, an ancient female
ritual, and in that vulnerable and spiritual time of nakedness, there is no
higher authority present, and no intermediary.7 The idea that Judaism allows
and encourages such a feminine encounter in which men have no part other
than to build the structure and enable women contributes something to our
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understanding of what exilic Judaism looked like—and in some places still
looks like—and how it was run.
Interestingly, rabbis have long related women’s administration of the
practice to the way the halachah on postmenstrual immersion was constituted. Most interpretations of Babylonian Talmud, Nidah 66b, where it says
“the daughters of Israel were stringent upon themselves,” find that the root of
the current-day practice is in the stringency women placed upon themselves,
which was later adopted approvingly by the rabbis. Both Maimonides and
Nahmanides find women to have constituted the mandated practice through
their custom, though some rabbis hold a different opinion and interpret the
halachah to have been brought about by rabbinic interpretation of the Torah.8
If indeed women constituted the halachah by their own stringency, then we see
the law itself being shaped by the people over whom it became law, even when
the people were women, marking a form of democratic legislation.
The administration of the practice by women, and their ruling of this
realm of their lives also comes out in accounts of the “mikveh rebellion” in
Egypt at the end of the twelfth century, in Maimonides’ time, and also in
a similar period in Byzantium. The rebellion was a well-coordinated refusal
of women to attend the mikveh and to rather turn to the Muslim bathhouses, the hammam, which were common in Egypt and which may have
been cleaner with better access to hot water than the mikveh. The influence
of Karaism was also likely a factor. The rabbinic response was extreme and
mostly ineffective and included threatening Ketubah [marriage contract]
money.9 The fact that men—even rabbis—could do little to enforce this
aspect of Jewish life attests to the extent to which it belonged to women.
One of the few questions rabbis discuss and disagree on regarding women’s
immersion is whether it is permissible to bathe after the mikveh. This discussion is said to have been rooted in the period of rebellion, as apparently a
common misunderstanding (or disagreement) developed, that what purified
women was not the water of the mikveh but the mere act of washing, such
that any baths were adequate.
Finally, we can find evidence of the extent to which the mikveh belonged
to women by the dearth of rabbinic discussion about it. While recently there
has been some excitement about the rise of mikveh scholarship among rabbis,10
perhaps there should be more positive reflection, in retrospect, at the halachic
void that left space for women to constitute their practice prior to the recent
surge in interest among men in this area, which curiously coincides with the
Jewish state’s rulings on religious matters, including on the mikveh.
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The result of women running the mikveh for themselves, according to a
legal regime they initiated and with little observation, enforcement, or rabbinic
discussion, was that the practice of ritual immersion was observed distinctively
in different communities and became reflective of the character of the women
in those communities. In a fascinating account of Jewish life in North Africa in
the early modern period, English Anglican author Lancelot Addison discussed
the mikveh as one of the aspects of Jewish life practiced differently in Barbary
and in Europe. While much of his work, titled On the Present State of the Jews
(More Particularly Relating to those in Barbary) and written following his travel
in that region,11 draws on accounts of Jewish life and laws that Addison read
in Hebraist works merged with his observations and accounts heard in North
Africa, in his account of the mikveh he drew a distinction between North African Jewish life and Jewish life as reported in Hebraist sources. Addison wrote of
the “discrete matrons” responsible for the “tabila” [tvilla, immersion] in Barbary
and described the practice they were in charge of carrying out, comparing the
women of Barbary to the women described by other Hebraist authors. He found
that the young Jewish women of Barbary were more modest than Jewish women
he had “heard of ” elsewhere (likely in Johannes Buxtorf ’s Synagoga Judaica) and
would not have paraded with the young bride on their way to and from the
“bath,” which would have been contrary to their modest ways.12 Here we have
testimony to a variety of ways in which mikveh was practiced by women, and
there is no mention of male involvement or mandate over the practice, even
when a male rabbi described the female practice in Barbary to the male author
(Addison) who recounted it and compared it to another male Hebraist’s account.
Addison’s work is more than an account of the practices of women in
Barbary. It is also an account of Jewish life there, and the account gives a strong
impression that despite the restrictions on the Jews that amounted to forced
separation from Muslims and separate living quarters, within their quarters
Jews lived as they always had, with their own legal codes and institutions. Their
separation by external symbols and walls was only a forced physical expression
of a separation Jews themselves would otherwise have maintained without
physical symbols. The book ends up being about Jewish life as governed by
custom and text. About the mikveh and the prayers, about the Sabbath and
about trade. The Judaism Addison describes was an inherited tradition—a
comprehensive way of life—that Jews in different places accommodated to
their time and place. This was in line with the seventeenth century perception
of the Jews in general, that would have the Jews as a people who observed and
preserved their own texts and traditions in distinct teachings and practices.
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This—Judaism belonging to the people wherever they lived—was an
aspect of Judaism that seventeenth century thinkers correctly understood.
James Harrington, an influential English republican thinker, proposed settling
the Jews in Ireland because “The Jews of all people never incorporate.”13 Even
if placed in the same space with non-Jews, Jews would choose to take part
in their own distinct form of life. But the modern state could not tolerate a
people that wouldn’t incorporate. The modern state didn’t section off land for
people to be different and to rule themselves, not in the seventeenth century
or in the French Revolution, or in the nineteenth century colonies or nation-
states. When we look at the meaning of the modern state, we understand the
necessity of incorporating—becoming one with the people and its religion—
in the eyes of the founders of modern sovereignty. The fact that the modern
state requires conformity becomes a primary justification for a Jewish state,
but it also means that a modern Jewish state, on what has become known as
the Westphalian model that will be explored in the next section, contains an
inbuilt threat to a Judaism in which the highest authority is the people.
THE NATURE OF THE MODERN STATE
In 1576, Jean Bodin first published his work Six Books of the Commonwealth,
which is well known for its founding the idea of modern sovereignty that has
become synonymous with the modern state. But what exactly was Bodin’s idea
of modern sovereignty, why was it needed, and what change did it propose
from what came before? Most students of the history of political thought
these days aren’t able to answer these questions well. The only full English
translation of Bodin’s Six Books was published in London in 1606. Since then,
Bodin’s theory of sovereignty has been promoted in an abridged translation
published in 1955, which can be found online, but most commonly in four
chapters in a very thin book titled On Sovereignty published by Cambridge
University Press.14
What is hard to tell from the abridged editions of Bodin’s Six Books
was the extent to which the modern state was initially conceived to resolve a
Christian problem that rose at the beginning of the Protestant era. The onset
of Protestant Christianity brought Europe sudden and quite intense religious
heterogeneity—or diversity—radically transforming a largely homogenous
Catholic world. Europe’s wars of religion followed, and Bodin was the first in
a series of authors, and political theorists in particular, who would consider
heterogeneity a cause of war and would offer a political resolution—a form of
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state—to end the conflict. This form of state, needless to say, was imagined as
largely homogenous, and the homogeneity was in the form of uniform public
religion.
And so, while the modern state, in line with Renaissance ideals that predated Bodin, sought to create lasting and peaceful political units that would
not be destroyed from within and that would protect those within them from
threats without, modern sovereignty sought to achieve this with a single sovereign who was to be the undisputed highest order of command, created by the
people themselves by covenant, who would rule over civil and religious matters.
That the sovereign was to preside over religion is generally underemphasized,
but the meaning of this is that Christian Europe, at its first moment of religious
diversity, sought to tame it. The sovereign would be the highest authority on
religion, state religion would support his authority in all areas, and Bodin cited
“all wise men and lawgivers” on the importance of religion serving the sovereign.15 The successful sovereign—even the sovereign who could best protect
his constituents’ lives—would be the sovereign who could preserve his own
sovereignty and thus demonstrate stability, and religion was a key ingredient
for preserving sovereignty. Whereas religious diversity was a cause of discord,
religious unity under a sovereign was a way of maintaining peace.
Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan follows from Bodin’s Six Books, developing
the idea of modern sovereignty while addressing specifically English problems.
“My highest priority was to absolve the divine laws,” wrote Hobbes in his
correspondence on the question of why he chose to write Leviathan—a work
about sovereignty—at the time he did, during England’s wars of religion.16
Hobbes was concerned about the divine laws being used to undermine sovereignty. English preachers, some even speaking from the pulpit in parliament,
promoted the idea of England as a new Israel, justifying using political means
to reach salvation or the kingdom of God. Hobbes found these preachers to
be the cause of England’s civil war, as they presented themselves representing
and promoting a spiritual kingdom that could be at odds with the ends of the
civil kingdom, which were for Hobbes first and foremost self-preservation.17
For Hobbes, unity between the spiritual and the civil under one sovereign was
imperative for the sake of peace. This unity would be achieved by the sovereign
determining the religious canon—namely, which books of the Bible were to be
considered God’s word—and there would be no higher appeal on matters of
religion or state.18 The sovereign would be, quite explicitly, like God over the
Israelites.19 For those who did not truly believe, Hobbes affirmed freedom of
conscience, meaning freedom to believe internally whatever one liked, but the
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sovereign could command any ritual or law with the highest authority. And
Hobbes was quite possibly not ignorant of what Judaism certainly knew, that
ritual had the power to create something that looked very much like conscientious belief.
While there were other ideas of politics floating around early modern
Europe and a very different idea of Church-State relations that developed in
America,20 Bodin’s idea of the state that Hobbes affirmed and enriched, with
religion serving the sovereign, reflected and guided the actual formation of
modern European confessional states. The modern state was characterized at
the peace of Westphalia in 1648 in the same terms as the peace of Augsburg in
1555, cuius regio eius religio [he who holds the region holds the religion]. The
Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, was defined as “a Christian and universal peace”
that sought to end “Christian wars” between “Christian king” and “Christian
majesty” mostly by setting a religion over each territory: Catholic, Lutheran,
or Calvinist.21
Interestingly, this idea—in fact the modern state itself—in Hobbes’s
Leviathan is portrayed as temporary. Temporary until the second coming of
Christ when the kingdom of God would be restored. Until that messianic
moment, Hobbes tells us, we need a Leviathan—an earthly sovereign. The
commonwealth is described as mortal; it will die when God comes to rule in
person. Until then, the sovereign rules over civil and religious matters, not in
order to bring about the messianic moment—which Hobbes found humans
could not know how to do—but in order to protect life and strengthen the
sovereign who protects life.
Thus far the modern state. A commonwealth constituted by covenant—
social contract—to protect the lives of its constituents partly by presiding over
religion and preventing religious warfare from within or without.
It may seem odd that I am about to end a description of the nature of the
modern state and its approach to religion in the middle of the seventeenth century, particularly as I am about to move to the implementation of the model
of the modern state in a Jewish state. Should we not move now to consider the
nation-state model of the nineteenth century? My position is that there was
no new state model proposed in the nineteenth century, but that the nation-
state was a direct development—in some respects a secularization—of the
Westphalian model. “Westphalian sovereignty” is still the form of sovereignty
honored by the United Nations, and when the idea of sovereignty is being
scrutinized today, it is the seventeenth century idea that is being scrutinized.22
If we are to consider the founding of the state of Israel, the seventeenth century
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provides as much background as the nineteenth. Not only was there was actually a proposal for a modern Jewish state framed in the seventeenth century
that is strikingly similar to nineteenth century proposals (I will discuss this in
the next section), but the justification early Zionists found for a Jewish state
in the nineteenth century was grounded in the justification for states in the
seventeenth: protection of life, religion, and liberty. Theodor Herzl famously
sought a state to protect the Jews, and his diplomatic interlocutors in the nineteenth century spoke in no novel terms about their desire for homogeneity.
A JEWISH STATE AND THE LOCUS
OF AUTHORITY IN JUDAISM
Just as I ended the discussion of the modern state in the seventeenth century,
I begin my discussion of the modern Jewish state in the that same period, two
centuries before the rise of modern Zionism. For contrary to common perception, the first proposal for modern Jewish sovereignty came not with the
Zionist movement in the nineteenth century, but with the sovereignty theory
of the seventeenth. When they conceived of the modern state partly to resolve
religious conflict, early modern political theorists considered the implications
of their approach for politically resolving the problem of Jewish diversity,
which was largely theoretical. Should Jews be tolerated or encouraged to coinhabit states with Christians, or should they live in separate political entities?
Jean Bodin, writing in France where Jews were prohibited from living
but where crypto Jews were victims of the violence of the wars of religion,
considered the implications of the statelessness of the Jews. He explained
that it was quite natural for men to be jealous of their religion, and that the
Jews’ insistence on preserving their “strange religion” would cause others “to
hate and condemn them.”23 Bodin speaks of the “great poverty of the Jews
themselves, who in no place of the world may possess any lands, means that
they need the less and are indeed the less able to fight for their religion and
liberty.”24 In the absence of land, according to Bodin, the Jews are unable to
protect themselves or their religion, as they cannot be included in the lands of
others. While Hugo Grotius, writing in a Dutch context, differed and found
Jewish difference not so essential as to mean the Jews’ exclusion from political society or even from a minimal civil creed,25 Thomas Hobbes agreed with
Bodin, referencing the fact that the Jews were the only religion not allowed in
the Roman republic.26 The Jews, as I quoted from Harrington above, didn’t
“incorporate.” It is worth considering that the Dutch context was one in
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which Jews lived, de facto, when Grotius wrote, whereas there were no open
Jews in England or France. This brings us back to Harrington who, in 1656
when Cromwell was consulting on the reintroduction of Jews to England,
first proposed giving the Jews land and arguably sovereignty or statehood.
His proposal, which he lamented hadn’t been “thought of in time,” was that
the Jews should be settled in Ireland, in perpetuity, under their own laws and
institutions.27 Harrington’s discussion of the Jews, and even his proposal for
Jewish sovereignty, was very much in line with the discussion and the terms
set by Bodin and Hobbes.28
Why this matters to the present discussion of the democratic nature of
Judaism and the question of what statehood does to the locus of authority
within Judaism is that it highlights the type of state the modern state on the
Westphalian model is. Even when discussing a Jewish state, non-Jewish sovereignty theorists at the onset of modernity conceived of a Jewish confessional
state. The model then was cuius regio eius religio—he who holds the region
holds the religion—only that the religion held in the lands imagined for Jews
would be Jewish. On this state model, diversity within Judaism would be no
more a virtue in the Jewish state, no more a contribution to stability, than
diversity within Christianity was to a Christian state. The same sovereign
constituted by the people who would decide on civil matters would decide on
Jewish religious matters, at least for the purposes of outward religion.
Two hundred years later, when Herzl sought a state for the Jews, his theoretical and utopian writings opened up various possibilities for encountering
difference other than the possibilities imagined by early modern sovereignty
theorists. Herzl imagined, for example, preserving the unique character of
diverse Jewish communities and a mutually enriching relationship between the
Jews and other inhabitants of the land.29 But still, Herzl considered religion an
important factor for maintaining social cohesion in the state, and he imagined
Jewish religion playing this role just as sovereignty theorists in the seventeenth
century had imagined the role of Christian religion within the states they
conceived.30 Herzl was also wary—as were the founders of modern sovereignty—of what religion interpreted in certain ways could do to society, only
that unlike the founders of modern sovereignty, Herzl’s approach was not to
suppress or exclude difference, but rather to meet it with radical toleration and
to recognize the dangers of doing otherwise.31
Whatever Herzl’s ideal and whatever its deviation from the early modern
encounter with religious difference was, his successful diplomacy appealed to
a European Christian—even a Westphalian—mindset. Herzl wrote in and for
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a world in which the Jews were unprotected in their absence of a land and for
a Europe that understood the state as sustained by a single public religion to
which the Jews were outsiders.32 It is interesting to note that Herzl’s appeal
to representatives of the Ottoman Empire was not successful, even when the
Ottoman model for encountering difference was treated with great respect
in Altneuland.33 Rather, Herzl was successful in appealing to Europeans—
markedly the English—and Russians interested in reducing heterogeneity in
their states by sending the Jews elsewhere.34
The partnering of Herzl with other organizations and individuals in the
Jewish world, the split between territorialism and Zionism, and the settling of
Palestine in the early twentieth century must largely be set beyond the limits of
this essay, so as to allow me to reengage the foundations of Jewish sovereignty
with how the state eventually defined—or in some cases did not define—its
relationship to lived Judaism in its founding years and again today. Yet it is
important to acknowledge the extent to which the partnering of Herzl with
his Westphalian mind frame, and religious Zionists who sought not only to
protect the Jews and facilitate their cultural flourishing but also to begin the
long-awaited redemption, was among the complex of positions that became
the Zionist movement constituting the State of Israel. The joining together of
post-Catholic European secular political ideals and messianic-religious ends
in the early years of the state meant that various arrangements were made by
the secular establishment to create common cause with religious Zionism. Set
beyond the pale were Jewish voices, religious and nonreligious, that warned of
the dangers of statehood for Judaism and who called for separation of religion
and state. If in Altneuland Herzl had considered the dangers messianic ends
could pose to political life and imagined a society in which the problems the
modern state had with religious difference would not apply, partly due to some
degree of separation between religion and politics, separation was out of place
in the Zionism that came to build the state. The British Mandate’s governing
of religion through status quo agreements, and not the nature of Judaism in
the Diaspora, was the starting point for relating religion and state in Israel.
Exemplifying the extent to which separation of religion and state was
beyond the limits of Zionist discourse in the founding years of the state, we
find the correspondence between R. Isaac Halevi Herzog and R. Haim Ozer
Goroditzky. Herzog would become Israel’s chief rabbi, whereas Goroditzky
was the head of Moetset Gdolei Hatorah [Council of Rabbis] in Europe before
the Holocaust. The rising religious leader in Palestine had turned to the European Jewish leader to consult on the relationship between Jewish law and state
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law in Israel. Goroditzy proposed that the state set up two parallel sets of laws,
thus continuing a relationship that Jewish law had had to state law outside the
Jewish state. Herzog was apparently surprised by Goroditzky’s response and
would not accept his recommendation. To Herzog, it was crucial that Jewish
law be expressed in state law.35
Yet when Herzog was appointed to the position of chief rabbi, it was
under the state and under a secular administration in which many presumed
that Judaism itself, as religion, would become redundant once Jewish life was
protected in the state.36 Jewish law, then, could not simply (or in any complex
adaptation) become state law, and the relationship was never clearly defined.
It is well known that Israel does not have a constitution, and over the years
the Knesset and Supreme Court have sought to balance the desire of Jewish
statehood—with such agreed-upon ideas as Shabbat and the Jewish calendar
being expressed in the public sphere—with the needs of a modern society and
a large secular population.
There is surely some irony in the fact that in the Jewish state, from its
founding, the agreed-upon framework for the balance between religious and
secular legal realms was based upon status quo arrangements that would continue the British Mandate’s approach to religion rather than seeking a Jewish
approach. But together with the formation of a state rabbinate and with the
state’s providing of religious services, religion-state relations in Israel today
actually resemble neither pre-state Judaism or Mandate arrangements. Rather,
they exemplify the Westphalian principle of cuius regio eius religio: a top-down
power structure, with rabbis appointed by the state and serving the sovereign,
the chief rabbinate and local rabbinic council being arms of the state.37 Religious pluralism has been enabled through lack of definition and purposely
left loopholes, but recent rulings and proposed laws have revealed a closing-in
on this pluralism in a manner made possible given the definition—and lack
of definition—of the relationship between religion and the state. With the
sovereign today being bolder than ever in legislating religion,38 the locus of
authority in Judaism is changing on account of the state, which is problematic
both for the state and for Judaism more broadly.
Before returning to the mikveh as an object of parliamentary legislation,
I state my understanding that when the Jewish state positions Judaism politically, this affects not only the locus of power in Judaism within state borders,
but the locus of power in Judaism itself. For, certainly the fact that conservative
women who attend mikvaot in the United States will not find one to attend in
Israel could be described as a local issue, to do with how Judaism is practiced
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in different locations. It could be argued, indeed, that when the state of Israel
owns Judaism within its borders, this is equivalent to a large community owning its Judaism without this affecting other communities. But this is not presently the case. The fact that Israel was established as a national home for the
entire Jewish people, with the potential for Jews to gather there at any time as
necessary or desirable, means that Jewish religious authorities throughout the
world will administer their affairs such that their constituents will be able to
conduct their lives in Israel. Any rabbi conducting a conversion, for example,
will want the convert to be able to move to Israel and marry an Israeli. This
means that if the Israeli rabbinate sets particular standards for conversion, rabbis abroad will likely abide by these standards as a service to their constituents.
A recent incident demonstrates the extent to which Israel’s rabbinate,
a body appointed by the sovereign in the Jewish state, is a higher authority
beyond the Jewish state, in its own perception and in the perception of rabbis
around the world. The incident was the leaking of a “black list” of rabbis put
together by the Israeli rabbinate. Whatever the purpose of this contentious list,
its existence conveyed a simple message: rabbis worldwide were expected to
understand that if they want their decisions and authorizations to be respected
in Israel—even the conversions and marriages they conduct and the letters
they write—they are to abide by and respect the standards of the rabbinate in
Israel, even with a degree of trepidation.39 This means that a rabbi appointed
by a community in New York, who is part of the Orthodox Union, or local
rabbinic council, in such a way that reflects the traditional democratic nature
of Judaism and its belonging to the people, cannot simply rely on the democratic basis of his authority. He must, for full authority and credibility, even
among his own constituents, bow to the standards set by the Israeli rabbinate
that serves under the sovereign state of Israel.
We return now to the mikveh, and to how this aspect of Judaism that
once belonged to the people—even in a sense to women—became (though
perhaps not irreversibly) a tool in the hands of the state, marking a move away
from democracy in Judaism.
In Israel, the mikveh is a state institution built with taxpayer dollars. It
is run by municipal councils in accordance with their understanding of the
makeup of their community and always within the framework of Orthodox
Judaism. There have long been—and increasingly over recent years—accounts
of women feeling uncomfortable with the way in which their local mikveh was
run. Recently in Ramat Beit Shemesh, women opted to drive far from home
to avoid being handled by the Haredi [ultra-Orthodox] women running their
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local mikveh in a stringent, and reportedly physically painful, manner.40 In
response to such complaints and others, an organization called ITIM, which
rose to assist Israelis in their encounter with state-administered religion,41 filed
a request with Israel’s Supreme Court that women in Israel be permitted to
use their local mikveh without an attendant, which had not been previously
possible.42 The Chief Rabbinate and Religious Council agreed to the change,
and the response came from the State Attorney’s office, though the rabbinate
made clear that its halachic ruling was still that women should bathe with an
attendant. What is important in this ruling is that it was up to the state to
make a decision about how the mikveh would be run and what the limits of
this practice are in the state. The state was able to broaden the scope of permissible practice beyond what the rabbinate would have liked, but this political
decision could be changed by the state too.
Indeed, the state currently appears to be moving towards enforcing more
stringency on the way the ritual baths are used in the state. The Torah Judaism
party in Israel’s Knesset recently proposed a “mikveh bill,” according to which
regional religious authorities (all of whom are Orthodox and serve under the
Chief Rabbinate) would have the discretion to bar individuals from using
state ritual baths, regardless of any previous agreements.43 The impetus was a
Supreme Court ruling requiring the state to allow reform and conservative bodies to use the mikvaot provided by the state for their conversion purposes. To
the court, this was a matter of taxpayer dollars serving the general public. In the
past, rabbinic authorities might have ruled like the Supreme Court—as we saw
with R. Moshe Feinstein—that those who contributed to building the mikveh
should be allowed to use it. But in the Jewish state, the mikveh is a state institution, funded by the state. The logic of cuius regio eius religio means that the fact
the state is funded by the taxpayers does not require it to provide equal religious
services that serve all. A Catholic state might use taxpayer dollars for Catholic
institutions but not for Lutheran or Jewish ones, and if Catholics were divided,
the state could choose a position. The fact that mikveh, once built by a community and handed over to women, is a state-provided service in a state with a
particular understanding of Judaism set by coalition politics marks a real change
in the institution, away from popular authority and toward state authority.
There have recently been a number of other examples of the state legislating on religious matters, not only to restrict secular or non-Orthodox ways
of life but also to limit the diversity within orthodoxy. A conversion bill now
on hold seeks to make the Orthodox Rabbinate the only body in Israel legally
allowed to conduct conversions in Israel. The question of whether any shops
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will be allowed to open on the Sabbath or any modes of public transportation will be allowed to run have long been in the hands of the Knesset. For
the nature of Judaism, these all mark a fundamental change, away from the
people administering their own religious lives and toward the state administering Judaism. Religion, in Israel, is very much governed by the sovereign. But
if at the founding of the state the sovereign was a secular leftist establishment
that assumed religion would disappear, today the sovereign itself is strongly
invested in religious interests. Initial concessions made to religious authorities
under the state, primarily over matters of marriage, divorce, and burial, initiated a process by which the state changed the locus of authority for rabbis and
Jewish institutions in Israel and around the world.
Is there an alternative that would allow the locus of authority in Judaism to remain with the people, while still having a Jewish state? Separation of
church and state that became the principle for relating religion and politics in
America is the alternative Western politics has to offer to the confessional state,
but this developed in the American colonies through Christian evangelical and
local political concerns. Any alternative conceived for Israel will more likely be
rooted in Jewish concerns and local Israeli concerns.
Such concerns were very recently expressed by a prominent rabbi in
Israel. In a rare and bold interview published in Makor Rishon, R. Shlomo
Riskin of Efrat described how the rabbinate in Israel has become corrupt to the
extent that there are five municipalities in Israel in which it is not possible to
get kosher food. Riskin, interestingly, writes that in such a situation it would
be preferable to separate religion and state, sounding a voice—even a political
possibility—for returning Judaism to its constituents. This is a voice that has
been long suppressed in Zionism and no less in religious Zionism.
Indeed, there have long been rabbis who sided with a separation of religion and politics, such as R. Goroditzky, who was discussed earlier. But such
rabbis generally did not identify as Zionists, and their concerns have generally
been kept out of mainstream Israeli and Jewish public discourse. Even the
mere desire for continuity between pre-state Judaism and post-state Judaism is
generally seen as a denial of one of the key principles of Zionism: the need to
overhaul Judaism and overcome the Diaspora. But it may be time to consider
that negating exilic Judaism may not be a necessary component of Zionism.44
After all, it is the Westphalian state of cuius regio eius religio that changes the
locus of authority in Judaism, and not a particularly Jewish form of state.
The idea that there might be an alternative to state-owned religion for
Judaism and for the Jewish state first occurred to me when reading Herzl’s
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works. Herzl’s initial vision was that: “Every group will have its rabbi, traveling
with his own congregation. Local groups will afterward organize themselves
around their rabbi, and each locality will have its own spiritual leader.” Herzl
imagined communities maintaining their difference in the state. Further, he
wrote the following:
Anyone who has seen anything of the world knows that just these
little daily customs can easily be transplanted elsewhere. . . . There
are English hotels in Egypt and on the mountain crests of Switzer
land. Viennese cafes in South Africa. French theatres in Russia.
German operas in America, and the best Bavarian beer in Paris.
When we journey out of Egypt again we shall not leave the fleshpots behind. Every man will find his customs again in local groups,
but they will be better, more beautiful, and more agreeable than
before.

It is enough to compare Herzl’s fleshpots to Ben Gurion’s melting pot
to understand the extent to which Israel’s founders sought homogeneity
over diversity and to relate this to the singular Judaism developing as state-
Judaism in Israel. The state currently follows Hobbes: it chooses the canon,
the extent of rabbinic authority, and the rabbis who run the mikveh; even
the women who supervise are public servants. Accountability is not to the
people, but to the state. How distant from a Jewish world of communities
living in accordance with their rabbis, who are accountable to them. How
distant, indeed, from diaspora Judaism as it is still lived in the United States
and elsewhere.
It may be worth reflecting on the fact that not all of Judaism as lived in
Israel is distant from community lived and run Judaism. The Haredi establishment continues to run its own courts and schools and continues a more
diasporic, people-owned Judaism in Israel, largely in private. To an extent, it
lives a separation of religion and state by not accepting religion as interpreted
by the state. This is true even when Haredi politicians are among the most
vociferous arguing in the Knesset for religious laws: for public transport not to
be run on Shabbat, for mikvaot to allow only the Orthodox, for secular schools
to teach Judaism as religion. The way Haredim live in Israel offers a view into
the possibility of living out a separation of religion from state, even a communal existence with representation in a greater state framework. Imagining this
is beyond the scope of this essay. But such a framework could be created in the
Jewish state today, which would contain the possibility for returning some of
the democracy to Judaism, some of Judaism to the people.
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AFTERWORD: THE END OF DEMOCRATIC JUDAISM
In the introduction, I promised to end the essay with a reflection not only on
the bringing-to-an-end of democratic Judaism, which I have claimed is the
result of administering a particular kind of Jewish state, but also of the end—
in the sense of a “telos” or teleological end—of democratic Judaism. What end
does democratic Judaism serve, such that it might be justified to preserve this
aspect of Judaism, even if this means changing the ways in which the Jewish
state currently relates to Judaism?
When we think of the telos of Judaism, we may think of messianic times,
and there is a complex relationship between Jewish statehood and messianic
times, since before the establishment of the state, some religious Jews considered the return of the Jews to the biblical land to mark the onset of messianic
times, while others considered the return to Jewish statehood a sin, until
messianic times, and there are many positions in between. In fact, insofar as
a messianic end is part of the way some branches of religious Zionism understand the state itself, it has become part of what justifies the “bringing to an
end” of democratic Judaism.
But messianic times as an end can be interpreted in many ways, as there
are multiple conceptions of messiah within Jewish tradition, many of which
do not involve a progressive idea of history that would involve bringing traditional Jewish life to an end at a messianic moment. The idea that Judaism as
we know it ends with the coming of the messiah—that messianic times supersede life in this world—is a quintessentially Christian idea that many of the
rabbis actively rejected. Maimonides, for example, famously argued that messianic times—marking the time at which God would once again dwell with
the people—would not fundamentally mean changing Judaism or Jewish life,
but only changing the king. God’s intention for the way Jews should conduct
themselves in the world would not change. We saw that in the Talmud, the
Oven of Achnai story has the people constituting the law in the direct presence
of God, just as they did in his absence. Democratically lived Judaism, in which
the constituents hold the highest authority, seems according to the rabbis to
itself fulfill God’s intentions, both in his absence and his presence.
I would propose, then, that the end of Judaism as lived democratically
be detached from conceptions of change or progress or even messianic times
and that we focus, rather, on the human ends about which there is generally
agreement. God bequeathed his law at Sinai to the people, who accepted it
as one voice and committed to continuing to transmit, adapt, and legislate
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in continuing God’s work. Man, through owning the law, comes to live in as
close as possible proximity to God’s intentions; both God’s intention for man
and God’s intention for the world. Living in accordance with God’s intentions,
and in proximity to God himself through the legislative work that was once
God’s own, is an end in itself. Such a life also encourages a certain humility,
as man recognizes the tentative nature of his legislation, bequeathed to future
generations, and realizes the timelessness and greater perspective of God.
John Milton, the seventeenth century poet and political writer, understood Judaism in this way, and his work allows us to explore how Judaism lived
democratically might be compatible with modern politics. In Areopagitica, a
pamphlet in favor of freedom of the press published in 1644, Milton argued
that the closest we can come to the rule of God in the absence of the kingdom of God—in the meantime—is to allow for a plurality of voices, even
false voices, in public space. His argument was that freedom of the press and
the human encounter with a variety of opinions and positions allow truth to
emerge, and this is God’s intention for how men should recover truth in the
world.45 While recovering truth through encountering multiplicity, Milton
also finds that men leave space for the return of God’s rule, as no one usurps
God’s authority in the meantime. In another text, Milton found multiplicity
to be the way of rabbis, as he argued with his interlocutor by siding with some
rabbis over others, acknowledging that there is no single rabbinic viewpoint
that is authoritative, but multiplicity.46 Milton of course was a Christian, and
the idea that God would eventually return and end the human search for
truth was integral to his understanding, but his idea of human politics was
very much compatible with both the human constitution of truth and law and
with a state that allows such pursuit to occur within it—a state that does not
promote a single truth at the expense of all others.
It is interesting to contrast Milton’s ideas with those of Hobbes on this
matter. Both Milton and Hobbes consciously wrote for a period in which God
was absent, and both authors considered the meaning of human rule for the
interim period between God’s kingdom over Israel in the past and his future
kingdom promised in messianic times. Yet Hobbes had human rule mean
that men authorized a sovereign to make decisions for them, while Milton
considered the continuous acts of men constituting and considering texts and
truths to be a godly activity in which they were supposed to participate. The
difference between Hobbes’s idea and Milton’s can be analogized to the difference between R. Eliezer and the sages in the Oven of Achnai story. R. Eliezer
would like to be the highest authority, and he has every reason to believe his
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title to be true, only that God himself authorized not a single highest authority, but the people. Once God placed the law in the hands of the people, the
people are not authorized to return the law to heaven. This is not the nature
of the Torah or God’s law. There is not a single truth to be obeyed, but it is
through multiplicity that God intends for men to reveal truth themselves in
his image. This may be read to imply that not only may men not return the
law to heaven, but they may also not relinquish their ownership of it to a
sovereign, Hobbes’s mortal God.
If we consider the situation in the state of Israel, where the state is the
highest authority on matters of religion, we see state-appointed authorities
leaving little space for dissenting voices and practices or for people to constitute
their own laws and practices. The result is the alienation of many traditional
Jews from the state and the alienation of many within the state from Judaism.
The end of democratic Judaism may have been a human end, to allow Jews
to engage the laws and participate in Torah discourse, while at the same time
leaving space for divine authority. The end may simply have been to live in
accordance with God’s intentions. The end of state-run Judaism abandons
these ends of democratic Judaism in favor of strengthening the sovereign—the
end of state religion for Hobbes—and this is a high price to pay.
Judaism, we have learned from history, is capable of leaving space for the
state. It allows the law of the state to be the law, Dina Demalchuta Dina, and
provides a realm for the Jewish people to own, each in their communities; a
realm where they are the highest authority. The question now facing the Jewish
world is whether the Jewish state is capable of leaving space for Judaism as it
has been lived for generations. A Judaism where the highest authority lies not
in a state or even in God, but in its constituents.
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Freedom” and “Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.” Israel’s Declaration of Independence,
contrary to common belief, does not mention the democratic nature of the state, though
its references to “benefit of all its inhabitants,” “freedom, justice, and peace as envisaged
by the prophets of Israel,” and “complete equality of social and political rights to all its
inhabitants” as well as “freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture”
and its offer to Arab inhabitants of “full and equal citizenship and due representation in
all its provisional and permanent institutions” were understood as referring to democracy.
2. See the introduction and chapters of Gordon Schoche t, Fania Oz Salzberger, and
Meirav Jones, Political Hebraism: Judaic Sources in Early Modern Political Thought (Jerusalem: Shalem Press, 2008). See also Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and
the Transformation of European Political Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2010).
3. Here I sidestep the question of whether the Jewish state is properly described as democratic in its current form and what type of democracy it is, including the debate on ethnic
democracy, which notably began before 1992, even when it alluded to the “Jewish and
democratic” claims of the state. See, for example, Sammy Smooha, “Minority Status in an
Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel,” Ethnic and Racial Studies
13:3 (1990): 389–413; Sammy Smooha, “The Model of an Ethnic Democracy: Israel
as a Jewish and Democratic State,” Nations and Nationalism 8:2 (2002): 475–503; Yoav
Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of
the Jewish State,” American Political Science Review 86:2 (1992): 432–43; Ruth Gavison,
“Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the “Ethnic Democracy” Debate,” Israel Studies
4:1 (1999): 44–72.
4. Conservative rabbis have recently offered alternative names for the ritual of immersion,
including the laws of sanctification of marriage or the laws of sanctifying the family, taking the emphasis away from purity and impurity and towards sanctity.
5. Benny Porat, “Five Jewish Concepts of Israeli Democracy: Opening Essay,” in Benny
Porat and Aviezer Ravitzky eds., Thoughts on Jewish Democracy (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem:
Am Oved and the Israel Institute for Democracy, 2010), 19 [Hebrew].
6. For more on this, see J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 3 (New
York: Yeshiva University Press, 1989), 102–5. R. Moshe Feinstein’s rulings from Iggerot
Mosheh, Hoshen Mishpat II:24, and Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh Hadeah II:125 are cited.
7. Varda Polak-Sahm, The House of Secrets: The Hidden World of the Mikveh (trans. Anne
Hartstein Pace; Boston: Beacon Press, 2009). To experience the mikveh in this way in
the State of Israel, the author had to shed not only clothing, childhood memories, and
preconception, but also thoughts of the watching eye of the state
8. See Rambam, Hilchot Isurei Biah 11:10; Ramban, Hilchot Niddah 1:19. For rabbinic
authorities that see hilchot niddah of seven days a stringency of the rabbis, rather than a
custom of the women later agreed upon by rabbis and much later codified, see Tosefot

The Jewish State and the End of Democratic Judaism

253

Megillah 28b, which says that the rabbis would not enact something that was not in the
Torah, implying the role of the women to have been insignificant.
9. For the rebellion and the rabbinic response, see Avraham Grossman, Pious and Rebellious: Jewish Women in Medieval Europe (trans. Jonathan Chipman; Waltham: Brandeis
University Press, 2004), 109–11.
10. Hillel Goldberg, “The Efflorescence of ‘Mikveh’ Studies,” Tradition: A Journal of
Orthodox Jewish Thought 43:3 (2010): 73–79.
11. The first edition of this work was published under the title On the Present State of the
Jews (More Particularly Relating to those in Barbary). Wherein is Contained an Exact Account
of Their Customs, Secular and Religious. To Which is Annexed a Summary Discourse of the
Misna, Talmud, and Gemara (London, 1975). The second edition of the work was published under the same title only without reference to the Jews in Barbary, reading On the
Present State of the Jews, Wherein is Contained an Exact Account of Their Customs, Secular
and Religious. To Which is Annexed a Summary Discourse of the Misna, Talmud, and Gemara
(London, 1976). Both editions contain a frontispiece of an American-Indian looking
“barbarian” with the short title “On the Present State of the Jews in Barbary.”
12. Lancelot Addison, On the Present State of the Jews (London, 1675), 47–48; Elliott
Horowitz published an important article documenting the ways in which Addison clearly
read and drew on Buxtorf ’s Synagoga Judaica, which was published in 1603 but made its
way to England in a largely plagiarized work by Alexander Ross, published as A View of
the Jewish Religion (London, 1656). See Elliott Horowitz, “‘A Different Mode of Civility’:
Lancelot Addison on the Jews of Barbary,” Studies in Church History 29 (1992): 309–25.
13. James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (London, 1656), Introduction.
14. Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty (ed. Julian H. Franklin; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
15. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (London, 1606), 4.7.
16. Thomas Hobbes, Autobiography [Thomas Hobbes malmesburiensis vita carmine
expressa, in opera philosophica, ed. Molesworth, London, vol. 1, pp. lxxxi–xcix], cited
in Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 125.
17. Hobbes writes: “I am sure that experience teaches, thus much, that the dispute for
[precedence] between the spirituall and civill power, has of late more than any other
thing in the world, bene the cause of ciuill warres, in all places of Christendome.” See Noel
Malcolm, ed., The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994),
vol. 1, 120.
18. The frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan (London, 1651, multiple editions) is a powerful image of an “artificial man,” made of numerous men, presiding over church and state.
This is in line with the subtitle and content of the work, which speaks of a commonwealth
“ecclesiastical and civil.”

254

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

19. Hobbes offered the Ten Commandments as teachings the sovereign would do well
to teach his constituents and in general offers the kingdom of God over Israel as a model
commonwealth. See Hobbes, Leviathan (London, 1651), Book 2, chapter 30. See also
Meirav Jones, “My Highest Priority Was to Absolve the Divine Laws: The Theory and
Politics of Hobbes’ Leviathan in a War of Religion,” Political Studies 61:1 (2017): 248–63.
20. While there is a vast literature on church and state in America, which is structured
on a different model than the European confessional state, which sowed the seeds for the
European nation-state, I found Teresa Bejan’s recent work on Roger Williams’s idea of
toleration and its roots in Evangelical Christianity particularly interesting as a view into
how religious politics can yield diverse interpretations on how the state should relate to
religion. For Bejan’s account, see Teresa M. Bejan, “Evangelical Toleration,” Journal of
Politics 77:4 (October 2015): 1103–14.
21. Avalon Project at Yale Law School. n.d. “Treaty of Westphalia; October 24, 1648,”
Lillian Goldman Law Library. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp
(accessed January 8, 2015).
22. There is a vast and growing literature that is revisiting “Westphalian sovereignty,”
or the seventeenth century model. See, for example, Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty,
International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55:2
(2001): 251–87; Christopher Rudolf, “Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global
Age,” International Studies Review 7:1 (2005): 1–20; James A. Caporaso, “Changes in
the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty,” International Studies Review 2:2 (2000): 1–28; Stephane Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of
International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia
(Leiden: Martinuc Nijhoff, 2004); and many more.
23. Bodin, Six Books, 3.7, 4.7.
24. Ibid., 3.8.
25. On this see Jacob Meijer, “Hugo Grotius’ ‘Remonstratie,’” Jewish Social Studies 17:2
(1955): 91–104.
26. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.12.
27. Harrington, Commonwealth of Oceana, Introduction.
28. For a more detailed account of the discussion of the Jews’ political predicament and
the possibility of Jewish sovereignty among modern sovereignty theorists, see Meirav
Jones and Yossi Shain, “Modern Sovereignty and the Non-Christian, or Westphalia’s Jewish State,” Review of International Studies 43:5 (2017): 918–38.
29. In The Jewish State, Herzl imagined communities continuing as they had outside Israel,
insofar as this was considered desirable by the members of the communities, and even
languages preserved in a “federation of tongues.” In Altneuland, the visitors to Palestine
are introduced to a Muslim member of the Jewish “New Society” and are introduced
to Jewish Palestine not as a “state” in the European sense, but rather a society where all
are treated as “men,” though religion is preserved and seems to serve an important role,

The Jewish State and the End of Democratic Judaism

255

both in territorial parsing, in terms of where communities live, and also in the identities
that are preserved in and by the greater society. See Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State
(1896) http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-jewish-state-quot-theodor-herzl; Theodor Herzl, Altneuland (1902), Book 3, Chapter 1, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org
/quot-a ltneuland-quot-theodor-herzl.
30. Shlomo Avineri wrote on the religious element in the portrayal of Jerusalem in Altneu
land, that for Herzl, “religion, and certainly the Jewish religion, was to be respected in
the future of the Jewish state. Religion was an important force for social cohesion on the
symbolic level. It was not, as Protestant tradition would have it, only a matter of inner
personal faith.” See Shlomo Avineri, Herzl: Theodor Herzl and the Foundation of the Jewish
State (trans. Haim Watzman; London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2013).
31. It is worth considering the place of Rabbi Dr. Geyer, in Altneuland, Book 3, who is
described as having brought the prejudice of Europe to the New Society.
32. The secularization of this idea is beyond the bounds of this essay, but it is possible not
only to understand religion as something from which the Jews were outsiders, but also
irreligion and nationhood as well.
33. The Muslim member of the Jewish society in Altneuland, represented by Reschid Bey,
offers the insight that he did not learn toleration from the Europeans, but that Muslims
had long tolerated the Jews, whereas Christians had not.
34. In February 1897, Die Welt, the Zionist newspaper edited by Theodore Herzl, visionary of and diplomat for the establishment of the modern Jewish state, published an
interview with Prince Dimitrie Sturdza, former prime minister of Romania. The Prince
said: “I consider Dr. Herzl’s idea to be excellent; in fact I may say the one and valuable
way of solving the Jewish question. . . . The Jews are the one people who, living in foreign countries, do not assimilate with the inhabitants as others do.” Translated in Avineri,
Theodor Herzl, 153.
35. Aviezer Ravitzky, Religion and State in Jewish Thought: Models of Unity, Separation,
Clash, or Subjection (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 1998), 11–18 [Hebrew].
36. A poignant critique of this position of the secular Left, not only among Israel’s liberationists but also among the leftist liberationists of India and Algeria, active at roughly the
same time, can be found in Michael Walzer, The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions
and Religious Counter-Revolutions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).
37. This had long been ambiguous, and religious courts tended to rule beyond their
official state jurisdiction, as many considered these courts continuous from Diaspora rabbinic courts. Recent Supreme Court rulings, which limited the jurisdiction of rabbinic
courts based on the fact that they are an arm of the state, have more clearly defined the
relationship between church and state in Israel, while creating controversy and spurring a
religious resistance in the form of resort to private courts. On this see Arye Edrei, “Judaism, Jewish Law, and the Jewish State in Israel,” in The Cambridge Companion to Judaism
and Law (ed. Christine Hayes; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

256

Is Judaism Democratic: Reflections from Theory and Practice Throughout the Ages

38. While the focus of the discussion here is the role of the Knesset in legislating religion,
often spurred on by challenges from the Supreme Court based on appeals by citizens, still
there is a place beyond this essay to discuss the extent to which the Supreme Court itself
has been involved in legislating religion, even in seeking to shape halachah for today’s
world. Arye Edrei’s work in this area is fascinating, and I direct the reader to his recent
article, “Judaism, Jewish Law, and the Jewish State in Israel.”
39. The “blacklist” was reported and transcribed on many news sites in Israel and abroad.
The Chief Rabbi apparently had not authorized its release, nor did he acknowledge the
existence of it. For present purposes, it is enough to note that the Israeli rabbinate keeps an
organized list of rabbis abroad and follows their conduct, and that there is an expectation
that rabbis will meet whatever standards the Israeli rabbinate sets, if their authority is to
be accepted. This is very distant from pre-state Judaism. For some sample news reports,
see online reports from Haaretz, the Jerusalem Post, NPR, and The Forward, respectively:
“The Complete List of Rabbis Blacklisted by the Israeli Chief Rabbinate,” Haaretz, July
10, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.800651 (accessed August 4, 2017); Jeremy
Sharon, “Israeli Chief Rabbinate Blacklists 160 Diaspora Rabbis,” Jerusalem Post, July 9,
2016, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Chief-Rabbinate-forced
-to-publish-rabbinical-blacklist-of-160-rabbis-in-Diaspora-499171 (accessed August 4,
2017); Daniel Estrin, “Have Israel’s Religious Authorities ‘Blacklisted’ 160 Rabbis?”
NPR, July 9, 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/09/536270818
/have-israels-religious-authorities-blacklisted-160-rabbis (accessed August 4, 2017); Ben
Sales, “Israeli Rabbinate ‘Blacklisting’ American Rabbis,” The Forward, July 9, 2016,
http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/376546/israeli-rabbinate-blacklisting-a merican
-rabbis/ (accessed August 4, 2016).
40. Ruth Eglash, “Ramat Beit Shemesh Jostle Over Control of Mikva,” Jerusalem Post,
April 25, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Ramat-Beit-Shemesh
-residents-jostle-over-control-of-mikva.
41. See http://www.itim.org.il/en/about-itim/about-us/.
42. Ben Sales, “At Israel’s Mikvehs, Women Claim Verbal Abuse, Unwanted Touching,”
Times of Israel, March 29, 2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/at-israels-mikvahs-women
-claim-verbal-abuse-unwanted-touching/ (accessed August 4, 2017); “Israel’s Chief Rabbinate Agrees to Mikveh Immersion Without Attendant,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, June
22, 2016, http://www.jta.org/2016/06/22/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/israels-chief
-rabbinate-agrees-to-mikvah-immersion-without-attendant (accessed August 4, 2017).
43. Marissa Newman, “Knesset Approves Law to Bar Non-Orthodox from Ritual Baths,”
Times of Israel, July 26, 2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-approves-law-to
-bar-non-orthodox-from-ritual-baths/ (accessed August 4, 2017). Interestingly, in the
discussions surrounding this law, the United Torah Judaism MK, Moshe Gafni, who
proposed the bill, vociferously argued that Reform Jews in the United States did not
seek mikvaot, and only in Israel they wish to attend. This demonstrates an unsurprising
ignorance of what has been considered a “mikveh revival” in the American non-Orthodox,

The Jewish State and the End of Democratic Judaism

257

and particularly Conservative, community. On this, see Johanna R. Ginsburg, “Dipping into Tradition: The Mikveh Makes a Comeback,” Jewish Theological Seminary
Magazine 10:3 (2001); Diana Stevens, “The Growth of the Mikvah Movement,” United
Synagogue Review (2001); “Mikveh and the Sanctity of Family Relations,” Rabbinical
Assembly, https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/20052010/mikveh_introduction.pdf (accessed August 4, 2017).
44. Salo Baron, in a 1928 article, offered the perspective that a lachrymose view of
Jewish history was not necessary for Zionism. He implied that there could be a Zionism without shlilat hagalut [denial of the exile], but did not expand on how such a
Zionism would relate to religion and state. See Baron, “Ghetto and Emancipation,”
Menorah Journal (1928).
45. John Milton, Areopagitica (London, 1644), in John Milton, Areopagitica and Other
Writings (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 19. Milton cites the Hebraist and Talmudist
John Selden approvingly on this matter.
46. John Milton, Defense of the People of England, in Milton, Political Writings (ed. Martin
Delzainis; trans. Claire Gruzelier; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 98–99.

